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UD3022HIT7517

POLITICAL PARTY FORMATION AND ALLIANCES: A CASE OF KENYA

A Final Thesis Proposal Presented to

School of Social and Human Studies

In partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

For the Degree of Doctorate in International Relations

ATLANTIC INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

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Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge, the support and encouragement l was given by Wife and all my seven who took it as a challenge for me to be reading for my doctorate in my early 50s.

I would also like to thank a number of persons whom l involved during my research questionnaire in chapter 3 of this study paper. My appreciation goes to Mighel Karanja who assisted in carrying out my research questionnaire in Sabatia constituency in Vihiga District.

A note of appreciation to my supervisors who continued guiding me online by providing valuable input/ comments and corrections at all stages of my work and friends who kept me in fruitful discussion based on my research topics.

Finally, l owe my gratitude to all those residence of Sabatia constituency, men and women, who willingly gave interviews and answered the research questions. To them, this thesis is dedicated- Amen

Abstract

The concept of political party formation in Kenya has been growing ever since Kenya adopted Muilt-party system. In the early 1980s there were clandestine movement all over the country put pressure on the dictatorial regimes to demonstrate by providing free political space. Kenya as a civilian one-party system was finding it difficult to respond to political reform pressure, albeit reluctantly. The international community especially the donors were not ready to work with a country that was not practising democracy.

This study focuses on Kenya to demonstrate how political party emerged up once there was political space in the early 1991, at the same time how these parties tried to form coalitions and alliances to a seat the one party system government. The study also will look at the challenges faced by multi-party system after the emergent opposition parties were riddled with schisms along ethnic and personal ambitions for power. This kind of behaviour rendered them an popular, weak and therefore incapable of challenging the KANU government.

The One party system utilized several strategies in trying to divide political parties until these parties realised the political game plan and eventually they were forced to unite in order to manage to remove the KANU regime. It is the view of this research to investigate the importance of political alliances /coalition in a country like Kenya with more than 42 tribes for any government to maintain balance.

It is through unity of opposition parties and civil societies that put pressure to the government that contributed to the achievement of scrapping of section 2A of the constitution that re-established a plural party system in 1991 and the minimum political reform that took place before the run –up of the 2007 general elections. First the political parties are still riddled with schisms along ethnic lines and personality and this will continue to weaken and undermine their unity as a force for achieving any economical, political, and

social change. Second, due financial instability of some of these parties the government still has the capacity and potential to compromise and buy of some of the party leaders to weaken their overall political strength. Thirdly, currently most of this political parties are very poor and do not have external forces or donors ready to fund them. Therefore, based on these factors political parties will take long to be able to sustain themselves individually, and alliances and coalition will be the order of the day for many years to come in Kenyan politics.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Historical Background

Since Independence 1963 Kenya was a one Party State and the leadership enjoyed monopoly until there was pressure it gave in Multi-party in 1991. This brought a drastic change in Kenyan politics because for the first time during the 2002 General Election was held under an incumbent who by law was not allowed to contest for the third around.

Generally, it was not easy to bring the traditional ruling party down were it not for the pressure from civil society and the opposition parties uniting and forming alliances/coalition for a common goal. It was through this unity of the opposition and civil society that so the ruling party Kenya African National Unity (KANU) defeated since its founding in 1960.

Kenya became the 34th independent state in Africa on the 12 December 1963 after a long struggle with the colonialism regime from the British colonial history in Africa. This bitter struggle to get rid of the colonialism, has left Kenya as a country politically deeply divide and entrenched tribalism because some tribe believe that their own lost lives while others were not ready to come on the front to fight colonial regime.

It is believed that the first African political body in Kenya was neither tribal nor even national in outlook. It was called the East African Association formed in 1919. The objective of this Association was to protest against hut-tax, forced labour and the Kipande (registration certificate), led to the riots and shootings of March 1922 and the subsequent deportation of three Kikuyu, Harry Thuku, Waiganjo Ndotono and George Mugekenyi.

After this it became government policy, supported strongly by the mission to encourage the development of tribal, or at best provincial, political bodies. The 1920's and 1930's saw the emergency of the Kikuyu Central Association, the Taita Hills Association, the Kikuyu Provincial Association, the Kavirondo Taxpayers' Welfare Association, and the Ukamba Members' Association. This support of tribal bodies betrayed attitudes of mind that lingered on among Kenyan colonial administrators up the brink of independence.

Kenya political giants got the challenge when the country was restored to political pluralism in 1991, before it was de jure one party state since 1982 and defacto one –party since 1969. Since accepting to go Muilti-party system, Kenya has held four general elections, on 29 December 1992, the second on December 29-30, 1997, December 27, 2002 and December 27, 2007.

The preceding decade of the eighties had been traumatic for Kenya. Parliament repealed the constitution making Kenya a de facto one party state. An attempted coup by military in 1982 rocked the ruling party KANU and government setting the stage for ill-tempered government against a restless student community at universities and tertiary institutions.

Scores of academics, students, lawyers, businesspeople, doctors and politicians were arrested and detained without trial. Those who escaped went into exile some never to return. Democracy, which had been ailing almost since independence, died. The state repressed every one and tortured, some to death any one perceived, at the slightest presumption, of being anti government. Several political movements were formed. This included clandestine organizations such as MWAKENYA. The government responded by arraigning almost anyone found in possession of, as much as a newspaper, before court on charges of sedition. The economy all but collapsed by as inflation soared. Essential services delivery such as health and education were hampered due to rampant corruption and mismanagement. Peoples' movement and all freedoms were severely curtailed.

Organisations including cultural associations or unions were deregistered. Politically the people had no voice in the making and administration of the laws. Economically Kenyans had been kept for decades in the periphery of the survival or worse in a state of abject poverty. It is against this undemocratic culture that Kenyans organized themselves and demanded the restoration of democracy. The nineties began with the disappearance and murder of the foreign minister, Dr. Robert Ouko. This event brought demonstrations on the streets and exerted further pressure on the government. It became a major turning point for the fortunes of the then ruling party, KANU.

That political atmosphere was thus tense and not conducive for organization or formation of above board political parties. As pressure mounted some Kenyans gathered courage to give political content to the widespread dissatisfaction in the Country. Defiant, they founded Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD) in 1991.

It is accepted that the people, who are the real source and owners of state power, cannot take part in direct decision-making, and that, for practical reasons, they elect a few to represent them in government for a certain period of time. The consequence of this departure from the Athenian model is that modern democracies practice what is known as representative democracy. The principle of people's political participation through representative democracy in turn necessitates the existence of political parties. The parties serve as the vehicles through which people delegate their political power to representatives who represent and perpetuate a set of shared political interests, aims, beliefs and objectives, which the members of the party subscribe to.

At a structural level, political parties are formal associations or groups with organisational structures and programmes and a membership. As Ojwang states, "The raison d' etre of a political party is therefore the mobilization of people and resources to access the executive and legislative machinery of the state in order to introduce and propagate the party's set ideas, vision and policies. The aim is to take charge of the state machinery and thus influence, in varying degrees and as far as possible, the executive, legislature, judiciary and attendant state power structures".

The character and configuration of political parties in any country, both at the level of policy and ideological inclination and at the level of internal governance are thus a critical indicator of the country's democratic credentials. As the vehicle through which individuals attain political power and the units through which the diversity of the country politically transact, political parties are the building blocks of representative democracy.

Kenya is among countries that practice representative democracy. However, the country's political structure and process are fully democratic in spite of there being in existence motley of political parties. Four decades of single-party rule have produced a heavily centralised executive authority that relies on dominance and coercion rather than consensus and conviction. It is in an effort to correct the democratic deficiency that the country is presently developing a new constitution.

1.2 Definition of Key Terms

Political parties have been defined in various ways. But the myriad definitions reflect more the various perspectives and areas of emphasis informed by one's disciplinary background than a fundamental difference in meaning. Consensus exists on two key definitional issues: that political parties are formally organised and that they aim at capturing or gaining control of the government.

The key elements of political parties are captured in the following definition: Political parties are associations formally organised with the explicit and declared purpose of acquiring and or maintaining legal control, either singly or in coalition with other similar associations, over the personnel and the policy of the government of an actual or prospective state (Dowse and Hughes, 1972).

It should perhaps be emphasized that what broadly differentiates a political party from, say, a football team, a welfare Organization, or a trade union is a political party's expressed and explicit objective to control governmental or state powers.

1.3 The Main Features of Political Parties

Besides the objective of controlling governmental powers, there are specific features unique to political parties. Some of these features include the following.

1.3.1 Ideology

A political party's ideology differentiates the party from a mere lobby group and also gives it a distinctive character different from other political parties in the same country. An ideology is basically a philosophy or set of principles that underlies a political programme. It consists of the shared beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions that cause a certain group of people to join together and develop and advocate specific political programmes.

For example, socialist parties hold the ideology that the good of the community is more important than the interests of individuals, whereas parties that support capitalist or free market policies have their basis in the opposite ideology. Liberalism is an ideology founded on a belief in progress and tolerance of difference, whereas conservatism grows out a belief that society should be unified and stable. An ideology is therefore a view of the world that produces, at least in theory, consistent approaches to a range of specific political and social issues.

1.3.2 The Party Manifesto

A political party's ideology is a set of principles that leads to a certain set of policies, sometimes called the party "platform." The ideology and the policies that flow from its ideology are put down in writing in a party manifesto (or blueprint or action plan). This manifesto is a statement of the goals and principles the party promises to pursue if voted into power.

As a contract with voters, the manifesto spells out the party's perception of the country's problems and states how the party proposes to address problems and help achieve the collective aspirations of the nation if elected. The manifesto sets out the measures which the party proposes to take in order to improve public services such as health, education, and transportation, promote national development issues such as trade, industrialization, employment, and address public concerns in areas such as technology, the environment, and crime.

However, for a responsible and effective political party, it is not enough to propose policies. A credible party manifesto must also justify the party's plans prove its commitment to them, and persuade the public that these plans are feasible. Political parties that have had Previous experience in government can do this by spelling out their achievements and accounting for their failures. However, a party's abilities and the efficacy of its policies can only be fully tested when it forms the government-and attempts to implement its programme.

1.3.3 Organisational Structure

Political parties are usually required by law to have certain organisational structures, such as a constitution, particular officers, and a network of local branches. The specific legal requirements vary from country to country, and different political parties have different organisational structures within the law.

The underlying purpose of the organisational structure of any political party is to enable the party to develop popular polices, broaden its support, and campaign effectively in elections. Therefore, political parties require an organisational structure, which leaders and members can use to run the party, choose their leaders and officers, and determine party policies. Usually, this organisational structure is defined in the party constitution.

Like other types of constitutions, the constitution of a political party is the party's "basic law." Its sets out the principles and operating procedures of the party, specifies the rights and responsibilities of members and officers, and lays down the rules for the internal governance of the party. The ultimate aim of a party constitution is to provide a democratic structure and ensure that this structure is observed in practice. The constitution should therefore be very clear about the party's leadership structures, the rights and powers of the leaders and members, and the nomination and election procedures.

Democracy within a political party can be achieved in various ways. It is therefore up to each political party to decide exactly how it should govern itself. However, the basic principles of democracy - transparency, accountability, and popular decision making by the people, or in this case by the members must be observed. Therefore, the constitution of a

political party should be in harmony with the interests of the members. In particular, it should ensure that the members are the ones who ultimately choose the party's policies and leadership. A political party should be more than a vehicle for the political ambitions of its leaders. It should be a vehicle for citizens sharing a common political agenda in which the members, not the leaders, are the foundation and the reason for the party's existence.

In addition to being democratic, a party's organisational structure also needs to be effective. A political party is much more than a "talking shop." Its mission is action-oriented: to develop policies, sell them to the electorate, and win power in elections. Therefore, its organisational structure has to be efficient in terms of day-to- day management and forward planning (the next party conference, the next election). At the same time, it also has to ensure that party leaders are aware of the views, needs, and problems of the party membership and the entire country. This is normally accomplished through a party branch network that enables grassroots members to be represented in decision- making processes.

1.3.4 Membership Base

Another essential characteristic of a political party is the membership base. Generally, political parties try to build as large and broad-based a membership as possible. The larger the membership base - and the more varied in terms of age, gender, education, occupation, social class, ethnicity, region, and so on - the more credibility the party will have and the more successful it is likely to be in winning elections.

In addition, the membership base is vital for the internal functioning of a political party. A political party recruits people who are committed to its ideology and principles and who will be able to participate in party governance, policy formulation, and campaigning. From among these members, the party leaders are elected. The membership base is therefore vital to the future of a political party.

The membership base of a political party is also an important aspect of citizens' participation in national politics. People who join political parties are usually more politically aware and activist than the average citizen. By joining a political party, members of the public achieve

a higher level of political participation than those who merely vote. Therefore, the level of membership in political parties among the voting population of a country is an important indicator of the political maturity of the people.

Members of parties are able to shape the ideology and policies of their parties. They can demand more accountability from their leaders and even become party leaders themselves. As party leaders, they have a better chance of being nominated as candidates in national elections and therefore of participating directly in policy making and governance. By building their membership base, therefore, political parties make a contribution to the overall development of responsible citizenship.

However, regardless of the nature or breadth of the membership base of a political party, the ultimate responsibility of the party should be to the nation as a whole. A truly national political party is interested in the welfare of the nation, not the welfare of its own members or supporters only. Otherwise, it is really only a political faction whose aim is to advance the restricted interests of its members whether or not such interests promote the common good.

1.4 Functions and Significance of Political Parties

In democratic societies, orderly competition for power is the definitive function of political parties. Parties offer ideologies and programmes that the public can choose whether to support or not. Party members and their leaders have certain common aspirations, principles, and policies, and they join together in a political party mainly in order to sell their ideas to their fellow citizens. The ultimate goal is to put these ideas into practice in government for the good of the nation. Parties field candidates in elections so that the aspirations, principles, and policies of the party can be implemented through government programmes.

1.4.1 Political Parties and Governance

Whether or not they win control of the government, political parties participate in governance. There are two ways political parties participate in governance either directly as the party in power or indirectly as the opposition. The government, of course, is constituted

only by the party or parties that control a majority of seats in the legislature, but the losing parties still play - or should play a vital role in the overall governance of the nation.

When elected to participate directly in government, party leaders are expected to promote their party's ideology and carry out its legislative agenda. They do so by taking the appropriate actions according to the constitution of their country, such as appointing officials, setting up commissions and task forces, and drafting and passing laws. Being in government is a political party's opportunity to implement its programmes. In some cases, such as coalition governments, a political party will support policies of other parties if these ensure that some of its own goals are achieved.

When political parties fail to be elected to form the government, they form the opposition. The role of the opposition is to criticize government policy and prevent abuses of power. This role is essential for ensuring good governance, minimizing mistakes and corruption, and protecting the rights of citizens. Without an effective opposition, there is no ongoing check on the power of the government. On the other hand, an active, vigilant opposition keeps the government "on its toes" and not only prevents abuses from arising but also encourages more efficient policy making and implementation. The key to both good government and effective opposition is free competition for power.

This requires a constitutional and administrative framework that enables competing political parties to freely market their ideas and policies to the people. It is this framework that distinguishes competitive, democratic political systems from non-competitive ones: In non-competitive ... political systems, the only party in the country places and maintains people to be in control of government machinery without any formal competition from any other quarters. In other system however, each party seeking to gain power must compete for popular support with another group or groups holding divergent views (Newman 1956).

However, for political parties to participate effectively in competitive politics they also need the internal capacity to bring their ideas and project public attention and influence public opinion. At election time in particular, they require the machinery, infrastructure, skills, and

resources to campaign throughout the country and make good use of whatever instruments available.

Therefore, political parties are also channels of communication which circulate political ideas, principles, and policy options among their members and entire society. As such, they perform a vital educational role in the maintained and development of democracy in a country. However, if political parties distort their messages, mislead the public, or incite ethnic or racial animosity in order to influence public opinion, they undermine democracy.

1.5 Political Party Systems

Political parties operate within specific political systems. The general characteristics which underpin a particular system can enhance or circumscribe the freedom of a political party to function effectively. Two approaches are usually employed in classifying party systems, first, according to the numbers political parties in a country and, second, in terms of the origins of the parties the social, political, economic, and other conditions that led to their formation. The two methods are complementary, not mutually exclusive, and we analyse the various party systems in this report using a combination of the two approaches.

I.5.1 Single-Party Systems

In a single-party system, there is only one legal political party. Alternative parties are banned, and elections only offer the electorate a choice of candidates from the ruling party. The precursors of the single-party systems were the communist and socialist party systems. These were based on the ideological belief that the working class had an inherent right to constitute the dominant political group to which all other societal interests should be subjugated.

The ideological argument behind this belief was that in the capitalist countries political parties are instruments of the capitalist classes for the oppression of the workers. For this reason, when the working class liberates itself from capitalism, it is duty-bound to constitute itself into a workers' party to which all other interests must submit.

In theory, this system could be considered democratic as long as there is free competition of ideas and policies within the ruling party. In practice, however, the communist party's monopoly led to dictatorship. Without competition from other parties, the workers' party had no check on its powers or activities, and its leaders soon became a small, tyrannical elite.

In Africa, the end of colonialism coincided with the height of the Cold War between the communist and capitalist states. Though most of the newly independent African states began as multiparty democracies modelled on the systems of their former colonial rulers, within a few years they evolved into single party systems. The single-party system dominated African politics until the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the collapse of communism forced a re-evaluation of the relevance of the single-party system in Africa. The resulting clamour for democracy has generally led to the demise of the one-party system in most African states, including Kenya.

1.5.2 One-Dominant-Party System

The one-dominant-party system falls somewhere between the multiparty and the single-party systems. Technically, this system is multiparty, but in practice one dominant party controls the electoral environment and restricts the ability of other parties to effectively compete for power. In Africa, typical examples are Egypt, Senegal, and Botswana. All three countries have practised multipartyism for many years, even when single-party dictatorships were predominant in the continent. However, in practice the ruling parties in these countries so entrenched themselves in power as to preclude a serious possibility of the opposition parties winning.

Further, an emerging trend has been observed since the re-introduction of the multiparty system in Africa in the early 90s, where ruling parties manipulate elections to perpetual themselves in power. The opposition is harassed and reduced to a symbolic role.

1.5.3 Two-Party Systems

Sometimes, multiparty systems are so thoroughly dominated by the two parties that they effectively become two party systems, as none of the parties has any real chance of forming a government or in most cases one having an impact on government policies. This has been the case in the United States for most of its history. The Democratic and Republican parties do the national and state legislatures, as well as local politics in most states.' other parties are free to compete; they are rarely able to elect representatives even at the local levels.

The chances of other parties becoming important in two-party systems vary from place to place. In the United States, the Republican and Democratic parties are so entrenched at all levels of the political process that only a major upheaval could open up the political space to meaningful participation by another party. In Britain, however, which was effectively a two-party state (Conservative Labour) for forty years following the Second World War, dissatisfaction with polarized politics led in the 1980s to the formation of the Liberal Democratic Party, which now has a substantial following.

1.5.4 Multiparty Systems

Ordinarily, multipartyism means the presence of three or more political part in a country. Under this system, all parties have an opportunity to run elections. The party that wins the most constituencies (parliamentary system) the most votes (proportional representation) forms the government. Although rules differ from country to country, a coalition government can sometimes be formed if no single party gains an outright majority of seats in the legislature.

In a coalition, two or more parties agree to form a government together in order, to command majority support in the legislature. In some multiparty system as in South Africa, candidates not affiliated to any party (independent candidates) are also allowed to stand for election. In Kenya, how candidates have to be nominated by a registered political party.

1.6 Purpose of the Study

It doesn't take a political scientist to realize that Kenyan political parties are vehicles of convenience for their de-facto leaders. If one attempts to go beyond the veils of their bleak agenda of "ambition for power"; (s) he might be surprised to be encountered with nothing more. The track records of history of Kenya's political parties proves this assertion. This explains why Kenya's political parties are held in the enclave of tribalism.

The challenges and problems of the Kenyan masses transcends tribal belongings and religious affiliations; energy crisis as firewood are growing scarce and electricity remaining to be a sweet dream; exorbitant school fees even in community secondary schools; lack of pasture and water during no rain spells; expensive medication, unemployment, food insecurity and poor returns from their sweat are among the thread shared.

The goal between Kenya's political parties and their people are two worlds apart. Parties hunting for power from the people: people who are struggling to meet their basic needs. What a deviation from one another? To anyone's informed judgement, Kenya's political parties should be institutions seeking to answer the contagious problems of Kenya's people. For them to be relevant their policies must spring from the people themselves. Thus from the mobilized ideas, a particular party becomes an integration of workable vision and manifestos.

This strategy will enhance intelligent coalition from parties with a common destiny. Only then shall we experience political parties that will outlive leaders and hail 'unity in diversity' in terms of tribes. Every tribe in Kenya is unique in Geography and customs; in talents and inclination towards some vocation. Imagine of a scenario where a party is like a boardroom where Kenyans of same interest are deliberating on how they can exploit their potential and experience; knowledge and resources! It would be ironical for people from different tribes to flock without having the same feathers -same feathers in goals to be met. And, the spokesman being a party, go between the people and the Government.

In Kenya even before independence we were able to identify Kenyans greatest enemies: poverty, ignorance and diseases. Unfortunately these problems have been growing from bad to worse in direct proportionality with time. We laid a political foundation whose philosophies have been a song devoid of genuineness towards the common man's needs. Thus Kenya's political activities have been a shepherd nurturing Hyenaism and sheepish hearts amongst us hence promoting the gap between the haves and have-nots into stardom. Since there is no relationship between political parties and its people other than ethnic, political leaders use them to bargain for their selfish ends.

Hegemony and nepotism has been perfected. False dynasties are on the hold. And communities are being sacrificed on the altar of big man syndrome. This has bred a fluid situation where we look upon personalities on a political platform instead of the party in context. At long run, the nation is left in fragments of hatred, revenge and mistrust from alliances of conveniences that are never honoured as they are built without consulting the constitution.

People vote for such and such a leader with a mirage of securing their own into a particular position. These confusions leave the citizenry paranoid and unable to differentiate political light from political heat that is flooding the Kenya phenomenon; especially now that 2007 is an electioneering year in Kenya. One is mistaken to term political confrontation as political maturity, which is measured as a scale of developments. How can it be realized from parties on sell and no democracy is exercised in anointing political leaders. One assumes leadership so long as (s) he is the chieftain of a particular tribe of respective party.

Truly, the lion is the king of the jungle, but, the poorest hunter that can starve to death. Because of its lack of focus when chasing a prey: it keeps on picking on any other a long the chase thus getting tired from distance and time. Most of Kenya's political parties are indomitable lions without focus, keeping on jumping from one alliance to another sooner than later loosing their identity and vision. Their rights are transformed into fighting tools of imaginary political wars against imaginary enemies. Thus some leaders turn themselves into gods to be served without question. Their words live as a command.

It is only fair judgement that Kenya's political leaders should not be struggling "building" political parties, rather creating political institutions answerable to the challenges and problems encountered by a group of the society they want to recruit into their membership. It's an open secrete that we all subscribe to movements or associations where Kenya's interests are taken care of and we can surely bank Kenya's hope and aspiration to the leaders thereof. Since Kenya's political parties haven't epitomized a platform to define whom they are and what they stand for a part from chasing after statehouse.

There has been a great change in development of democracy in Kenya during the past 16 years which has been driven by the growth and development of its emerging dynamic political parties. Despite the increasing, merging, and alliances of various parties, little if any attention has been made to find out if parties are driven by personality or ethnically or wealth in Kenyan politics. To be sure of the assumption that political parties in Kenya are that they are ethnically driven and personality mooted. This thesis is here to investigate these assumptions about political parties.

This research started in March, 2007 by this time there were 85 registered political parties in Kenya since then the number of registered political parties have increased to 135 (see Appendix 11 for list of this parties).

1.7 Research Questions

This study seeks to answer the following research questions:

   i.   Do the electorate understand what political parties are?
   ii. Do the electorate know what political party coalitions/alliances are?
   iii. For what reason are the political parties in Kenya formed?

   iv. Why do political parties in Kenya merger or form alliances?
   v.   What benefits has the emergence of political alliances/coalitions in Kenya brought in the process of democracy?

CHAPTER TWO: DEFINITION OF THE INVESTIGATION

2.1 Origins of Political Parties

Before political parties emerged, political legitimacy in most of the world derived either from God ("the divine right of kings"), from hereditary right (for example, automatic succession by the ruler's first-born son), or from the will of a small elite (as in some city-states). Beginning in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, citizens began to challenge these old ideas of political legitimacy. As demands grew for greater participation and as challenges to the legitimacy of existing structures of authority became more radical and revolutionary, mass movements of citizens emerged.

Historically, therefore, political parties emerge when the activities of a political system reach a degree of complexity that requires the development of new and wider political formations. In other words, political parties become necessary when a society becomes diverse, classes become conscious of their interests, and large numbers of citizens demand the right to participate in political affairs. The emergence of political parties can be traced back to eighteenth- century England. Following the 1688 revolution which established parliamentary rule, the English middle classes captured political and economic power. They then began to organize themselves into groupings led by prominent members of their class in order to control the state and promote their ideological aims.

In the course of the eighteenth century, two main political groupings emerged in England: the Whigs and the Tories. The Whigs mainly represented the interests of traders and manufacturers and favoured free trade, low taxes, the growth of the cities, and an aggressive foreign policy. They also supported the expansion of personal liberties and opposed the traditional privileges of the aristocracy. The Tories on the other hand represented the old landed families and other large property owners. They favoured protectionist trade policies and the preservation of traditional ways of life and wanted to restrict political power to the wealthy and propertied classes.

These two groupings were the ancestors of the modern Liberal and Conservative parties. As British society developed, more and more citizens gained the right to vote and participate in politics, and the political issues became more complex. In response, the Whigs and Tories gradually transformed themselves from informal groupings of important men and their supporters into more and formal organisations. By the middle of the nineteenth century, they acquired most of the organisational structures of modern political parties in other European countries a similar process took place. As in England, the rise of the middle class, the expansion of representative democracy, and the opening up of forums for political discussion and participation were the main catalysts for the formation of political parties. Thus, early forms of political parties arose in France on the eve of the 1789 revolution and in Germany at the time the 1848 revolution. The emergence of political parties in other countries has generally followed a similar pattern.

As universal suffrage (one citizen, one vote) became prevalent throughout the West in the early part of this century, political parties turned into complex and highly organized mass organizations. In Western Europe and North America, as well as in some parts of Latin America and Asia, forms of democracy based on competition among political parties became the standard political system. 0n the other hand, in Eastern Europe, Russia, and China, the old monarchies gave way instead to communist one-party systems. While the multiparty systems of West generally developed into increasingly sophisticated and flexible methods of enabling citizen participation and choice, the one-party systems of Eastern Bloc perfected the "party of the workers" as an instrument of social mobilization and control.

Despite momentous progress in industrialization and modernization, the on party systems generally failed to achieve sustained economic growth. In contrast, the multiparty systems of the West were able to deliver both growth and stability. In the late 1980s, therefore, most of the communist state abandoned their one-party systems and adopted variations of the Western model. At the same time, the one-party states of Africa and Asia came under intense pressure to liberalize their systems. During the 1990s, most of them tried to do so, with varying degrees of success.

Today, political parties form the central pillars of multiparty political systems in most countries around the world. The main exceptions are some hereditary any religious monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, where there are no legal parties at all, and the People's Republic of China, the major surviving one-part communist state. Given the trend of the past two hundred years, it is reason to predict that political parties will continue to dominate political activity and determine the course of political development in most countries of the world for many generations to come.

However, it is much more difficult to predict the specific forms political parties or multiparty systems will take in the years ahead. For example, globalization and economic liberalization are greatly increasing the political as well as economic importance of multinational corporations. This development poses a threat not only to state sovereignty but also to genuine party participation. Meanwhile, in Africa the emergence of one-dominant-party systems threatens to stall the democratization process and make multiparty irrelevant. The solutions to these and other challenges will largely depend on how effectively political parties can respond and adapt their structures and methods to ensure that they remain genuine vehicles of citizen participation.

2.2 The Emergence of Political Parties in Africa

As we have seen, the development of political parties worldwide has its roots in the desire of citizens to participate more fully in their political systems and have leaders whose power derives from the will of the people. The underlying issue has been what makes a regime and its leaders legitimate.

In Africa, the development of political parties was a revolutionary process based on excluded groups. As in Europe, the essential issue was the legitimacy of the rulers, but in Africa the rulers were foreign colonialists, and the excluded groups consisted of the whole African population. Racism played a key role, as the colonialists used pseudo-scientific theories of racial superiority to argue that Africans were incapable of self-government. Political parties in colonial Africa therefore began as nationalist movements whose ultimate aim was to restore 'the sovereignty of the indigenous people. They generally started out as small groups

trying to open up opportunities for indigenous political participation and resist specific instances of colonial racism and exploitation. When the colonial administrations refused to make reforms, these groups became more and more radical and populist. They broadened their support among the people and gradually developed into mass movements and eventually into fully-fledged political parties. Most of these nationalist parties were centered on strong personalities who were pioneers in the struggle for freedom and founders of their parties. In many cases, these individuals had also served long sentences in colonial jails and had become embodiments of the freedom struggle. Notable examples include Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta, Algeria's Ahmed ' Ben Bella, Kwame Nkurumah of Ghana, and South Africa's Nelson Mandela.

However, the formation of parties around strong personalities is not a new phenomenon nor is it peculiar to African independence movements. In Europe, some of the oldest parties, including the Conservative and Liberal parties in Britain, were founded and dominated in their early years by outstanding personalities such as Robert Walpole and William Pitt. Even during the modern period, a strong party leader like Margaret Thatcher has sometimes been able to dictate a party's policies and approaches. In the United States, the Democratic and Republican parties have often been dominated by strong willed leaders such as Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln and, more recently, Bill Clinton and Newt Gingrich.

This phenomenon is often repeated in emerging democracies, where political movements and parties, especially new ones, tend to be centered on an influential personality, often the leader of a particular community. This is not necessarily detrimental either to the development of democracy or the development of the party. Indeed, in many cases the opposite is true. On the other hand, the phenomenon has risks, especially in countries where society is unstable due to mass poverty or tribal and regional tensions.

Another important feature of ant-colonialist nationalist movements, both in Africa and other regions, was their internal fragility. To pursue a credible nationalist agenda, these movements had to become genuine mass movements. This meant uniting diverse social elements into an effective political force. In most cases, these movements held together

during the pre-independence period as a result of a common dedication to the goal of national independence.

Among both the leadership and the grassroots, however, there were conflicting interests which were submerged for the sake of the common struggle. At independence, most African countries had multiparty political systems as a result of a deliberate colonial policy to bequeath political systems to their former colonies which resembled as closely as possible the system in the mother country. But after independence, these structures were quickly dismantled, giving way to one-party systems. African leaders sought to justify the imposition of one-party rule on many grounds. For example, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania argued as follows: Where there is one party, and that party is identified with the nation as a whole, the foundations of democracy are firmer than they can ever be where you have two or more parties each representing only a section of the community. My argument is that a two-party system can be justified only when the two parties are divided over some fundamental issue. Otherwise, it merely encourages factionalism (Nyerere, 1962).

In effect, Nyerere was putting the case that under the conditions existing in Africa – dominated by imperialism - an "African democracy" could only be created under a unifying single party system. Re-echoing the same sentiments, Mugabe of Zimbabwe had this to say: We feel that a multiparty state is an oddity. It is a strange phenomenon to us, and we say this in all genuineness. We feel that it makes unnecessary division in Kenyas society that Kenyas own traditional style of oneness - we are a family, under one chief with various headmen under him and if we can use this concept to create one political society, allowing for expression of opinions of various kinds, that would be better than a multiparty state and its divisional nature (The Herald, December 31, 1986) Like Nyerere, Mugabe is oversimplifying the African situation to justify his political standpoint. The traditional Zimbabwe which he advances as his model did not have a single chief before colonialism, and the social Organisation was not similar in all communities.

The argument that single-party rule has its roots in African tradition is difficult to sustain. Not only were political institutions in Africa very varied and full of internal contradictions

themselves, many were destroyed under colonialism and new ones created to make it easier to rule the continent. Even if the one-party system is capable of providing democratic governance in theory, the African experience over almost thirty years has been to the contrary. In almost every case, the one-party state degenerated into one-man rule. Divergent political opinions were ruthlessly oppressed. Political dissidents were harassed or thrown into jails.

This was true of Kenya, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Ghana, and Nigeria, to mention only a few. Ironically, this intolerance then gave impetus to new movements clamouring for broader-based political participation and genuine competition. The ultimate result has been the transformation of previously single-party states into multiparty ones in most parts of Africa over the past decade.

In the next section, we discuss the historical development of political parties in Kenya. We focus on the salient trends and features of the colonial era (when African participation in governance was officially repressed), the nationalist movements of the 50s and 60s, the single party era of KANU monopoly in the first three decades of independence, and the rebuilding of political pluralism since 1991.

2.3 Political Parties in Kenya: An Overview

The rise of political parties in Kenya can best be understood in the wider context of the reaction by Kenyans to colonial rule. From a very early stage of colonial experience, Kenyans organised themselves in different forms to count their economic and political exclusion and fight for their rights. To begin with, these forms of political mobilisation were not political parties. At first, they took traditional forms. Later, trade unions grew up that focused mainly on trying to protect and extend the rights of African wage earners.

However, these unions also provided an opportunity for the first generation of anti-colonialist leaders to share ideas on wider issues and gain experience of grassroots mobilisation. The first indigenous political groupings were organised along ethnic lines but

did not restrict themselves to ethnic issues. For example, the Young Kikuyu Association, formed by Harry Thuku in 1921, addressed a broad range grievances shared by all indigenous Kenyans. At this point, most grievances were still closely related to labour issues, for example forced labour, high taxation, and the introduction of mandatory "native" identification cards (known as the kipande). Other ethnic-based organisations formed at around the same time included the Young Kavirondo Association in Nyanza and the Central Association in Murang'a.

As resistance to colonialism deepened and grew more sophisticated, and as more and more Africans moved to towns and cities and mixed with those other ethnic backgrounds, the first cross-ethnic political movements developed. In 1944, the Kenya African Union (KAU) was formed. Though at the beginning KAU had a mainly Kikuyu following, it was the first indigenous Organisation to reflect a Kenyan national outlook.

Whatever their ethnic composition or outlook, all these early nationalist movements shared common goals - overturning white colonialism, ending racist and exclusionist policies, and replacing the colonial government with an indigenous one. Related concerns included reclaiming alienated land, defending the indigenous cultural heritage, and promoting the economic social development of Kenyans. With such an agenda, the nationalist movements were considered enemies of the colonial state. They were refused registration, and their leaders were constantly harassed and often imprisoned.

However, no amount of repression could counteract the will of the people, and with the beginning of the Mau Mau insurgency in the late 1940s the independence struggle greatly intensified. The state of emergency decreed by the colonial government in 1952 and the imprisonment of key nationalist leaders were designed to finish Mau Mau. However, the colonialists soon realised that they could not fight the Kenyan independence movement forever. In 1954, they therefore began to move towards a constitutional settlement with representatives of the African majority.

In 1954, the Littleton Constitution increased African representation in the Legislative Council (Legco) and created the constitutional foundation for a future legislative assembly. In 1957, the African seats in the Legco were made elective (though the electors' roll was very restricted), and in 1958 the Lennox Boyd constitution increased the number of elected African members to fourteen, which was equal to the number of European representatives. Though African political parties remained banned, nationalist leaders continued to agitate for independence, and by 1960 it had become clear that majority rule was on its way.

In March, 1960, a leader's conference in Kiambu founded the Kenya African National Union (KANU). KANU at this time had a generally left-of-centre ideology. Its platform called for immediate independence, a centralised, unitary state, a republican government, and a strong state presence in the economy. In reaction, leaders who favoured a federal system of government joined forces at a meeting in Ngong in June of the same year and formed the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). Like KANU, KADU demanded independence, but it wanted a federal state and a limited central government in order to protect the interests of minority ethnic groups. In ideology, KADU was generally more conservative and favoured a capitalist economic system with minimal state interference.

In 1961, the British government finally conceded the principle of majority rule, began the Lancaster House constitutional process, and lifted the ban on African political parties. This allowed KANU and KADU to operate legally and paved the way for the first general elections in Kenya in which African political parties were free to compete for power. These elections were held in March 1961. Thanks mainly to support from the large Kikuyu and Luo communities, a broader base in the urban centres, and better Organisation, KANU won the elections with 61% of the vote and 19 seats in the Legco compared to KADU's 16% and 11 seats.

However, in protest at the continued imprisonment of Jomo Kenyatta, KANU refused to take office. A government was then formed by the KADU members of the Legco with support from European and Asian members. At the second Lancaster House conference in February and April 1962, KANU was forced to accept the KADU proposal to incorporate federalism

in the independence constitution. However, it did so under pressure from the British government, which felt that federalism would protect the interests of Kenyas white settlers. After winning a large majority in the independence electric May 1963, KANU began almost at once to dismantle the federal system and create a unitary republic.

Though some small ethnic parties also existed and had a limited impact at polls, at independence Kenya was basically a two-party state. However, it did not continue as one for very long. On November 10, 1964, KADU dissolved itself and merged with KANU. During the brief period between independence and the dissolution of KADU, multipartyism did not function in a meaningful way. In particular, the opposition did not fulfil its role effectively, nor did the government take the idea of opposition seriously. Instead, the main dynamics of the first period of multipartyism emphasised ethnic rivalries, cronyism, and contradictions between the ideal of national unity on the one hand and entrenched ethnic and regional orientations on the other (Ojwang, 1981).

The federalism of the independence constitution was an awkward compromise which KANU was committed to dismantling, and there was an absence of underlying social structures, such as a network of civil society organization, that could have sustained the party system and helped it to develop. In general, the political players lacked commitment to the basic ideals of multiparty democracy and were distracted by the post-independence struggle for power and influence in the new state.

When KADU members crossed the floor, the KANU backbench was left as the only forum for expressing views critical of the government. However from 1965 the government launched a vigorous assault on independent opinion in parliament and neutralized critics on the backbench by removing them from all committee positions. As a result, debate fizzled out. What remained of party activity became the initiative of the executive or of alignments centered on mavericks such as Oginga Odinga.

When Odinga and his followers left the government in 1966 and formed the Kenya People's Union (KPU), there was a brief revival of multipartyism. KANU responded to the KPU

defections by passing a constitutional amendment that forced the rebels to seek re-election. The mass by-elections that followed, known since then as the "little general elections," were Kenya's last experience of multiparty politics until 1992. However, "the little general elections" were hardly models of competitive politics. The government from campaigning freely systematically hindered KPU. Legal registration of the party was delayed until nomination day, preventing KPU from organising effectively. During the campaign, KPU candidates were denied licenses for meetings, KPU supporters were harassed, and the Voice of Kenya, most voters' only source of news, gave the party a blackout. In spite of this distorted electoral environment, KPU got more total votes than KANU but won only a quarter of the contested seats.

In 1969, shortly before the next general elections, KPU was proscribed and its leaders detained. KANU's monopoly became complete. From then on, the only opposition" was provided by independent-minded members within the party such as Martin Shikuku, Jean-Marie Seroney, and J M Kariuki, and a few prominent dissidents outside the party such as Oginga Odinga. In theory, KANU remained open to criticism from within, but in practice the party's disciplinary provisions were used to stifle internal democracy. With no opposition parties, KANU members who did not toe the line had nowhere to go except the political wilderness.

As a result, KANU became less and less effective as a mass movement or a genuine vehicle for policy development. In 1982, after thirteen years of de facto one-partyism, Kenya became a de jure one-party state through the enactment of the Constitution (Amendment) Act Number 7 of 1982, which made KANU the sole legal political party. The period that followed saw increased repression through the use of detention without trial, crackdowns on dissidents and "underground" movements, banning of publications, and expulsion of dissenting members from the ruling party. With the option of forming an opposition party now legally closed, KANU brought more and more aspects of the state under its control and became progressively bolder in silencing dissent both inside and outside the party.

However, KANU's dictatorial policies only produced increasing dissent and general discontent among the citizens. In addition, the late 1980s saw a global resurgence of democracy precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War removed the West's incentive for propping up unpopular regimes in the developing world, and as a result international pressure for change was now added to the clamour of the Kenyan people themselves. The notorious mlolongo elections of 1988 were a turning point. The queue-voting system that KANU imposed for these elections, and the glaring rigging that followed, brought dissatisfaction with the one-party system to new heights. A groundswell of demand for change led to the Saba Saba (July 7) riots of 1990 and to increasing international pressure, culminating in an aid freeze the following year by major donors. At this point, KANU was forced to recognize the inevitable and restore the right to form alternative political parties. This paved the way for multiparty elections in December 1992.

Since the restoration of multipartyism in 1991, the Kenyan political scene has been characterized by uncertainty and instability. Numerous new parties have sprung up, and innumerable defections and redefections from one party to another have occurred across the political spectrum from the municipal level to the cabinet. Many of the new parties have had little impact at national level, but the main ones have developed considerable following in different parts of the country.

It must be said that the opposition provided KANU with plenty of opportunities. The history of opposition in Kenya since 1992 was one of division, infighting, and a consistent inability to cooperate to achieve common goals. Despite efforts by various individuals and pressure groups to facilitate a united opposition front for the 1992 and 1997 elections – and in particular to promote the idea of a single opposition presidential candidate - no lasting alliance could be formed. In 1992, Matiba denounced the idea of a single candidate as undemocratic, using a slogan, "Let the People Decide" that then became his trademark. Odinga and Kibaki accepted the principle of fielding one opposition presidential candidate, but they could not agree on which of the two it should be.

The ambition to become leader of a party and to vie for the presidency led to a series of splits in the original FORD coalition. First, FORD split into FORD-Asili, led by Kenneth Matiba, and FORD-Kenya, led by Oginga Odinga. Later, Raila Odinga left FORD-Kenya to lead the National Development Party, and Kenneth Matiba left FORD-Asili to form Saba Saba- Asili. The result is that the original multi-ethnic FORD, which had a substantial following in virtually all parts of the country, was replaced by four parties whose support was largely confined to the ethnic communities of their leaders. Voting patterns in both the parliamentary and presidential elections in the 1997 general elections clearly showed this (IED, Report on the 1997 General Elections in Kenya). It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that most opposition leaders are more interested in their personal ambitions than the cause of democracy.

In addition, little progress appears to have been made in defining party ideologies or developing policies and programmes. Though the major opposition parties, and some of the minor ones, have issued manifestos, their approaches to issues have been obscured and muddled by internal wrangles. As a result, it is
difficult for voters to tell what the different parties really stand for, apart from the ambition to form the government. The frequency of defections and leadership wrangles indicates that many opposition politicians have not been motivated by principles or constructive policy commitments and that the only real issues for many are power and ethnicity.

In terms of structure and organisation, the opposition parties have been hampered by misadministration and persistent problems with internal democracy and transparency. Party elections, particularly in FORD Kenya and FORD-Asili, had been marked by confusion, incivility, widespread charges of rigging, and even violence. Party structures and lines of command often appear to be unclear, inefficient, or haphazard.

In comparison, KANU retained an image of unity despite persistent allegations of the existence of KANU A and KANU B factions and the looming Moi succession issue. However, the party refused to hold internal elections in defiance of its own constitution, and its governing and policy-making structures remain opaque to say the least. As with the

opposition parties, it was difficult to avoid the suspicion that ideology and policy were more shadow than substance.

In summary, between 1991 and 1997 the development of political parties in Kenya had been conditioned largely by the ambitions of leaders and by ethnic loyalties centering on these leaders. As a result, most opposition parties were unable to develop national followings or distinctive policies and programmes based on coherent ideologies. In fighting based on leadership and ethnicity split the formerly united opposition movement into factions, crippled their organizational capacities, and prevented them from working together on common agendas such as constitutional reform, fighting corruption, and curbing political violence.

On the other hand, several opposition parties developed relatively strong grassroots networks, and citizen participation in the political process was greatly enhanced. Political parties, like the centralized state, are relatively new phenomena in Kenya. They made their tentative arrival with the advent of colonialism in the second half of the 19Th century, and even then, only incidentally. As in other colonial states that emerged in the wake of the European scramble for Africa, the arbitrary creation of Kenya, was necessarily a negation of the prevailing African political systems — where each ethnic group existed as an autonomous, self-regulating entity with its own laws affecting behaviour in society.

The colonial state brought in its train a new organizing political concept, a compelling bureaucratic-political system regulated by, and implementing, new laws largely of the "gesellschaft" strain. Primarily outsiders who often had little understanding of, or sympathy for, the customary laws and the "gemeinschaft" tradition previously in force operated the new system.

The result was an emergence of a colonial political system of governance. The new system was accompanied and buttressed by novel social and economic formations represented by the organization of European settlers and Indian traders practicing a modern type of economy, which further served to reinforce one dominant Centre. The advent of colonialism

therefore did not introduce political parties per se in Kenya but, rather, introduced the political foundation on which political parties would subsequently anchor.

The actual emergence of political parties came shortly after the proclamation of Kenya colony in 1921— it had been a 'protectorate' until then — and after the First World War, when African people became increasingly politicized. Without government approval, African opinion leaders, in a large measure drawing from the exposure of the World war, began to coalesce into embryonic political parties, essentially for the purpose of urging public redress to specific grievances. In 1921, the Young Kavirondo Association and the East Africa Association (based in Nairobi) were formed. The Kikuyu Central Association, the Ukamba Members' Association, the Taita Hills and the North Kavirondo Central Association followed suit.

This fragile base of political action was aided by two other developments; the formation of local welfare bodies (self-help devices to replace mission welfare services). The establishment of local councils in African areas. Although the district commissioner largely controlled these councils and African opinion became increasingly disenchanted with them, for some time they accorded the only valuable forum of political expression, and various political associations keenly sponsored candidates to them.

It is from these nascent political groupings that political parties as we know them today can be said to have evolved. The evolution took several critical phases, the first being between 1923 and 1952. This phase was fed and preoccupied by the notion of 'separate development' entrenched by the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915 and the Native Lands Trust Ordinance of 1930 which delineated lands separately for whites and for Africans.
The significance of this phase in the evolution of political parties in Kenya is that it provided the first modern-type organized political pressure by the people, culminating in the compelling of the colonial administration into a political engagement with the Africans. While it can be argued that the colonial regime would have been happy to keep Africans wholly in the periphery of state power, organized political resistance through the nascent parties compelled the regime to react where it would otherwise have preferred to do nothing.

In 1944 the government proscribed a number of the African political associations and for the first time, nominated 2 Africans — Eliud Mathu and F.W. Odede — to the Legislative Council with the implicit aim of simultaneously containing and co-opting the emerging African political class.

The result was that for more than a decade subsequently, the situation was defined by a disjunction between two streams of African political expression, one operating from within the colonial regime— and generally collaborating with the regime — and the other operating from outside the regime and generally in direct confrontation with the government. The situation was aggravated by the intransigence of the colonial regime and the tendency to dismiss African political demands as emanating from a few hotheads unrepresentative of the masses.

Thus, while African political groups were becoming more active, there was a tightly limited opportunity for African expression in the Legislative Council. Consequently, African political expression found other outlets in the spontaneous, populist, nationalist stream of which the Kenya African Union (founded 1944) became the most prominent.

It is in this period and from this alternative stream of African political expression that political parties as we know them today finally took root in Kenya. From the outset, KAU had developed as a party for agitation. Heir to the less politically evolved Kikuyu Central Association of 1924-44, it was an extra-parliamentary party though generally constitutionalist in its methods, fired by many political and economic grievances above all the land issue on which its mainly Kikuyu membership was almost religiously focussed. Yet, as the turbulence of the subsequent decade would reveal, KAU carried in it the seed of a progressive multi-tribal expansion. Because of the alleged connections of some of its leaders and members with Mau Mau, it was suppressed during the State of Emergency and almost disappeared. Yet, when the Emergency had passed and political activities resumed, it was KAU's heir, Kenya African National Union that emerged as Kenya's dominant and first truly national and modern style political party.

Kenya joined the family of independent nations as a multiparty state, of which the two leading parties were the ruling party KANU and the official opposition party, the Kenya African Democratic Union, (KADU). Of the two, KANU was the dominant party with 83 of the 124 House of Representatives seats, including seats in every region and a majority in the senate and control of three of the seven regional assemblies. The two parties co-existed as the two main parties until November 10, 1964 when the KADU voluntarily dissolved and its members joined the former. The third party, African People's Party disbanded too and its members rejoined KANU, effectively turning the country into a one party state.

The instructive aspect of the dissolution of the two opposition parties was that the general membership of the opposition parties were not involved in making what was, to all intents and purpose, the most important party decision. Nor were KANU members involved in making the decision to in effect merge their party with the opposition. Instead, the decisions were made at the party leadership level, by implication amounting to an executive level, or at best, management levels merger of private companies. It can therefore be argued that at Independence, the groupings that projected themselves as political parties in Kenya were only superficially so.

Within two years of the KANU/KADU merger, however, an explosive power struggle precipitated a parting of ways between the top two party leaders — also the President and Vice-Presidents of the country — Jomo Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga, resulting in the establishment of the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) by the Vice-President. Kenya reverted to a multi-partysm system.

The sources of the conflict that led to the break-up of KANU were manifold. Lashes of temperament, of generation, of regional and ethnic interest, and of ambition (especially long-run ambition for the presidential succession) all played a part. Still, it was notable that the conflict also stemmed from a genuine clash of policy ideas over a whole range of issues, foremost among which were the issues of land distribution and use, development planning, and Kenya's relationship with the great powers. On these pervasive issues the two factions

took consistently antagonistic political positions, hence the labels 'conservative' and 'radical'.

The KANU/KPU era was short-lived, lasting only months and culminating in a remarkable – – and bloody — public confrontation between the leaders of the two parties in KPU's stronghold town, Kisumu, on 28th October. Following the turbulent public meeting, KPU party MPs were arrested and subsequently placed in preventive detention. Two days later the party was proscribed by the KANU government, a peculiar eventuality that can be said to have translated into the wilful closure of one political party by another.

Thus far, the notable aspect of political parties in Kenya was that parties served as the tightly "controlled vehicles" for the acquisition and consolidation of political power by individual leaders rather than a democratic grouping of people pursuing a set of ideas and policies. The ownership of the parties tended to be firmly tilted to the advantage of the party leadership rather than the members. It is also notable that political parties had no clear source of funding, or an effective democratic management system. Similarly, the entire gamut of internal governance considerations, notably the elections of office bearers and the setting of policies was equally uncertain, as was the party's independence from government interference. The peculiar and underdeveloped nature of political parties in Kenya however took a clearer perspective with the advent of the second liberation in the 1990s.

2.3.1 Second Liberation

After the proscription of KPU, KANU reigned as the sole political party into the 1990s. Not until 1991, a quarter of a century later and thirteen years after the demise of the inscrutable Jomo Kenyatta would multi-partysm return; suitably if also incredibly figure-headed by KPU's former leader Oginga Odinga. With George Anyona, the Jaramogi, as the old man was now universally known by a title of high esteem, had nine years before attempted to form an opposition party, the Kenya African Socialist Alliance (KASA), in response to which a panicked KANU had rushed through parliament a constitutional amendment which made the country a de jure one party state. It was therefore only after the repeal of that

constitutional limitation in the wake of a concerted "mass action campaigns" that multi-partysm returned.

Initially, the opposition forces coalesced around one party, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), hitherto a pressure group spearheading the campaign for the reintroduction of multipartysm. Within months however, an alternative party, the Democratic Party (DP) joined the fray and soon afterwards,
FORD degenerated into acrimony and splintered into FORD Asili (FORD-A) and FORD Kenya (FORD-K). In the meantime other peripheral — and on many instances no more than one-person parties — sprouted among them the Kenya National Democratic Alliance (KENDA), Labour Party Democracy (LPD), Party of Independent Candidates of Kenya (PICK) and the Social Democratic Party of Kenya. Instructive of this phase in the evolution of political parties in Kenya is that parties tended to take the hue of ethnic associations. The ethnic factor was however more incidental than appearances tended to imply. In the case of FORD, the splinter into FORD-A and FORD-K was to a large extent a reflection a clash of ambitions between party leader that was fed and motivated by ethnic interests.

The emergence of DP was in turn the case of senior figures in the ruling party seeking an alternative political vehicle away from the crowded FORD, again fed and propelled by ethnic interests. Yet, in both cases, it can be argued that the problem was more fundamental to the character and nature of political parties at that stage of Kenyan political evolution. Conversely, the ethnic factor camouflaged the fact that the parties were still in the mode of organizations funded, controlled and defined by their 'supreme' leader or a small elite clique around the leader rather than mass organizations constrained and controlled by the general membership. The sprouting of peripheral parties was in turn the consequence of a loose registration regime beholden to the whims of the ruling party.

The results of the 1992 and 1997 elections thus reflected the sorry state of political parties. The elections reproduced ethno demographic patterns of the country; each party having curved an ethnic territory for control and domination and at the same time fencing off advances by other parties. Only FORD-K won electoral seats from all ethnic groups, in part

because some of its party MPs from outside Nyanza and Bungoma were voted into parliament because of their individual contributions to the democratization process. This notwithstanding, intra-party rivalries prior to and after both elections clearly mirrored the inter-ethnic divide in all the parties.

2.3.2 Political Parties Today

The fractious opposition political parties that emerged in Kenya after the reintroduction of multipartysm in 1991 lost two consecutive general elections — in 1992 and 1997 — to the ruling party KANU before forging an alliance and ousting KANU from power in 2002. Of the three main parties of the early 1990s, one, the FORD-A, has been swept to the periphery while one formally peripheral party, FORD-People, has moved to the mainstream. Another formally peripheral party, the National Development Party (NDP) underwent a convoluted metamorphosis, first merging with KANU and then, within a year, splintering away with a section of KANU to form the Liberal Development Party (LDP) in 2002. The government thus was nominally in the hands of an alliance comprising of the DP, Ford- K, the LDP and a host of other peripheral parties. The alliance operated under an umbrella party, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). The former ruling party KANU and FORD-People constituted the mainstream opposition.

But things changed. Within two years of NARC administration, LDP split from the coalition merging with KANU to form a formidable opposition that saw the government (NARC) lose the 2005 referendum. Simeon Nyachae's FORD People joined the government side to form a government of national unity (GNU). LDP and KANU plus all the other parties that formed the formidable force that campaigned against the new constitution formed an alliance –the Orange Democratic Movement party of Kenya (ODM-K). With wrangles from other party members within the party led by KANU's chairman Uhuru Kenyatta, some KANU members joined the government side to form Party of National Unity (PNU) while another ODM faction was formed to counter Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka's ambition to take over the party. Kalonzo remained with the ODM-K while Raila, Balala, Ruto, Mudavadi and Nyaga formed ODM Party which served as the mainstream opposition, later the team named the pentagon.

Notable of the period is that political parties have scaled another evolutionary step in the political development of Kenya. For the first time in the country's history a ruling party has been ousting from power and replacement by the opposition. Moreover, the change has been brought about by an alliance of formally fractious opposition parties. Yet, as was the case at the advent of multi-partysm, the fundamentals of political parties remain a case of the pieces being less than their sum. The former opposition has indeed replaced the former ruling party, but arguably, the parties' electoral strengths on both sides remain relatively unchanged.

The opposition parties are in power not because they garnered significantly more votes than they commanded in the proceeding two general elections but rather because they were able to align their disparate votes into one basket. Conversely, they would still have won in the preceding two general elections had they been in an alliance. Moreover, the parties remain firmly in the grip of their respective leaders who, with a small clique, provide the funding and policy direction. A reflection and indicator of the unchanged state of political parties is the fact that in the first months of the new government, the most contentious political skirmishing among the parties making up NARC has revolved around a memorandum of understanding that was largely unknown to the party membership before the elections. The parties remain hazily defined in term of source of funding, financial control, internal governance and policy formulation. It is this lacuna among other shortcomings that the Draft Constitution and the eventual new constitution are seeking to resolve.

Second, it introduces a new type of party, the ethnicity-based party. This is not a mass party because, typically, it is organizationally very limited and more interested in accessing state resources than in ideology or policy. Within this latter category they distinguish two sub-types. The ethnic party is primarily concerned with just one ethnic group. Numerous such parties are to be found in Asia, for instance India's Telegu Dasam Party representing the Telegu-speaking people and the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) and its offshoots representing the Tamils and in tropical Africa, although given the often very large number of ethnic groups in a single African country, parties that represent only one such group are

relatively unusual (it is unusual in Zambia for instance - see web case study two). The congress party brings a range of ethnically-identified groups together.

India's Congress Party and the United Malays National Organization in Malaysia are cited as examples, although, certainly in the Indian Congress case, this seems to understate the role of organization and ideas, at least in the past. Third, within the elector list type of party, Gunther and Diamond introduce a new sub-type, the personalistic party, to apply to parties like the Thai Rak Thai Party mentioned above. Overall this typology is undoubtedly a great advance in getting us to think in a more systematic way about how parties vary. The trouble with it is first that it still remains in some ways western-oriented and second, as the authors acknowledge, that all categories represent 'ideal types' and actually existing parties tend to straddle across them. For instance many seemingly ethnic, or multi-ethnic, parties in Africa are actually mainly vehicles for individual political leaders, though these are hardly the high-tech, professionalized organizations evoked by the term 'electoralist'.

Parties in party systems In any case individual political parties need to be understood in the context of party systems – that is the interactions between a set of parties – that both help to shape and constrain them. Party systems like parties vary considerably, and different ways of classifying them have been advanced. In this context the thinking of Giovanni Sartori (1976) has been seminal. His approach to classification involves the number of parties, the degree of ideological polarisation and whether the system is competitive or authoritarian. By numbers he is not referring to literally how many parties there are. In developing countries, especially when competitive elections have only recently been (re-)introduced, there are often a great number of parties. For instance 26 parties contested the first competitive elections in Côte d'Ivoire in 1990; more than a hundred parties were formed and 38 parties contested in Indonesia's 1999 General Election.

The character of the party system will also be affected by laws or Constitutional provisions imposing requirements on parties. For instance such measures proscribe the formation of parties based on religion, region or ethnicity, in a number of African countries including Tanzania, Ghana and Nigeria. In some countries, for instance India from 1985, and much

more recently Bolivia and South Africa in a bid to strengthen party discipline, measures have been passed banning defection of MPs from one political party to another unless they are prepared to seek re-election under their new affiliation.

More fundamentally, however, it will be affected by the system of government. Presidential systems prevail in Latin America and in sub-Saharan Africa where of 45 countries with multi-party systems, only four qualify as parliamentary (van de Walle, 2003). As noted above, strong presidential systems, in which executive powers and patronage are concentrated in a directly elected president, are more likely than parliamentary systems to be associated with party systems in which the opposition is weak and fragmented and parties, including those supporting the President, are weakly institutionalized (Zambia is a good example). This is not an iron law, of course, and in Latin America there are countries like Chile where a strong presidency coexists with a stable, institutionalized party system.

Parties and their social base

A further factor that could be expected to shape party systems is the nature of the society they operate within. This section explores parties' links with their social base, including social groupings and civil society associations. Strong roots in society are seen as a defining feature both of individual and of party system institutionalization. But in addition to identifying which groups or associations parties have links with, we need to consider the character of those links. Within western political science the Lipset-Rokkan cleavage model has been very influential in the analysis of bases of support for political parties.

That model, however, strongly reflects, as it was intended to, the experience of Western Europe. Lipset and Rokkan identified a series of social cleavages that could serve to structure party systems: between church and state, centre and periphery, urban and rural sectors and labour and capital. They implied that with economic development and growing national integration, class-based cleavages would increasingly come to the fore. At the same time their 'freezing thesis' hypothesized that party systems would be strongly imprinted by the main cleavages that had been politicized at the time they came into being, that is, in western Europe, on the eve of mass suffrage (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In practice, when

applying this approach, analysts have primarily concentrated on electoral behaviour, as a guide to 'cleavages'.

A number of studies have considered how far the model illuminates electoral behaviour in Latin America (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Dix 1989) and in Asia, especially India (Chhibber and Petrocik 1990, Heath and Yadav 1999). Latin America is the region where the character of cleavages and tendency for class-based cleavages to grow in importance has come closest to the Lipset/Rokkan scenario. Chile has been singled out as an almost classic instance (Scully 1995). Even then, the observation is that, for a number of complex reasons, including the fact that the restricted scope for departure from neo-liberal economic polices limits the credibility of left-tending discourse, Latin American parties now

2.4 Political Engineering of Parties and Party Systems

Because they channel, aggregate and express political demands, political parties play an important role in the management of conflict in societies divided along cultural, linguistic, religious, regional or other kinds of 'ethnic' lines. However, the impact that parties have on ethnic conflict varies depending on the way in which such cleavages are expressed by the party system. Ethnically-based parties, for example, typically claim to represent the interests of one group alone.

By making ethnically-specific appeals to mobilize voters, the emergence of such parties often has a centrifugal effect on politics, heightening ethnic tensions. The role of ethnic Serb and Croat parties in undermining the consolidation of democracy in post-war Bosnia is a case in point. By contrast, multi-ethnic parties need to appeal to a broader support base, and thus tend to have a more centrist impact, aggregating diverse interests and de-emphasising mono-ethnic demands. India's Congress Party is often held up as a classic example of the advantages for social integration and conflict management of a broad-based governing party committed to national cohesion and stability.

Political parties are thus intimately linked to the rise and fall of conflict in ethnically plural societies. But despite the impressive body of scholarship on constitutional engineering that has appeared over the past decade, there has been surprisingly little attention given to the

ways in which multi-ethnic parties can be developed and sustained. Political parties have typically been viewed as social phenomena beyond the scope of deliberate institutional engineering. There are several reasons for this. Because political parties in theory represent the political expression of underlying societal cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), parties and party systems have not usually been thought to be amenable to overt political engineering. While some authoritarian states have attempted to control the development of their party system (e.g. the mandated 'two-party' or 'three-party' systems that existed under military rule in Nigeria and Indonesia respectively, or the 'no-party' system that currently exists in Uganda), most democracies allow parties to develop freely. Because of this, parties are generally understood to remain beyond the reach of formal political engineering in most circumstances.

Recent years, however, have seen some ambitious attempts to influence the development of party systems in a range of ethnically-diverse countries such as Indonesia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Papua New Guinea. In the discussion of these and other cases which follows, this paper presents an initial survey of some the different institutional and political strategies for encouraging the development of broad, cross-regional or multi-ethnic parties and party systems that have been used around the world. First, however, it is necessary to step back and look at the relationship between parties, ethnicity and democracy more generally.

2.4.1 Party politics and ethnic conflict

One reason that democracy is inherently problematic in ethnically-divided societies is because of the pressures for politicization of identity issues. Because it is often easier to mobilize support by appealing to ethnic allegiances rather than issues of class or ideology, aspiring politicians have a strong incentive to mobilize support along ethnic lines. Unscrupulous political leaders who 'play the ethnic card' can be rewarded with electoral success. As rival parties respond in kind, a process of 'outbidding' can easily take hold, pushing the locus of political competition towards the extremes (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). In this way, the presence of ethnic parties can easily lead to increasing ethnic tensions and, in some cases, the outbreak of ethnic conflict.

The extent to which this occurs depends significantly on the extent to which a country's party system is ethnically-based or not. One reason peace and democracy is more prevalent in mono-ethnic societies than in multi-ethnic ones is due to the particular ways that parties form, develop and campaign in ethnically-divided societies. Specifically, "in ethnically divided and multi-ethnic societies, political parties tend to form around ethnic allegiances. This is particularly the case in multiethnic states where ethnic groups are not heterogeneously dispersed throughout the country, but live in specific geographic regions" (Freedom House 2000). A recurring feature of democratization in multi-ethnic states in Africa, Asia and the former Soviet Union has been the rapid emergence of parties which draw their support exclusively from one ethnic group or region and are committed to the realization of nationalist or separatist agendas (Ishiyama and Breuning 1998). Given that such parties mobilize support by making powerful emotional appeals to issues of identity, history and survival, it is not surprising that ethnic conflict is often a direct result of the appearance of these 'ethnic parties'.

A particular danger-point is when a society is in the throes of rapid political change, for it is at this point that exclusive ethno-nationalist appeals are often the first recourse of would-be politicians (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). In such circumstances, the easiest way to mobilize voter support at election time is often to appeal to the root insecurities of the population. Electoral politics can easily turn into a contest between sectarian parties competing on identity issues. There are many examples of this. Post-communist elections in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s resulted in the victory of extremist nationalist parties, committed to (and achieving) the break-up of the federation. The 1993 elections in Burundi, which were supposed to elect a power-sharing government, instead mobilised population groups along ethnic lines and served as a catalyst for the ethnic genocide that was to follow.

In post-Dayton Bosnia, the major parties have continued to form along ethnic lines and voters have continued to elect them to power, despite the efforts of the international community. In each of these cases, ethnic politics has had a negative impact on democratization. As Gunther and Diamond (2001) write, "The electoral logic of the ethnic party is to harden and mobilize its ethnic base with exclusive, often polarizing appeals to

ethnic group opportunity and threat … the ethnic party's particularistic, exclusivist, and often polarizing political appeals make its overall contribution to society divisive and even disintegrative".

For this reason, scholars and policymakers alike have frequently identified the need to build broad-based, aggregative and multi-ethnic political parties if inter-ethnic violence is to be avoided and the routines of peaceful democratic politics consolidated in fragile multi-ethnic states. Horowitz (1991), for example, has consistently advocated the need for broad multi-ethnic parties or coalitions of parties as a key facilitating factor for avoiding ethnic conflict. Similarly, Huntington (1991) argues that fractionalized and ethnically or regionally exclusive party systems are extremely damaging for democratic prospects and are, consequently, found widely in the failed democracies of the Third World.

A particularly dangerous form of party system is that of 'polarized pluralism' (Sartori 1976) featuring competition between extremist movements. Under such conditions, the logic of elections changes from one of convergence on median policy positions to one of extreme divergence. Politics becomes a centrifugal game. Such fragmented party constellations are empirically far more likely to experience violence and the breakdown of democracy than more moderate multipartism based on a few 'catch-all' political parties (Powell 1982). Indeed, almost all cases of violent civil war in recent years have featured mono-ethnic political parties striving to implement ethnically-exclusive agendas (Gurr 2000).

The impacts of party system fragmentation go beyond the issue of ethnicity itself. In his classic work on political change, Huntington argued that strong parties are "the prerequisite for political stability in modernizing countries" (1967:412). Comparative research across a range of contemporary democracies supports this: broad-based parties with strong ties to the electorate are associated with higher overall levels of development than other party systems (Powell 1982:101), with party system fragmentation presenting a particular barrier to achieving substantive economic reform (Haggard and Webb 1992).

The issue of party system aggregation is separate from, but related to, that of ethnic parties. Of course, not all ethnic parties are extremist, just as not all programmatic parties are centrist, and party system fragmentation does not necessarily mean party system polarization. The level of institutionalization of party politics is a key intermediate factor here. By moderating and channelling political participation, institutionalized parties are widely seen as key components in managing incipient conflicts and building a functioning democracy (Huntington 1968). Mainwaring and Scully (1995) argue that party system institutionalization depends on four factors: the regularity of party competition, the extent to which parties have stable roots in society, the extent to which parties and elections are widely accepted as the means of determining who governs, and the extent to which parties are organized internally.

By contrast, in inchoate party systems, "party organizations are generally weak, electoral volatility is high, party roots in society are weak, and individual personalities dominate parties and campaigns". (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995) With the exception of electoral volatility, these are also some of the defining characteristics of ethnic parties, which typically have low levels of ideological coherence and programmatic commitment, lack a well-developed organizational structure and membership base, depend on clientelistic mobilization for their electoral success, and tend to be organized around a single charismatic leader (Gunther and Diamond 2001). Although it is certainly possible for ethnic parties to be successfully institutionalized themselves, they tend to be associated with weak party system institutionalization overall (Randall and Svåsand 2002).

Despite this weight of empirical evidence in favour of aggregative party systems in general, and the bleak assessment of ethnic parties in particular, various approaches to conflict prevention assume and even foster their presence. For example, the guidelines of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) explicitly affirm the right of ethnic minorities to form their own parties and compete for office on an ethnic basis. In Latin America, restrictions on indigenous groups traditionally hampered their ability to form ethnic parties, but this practice has changed in recent years, resulting in the emergence of new Amerindian parties (Van Cott 1999).

By contrast, in Africa and Asia, where new democracies have been literally torn apart under the pressures of tribalism and ethnic mobilization, more effort has been put into retarding or restricting the ability of ethnic groups to form parties in the first place. It is important to recognise this disparity at the outset, as the divergent experiences of different world regions regarding ethnicity and party politics reflects a similar divergence in thinking regarding the best means of ameliorating the dangers of ethnic politics. The contrast here between the developed and the developing world is particularly strong.

The scholarly literature identifies several competing approaches to building sustainable democracy in ethnically-diverse societies. One is to recognize the importance of ethnicity in the political system directly, and to make ethnic groups the building blocks of politics – through, for example, ethnic political parties – which can then be guaranteed representation in a 'grand coalition' government. This 'consociational' approach is widely associated with the work of Arend Lijphart, of course, and represents probably the best known strategy for managing ethnic tensions in a democratic system (Lijphart 1977). Consociationalism emphasises the need for divided societies to develop mechanisms for elite power-sharing if democracy is to survive the travails of ethnic or other conflicts. The mechanisms for ensuring sustainable power-sharing arrangements are encapsulated in four key features: grand coalition governments in which all ethnic groups are represented; proportional representation of different groups in the distribution of legislative seats and in the civil service; segmental autonomy via federalism or similar devices; and a power of veto over key decisions by minority groups (Lijphart 1977).

In terms of electoral arrangements, consociationalists argue for proportional voting systems which enable ethnic groups to be represented in parliament in proportion to their numbers in the general community, allowing ethnically-based parties to form the basis of government (Lijphart 1990). Adroit political leadership is key to the success of such arrangements: ethnic demands are kept in check by elite-level negotiations between the leaders of the various groups. This approach assumes the presence of ethnic parties in divided societies; indeed the basis of consociationalism is that all ethnic groups are free to compose themselves into parties and be represented proportionately in government.

Lijphart developed this institutional prescription from a detailed examination of the features of power-sharing democracy in some continental European countries (the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland), and there is disagreement over how far these measures can work when applied to ethnic conflict in developing countries, if at all (Sisk 1996). Critics also question the assumption that ethnic elites and ethnic parties are willing to act moderately, and that the replication of deep social divisions in the legislature via ethnic parties is a good thing for divided societies, given that much of the evidence from divided societies suggests otherwise (Horowitz 1991). In post-war Bosnia, for example, groups are represented in parliament in proportion to their numbers in the community as a whole, but because the major parties are ethnically-based and can rely exclusively on their own community for their electoral success, they have little incentive to act moderately on ethnic issues, and every incentive to emphasize sectarian appeals. The result at successive elections from 1996-2002 was effectively an ethnic census, with electors voting along ethnic lines and each of the major nationalist parties gaining support almost exclusively from their own ethnic group. Similarly in Guyana, a society polarised between citizens of African and Indian descent, democracy has been undermined by ethnic parties which form either the government or the opposition, despite the use of a highly proportional electoral system (Reilly and Reynolds 1999).

In contrast to consociationalism, an alternative approach to managing ethnic conflict seeks to move the focus of politics away from ethnicity towards other, less volatile, issues by fostering inter-ethnic cooperation and "making moderation pay" (Horowitz 1991). To do this, politicians need to be made responsive to cross-ethnic pressures, rather than acting solely as the representative of one group alone. Supporters of this approach advocate policies which promote the development of broad-based parties or coalitions of parties, encouraging voters, parties and candidates to transcend ethnic considerations as the defining point of political competition. This involves crafting institutions which de-emphasize the importance of ethnicity in the political process by undermining the potential for mono-ethnic demands. Specific institutions include the use of 'vote-pooling' electoral systems which make politicians dependent on several different groups to gain election; devolution via non-ethnic

federalism, in order to proliferate points of power; and the development of non-ethnic or multi-ethnic political parties or coalitions of parties (Horowitz 1985).

This broad approach has been dubbed 'centripetalism', because the objective is to make the focus of political competition centripetal rather than centrifugal (Sisk 1996, Reilly 2001). A centripetal political system or strategy is designed to move political competition towards centrist issues by making politicians seek electoral support from groups beyond their own ethnic community.

2.4.2 Constraining Ethnic Parties and Reducing Party Fragmentation

The most common approach to political engineering of parties and party systems is to introduce regulations which govern the formation, registration and behaviour of political parties. Such regulations can ban ethnic parties outright, or make it difficult for small or regionally-based parties to be registered, or require parties to demonstrate a cross-regional or cross-ethnic composition as a pre-condition for competing in elections. Nigeria, for example, requires parties to display a 'federal character' by including members from two-thirds of all states on their executive council, and by providing that the name, motto or emblem of the party must not have ethnic or regional connotations. Nigeria has also experimented with other more restrictive party system regulations, ranging from the mandatory two-party system under the military administration of President Babangida to the current rule that parties must win at least five percent of the vote in local elections before they can compete nationally (Seberu 2001).

Drawing on the Nigerian experience, in recent years some countries – notably Indonesia – have attempted to guide the development of their party systems by more complex strategies. Since the fall of former president Soeharto and the transition to democracy in 1998, over 200 new parties mushroomed in Indonesia, raising concern amongst political elites that the emerging party system was too fragmented, with too many parties, for democratic government to work effectively. Many blamed the fragmented and polarized party system in the 1950s for the failure of democracy then, and were determined not to see it happen again. At the same time, there was an overriding worry, particularly since the breakaway of East Timor in 1999, about the threat of secessionism to the territorial integrity of Indonesia, and

the concomitant dangers of regional parties providing a springboard for separatism. Building a consolidated party system was thus seen as an essential step in countering secessionism and building a consolidated democracy.

To achieve these twin goals – building national parties while resisting separatist ones – Indonesia's constitutional engineers (particularly the Team Tujuh working out of the Home Affairs Ministry in 1998) developed a complex package of incentives and restraints on party system development. On the one hand, all political parties were required to demonstrate a national support base as a precondition to compete in the 1999 elections. Intending parties had to demonstrate that they had an established branch structure in more than half of Indonesia's 27 provinces, and within each of these provinces also had to have established branches within over half of all regions and municipalities. These rules were ultimately interpreted relatively liberally, and 48 parties competed at the 1999 elections, although only seven gained significant representation (three of which, GOLKAR, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, had been the only legally-permitted parties under Soeharto's reign)

In addition to the provisions encouraging cross-regional membership, there were strong systemic pressures for party amalgamation: parties which failed to gain more than 2% of seats in the lower house of parliament, or at least 3% of all seats in both houses combined, would have to merge with other parties to surmount these thresholds if they wanted to contest future elections. To the surprise of some observers, these merger provision have been enforced in the lead-up to the 2004 elections, meaning that many small parties have had to amalgamate with others. Moreover, the new (2003) party laws go even further than the 1999 ones: in order to compete in the 2004 elections, new parties must prove that they have branches in two-thirds of Indonesia's provinces and two-thirds of the local government areas (regencies) within those provinces, and each of these regency-level party units must demonstrate that it has at least 1,000 members (or at least one-thousandth of the number of residents in smaller regencies). Given that there are 30 provinces and 416 regencies in Indonesia, these are onerous requirements -- as one commentator noted, if the laws are enforced "parties may, instead of collecting dues from members, be paying them to sign up

in future" (Tan 2002).

While the Indonesian laws appear to have been relatively successful in their over-riding aim of preventing separatist parties, encouraging multi-ethnic party formation is easier said than done. Many countries in Africa, Asia and elsewhere have constitutional or legislative requirements which explicitly ban 'ethnic' parties from competing in elections, or which require parties to be 'nationally-focussed' or similar. For example, in Tanzania the Political Parties Act 1992 requires that parties be 'national' in character. A similar law in Ghana requires parties to demonstrate a 'national character' before they can be registered by having branches in all 10 regions of the country, and precludes names or symbols which have an ethnic, religious or regional connotation. Togo, Senegal and a range of other African countries have similar rules on their statute books. However, in most cases these are essentially aspirational provisions that are not capable of being enforced effectively. What ultimately makes a party 'ethnic' is not the nature of its composition or even the fact that most of its votes come from one group, but the fact that it makes no attempt to appeal to members of other groups.

A more drastic approach to precluding the development of ethnic parties is not just to place restrictions on their development, but to ban political parties altogether. This was a frequent justification for the mandated one-party systems that existed in much of Africa until the early 1990s. Today, Uganda represents the best-known example of such a 'no-party' system in action. Under this system, political parties are severely restricted and all candidates for election must run as individuals, not party nominees. President Yoweri Museveni imposed the no-party system in 1986, citing the way in which political parties had inflamed racial and ethnic conflict as the main justification for the new laws. Prior to this, politics in Uganda featured a complex inter-weaving of ethnic and party politics, with parties mobilizing votes on the basis of ethnicity, region, and religion. The instability that this created was widely seen as having led to the Idi Amin dictatorship in the 1970s.

Since its introduction, surveys have shown strong public support for the 'no-party' system, and international criticism has been surprisingly muted despite the fact that it has allowed the

governing National Resistance Movement to monopolize power (Kasfir 1998). But it is doubtful whether such a system is a feasible long-term solution to managing the confluence of ethnic and party politics, especially given the apparent tendency of such arrangements to degenerate into de facto one-party rule. In democratic settings, party systems cannot be fashioned by government fiat alone.

2.4.3 Encouraging Moderation via Electoral System Design

A second approach to political party engineering has been to use the electoral system to try to refashion the party system. There are several ways of doing this. One of the most common is to adopt a closed party-list form of political representation, thus giving party leaders the ability to dictate the composition of their party lists. In some countries, this has enabled a more conscious strategy of multi-ethnicity than would have been possible otherwise. In Singapore, for example, most MPs are elected from multi-member districts known as Group Representative Constituencies, which each return between three and six members from a single list of party or individual candidates. Of the candidates on each party or group list, at least one must be a member of the Malay, Indian or some other minority community, thus ensuring a degree of multi-ethnicity on party slates. Similarly, some have argued that the closed-list proportional representation system used in South Africa's 1994 elections enabled the major political parties to adopt a similarly multi-ethnic approach there by making sure minority candidates were placed in winnable positions on the party list (Sisk 1995, Reilly and Reynolds 1999). In Bosnia, however, reformers have moved in other direction, adopting open-list voting – a move supposed to increase accountability between voters and their representatives and provide space for moderate or non-ethnic candidates, but which comparative experience from other countries suggests can actually impede cross-ethnic behaviour.

In the Philippines, the 1998 elections saw the first application of a different kind of party-list system designed to encourage diversity, with 20 percent of the parliament elected from special list seats. These seats are not open to established parties but are designed to represent 'sectoral interests' and marginalized groups such as youth, labour, the urban poor, farmers, fishermen and women. Any group securing at least 2% of the party-list vote gets a seat, up to

a maximum of three seats. However, the list seats have been dogged by problems. In 1998, only 13 of the 52 list seats were filled, as electoral authorities struggled to verify the credentials of elected groups.

Following the 2001 elections, the Supreme Court found that most of the groups elected did not in fact represent minorities, and that some indeed had links to the major parties (May 2002). The lists seats have, however, resulted in more diversity within parliament than would otherwise be the case. Indeed, some have argued that the only way to get genuine party development and accountability in the Philippines is to allocate a much larger portion of the parliament to the party lists, eliminate the provision capping the number of seats available to each group, and allow established political parties to participate in the party-list component of elections (Montinola 1999).

Other electoral system innovations can be used to counter party fractionalization and encourage inter-party cooperation and coalition. In the former category are devices like vote thresholds, which aim to prevent the election of too many small parties in parliament. Probably the most extreme application of this is in Turkey, where parties must attain at least 10 percent of the national vote (and constituency-level thresholds also apply) before they can be represented in parliament, thus discriminating strongly against smaller parties, especially those with geographically concentrated support bases (Özbudun 2001).

In the latter category are vote-pooling electoral systems in which electors rank-order candidates, and votes are transferred according to these rankings. These systems can encourage cross-party cooperation and aggregation by making politicians from different parties reciprocally dependent on transfer votes from their rivals. For example, the single transferable vote system used at Northern Ireland's crucial 1998 'Good Friday' election enabled 'pro-agreement' Republican and Unionist voters to give their first vote to their communal party, but to transfer their secondary preference votes to pro-agreement non-communal parties -- thus advantaging the 'moderate middle' of non-ethnic parties and altering the dynamics of a seemingly intractable conflict.

A related system, the alternative vote, has been adopted in two ethnically-divided South Pacific states, Fiji and Papua New Guinea, in recent years. Encouraging the development of a more aggregative party system was one of the primary goals of the electoral reforms in both cases (Reilly 2001).

A final option for promoting cross-ethnic parties is to introduce distribution requirements which require parties or individual candidates to garner specified support levels across different regions of a country, rather than just their own home base, in order to be elected. First introduced in Nigeria in 1979, distribution requirements have so far been applied exclusively for presidential elections in large, ethnically-diverse states in order to ensure that winning candidates receive a sufficiently broad spread of votes, rather than drawing their support from a few regions only.

The original formulation in Nigeria's 1979 constitution required successful presidential candidates to gain a plurality of votes nationwide and at least a quarter of the votes in thirteen of Nigeria's then nineteen states. In 1989, this provision was made even more onerous, requiring a president to win a majority overall and at least one-third of the vote in at least two-thirds of all states in the Federation (Suberu 2001). In the event that a single candidate does not meet this requirement, a runoff election is required. The Kenyan constitution provides a similar threshold, requiring successful candidates to win a plurality of the vote as well one-quarter of the valid votes cast in at least five of the eight provinces.

There is significant disagreement amongst scholars and other observers as to the real utility of such measures, with some interpreting them as impotent and even harmful mechanisms which can subvert democratic consolidation, while others seeing them potentially important mechanisms for muting ethnic conflict and ensuring the election of broad, pan-ethnic presidents (Sisk 1996). The empirical evidence to date reflects this divergence of opinion.

In Kenya, for example, President Daniel arap Moi consistently subverted requirements that he receive cross-country support by manipulating tribal politics to ensure the continuation of his presidency, even as his own popularity was falling. Yet the new Kenyan president, Mwai

Kibaki, recently won a landslide victory under the same system. Similarly in Nigeria, despite serious problems with the workings of the system in the past, the transitional May 1999 presidential election which swept Olesegun Obasanjo to power appeared to work largely as intended. At the election, Obasanjo ran on a cross-ethnic platform and in fact gained greater votes outside his own region than within it -- precisely because, it appears, he campaigned on a cross-regional multi-ethnic platform. Obasanjo was re-elected in 2003 under the same provisions.

A related reform has recently been introduced in Indonesia. In 2004, for the first time, a direct national election will be held to elect Indonesia's president and vice-president. Like the new party laws, the presidential election voting system has been designed to ensure that the most broadly representative candidate is elected. A two-round system will be used, with candidates for the presidency and vice presidency running as a team. In order to avoid a second round of voting, first-round winners must gain over 50% of all votes as well as a minimum of 20% in half of all provinces. This latter provision was borrowed from Nigeria, whose experience has been widely discussed in Jakarta in recent years. Again, the aim is to ensure that the winning candidate not only has majority support overall, but also has broad, cross-regional support as well. In this respect, the presidential electoral law is consistent with the centripetal logic of Indonesia's new laws on party formation, which aim to promote parties with a cross-regional support base.

2.4.4 Top-down approaches to party building

A third approach to building multiethnic parties is what I call the "top-down" approach, which carries the expectation that parties can be 'built', to a certain extent, not from below (as is usually the case), but from above. This approach usually focuses on increasing party discipline and cohesion in parliament as a means of stabilising party politics, in the hope that more disciplined parliamentary parties will lead to a more structured party system overall. One way to do this is to restrict the capacity of members to change parties once elected. This practice, which was once widespread in many Asian countries, has been curtailed in recent years by the introduction of "anti-hopping" provisions in states like India, Malaysia,

Thailand and Papua New Guinea. These have made it difficult or impossible for a politician elected under one party label to change allegiance to another party once in office (Hassall and Saunders 2002). However, such restrictions have little sway over party defections which take place outside the parliamentary arena.

Another approach is to provide direct assistance to party organizations via public funding to political parties, usually on the basis of their vote share at previous elections, which tends to have the net effect of advantaging existing parties and raising the barrier to newcomers. Free airtime on television and radio is another form of direct assistance to parties. Notably, both forms of public support can also be used to encourage particular kinds of party structures by, for example, specifically discriminating against extremist, fringe or ethnic parties.

In some countries, political parties are so weak as to be essentially irrelevant in the electoral process. In many Pacific Island countries, for example, independent candidates with no party affiliation are the major political force in parliament. In such cases, more ambitious institutional innovation is required. One such institutional innovation has recently been enacted in Papua New Guinea, which has over 800 indigenous languages and thousands of competing tribal groups, making stable government extremely difficult. A package of constitutional reforms introduced in 2001 aimed to stabilize executive government and build a coherent party system in parliament.

The reform package represents an ambitious attempt to rework Papua New Guinea's political system from above by introducing new rules governing the formation, composition and funding of political parties; financial incentives for elected candidates to form themselves into parliamentary parties; constitutional provisions aimed at stabilizing executive government by limiting no-confidence votes against the executive; restrictions on the capacity of party-members to change their support for key parliamentary votes; a new system of party registration and funding; and reforms to the electoral system in order to encourage majority winners, manage inter-group conflicts, and promote female candidates. Taken together, this package represents one of the most far-reaching attempts to engineer the political system undertaken by a democracy anywhere in the world.

2.4.5 External Interventions

A final approach to political party engineering in ethnically divided societies has been for external actors to attempt to intervene directly in the development of the party system. This often involves channelling technical or financial assistance from international donor agencies, NGOs, or multilateral agencies to party organizations in those states in which the international community has taken a prominent role, such as new or transitional democracies. Building coherent party systems in post-conflict societies is a particularly difficult process, as parties often form around the very same cleavages which spurred the original conflict, polarizing the political system and leading to a continuation of the former conflict through the new 'democratic' political process (Reilly 2002a). Increasing awareness of the problems caused by such polarized or otherwise dysfunctional party systems has lately spurred international actors such as the United Nations and other multilateral bodies – which have traditionally been wary of direct involvement in politics, preferring more traditional kinds of development assistance -- to take a more active role in assisting political party development in some countries.

The most ambitious actors in this field have been the international democracy promotion organizations which have proliferated over the past decade (Carothers 1999). Because they are not bound by the same strictures as multilateral agencies, some of these have attempted to directly shape the development of the party system in recipient countries, including in ethnically-divided ones.

The vexed problem of transforming armies into parties after a protracted period of conflict continues to trouble international interventions in this field. As one survey of post-conflict elections concluded, "Democratic party building is proving to be a slow process. In all the [post-conflict] countries, political parties are organized around personalities, narrow political interests, and tribal and ethnic loyalties" (Kumar 1998).

2.5 Political Coalitions

2.5.1 Pre-election coalitions

In order to understand the role of a party, we first need to understand what happens without parties: a world in which only independent candidates stand for election. Such a world has been modelled recently by two sets of authors: Besley and Coate (1997). These authors' were the first to endogenise the candidacy decision and the factors that influenced an individual citizen's decision to enter as a candidate or not, i.e. the trade off between the costs of candidacy and the benefits of getting the best policy for a particular candidate implemented.

But it seems clear that forming coalitions in this set up would have dividends! Candidates could share the costs of candidacy if they made a party" of like minded individuals, or they could improve their chances of electoral victory if they could join a coalition of individuals with deferent policy positions thus ensuring commitment to a set of policies rather than just their own best policies. Parties could also act as mechanisms to coordinate voters' decisions. The first set of authors we survey considers exactly these variations on the citizen candidate model.

The models differ in the main motivations for parties to form, the predictions on the size and number of parties, the models and the equilibrium concepts employed. Among the motivations for pre-electoral coalitions to form, the first one we present is the cost-sharing motivation. Riviere (1999) and Osborne and Tourky (2002) are both models of parties as cost sharing organisations. Although the models are considerably different in detail, both assume uni-dimensional policy space. While Riviere (1999) assumes Plurality Rule, Osborne and Tourky (2002) present a more general model which is applicable to both Plurality Rule and Proportional Representation.

In a companion paper, Levy (2002B), verifies the robustness of the party effectiveness" result under various stability concepts. Morelli (2002) differs from the two authors above by looking at multidistrict elections and Proportional Representation. He is concerned too with whether heterogeneous" parties form in equilibrium, and whether parties are effective",

although these terms are interpreted differently from Levy (2002A). Parties are effective if they can be part of the government, without considering their effect on the actual policy implemented. The main question he is concerned with is the conditions under which the number of effective parties is larger under proportional representation than under Plurality voting (Duverger's (1954) hypothesis). Parties are active if they run for election in at least one district.

2.5.2 Post-election Coalitions

The common thread linking all the authors mentioned so far is that an important factor in the party formation process is the anticipated voting behaviour that follows. However some authors suppress the role of voters and assume the legislative composition as given. The seminal work of Riker (1962) is the first to study this kind of coalition behaviour. His predictions still form the basis for recent research on this topic: he focused on a narrow interpretation of the objectives of political parties, i.e. that they were interested in the spoils office. Thus, the game is a zero sum game and this led to his insight called \the size principle". This is the notion that coalitions must be minimal winning coalitions, so as to maximise the gains from forming them.

Traditionally the study of coalitions among political scientists has focused on post election coalitions between parties.4 In the interest of brevity and non duplication I will focus on work that is more recent and refer the interested reader to the reviews mentioned below.

Jackson and Moselle (2002) model the benefits of party formation in the context of a legislative bargaining game. They use the legislative bargaining game of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and extend it to the case where bargaining between legislators is taking place on two dimensions {a private good dimension and a public good dimension (whereas in the original legislative game bargaining was only over the distribution of a taxed amount of a private good. As in Levy (2002A) and Riviere (1999) the outcome of the game is compared when parties can form and when they cannot.

The main question, in the context of this chapter, is to examine whether the equilibrium outcomes of the legislative game are different with and without parties {the question we saw in Levy (2002A) above: are parties effective? In terms of the extension of the simple legislative game to two dimensions the equilibria show that the two dimensions interact in interesting ways, even though legislators' preferences are separable on the two dimensions. In short the motivation to form parties" or coalitions may be to increase the power of a legislators' ideology or to garner extra benefits for their own constituencies in the budgetary process (the distributive dimension).

So, what are the main insights that emerge from this survey of party formation?

The first important insight is that although most models of politics are uni- dimensional, it is not an innocuous assumption. Indeed the question of whether parties as an analytical construct are important to study may depend crucially on this assumption. Both Levy (2002A) and Jackson and Moselle (2002) show, in different settings that parties are effective when the issue space is multi-dimensional, and not necessarily when the issue space is uni-dimensional.

What are the motivations to forming parties? As aptly summarized by Strom (1990) the literature has focused on three main motivations: office seeking, policy seeking and vote seeking. Most of the models have similar motivating factors: economies of party size (Osborne and Tourky (2002), cost sharing (Riviere, (1999)), greater ability to commit to and obtain good policy positions (Levy (2002A), Morelli (2001), Jackson and Moselle (2002)). The costs to forming parties are the costs of compromise in many of the models.

Many of the papers focus on showing the conditions under which Duverger's (1954) Law holds. Thus e.g. Riviere (1999) shows the conditions under which two parties emerge endogenously in single district Plurality Rule elections while Morelli (2001) shows the configurations of voter preferences under which Duverger's (1954) hypothesis (that there are typically more parties under Proportional Representation than under Plurality Rule) is true.

What determines the number of parties? Among the authors for whom this is an endogenous variable: Levy (2002A) seems to suggest that it is the original partition of groups of citizens with identical preferences: her example 2 shows that when there are 3 groups, there will be two parties in equilibrium. In Morelli (2001) it is the electoral institution and the original preference distribution that predicts the number of parties that form, while in Austen Smith and Banks (1988) and Jackson and Moselle (2002) it is the legislative bargaining game and the gains from trade and ultimately the preference intensities of legislators that determine the number of legislative coalitions that will form. On the other hand some papers simply show the conditions under which a two party result emerges (e.g. Morelli (2001), Osborne and Tourky (2002)). Of course, while Osborne and Tourky (2002) have sufficient conditions that guarantee obtain duvergerian outcomes for every distribution of preferences and for every electoral system, Morelli (2001) shows that preferences and electoral systems determine everything.

In terms of predictions about which policy will ultimately be implemented {the asymmetric importance of the median is a common theme both in unidimensional and multi-dimensional models. Finally equilibrium concepts in most papers surveyed here were non cooperative, most called for sub game perfection. An exception is Levy (2002B) which explicitly uses some cooperative game theoretic equilibrium concepts as well. Jackson and Moselle (2002) use a combination approach {they employ the gnash bargaining solution as well as non cooperative bargaining in their model.

2.6 Definition of Terms

Political party

A political party is a political organization that seeks to attain political power within a government, usually by participating in electoral campaigns. Parties often espouse a certain ideology and vision, but may also represent a coalition among disparate interests. This is more common after elections using proportional representation rather than a "first past the post" system.

Parties are political institutions linking society and state. As such they are of the greatest political relevance to the relationships explored in this study. Not only are they a revealing reflection of state-society relationships but in the right circumstances they themselves may help to shape these relationships, that is, they can constitute an independent not merely a dependent political variable.

The great number and variety of parties make all attempts at definition perilous but the following is a good start. Parties are 'associations formally organized with the explicit and declared purpose of acquiring and/or maintaining legal control, either singly or in coalition or electoral competition with other similar associations over the personnel and the policy of the government of an actual or prospective sovereign state' (Coleman and Rosberg, 1964 : 2). Whilst this is helpful, clearly in the real world there are many ambiguous cases where parties overlap with social movements, civil society organizations or government institutions including the military (as in Iraq's Ba'ath Party).

Coalitions/alliances

A political alliance or political coalition is an agreement for cooperation between different political parties on common political agenda, often for purposes of contesting an election to mutually benefit by collectively clearing election thresholds or otherwise benefiting from characteristics of the voting system or for government formation after elections.

A coalition government is formed when a political alliance comes to power, or when only a plurality (not a majority) has not been reached and several parties must work together to govern.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

3.1 Procedure for Collecting Data

The study draws on both primary and secondary sources, including collection on political parties' formation, local news papers, websites, academic materials, collation, and analysis of available data on the political parties. In this study a two phased research was adopted, first researcher carried out preliminary reading of books, journals, and papers to gather basic information on the history and theory of political parties, the development of political parties, alliances and coalition in Kenya, history of the selected parties, and manifestos. The following were the main sources:

i. Information from the internet –websites
ii. Magazines and newspapers
iii. Books and academic journals
iv. Statutes
v. Constitutions, manifestos, and other publication of the selected political parties
vi. Reports from civil society actors

Questionnaire containing open and close –ended questionnaire will be administered in order to get personal accounts of on each individual views on Alliances. In – depth interviews will be done on key informants to get accurate information on reasons why Alliances can hold.

The second phase focused on the collection of primary data from members from the public. This involved administering a detailed questionnaire (see Appendix 1) on people's perceptions, opinions, thinking, and knowledge on the selected political parties under this study. One sampling site was selected -Sabatia constituency in Vihiga District is a densely populated constituency in the rural set and easily manageable because it is where l have my rural home and logistically it was easy to carry out the research.

Because of time factor the research focused on one constituency in Sabatia inVihiga District, its population according to 1999 census is 498,883 and an area of 563 sq km, it was split from the larger Kakamega District in 1990.

The large Vihiga is situated in Western Province of Kenya , Vihiga District is one of the eight districts that make up Western Province Sabatia constituency was strong hold of KANU party before the multiparty system was introduced in Kenya. According to the 1999 census the population is 117,863. Currently the constituency has supporters of different political parties, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (FORD-K), Kenya African National Union (KANU), Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and Kenya African Democratic Development Union (KADDU).

3.2 The Population

Sabatia Constituency is located in Vihiga District covering an area of 110 square kilometres. The total population of Sabatia Constituency is estimated to be 133,310. Therefore, the target population will comprise of adults above 18 years in all the six locations and 52 sub locations.

3.3 The Sample

This section will look at the sample size of each location with its population per sex, total accumulative, cumulative per population over 18 years and selected sub-location at random sampling.

The study used random sampling because a sampling frame of the individual sub-locations is not possible at the same time it will be waste of time. Sabatia constituency is divided into six locations: Wodanga, Busali east, Busali West, Chavakali, Izava, and North Maragoli.

The sub-locations in this case will be used as the cluster and at least on sub-location from each location will be included. The sample size needed will be divided with six locations to know the number needed per sub location.

For each cluster one Location will be selected as a starting point, and consequent Sub-locations visited till the number of sub-locations needed per location is achieved. To choose starting point, a central place will be chosen and the key will be thrown up and the direction of the opening side will point on the landing will be considered.

The purpose of sampling will be to get informants who will include Chiefs, Assistant Chiefs, Counsellors, politicians and community opinion leaders. Purposeful sampling affords the researcher the discretion to sample participants based on participants being in position to give context rich and reliable information.

3.4 Research Design

This is a case study of a form of political institution, political parties, linking society and state. There is a great variety and number of political parties in developing countries; there has also been a tendency to study them in terms of western experience. By the 1980s the consensus was that their political role was marginal, although since then there has been a growing emphasis on their role in democratization. This case study considers the main features and sub-types of political parties in developing countries; it explores their interaction in party systems; it examines the way that parties relate to their 'social base' and civil society organizations; and it analyses parties' political role, in particular their contribution or otherwise to the building of democracy.

3.5 Procedures for Analysis of the Data

The qualitative data will be recorded in tapes using recorders and the tapes will be transcribed then translated. If possible for qualitative data statistics package for social

scientist will be used to analyse the data. Content analysis (identifying, coding, and categorizing the primary patterns in the data) will take place.

CHAPTER FOUR: OVERALL OUTCOMES AND ANALYSIS

4.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the analysis and findings from the data collected from the field based on the specific objectives. The analysis was presented in form of tables, frequencies and percentages.

4.2 Background Information

Table 4.1 Age of the Respondents

	Frequency	Percent
18-40 years	960	64
Above 40 years	540	36
Total	1500	100

In the above table, the researcher sought to investigate the age of the respondents in Sabatia constituency. From the findings, the researcher found out that the majority of the respondents as shown by 64% were 18-40 years old; while 36% of the respondents said that they were above 40 years.

Table 4.2 Respondent's gender

	Frequency	Percent
Male	990	66
Female	510	33
Total	1500	100

The above table shows the findings on the gender of the respondents. From the findings, the study revealed that the majority of the respondents as shown by 66% were males, while 33% of the respondents were females.

Table 4.3 Respondent's highest level of education

	Frequency	Percent
No education	102	6.8
Primary	260	17.3
Secondary	566	37.7
College	350	23.4
University	222	14.8
Total	1500	100

The study also investigated on the highest level of education that the respondents had attained. From the findings, the majority of respondents as shown by 37.7% were secondary school leavers, 23.4% had gone up to college level, 17.3% were primary school leavers, 14.8% were university graduates, while 6.8% had no education at all.

Of the respondents who were university graduates, 20% of them were between 18-40 years of age and the majority of them were males, while the majority of the respondents who had no education at all were females and the majority of them were found to be over 40 years of age.

Occupation of the respondents

The occupation of the respondents was also investigated in the study where the majority of the respondents said that they were peasant farmers. Other respondents said that they were in occupations such as masonry, carpentry, mechanics, while quite majority of the respondents who had gone up to college and university levels of education were also in professional occupations such as teaching, clerks, nurses, doctors and also bankers.

4.3 Political Parties

Understanding of the term political party by the respondents

The understanding of the term political party by the majority of respondents was that they are associations formally organized with a purpose of acquiring and or maintaining legal control, either singly or in coalition with other similar associations, over the personnel and the policy of the government of an actual state.

Table 4.4 Whether the respondents belong to any political party

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	1238	82.5
No	262	17.5
Total	1500	100

In the above table, the researcher sought to investigate on whether the respondents in Sabatia constituency belong to any political party.

From the findings, it was clear that the majority of the respondents as indicated by 82.5% belong to a certain political party, while 17.5% of the respondents said that they did no belong to any political party.

If yes, the political party

The political party that was found to be dominant in Sabatia constituency was Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) as was shown by 56% of the respondents followed by Party of National Unity (PNU) as was shown by 30% of the respondents. Other respondents said that they were in political parties such as Democracy-Kenya (FORD-K), Kenya African Democratic Development Union (KADDU) and Kenya African National Union (KANU),

Reasons for being in the political party

The researcher also requested the respondents to state their reasons of being in their respective political parties.

The majority of respondents said that the reason for being in their respective political party was the current euphoria i.e. following the majority for example the majority of people in Sabatia constituency could have been in Orange Democratic Movement because of the move by the majority of people and hence the majority of respondents were influenced by that current move.

Others said that they were in their political parties because of self actualisation-this means that some people were in certain political parties to feel that they belong to that party whether the party was famous or not.

A few respondents also said that they were in their political parties because one of their relatives was a candidate of that political party and hence they had to be in that particular political party.

Table 4.5 Whether political parties are necessary

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	1350	90
No	150	10
Total	1500	100

In the above table, the researcher sought to investigate from the respondents whether political parties are necessary.

From the findings in the table, the researcher found out that political parties were necessary as was indicated by 90% of respondents, while 10% of the respondents thought that they were not necessary.

Table 4.6 Appropriately the number of times that the respondents have ever voted

	Frequency	Percent
Once	312	20.8
Twice	624	41.6
Thrice	245	16.3
Four times	192	12.8
Never voted	127	8.5
Total	1500	100.0

The study also investigated on the number of times that the respondents in Sabatia constituency have ever voted.

From the findings in the above table, it was clear that the majority of respondents had voted twice as indicated by 41.6%, where the majority said that they voted in 2002 and 2007. 20.8% said that they had voted only once where majority of this group said that they voted only in 2007, 16.7% of the respondents said three times which means that they started voting in 1997, 12.8% said that they had voted four times which means that they had been voting since 1992, while a small proportion of respondents said that they had never voted at all.

Understanding of the term "party manifesto" by the respondents

From the majority of respondents understanding, the term party manifesto meant the document that contains the promises, intentions or favors that a particular political party candidate intends do to its member in case that political party takes the power.

Knowledge of what is contained in party manifesto

Asked whether they knew what is contained in their party manifesto, the majority of respondents comprising of 56% said that they were not aware of what was contained in their party manifesto, they only hear the oral promises that the candidates in their parties give and they do not know whether the same is in the party manifesto, while 44% of the respondents said that they knew what was contained in their party manifesto.

Table 4.7 Whether the party that the respondents belong to really follow what is stated in the manifesto

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	546	36.4
No	954	63.6
Total	1500	100.0

In the above table, the researcher requested the respondents to state whether the party that the respondents belong to really follow what is stated in the manifesto. From the findings in the table, it was clear that the majority of the parties do not really follow what was stated in the manifesto after they get into power as was indicated by 63.6% of the respondents, while 36.4% of the respondents said that their party follow what as stated in the manifesto.

Whether political parties are relevant today

The study also sought to investigate from the respondents on whether political parties are relevant today.

From the findings, the majority of respondents comprising of 80% were of the view that political parties were important. This was due to the fact that political parties open peoples mind and help them to argue wisely/rationally as far as politics are concerned. Political parties also gives people a sense of belonging that is someone feels appreciated by a particular group of people who belong to the same political party.

20% of the respondents felt that political parties were not relevant. The majority of the respondents said that this was because a political party does not reflect the characters of its members or its candidates and therefore they do not find political parties relevant.

4.4 Party Coalitions and Alliances

Understanding of political alliance/coalition by the respondents
The understanding of the respondents on political alliance/coalition was different. One of the meaning was that it is an oriented arrangement, especially a temporary one, that allows distinct parties pool resources and combine efforts in order to effect change. The combination of such parties to form one party, as a union, variously organized and structured, but generally less formal than a covenant. Although parties form coalitions for many and varied reasons, the most common purpose is to combat a common threat or to take advantage of a certain opportunity; hence, the often-temporary nature of coalitions.

Others understaood political alliance/coalition as an *ad hoc* grouping of political parties for a specific purpose and such poliotical parties are diverse and are characterized by some degree of commonalities.

Generally the understanding of political alliance/coalition by the respondents was that this is a group political parties uniting behind a common goal.

Relevance of political parties

Majority of the respondents indicated by 67% were of the opinion that political alliances were relevant as they brought many political parties together and hence unity in their job. A political alliance also helps bring ideas together, that is, each political party has its own ideas

and all these ideas brought together are stronger than an idea of only one political party these respondents were of the opinion that political parties should form alliances.

The other reason that made the respondents view alliances as relevant was the fact that in Kenya today, it is very hard for one party to win an election and therefore to win an election political parties in Kenya have found it relevant to form alliances. This strengthens the parties in terms of coverage, and regional representation. In summary, a coalition/alliance formed on the basis of regional representation will have a higher advantage to win an election. While 33% of the respondents thought that political alliances were not relevant, and they were of the opinion that political parties should not form alliances.

Effect of alliances on democracy
The researcher also requested the respondents to give their opinions on whether political alliances weaken or strengthen democracy. The majority of respondents were of the opinion that political alliances strengthen democracy. The reasons advanced included the fact that the alliances, being a conglomerate of political parties, have manifestos of the affiliate political parties merged to form a manifesto for the coalition. This therefore means that the interests of all the affiliate parties are taken care of in the coalition and hence the interests of members of different parties (Wananchi).

The respondents who were of the opinion that alliances weaken democracy had very valid reasons that border on the tenets of multiparty democracy. One of the reasons was that as coalitions are formed, especially after elections, the opposition is weakened. This poses a problem because it points to a one party state rather than a multi party democracy. With a weak or no opposition, there exists no one to check the activities of the coalition government. But this problem can be corrected if the structure of the coalition is formed such that the parties joining the coalition are not denied their right to voice their concerns in the coalition.

Challenges that face political party alliances/coalitions
The respondents identified numerous challenges that face party alliances/coalitions. One of the challenges was that coalitions are bound to be faced leadership wrangles. Leaders of

different political parties come with different personal interests in the coalitions that are usually advanced in terms of positions in the coalition. If the positions are not fairly distributed among the political parties forming coalition, then wrangles might ensue. This happens in pre and post election coalitions.

The political parties also join coalitions with different expectations. If these expectations are not met, then the party that feels short-changed might opt to move out of the coalition. Thus, coalitions are always faced with the challenge of ensuring that the expectation all the expectations/interests of all the political parties that form the coalition are met so that no dissenting views are expressed.

Contents of a party manifesto

The respondents argued that to improve the economic, social and political life of the people in the constituency, there should be emphasis on poverty reduction; health of the people in the constituency, and also emphasis on education should be included in the manifesto. According to the respondents, these were the three areas that the respondents felt that they are not emphasised in the manifestos and they also felt that they were very important as far as their welfare was concerned.

CHAPTER FIVE: GENERAL DISCUSSIONS CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Introduction

From the analysis and data collected the following discussions, conclusions and recommendations were made. The response was based on the objectives of the study.

5.2 Summary

The researcher intended to obtain response on the political party formation and alliances. From the research, the researcher found out that the majority of respondents were males as was indicated by 64%, and they were males as shown by 66. It was also clear that the majority of the respondents had secondary education as their highest level of education, and it was also evident that of the respondents who were university graduates, 20% of them were between 18-40 years of age and the majority of them were males, while the majority of the respondents who had no education at all were females and the majority of them were found to be over 40 years of age.

The researcher found out that political parties according to the understanding of the majority of respondents were associations formally organized with a purpose of acquiring and or maintaining legal control, either singly or in coalition with other similar associations, over the personnel and the policy of the government of an actual state. Majority of respondents comprising of 82.5% belong to a certain political party and the dominant political party in Sabatia constituency was Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) as was shown by 56% of the respondents. The reasons suggested by the respondents for being in their respective political parties were; current euphoria that is following the majority, and self actualisation which means a feeling one belongs to a certain political party whether the party was famous or not and the majority of respondents shown by 90% felt that political parties were necessary. From the findings the researcher found out that the majority of respondents had voted twice as indicated by 41.6%, where the majority said that they voted in 2002 and 2007.

The term party manifesto according to the understanding of the majority of respondents is a document that contains the promises, intentions or favours that a particular political party candidate intends do to its member in case that political party takes the power. From the study, it was clear that the majority of respondents were not aware of what was contained in their party manifesto as was indicated by 56% and it was also evident that the majority of the parties do not really follow what was stated in the manifesto after they get into power as was indicated by 63.6% of the respondents. Asked whether political parties are relevant today, the majority of the respondents shown by 80% were of the opinion that they relevant.

On the party alliances and coalitions, the respondents were asked to give their understanding on this and they understood it as an oriented arrangement, especially a temporary one, that allows distinct parties pool resources and combine efforts in order to effect change and others felt that it is an *ad hoc* grouping of political parties for a specific purpose and such political parties are diverse and are characterized by some degree of commonalities and according to the majority of respondents shown by 67%, political alliances were vieved to be relevant by people of Sabatia constituency. This could have been due to the fact that political alliances/coalitions political alliances strengthen democracy because alliances, being a conglomerate of political parties, they have manifestos of the affiliate political parties merged to form a manifesto for the coalition. This therefore means that the interests of all the affiliate parties are taken care of in the coalition and hence the interests of members of different parties or people.

The challenges that face political party alliances/coalitions were found by the researcher to be; leaders of different political parties come with different personal interests in the coalitions that are usually advanced in terms of positions in the coalition. If the positions are not fairly distributed among the political parties forming coalition, then wrangles might ensue and also the political parties also join coalitions with different expectations. If these expectations are not met, then the party that feels short-changed might opt to move out of the coalition. Thus, coalitions are always faced with the challenge of ensuring that the expectation all the expectations/interests of all the political parties that form the coalition are met so that no dissenting views are expressed.

The researcher also found out from the respondents (people of Sabatia Constituency) that to improve the economic, social and political life of the people in the constituency, there should be emphasis on poverty reduction; health of the people in the constituency, and also emphasis on education should be included in the manifesto.

5.3 Conclusions

From the findings in chapter four and discussions in this chapter, it can be concluded that political parties are very relevant in that they help the citizens of a country to have a belonging politically. Political alliances/coalitions are very relevant due to the fact that they strengthen democracy because alliances, being a conglomerate of political parties, they have manifestos of the affiliate political parties merged to form a manifesto for the coalition.

This therefore means that the interests of all the affiliate parties are taken care of in the coalition and hence the interests of members of different parties or people. Political alliances also being a conglomerate of political parties have manifestos of the affiliate political parties merged to form a manifesto for the coalition. This therefore means that the interests of all the affiliate parties are taken care of in the coalition and hence the interests of members of different parties and communities are well represented.

5.4 Recommendations

From the findings in chapter four and the conclusions in this chapter, the researcher then concluded that people in Sabatia constituency should be well made aware of what is contained in the party manifestos and that the political parties should really follow what is in these manifestos after they get into power.

It was also concluded that for the improvement of the economic, social and political life of the people in Sabatia constituency, there should be emphasis on poverty reduction; health of the people in the constituency, education should be included in the manifesto.

5.5. Limitation of study

The sample-covered people in Sabatia constituency where some few people were illiterate, and the researcher had to interpret all the questions to majority of the respondents and others claimed to be just busy with their daily livelihood activities and l had to adjust my schedule for interviews. This took many days and also a lot funds especially the transport costs as the research took many days. Some of the respondents were also not willing to provide the required information and some had to be continuously reminded and even persuaded to provide the required information.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Field Research Questionnaire

Section A: Background information

1. What is your age?

   18-40   [   ]

   Above 40   [   ]

2. What is your gender

   Male   [   ]

   Female   [   ]

3. What is your highest level of education

   No education   [   ]

   Primary   [   ]

   Secondary   [   ]

   College   [   ]

   University   [   ]

4. What is your occupation?

   …………………………………………………………………………………………………
   ……………..

5. What is the name of your constituency

   …………………………………………………………………………………………………
   ……………….

Section B: Political Parties

6. What do you understand by the term political party?

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....

....

7. Do you belong to any political party?

Yes   [   ]

No   [   ]

8. If yes in 7 above, which one?

……

……………….

9. What reason do you have for being in the party? (**respond only if your answer in 7 above is yes**)

....

....

....

10. In your view are political parties necessary?

Yes   [   ]

No   [   ]

11. Please provide reasons for your answer in 10 above.

....

....

....

12. Please mark appropriately the years you have ever voted.

1992   [   ]

1997   [   ]

2002   [   ]

Never   [   ]

13. What do you understand by "party manifesto"?

....
....
....

14. Do you know what is contained in your party manifesto?

…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………

15. Do the party you belong to really follow what is stated in the manifesto? If yes what examples do you have?

Yes   [   ]

No   [   ]

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…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………

16. Do you think political parties are relevant today? Please provide reasons for your thoughts.

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....
....

Section C: Party Coalitions and Alliances

17. What do you understand by political alliance/coalition?

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18. Do you think that political alliances are relevant? Please explain your response.

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19. Do you think that political parties should form alliances? Give reason for your response.

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20. Do you think that political party alliances weaken or strengthen democracy? Please elaborate on your response.

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21. What challenges face political party alliances/coalitions?

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22. What do you think should be included or be emphasised in the party manifesto that can improve the economic, social and political life of the people in your constituency?

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……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………

Appendix II: Registered Political Parties in Kenya as at July 2007

1.   Party of Independent Candidates of Kenya (PICK)

2.   National Patriotic Party of Kenya (NPPK)

3.   Green African Party (GAP)

4.   United Patriotic Party of Kenya (UPPK)

5.   Mazingira Green Party of Kenya (Formerly Liberal Party of Kenya)

6.   Safina Party

7.   Forum for Restoration of Democracy for the People (Ford People)

8.   Kenya African National Union (KANU)

9.   Kenya Social Congress

10.   Kenya National Democratic Alliance (KENDA)

11.   Kenya National Congress
12.   Democratic Assistance Party

13.   Federal Party of Kenya

14.   Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD Asili)

15.   Democratic Party of Kenya

16.   New People Democratic Party

17.   Forum for Restoration Democracy (FORD Kenya)

18.   Kenya Nationalist Peoples Democratic Party

19.   Social Democratic Party of Kenya
20.   Kenya Socialist Party

21.   People's Party of Kenya

22.   Shirikisho Party of Kenya

23.   Kenya Republican Reformation Party

24.   Reform Party of Kenya

25.   The Labour Party of Kenya.

26.   The Peoples Solidarity Union of Kenya

27.   National Alliance Party (formerly National Democratic Independent Union)

28.   People Democratic Union of Kenya

29.   National Conservative Party of Kenya

30.   United Democrats of People and Integrity in Kenya (UDPI)

31.   National Labour Party

32.   Chama Cha Uma Party

33.   United Kenya Citizen Party

34.   Liberal Democratic Party

35.   Social Party for Advancement and Reforms –Kenya (SPARK)

36.   Chama Cha Majimbo na Mwangaza

37.   Sisi Kwa Sisi Party of Kenya

38.   Mass Party of Kenya

39.   Wakulima Party of Kenya (formerly United Agri- Party)

40.   Republican Party of Kenya

41.   Kenya African Democratic Development Union (KADDU)

42.   National Rainbow Coalition NARC

43.   United Peoples Party (UPP)

44.   National Progressive Party

45.   Kenya Citizen Congress

46.   Kenya Peoples Party

47.   Kenya Patriotic Trust Party

48.   Social Peoples Party and Congress

49.   Saba Saba Asili Party

50.   Liberal Alliance Coalition of Kenya

51.   United Democratic Movement

52.   National Party of Kenya

53.   Peoples Action Party of Kenya

54.   Pan African Reparations Movement

55.   Peoples Party of Progress

56.   Orange Democratic Movement Party of Kenya

57.   New Kanu Alliance Party of Kenya

58.   NARC Kenya

59.   AGANO Party

60.   United People's Congress (UPC)

61.   Wazalendo Party

62.   Orange Democratic Movement –Kenya

63.   Chama Cha Mwananchi

64.   Democratic Representative Party

65.   New Aspiration Party

66.   Kenya Alliance for National Unity

67.   Movement for Democratic Advancement Party of Kenya

68.   Growth and Development Party

69.   Republican Liberal Party

70.   Liberal Democratic Movement

71.   Congress of Democracy

72.   Kenya Union of National Alliance for Peace

73.   Generations Alliance Party of Kenya

74.   Restoration Democrats of Kenya

75.   Progressive Party of Kenya

76.   Forum for Republican Party

77. Republican Alliance Party of Kenya

78. Pan African Assemblies

79. National Star Party of Kenya

80. VIPA Progressive Alliance

81. Kenya African Democratic Union Asili

82. Peoples Patriotic Party of Kenya

83. Communal Democracy Party of Kenya

84. Citizen Democratic Party

85. National Dynamic Development Party

86. Peoples Democratic Party

87. New Democrats

88. National Renewal Peoples Party

89. Chama Cha Uzalendo

90. Forum for Orange Democratic Change Party

91. Pambazuka Party of Kenya

92. New Ford Kenya

93. Universal Democratic Party of Kenya

94. Community Development Party

95. National Integration Party of Kenya

96. Kenya Peoples Convention Party

97. Kifagio Party of Kenya

98. Jubilie Peoples Party of Kenya

99. Rainbow Orange Alliance

100. Moral Integrity Party

101. New Revival Generation Party

102. Democratic Reformation Party of Kenya