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**American Civil War:
History of the Ninth Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry:
1861-1865**

A Narrative

A Dissertation Submitted To
The School Of Social and Human Studies
In Candidacy for the Degree Of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of History

ATLANTIC INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
MIAMI, FLORIDA
Spring 2006

Friday, January 06, 2006



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ABSTRACT

Of the three hundred hardest fighting regiments in the American Civil War, the Ninth Indiana Voluntary Infantry Regiment, known as the Bloody Ninth, is the least written about of all the fighting regiments. Only one small newspaper article was written about the Ninth Indiana, even though amount it ranks was one of the great authors of his time, Ambrose Brice. This Dissertation will trace the history of the Civil War in the West, its affect on United States and Indiana politics as seen through the eyes of the men of the Bloody Ninth from April 1861 to September 1865. In summary, this dissertation will follow the Ninth Indiana Regiment through the major battles fought in the western theater where the American Civil War was won by the Union forces.

Chapter 1

THREE MONTH SERVICE

The election of Abraham Lincoln on November 6, 1860² triggered southern secession as the only way in which to preserve the southern agricultural economy, and the southern way of life. To enforce the secession from the Union action had to be taken, less inaction would cause reconstruction by default. It would happen at Fort Sumter.

Fort Sumter stood on a man-made island four miles from downtown Charleston at the entrance to Charleston bay. The fort was new and was still under construction when South Carolina voted for secession. With its 146 big guns, it could stop any ship from entering or leaving the harbor, although only two of the big guns were in place when they were ultimately needed. The Fort had become a commanding symbol of national sovereignty in the very cradle of secession, a symbol that the Confederate government could not tolerate if it wished its own sovereignty to be recognized by the world. On April 12th at 4:30 a.m. Edmund Ruffin, a sixty-seven year old farm-paper editor and old-line secessionist pulled a lanyard and the first shot of the war burst over Fort Sumter. The Confederates spent thirty-three hours and used four thousand shot and shells that destroyed part of the fort and set the interior on fire. The fort's commander was able to man only a few of Sumter's mounted guns, and had fired a thousand rounds in reply; most without effect. The Union's exhausted garrison surrendered on April 14th with the Union flag being replaced over Fort Sumter by the "Stars and Bars" of the newly

All reference notes listed within this text above number 200 will be found at the end of the Dissertation after the bibliography.

² Abraham Lincoln's won the 1860 Presidential election by winning only in the free states. The elections results: Bell, 588,879; Breckinridge, 849,781; Douglas, 1,376,957; Lincoln, 1,866,452. The combined votes of Lincoln's opponents outnumbered his own by almost a million; he would be a minority President.

adopted flag of the Confederate government.³ The garrison of seven officers and seventy-six enlisted men marched out of the fort with the honors of war, and were sent north.²⁰¹ Four bloody years were to pass before the U.S. flag flew again over Fort Sumter: raised on the anniversary of its surrender by the same Robert Anderson (then General) who hauled it down.

The North realized that it needed to quickly raise an army. A day after the surrender of Fort Sumter, Lincoln issued a proclamation calling for 75,000 militia to serve against "combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceeding." This proclamation was not an act of war against the Confederacy, for only Congress could declare war and Congress was not in session at the time of Lincoln's proclamation. Lincoln set the term of service for only ninety days because Federal law limited how long troops could serve without Congressional action. Lincoln then called an emergency session of Congress for July 1.²⁰²

With the proclamation came the militia draft which apportioned the number of troops to be forwarded by each state not in rebellion. To offset Lincoln's call for troops, the Confederate government a day later voted conscription, affecting all white males eighteen to thirty-five years old, who were to serve for three years unless exempted.



Indiana, in the decade before the Civil War, was a rural, agricultural state, seventh in the nation in population. Only 4.5 percent of Indiana's population lived in cities of more than 2,500 persons, with Madison (population of 9,000) the largest city in the State. The largest

³ The Confederate Congress adopted a flag consisting of a red field with a white stripe in the middle third and a blue jack with a circle of white stars going two-thirds of the way down the flag.

concentration of people was still in the towns along the Ohio River with New Albany and Jeffersonville having a combined population of slightly more than 10,000. Indianapolis, the capital city, located in the center of the state, had slightly over 8,000 inhabitants.²⁰³ Most newcomers to the state settled in the central part, where farmlands were superior to those in the southern part where many counties were hilly, extremely rocky and less fertile. The northern part of the state was the least populated and its citizens considered by others in the state, as "backwoodsmen."

With a growing population, Indiana was showing evidence of a feeling of western sectionalism. Most of the early settlers had come from the South, primarily Kentucky and Tennessee and economic ties with that region were very close. The bonds between Indiana and the East were less substantial, as Indiana tended to look with suspicion and resentment upon the more sophisticated, cultivated and industrial east. These feelings were intensified by the patronizing attitude which easterners adopted toward Indiana. Yankees enjoyed poking fun at Hoosiers by emphasizing their general backwardness. Even with historically close ties to the South and some dislike for the East, Indiana had a very strong pro-union bias.²⁰⁴

The high rate of illiteracy in the population was a source of embarrassment for the state, yet the state government gave little support for public education. The reluctance of lawmakers to spend money in the late 1850s on public services was partially a reaction against lavish expenditures of public money on ill-fated internal improvement programs during the 1830-40s which had nearly bankrupted the State, forcing a constitutional convention in 1850-1851 to deal with the crises.

Most of the northern part of the state was lawless, a carryover from the pioneer era in

which every one was compelled to fend for himself with neither aid or hindrance from government. Lawlessness led to the formation of vigilante committees and mob law was common. This type of citizen action was even given legal sanction by a law passed in 1852 which authorized the formation of companies "for the detection and apprehension of horse thieves and other felons."²⁰⁵ Under this law, companies of private individuals were allowed to organize and were given the rights and privileges of arrest. By 1859 thirty-eight companies of "Regulators" were formed, most numerous in the sparsely settled counties in the north.²⁰⁶ The law, not surprisingly, appears to have led to an increase in mob activity where secret societies regulated the morals of the communities and intimidated the citizens who were afraid to restrain them. In 1859 Governor Ashbel P. Willard reported to the legislature that many associations had been formed under the Horse Thief Law and had arrested and punished individuals without bringing them to trial in regular courts of justice. He insisted that it be stopped and the law repealed, and spoke of the "cruelties, murders and unrelenting inhumanities" perpetrated under the law. He used as an example an incident in 1858 where one group of Noble County Regulators apprehended an alleged murderer. After "a full and fair investigation" they determined that he was guilty and ordered him to be hanged. On the day of the hanging three hundred men on horseback assembled carrying banners, one of them containing a picture of the captured criminal and the words, "No expense to the county." The General Assembly paid no heed to the Governor's request and the law remained. Many of the Regulators were Indiana's leading citizens and legislators, who believed they were rendering great service to their community by protecting property under the law.²⁰⁷

If the state and local governments performed few services, the role of the federal

government was even more limited. In politics Indiana was normally a Democratic state, and the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian tradition of strict interpretation of the Constitution was prevalent. The philosophy of the Democratic Party emphasized states' rights, and many deplored the "vast machinery of the national Government," and especially the increased expenditure of money by Congress. Democrats favored limited government, economy, a low tariff, and opposition to monopolies.²⁰⁸

The State was extremely religious; the Methodist and Baptist denominations were by far the most numerous, but there was a substantial number of Presbyterians, who probably exerted an influence out of proportion to their numbers. Members of the recently founded Disciples of Christ or Christian Church were fourth in number, and Quakers were less numerous but were influential in parts of the state. Religion and the Bible were certainly powerful influences in shaping attitudes toward the great issues of the day. The churches were deeply involved in the controversy over slavery and the related questions of the status of the Blacks in society.²⁰⁹

Because of its close ties with the South, Indiana was more tolerant of slavery and less aroused by the antislavery movement than were most people in other northern states. It is probably more accurate to describe the dominant attitude in Indiana as neither pro-slavery nor anti-slavery but as anti-Black. There were few persons who wanted to see slavery introduced into the state, but there was widespread and intense racial prejudice and fear of the competition of Black labor. This fear was due in part to the fact that a large part of the population of Indiana came from the non-slave holding class of southern whites. The result was a prescriptive code designed to keep the small Black population in an inferior position, and to prevent the settlement of Blacks from the slave states. The severity of the Black Laws, which were copied in large part

from the codes of southern states, was remarkable in view of the small size of the Black population, which at no time before the Civil War constituted more than one percent of the total population.²¹⁰ In the Constitutional Convention of 1850-1851 there was sentiment in favor of denying Blacks the right to acquire land in the state. The proposal was not adopted, but an article was incorporated in the proposed constitution which prohibited Blacks from coming into the state to settle. This was Article XIII which was submitted to the voters separately,²¹¹ and was ratified by a larger margin than the main body of the Constitution.⁴

Because of this prejudice against Blacks, Indiana was slow to grasp the anti-slavery movement. Numerous local anti-slavery societies were formed, mostly by the Quakers. The Baptist organizations were so decentralized, it is difficult to determine to what extent Baptists were involved in the anti-slavery movement. Presbyterians and Methodists were divided and in most of these denominations, anti-slavery men appear to have constituted a radical minority. The majority of the members of the Disciples of Christ sought to avoid direct involvement in the slavery controversy.²¹²

As was to be expected, both major political parties in the late 1840's tried to find a position on slavery which would offend as few people as possible. Indiana Democrats and Whigs took the stand that the compromises in the U.S. Constitution were sufficient. The equivocal position of the major parties was unacceptable to anti-slavery Whigs and Democrats alike, who in 1848 formed a new party called the "Free Soil" party. In the 1848 elections, the "Free Soil" party showed surprising strength, especially for a new party. By the beginning of the

⁴ Ohio had Black Laws similar to those enacted in Indiana, but they were repealed in 1849, and the Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1840 failed to adopt an exclusion article. Illinois, on the other hand, had Black Laws which equaled in their severity the laws of Indiana.

1850s, in an effect to off-set the gains the "Free Soil" party had made, both major parties embraced the principles of opposition to the extension of slavery,

At the same time that anti-slavery forces were gaining strength in their effort to convince men of the evils of slavery and the need for political action to extirpate it, a crusade was being waged against strong drink. Many of the same people who opposed slavery were also identified with the temperance movement. Fraternal organizations picked up the call for temperance. In 1844 the Indiana Grand Lodge of the Masonic Order condemned the "intemperate use of Spirits."²¹³

In the early 1850s, large numbers of Whigs moved into the "American Party," popularly known as the "Know Nothings" because members were pledged to secrecy. This party was founded in a response to the immigration of large numbers of Irish and Germans into the State, a majority of whom were Roman Catholics. By 1850 55,000 had immigrated into Indiana, and by 1860 the number of immigrants had doubled. The "Know Nothings" program was strongly anti-Catholic, embracing hostility to alleged papal influence in politics and education.

By 1854 the anti-slavery Democrats, temperance Democrats, Know Nothings, Free Soil men and Whigs joined in a coalition to topple the regular Democrats. They formed a new party known as the "Peoples Party." Too many, the 1854 campaign was a great moral crusade, and the Democrats committed a serious blunder during the campaign by attacking the opposition for their anti-slavery sentiments and their crusade to prohibit liquor. The attacks strengthened the impression that the campaign was indeed a contest between the forces of good and evil. In the election this new coalition won a smashing victory. They elected the entire ticket of state officers and won the House, although Democrats would continue to control the Senate by two

votes. A study of the outcome of the legislative contests showed the development of a new sectional character in state politics, as well as a realignment of political strengths. Only the counties in the extreme south remained a Democratic stronghold.²¹⁴

The most immediate fruit of the coalition victory was the enactment of the prohibition law, which absolutely prohibited the manufacture and sale of whisky.²¹⁵ The joy of the temperance forces over the 1855 law was of short duration, as the Indiana Supreme Court found the law unconstitutional.²¹⁶ After this decision the temperance question ceased to be important for several years, as the People's Party was making strenuous efforts to cultivate the German vote that were generally anti-temperance.²¹⁷

In 1856 the coalition continued to use the name of People's Party even though they sent delegates to the Republican national convention. They nominated thirty-two year old Oliver P. Morton of Wayne County for the governor. He had been a Democrat until 1854. The campaign was conducted with intensity probably unequalled in any earlier contest. Democrats charged that Morton was an abolitionist and amalgamationist, bent on giving full social and political equality to Blacks. Girls in white dresses paraded with banners bearing the plea, "Fathers, save us from Nigger husbands!" In the election, the Democrat Abel P. Willard defeated Morton by a little less than 6,000 votes and carried the rest of the state's Democratic ticket to victory.²¹⁸

By 1858 the People's Party had finally taken the name Republican, and it dropped all planks which even hinted at Know Nothing principles, anti-immigration or anti-Catholic reflections. To prove the point, two persons of foreign birth were nominated for state office. Morton and most Republicans campaigned almost exclusively on the free-Kansas or anti-

Lecompton issue as it became known.⁵ Election results seemed to show that this was a sound strategy as the Republicans won seven seats in the United States House of Representatives, two more than in 1856.²¹⁹

By 1860 Republicans had overthrown the supremacy of the long-entrenched Democratic Party and emerged as a party numerically as strong as or stronger than their rival.²²⁰ Large numbers of Democrats had joined their ranks as concern over slavery and temperance had a stronger emotional appeal than older questions like the tariff. However Republicans did not intend that victory should elude them in the gubernatorial race in 1860 as it did four years before because of the taint of radicalism or abolitionism and humanitarian concern for the Blacks. Most Republicans believed that the best course was to subordinate slavery to other issues of that nature.²²¹

The leading contenders for the gubernatorial nominations were Morton and Henry S. Lane. Morton had carried the burden in the last election and had strong backing, but so did Lane. A compromise was worked out whereby Lane was nominated for the Governorship while Morton accepted the Lieutenant Governorship, with the understanding that if Republicans gained control of the legislature, they would elect Lane to the United States Senate and Morton would automatically succeed to the governorship.²²²

The Democratic platform deplored sectional political parties in one plank while endorsing the Dred Scott decision in another. For Governor the Democrats nominated Thomas A. Hendricks, a lawyer, past United States House of Representatives member, and

⁵ In Kansas in 1857 proslavery territorial government which was regarded as having been elected by the most glaring frauds, held a convention at Lecompton and drew up a constitution protecting slavery and providing for a system of ratification which made it impossible for the voters to abolish slavery completely. President Buchanan, eager to resolve the Kansas question supported for the Lecompton constitution.

Commissioner of the General Land Officer. Only forty years old in 1860, Hendricks was destined to become a United States Senator, Governor, and Vice-President.²²³

Lane preferred to campaign on questions other than slavery, and sought forcibly to impress upon the public that the Republicans were not abolitionists or "Niger Lovers."²²⁴ Lane asserted that he intended to abide by all the compromises in the Constitution on slavery, "and if the most extreme Southerner from South Carolina would be here, he would ask no more than this." Morton on the other hand emphasized the slavery issue more strongly and was somewhat less cautious. He argued, "Slavery is a moral, social, and political evil, that [it] is a curse to many people, a foe to progress, and enemy of education and intelligence, and an element of social and political weakness ..."²²⁵

The Republican campaign was marked by the expenditure of more money than in any previous campaign, and in the October state elections, these expenditures showed results with a substantial victory for Lane, Morton and the Republican legislative candidates.²²⁶ Republicans again won seven of the Congressional seats while Democrats retained control of the four seats they had won in 1858, all of them in districts in the southern part of the State. In the November election, Republican Abraham Lincoln carried the State winning a clear majority over his three opponents.²²⁷

It should be noted that Democrats in the waning stages of the campaign warned that a victory by the sectional Republican Party would inaugurate a strife which must end either in civil war or a peaceful division of the Union. The Democrats proved to be prophets when South Carolina announced one month later that she was severing her bonds with the Union.²²⁸

In January 1861, Lane was elected to the Senate and Morton succeeded him as governor

in accordance with the agreement made before the election. Morton in his first public address as Governor said he was there "to denounce treason and uphold the cause of the Union." He warned against encouraging the southern secessionists by giving the impression that the North was divided and undecided and called upon all men, regardless of party affiliation, to support the Union. "We are a nation, one and indivisible. . .," he declared. "And especially must we of the inland states cling to the national idea," or face the prospect of being cut off from access to the outer world. "Shall we now surrender the nation without a struggle and let the Union go with merely a few hard words? . . . If it was worth a bloody struggle to establish this nation, it is worth one to preserve it."²²⁹

Although Morton was ready to fight, public opinion had not yet crystallized in favor of the use of arms. Democrats were insisting that Morton and the Republicans were promoting the crisis for their own political purposes and that the true interest of Indiana lay with the South. The southern counties of Indiana even advocated recognition of the Confederate States. Their motto: "Not one dollar, and not one man from Indiana with which to subjugate the South and inaugurate civil war!"

The attack on Fort Sumter had an electrifying effect upon Indiana; never before had there been such excitement. Businesses closed so employees and owners could flock to the newspaper offices to wait for news concerning the attack. A patriotic rally was held at Metropolitan Hall in Indianapolis where Morton and other leaders of both parties addressed very large group of people, endorsing resolutions supporting Lincoln's administration and declaring, "We unite as one man to repel all treasonable assaults upon the Government, its property and citizens in every department of the Union -- peaceably, if we can, forcibly, if we must." Morton called for five

thousand volunteers and on April 16, appointed Lew Wallace⁶ of Crawfordsville as Adjutant General of the state.²³⁰

Ten days after the surrender of Fort Sumter Indiana partisanship was subordinated to patriotism in the special session of the legislature. "We have passed from the field of argument to the solemn fact of war." Morton declared. Resolutions were unanimously adopted declaring that Indiana was united for the defense of the government and ready to supply men and money. Resolutions were passed giving Morton ample authority to borrow and spend funds for purchase of arms and maintenance of troops. Thus, Indiana came to the war with enthusiasm shown by few other states, and had a governor with energy and determination who was of the opinion that the shortest way to peace was to hurry the war effort.²³¹



While the deep south was voting to cut its ties with its sister states, Robert H. Milroy called upon his neighbors in Rensselaer, Indiana in early February to organize a militia company to take part in the war he thought was sure to come.²³² Milroy was born June 11, 1816 on a farm near Salem, Indiana. At twenty-four he enrolled at Captain Partidge's Academy in Norwich Vermont and graduated with a degree in military science and engineering in 1843. Thereafter, he enlisted and became a captain in the 1st Indiana Regiment in the Mexican War. After the war he entered Indiana University, School of Law in Bloomington, and was subsequently appointed Judge of the 8th Judicial District. In May 1854 Milroy open a law practice in Rensselaer, the

⁶ Later a novelist and author of The Fair God and Ben-Hur.

County seat of Jasper.²³³

It was in that small northwestern Indiana county, only seventy miles from Chicago, that the citizens scoffed at Milroy's request for troops, and until the attack on Fort Sumter he had been able to recruit only two members, one being Gideon C. Moody destined to become Colonel of the *Ninth* Regiment. Within hours following the news of the attack on Fort Sumter, Milroy's company grew to one hundred thirty. He called the company the "Iroquois Guards," and led them off to meet his old friend Governor Morton. The Jasper County company arrived in Indianapolis on April 22nd and marched immediately to the State House, where they were met by Governor Morton and Adjutant General Lew Wallace who administered to each the oath of allegiance, and thus they were mustered into State service. Wallace then admonished the new recruits, "You are no longer citizens, but soldiers!" No one knew or suspected that it would be four long terrible years before any could return home again as citizens.

Indianapolis in 1861 was a bustling community of 19,000 people, and the railroad center of Indiana. The city had been laid out in a circle, much like Washington D.C., the center being the old Governor's house, and two blocks west the State House. Approximately one and a half miles north of the center circle were the State Fairgrounds which had been turned into military quarters dubbed "Camp Morton" by Adjutant General Wallace. Camp Morton was thirty-six acres and was to be the camp for all new Indiana recruits. The camp consisted of horse sheds, cattle pens, a large exhibition hall and dining room, and a two-story office building. All sheds had one side exposed to the weather, befitting the showing of horses, and not the housing of humans, yet 7,000 men would be sheltered in the first month of service in these horse sheds. Each shed had horse stalls with two tiers of bunks placed within each stall, where eight to ten

men could sleep on each tier. Straw was provided for bedding and a quilt was hung over the open side to keep out the weather.²³⁴

Milroy's Jasper County company was soon joined by other companies from the northern part of the State; two companies from LaPorte, two companies from Cass and one company from Carrol, Elkhart, Allen, Porter, and St. Joseph Counties. On April 22nd the Ninth Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry (hereafter referred to as the "*Ninth*") was formed, and Milroy was selected by Governor Morton to take command as its Colonel. On April 25th the *Ninth* was mustered into federal service for three months, with a total complement of 37 officers, 4 non-commissioned officers and 748 enlisted men.²³⁵

After arriving at Camp Morton and during the next thirty-four days the farm boys and backwoodsmen from northern Indiana who made up the ten companies of the *Ninth*, were taught the "general rules" of soldiering. These instructions were contained in Hardee's Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics which was the training manual used to train all recruits in both the North and South.²³⁶ The training consisted of three parts. First, "What ought to be taught to recruits without arms;" second, "the manual of arms" including loading and firing the new 58 caliber Springfield rifled musket.⁷ The final principle to be taught was the art of troop movement, or the principles of alignment, the march by the front, the different steps, the march by the flank, the principles of wheeling, and manner to change direction.

The daily routine at Camp Morton consisted of Reveille at 6 a.m., police call at 6:15 a.m.,

⁷ The Springfield Musket Model 1861 was made at the United States armory of that name. It weighed 9 3/4 pounds and fired the new "Minie" bullet invented by a French army captain named Claude E. Minie in 1848. The original design of the bullet used a wooden plug at its base which expanded on firing to take the rifling. The bullet was improved by an American, James H. Burton who designed a bullet with a simple cavity in its base so that when it was fired the compressed gas caused the rim to swell and take the rifling. The bullet was called the "minie ball." The Springfield was loaded down the muzzle and had a range of slightly less than 1,000 yards.

Breakfast at 7 a.m., guard mounting at 8 a.m., drill from 8:30 a.m. to noon, Dinner at 12:30 p.m. and Drill from 2 p.m. to 4 p.m., Retreat Parade from 5 p.m., Supper at 6 p.m., Drill to 9 p.m. and taps at 10 p.m.²³⁷

On May 1st the *Ninth* marched through Indianapolis to the State House yard where it was armed by Indiana's Quartermaster General. This arming consisted of receiving the musket, bayonet, a heavy leather box with a tin box inside made up of apartments for forty rounds of ammunition, a leather box for percussion caps, a leather scabbard for the bayonet, and two leather belts, one for the waist fastened with a brass buckle marked "US," and the other to go over the shoulder. No cartridges were furnished with the arming.²³⁸

By mid May the boys of the *Ninth* turned in their clothes from home for the new State uniforms. The uniform was sheep's gray⁸ in color, made of an inferior cloth, possibly satinet, and consisted of pants, shirt, roundabout (coat), a grayish hat with a tall crown, and stoga shoes. Additional equipment was given such as blankets, an India rubber blanket to give shelter from the rain, a haversack, a knapsack, a canteen and a tin cup.²³⁹


On May 22nd Governor Morton received the official requisition from the United States War Department for Indiana's quota of three home-service regiments and one new regiment. Two days later Major General George B. McClellan of Ohio with his staff, accompanied by Governor Dennison of Ohio, Governor Yates of Illinois, and Governor Morton came to Camp Morton to organize the Indiana forces to operate under McClellan's command in western Virginia. Plans were made and approved by this group of dignitaries for the Indiana troops to be moved to the seat of war.²⁴⁰

⁸ The issuing of gray uniforms created an unfortunate result in the battle of Cheat Mountain when Ohio troops shoot at soldiers of the Thirteenth Indiana, killing and wounding several of them.¹

Five days later the *Ninth* was ordered to Grafton, Virginia. They boarded the train at Indianapolis and traveled through Cincinnati, across Ohio to the Ohio River at Bellaire, Ohio. The train trip from Indianapolis to Bellaire took more than 25 hours.²⁴¹



One of the first and primary objects of the Union Army of the Ohio was to guard the Ohio River, but as the policy of the federal government became more aggressive and determined against the Confederacy, the purpose of the army was changed to a bolder purpose: to keep western Virginia in the Union. It was some time, however, before this bolder purpose could be put into action by sending Union troops into western Virginia. For this reason, the people of western Virginia took measures to help themselves by organizing regiments at Wheeling and Parkersburg for their own protection.



An inquiry from Winfield Scott, General and Chief of the United States Army, went to McClellan as to whether the enemy's force at Grafton could be subdued and if so he was urged him to "act promptly." This McClellan was ready to do, but before the arrival of Union troops into Western Virginia, he issued two proclamations, one to his soldiers, and the other to the

people who they were sent to protect. The soldiers were commanded to preserve the strictest discipline, and to remember that their duty was confined to the protection of loyal men against traitors. To the people of western Virginia he made assurances of the honest intentions with which the movement was undertaken. He reminded them of the fact that while the secessionists had sent their armed forces beforehand to terrify and intimidate, the United States had patiently awaited the result of their election. Moreover, they were assured that there would be no interference with their slaves.²⁴²

McClellan set a vanguard across the Ohio River into western Virginia on May 26th to link up with the 1st Virginia commanded by Colonel Benjamin Franklin Kelley.⁹ At the same time the First Indiana Brigade under Brigadier General Thomas A. Morris was sent forward by rail from Indianapolis. Morris, a West Point graduate, had a successful career as an engineer and railroad president before the War. He became the first commissioned brigadier-general from Indiana.¹⁰ The Indiana Brigade which Morris commanded included the *Ninth* as well as the 6th and 7th Indiana regiments, and later joined by the 8th and 10th Indianan regiments.

On the 27th Kelley was instructed by McClellan to take the train from Wheeling to Grafton, drive off the Confederates that occupied that town, and protect the railroad, rebuild the bridges and then advance on Harper's Ferry. His movements were hastened by the rapidity with which the Confederate forces were destroying bridges that would be necessary for McClellan's

⁹ The regiment was formed at Wheeling, Virginia to counter the southern Virginia militia that was being sent into Western Virginia.


¹⁰ Morris graduated fourth in a class of thirty-six from West Point in 1836, but remained in the Army for only two years. When the war came, he was appointed brigadier general, Indiana Volunteers, on April 27, 1861. With the expiration of his brigade's term of service, Morris was mustered out on July 27, 1861. Probably due to McClellan's animosity, he did not receive a reappointment in the National volunteers until the fall of 1862. At that time he elected to remain in private life.

line of communication. Hence, the point of approach for the first land battle in the great Civil War was Grafton, sixty miles south of Wheeling. Toward this point, Kelley moved with the 1st Virginia, followed immediately by the 16th Ohio. Another column, consisting of the 14th Ohio, crossed the Ohio River at Marietta, and moved on Parkersburg.

The officer commanding the Confederate detachment at Grafton, having heard of the Union advance, hastily retreated from Grafton to Philippi, fifteen miles farther south, where Colonel Porterfield was stationed with his small force of infantry and cavalry. Porterfield was a man of influence in western Virginia, and had been sent by General Robert E. Lee to secure the rail center at Grafton as part of Lee's plan to stabilize western Virginia for the Confederacy. Porterfield was ordered to recruit up to five regiments of volunteers from western Virginia, but his attempts proved entirely unsuccessful. He was obliged to write a letter to Lee, asking for reinforcements to enable him to maintain his position at Philippi. Lee was very concerned at this development, but other than ordering arms hurried to Porterfield felt that he could do little else²⁴³. With the troops from Grafton, Porterfield had less than 800 men, including 600 infantry and 173 cavalry.²⁴⁴

The occupation of Grafton by Federal troops had been accomplished without the firing of a single shot. General Morris reached Grafton on the 1st of June, and was instructed by McClellan to take command of all troops in western Virginia, including the soldiers that had just taken Grafton. Upon arrival, Morris discovered that Kelley had already planned an attack on Philippi. Morris approved the plan and added another column under Colonel Ebenezer Dumont of the 7th Indiana to cooperate with Kelley.

On June 2nd 3,000 Union troops received orders for a forced night march against the Confederates at Philippi. These troops moved in two separate columns of about 1,500 each. One column, under Colonel Dumont included eight companies of the 7th Indiana, the 6th Indiana and the 14th Ohio, and 2 field-guns of artillery. This column moved out at 5 o'clock via the Northwestern Virginia Railroad to Webster, twelve miles from Philippi, and then marched against the Confederate's front. Kelley, in command of his own regiment, the *Ninth* and the 16th Ohio, moved out at 8 o'clock and marched southward to Thornton; they then marched twenty-two miles through the drenching rain over wretched roads at a pace that would have done credit to veteran troops.



As a result they got into the rear of Porterfield's force.²⁴⁵

Colonel Dumont placed his two cannons on a hill north of the town supported by the 6th Indiana. The Confederate garrison had not learned picket duty, and was unaware of the Union force. Dumont anxiously waited for Kelly's appearance until daylight. From his position on the hill he saw the Confederates packing up, and believing that Porterfield intended to retreat, opened fire on them. When the Union artillery opened fire, the surprised Confederate camp was thrown into immediate and utter confusion. As the battery fired, the 7th Indiana took the covered bridge over the Tycerts Valley River in the center of town.²⁴⁶

Kelley arrived with the *Ninth* just as the artillery open fire, but he was too late to cut off

Porterfield's troops from fleeing the area. In a short fire fight that followed Kelley was shot in the breast after the confederates had been put to flight.²⁴⁷ He was the only injury on the Union side reported in the official records.¹¹ Although a planned pincers attack on the Confederates miscarried, the Confederate troops fled twenty-five miles southward to Beverly with such haste that northern newspapers labeled the affair "The Philippi Races."

The Confederate soldier that shot Kelly, a dark-complexioned, mustached, broad-brimmed fellow, was captured and placed in the Court House under guard. There was great excitement that night when it was reported the Kelly was dying, and a heavy guard was stationed not only at the Court House but also in the Court-yard to prevent Kelly's regiment from lynching the prisoner. No doubt, if Kelly had died that night, the prisoner would have joined him.²⁴⁸

An incident occurred later that night when a Confederate captain was caught by the *Ninth*. When questioned by Colonel Milroy, it was learned that he was a lawyer and a leader who induced his "less intelligent" neighbor to take up arms against his country. By consensus, the *Ninth* agreed to hang him for "he knew what treason was, he being a lawyer, and that he was guilty of treason and he knew it, and ought to hang for it." The *Ninth* was making preparations to hang this captain when General Morris came along and said, "Milroy, you must not do it; you have no right to hang a prisoner of war under such circumstance." Colonel Milroy tried to urge Morris to grant permission to conduct this hanging, arguing that "he was sort of a head devil in the conspiracy against the Government, and was by his own confession a traitor, and ought to hang." Morris would not permit the hanging to take place.^{12 249}

¹¹ The Unofficial records show that a private in Kelley's command was also wounded, and that 40 Confederate prisoners were taken, some wounded.²

¹² Milroy later writes of the incident: The men of the Ninth insisted on paying no attention to the order given by



With the Confederate troops being pushed back, political opposition in western Virginia to secession moved forward. On June 11th the Union Convention met at Wheeling. Forty counties were represented, and each county's delegation took the following oath: "We solemnly declare that we will support the Constitution of the United States, and the laws made pursuant thereof, as the supreme law of the land, any thing in the ordinance of the convention which lately met at Richmond to the contrary notwithstanding."²⁵⁰ The first issue confronting this convention was whether western Virginia could form a separate state and join the Union. This convention wanted to create a new state to be called "Kanawha," the Indian word for "place of white stone." Immediate statehood, however, was prevented by Article IV, Section 3, of the U.S. Constitution, which requires the consent of the legislature to form a new state from the territory of an existing one. During the second day, a committee reported a Bill of Rights which repudiated all allegiance to the Confederacy. Resolutions were offered to insure that western Virginia would remain in the Union. Another resolution ordered all forces in arms against the United States to disband and return home. Further, an ordinance was passed providing for the establishment of a provisional government. In doing so, the convention declared that the Confederate legislature in Richmond was illegal, vacated all state offices, and on June 20th appointed new state officials, headed by Francis Pierpoint as Governor. Pierpoint expressed the principle, in his inaugural, that to the loyal citizens of the United States belong the government and governmental

Morris as they "felt as volunteers, that the regular officers wanted to prolong the war to make money and rise higher in rank, and the men had little respect for regular officers or their orders." No record was made as to the resolution of this dispute.

authority.²⁵¹ Lincoln recognized Pierpoint's administration as the de jure government of Virginia, and the Senate allowed two U.S. Senators from western Virginia to be seated on July 13th. Three congressmen from western Virginia also took their seats in the House of Representatives.

Two days after the Union Convention met at Wheeling, Governor Letcher issued a proclamation calling upon western Virginians, in the name of past friendship and historic memories, to cooperate with secession and join the southern part of the State. Governor Letcher further offered to redress the wrongs from which the western part of the state had so long suffered. This proclamation fall on death ears.²⁵²



When Lee heard about the defeat at Philippi, he relieved Porterfield and brought him before a court of inquiry. The court found him culpable, but Lee gave him only a reprimand and decided not to proceed further against him.²⁵³

General Lee had few men and fewer arms to spare for western Virginia. He ordered into service the militia in seven counties of Virginia and planned a special expedition to burn the B. & O. Railroad Bridge at Cheat River. With Porterfield gone, Colonel Robert S. Garnett, Lee's adjutant general, was commissioned a brigadier-general and was hurriedly sent to the Allegheny Mountains in western Virginia. Garnett gathered a few thousand reinforcements and sent them to Beverly²⁵⁴. With 4,500 men "in a most miserable condition as to arms, clothing, equipment, and discipline," Garnett fortified the passes through which ran the main roads from the Shenandoah Valley to Wheeling and Parkersburg. Garnett had closely studied the situation and


reported to Lee that the enemy showed no disposition to advance beyond Philippi. "Beyond that point the Federals were not known to be in great force," reported Garnett.²⁵⁵

Garnett had fewer men than the Union, but he posted his troops on good ground so far as any forthcoming battle might be concerned. He was, however, completely isolated from any possible military support from Richmond. This position was some thirty miles south of Philippi at Rich Mountain, a gap in the Laurel Hill Range, where the Staunton and Weston turnpike crossed about five miles from Beverly. Garnett asked Lee for reinforcements, but before Lee received this appeal, Lee had sent one more regiment to Garnett, and on hearing more fully the situation, had directed two others to be forwarded under the command of able professional soldiers.²⁵⁶

At Rich Mountain, Garnett had posted Lieutenant Colonel Pegram with 3,000 men. Garnett with about 8,000 men occupied Laurel Hill fifteen miles farther westward. The fortified position at Laurel Hill was very strong, having earthworks thrown up with heavy guns mounted. In addition, there were several miles of entrenchments running in every direction up the side of the mountain, one behind another, the rear one commanding those in front.

On June 21st, McClellan arrived at Grafton to take personal command of the campaign. Thirty-four years old, possessing great ability and an even greater ego, McClellan exhibited in western Virginia the Napoleonic complex that manifested itself in his written dispatches and proclamations, though not in the handling of troops in battle. "Soldiers!" he declaimed in an address to his troops at Grafton, "I have heard that there was danger here. I have come to place myself at your head and to share it with you. I fear not but one thing -- that you will not find foemen worthy of your steel."²⁵⁷

By the end of June, McClellan had about 20,000 men. This included nine Indiana regiments, the *Ninth* of course, the 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, 11th, 13th, 14th, and 15th.¹³ The Indiana 11th Zouaves,¹⁴ under the command of Colonel Lew Wallace was placed on detached service at Cumberland on the Potomac. Ohio had seventeen regiments, the 3rd through 10th, 13th through 20th and the 22nd. Added to this were the 1st and 2nd Virginia; Howe's United States battery; Barnett's Ohio battery; Loomis' Michigan battery; and Daum's Virginia battery. The cavalry were Burdsal's Ohio Dragoons and Barker's Illinois Calvary.



McClellan assigned five or six thousand of these men to guard the B. & O. Railroad, which had been reopened to Washington, and sent another 2,500 men under Jacob Cox to move up the Kanawha River to Charleston. With the remaining twelve thousand, McClellan planned to encircle and trap Garnett's army. To do this, McClellan planned first to defeat the Confederate forces at Rich Mountain, and then engage the main body at Laurel Mountain. To stop any transfer of troops from Laurel Mountain to Rich Mountain, McClellan ordered General Morris with four thousand men, including the *Ninth*, to occupy Garnett's forces at Laurel Mountain.

¹³ The numerical designations 1st through the 5th would not be used in Indiana out of deference to the five Indiana regiments which served in the Mexican War.

¹⁴ A popular name for troops colorful dressed in French North African type uniforms. This usually comprised a short jacket, a broad sash, baggy pantaloons, gaiters, and a tussled fez.

Morris was to keep Garnett busy, but not to attack him in force, until Rich Mountain had been taken.

McClellan, with the main body of his army, (three brigades) marched to the rear and western slope of Rich Mountain. Rather than assault the Confederate trenches head-on, McClellan accepted a plan developed by Colonel William S. Rosecrans for a flanking attack by one brigade, while the other two brigades attacked the front. Accordingly, he divided his force into two columns, giving one column to Colonel Rosecrans who was sent to the rear of Rich Mountain, while McClellan remained in front of Rich Mountain ready for a simultaneous attack. Guided by a young man named Hart whose father lived on the top of Rich Mountain, Rosecrans's Indiana and Ohio regiments began their mountain climb. The paths were so difficult that cannons could not go with the troops. After a ten hour exacting march through rain and storm, Rosecrans reached the road at the Hart farm, and sent a courier back to McClellan to give the signal to attack. The messenger lost his way, and fell into enemy hands giving them full information of the planned attack.

Pegram had previously sent 350 men and one cannon to guard the Hart road. As Rosecrans' troops came out upon the road, they were warmly received by these 350 men with both rifle and cannon fire. Skirmishing combat went on for two or three hours, when Rosecrans' line charged and broke the Confederate line. Reinforcements were sent by Pegram with another cannon, but a runaway team of horses from a caisson on the hill-top ran into the gun coming up the hill and sent both crashing down the mountain side. Rosecrans, seeing the arriving Confederates troops, decided to stop the fight for the night and to resume his attack the next morning.

McClellan, hearing the sound of battle, overestimated Pegram's forces, and fearing that Rosecrans was losing, determined not to launch the simultaneous attack. Instead, McClellan moved rapidly to Beverly and took the town on July 12th.²⁵⁸ The failure to attack in accordance with the plan was never explained by McClellan.¹⁵

The next day Rosecrans found that the Confederates were gone from Rich Mountain and that they have abandoned their reinforced camp, leaving two spiked cannons, the sick and the wounded. All totaled, Rosecrans attack killed, wounded, or captured 170 of the 1,300 Confederates at a cost of 12 killed and 49 wounded.

Meanwhile, Morris at Laurel Hill with the *Ninth* moved to within a few miles of Garnett's fortifications. His camp was located on farm land 200 yards west of the six-house village of Belington. On a Hill northwest of Belington, the Confederates and Morris' Indiana Brigade fought a continuous skirmish with both rifle and cannon fire for several days. First one side would come out of their lines and make a demonstration, then fall back, and then the other side would advance its skirmishers, or make a flanking movement. A soldier later reported: "Capt. Moody's Company of the *Ninth* had been deployed as skirmishers and were advancing . . . drove the enemy, and had lost one killed and one missing." Later he reported, "The one killed was Wm. T. Girrard, he with others had advanced well into the timber and up the hill when he was shot in the head. The soldiers had named the hill for this hero." He notes, "John Anton, a private of the *Ninth* having taken a revolver from the person of a Confederate officer killed in a skirmish, advanced to the road and at a favorable opportunity, crossed the road and entered the

¹⁵ Jacob D. Cox, a Major-General, U.S.V., writing later as a historian of the West Virginia campaign, pointed out that McClellan in West Virginia "showed the same characteristics which became well known later. There was the same overestimate of the enemy, the same tendency to interpret unfavorably the sights and sounds in front, the same hesitancy to throw in his whole force when he knew that his subordinate was engaged."³

Laurel, two shots were fired, followed by a shrill scream of agony which still rings in my ears. Our skirmishers dashed into the woods, and there found Anton's bleeding, lifeless body."²⁵⁹ This went on for four days. Morris' official report recounts that the enemy advanced once to within 3/4 mile of his main camp, but were pushed back by cannon fire.

On July 11th Garnett at Laurel Hill, having been warned by messenger that Rich Mountain had been evacuated, quickly left his entrenchments and preceded southward hoping to reach Beverly before McClellan. In route they met the runaways of Pegram's army, and learned that Beverly was already in the possession of the Union forces. With retreat to the southwest cut off by McClellan, there was only one way of escape; follow the course of the Cheat River northeast until an outlet into the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia could be found.²⁶⁰

In the early hours of the 12th, the *Ninth's* Colonel Milroy sent Lieutenants Isaac C. B. Suman and William Copp to scout the enemy camp. When Copp came riding back down the mountain side with his arms and legs swinging wildly and shouting, "They are gone, they are gone", Colonel Milroy hurried to Morris and urged him to move upon the Rebels at once. Morris, thinking that the *Ninth* regiment was made up of only volunteers who were known as being too reckless and always in a hurry to get into a fight, doubted the information Colonel Milroy was relating. Fearing it was only a rebel trick to draw the Union army into a trap, he took his time in finding that the Confederates had indeed abandoned their works and were gone.²⁶¹

The 6th Indiana, the 6th Ohio and the remainder of the brigade took possession of Garnett's camp, while Morris with the *Ninth*, the 7th Indiana, the 14th Ohio, and one section of artillery, started a swift pursuit of the retreating Garnett. Morris marched to Leadsville, where he halted for further orders from McClellan.

At daybreak on the 13th Morris ordered Captain H. W. Benham¹⁶ of the Regular Army to lead the advance. As Benham gained on the rear of the Confederates, they began to throw away articles of weight or of little value. When pressed closer, the Confederates left tents, trunks, knapsacks, clothing and blankets. The van and rear guard frequently exchanged shots and continued a skirmishing pursuit for over two hours. The rain soon began to fall in torrents, turning the roads into a quagmire. The Cheat River at this point is very twisted, and the road through the mountain pass crosses it every few miles. At noon, at a bend of the Cheat River, Garnett attempted to make a stand at Carricks Ford, as the road was blockaded by a stalled team caught in the mud.¹⁷ Garnett's men had taken position on the right of the ford, across the river upon an almost precipitous bank from fifty feet at their right to eighty feet in height at their left. Additionally, Garnett positioned a cannon on the top of the bluff which completely commanded the valley, ford and road. When the Union skirmishers advanced on a brisk run along the low level bank of the river, the Confederates jumped to their feet, gave one big cheer for Jeff Davis, followed by a fearful yell, and opened a heavy fire with rifle and artillery. The 14th Ohio halted and stood their ground, giving several full volleys in return. The Union Artillery took a position farther back in a meadow and opened fire on the Confederates.²⁶²

The fighting in front of the column caused Captain Benham to order the *Ninth* and the 7th Indiana regiments to cross the river, and obliquely climb up the bluff in an attempt to turn the Confederate left. A difficult ascent was begun, so steep that the men had to cling to bushes just

¹⁶ Capt. Henry Washington Benham was first in the 1837 class at West Point, and a member of General Morris's staff as an engineer. He was later to become a General

¹⁷ Of great consequence to both sides, heavy rains fell, the narrow roads were almost impassable for wagons and artillery, and the creeks were out of their banks. Captain Benham officially reported the conditions to his superiors: "[F]or nearly the whole time the rain was pouring in torrents and the clayey [sic] roads almost impassable in many

to move up. Benham, seeing the difficulty, ordered the men back to the river, and marched them down to the ford, close to the bluff, but under fire of friend and foe. As the Indiana regiments marched downstream, the Confederates fled in great confusion, leaving on the field one cannon,¹⁸ twelve or thirteen dead and many wounded. The regiments captured about forty loaded wagons with their teams of horses which were caught in the mud.

Just as the engagement closed, General Morris came up with the 6th Indiana followed closely by the remainder of the brigade. The 7th Indiana was ordered to lead the brigade in pursuit of Garnett and began conducting a running skirmish with the rear guard of the Confederates to the next ford, a half mile distance. Garnett's men reformed on a hill in some woods that commanded the valley over which the Indiana regiments followed; but again as the Union troops approached, the Confederates retreated. To hasten their retreat, the Confederates discarded almost every item of equipment. The *Ninth* and the 7th Indiana rushed after them with such excitement that few stopped to secure trophies, not even blankets or coats that were disparately needed by the Indiana troops.²⁶³

Further down the river Garnett, having placed sharpshooters behind some driftwood near the bank in an attempt to slow the pursuit of the Indiana troops, was shot to death while rallying his men.¹⁹ One brave Georgian private stood near Garnett when others fled, and like a true hero died by the side of his commander. When General Garnett fell, the remainder of the Confederate force fled in confusion. Captain Benham and Major Gordon, both of whom had known Garnett

places."⁴

¹⁸ Spiked by Lieut. Washington who had proposed the cheer for Jeff Davis, and led in the yell.

¹⁹ Garnett was the first Civil War general killed in action.

in the regular Army, stopped and cared for the remains of their old companion.²⁶⁴

The *Ninth* continued in the pursuit of Garnett's forces until July 17th when direct pursuit of the Confederate army was discontinued. The *Ninth* traveled a distance of ninety-two miles over some of the worst roads in the country during the pursuit of Garnett's forces. When the chase was halted, the *Ninth* was ordered to rest for a few days, before returning to Indiana.²⁶⁵

Pegram and his men, having become lost in an attempt to join Garnett, and being unable to find food for his men, called a council of war. By advice of his officers, Pegram sent an offer of surrender to McClellan, and brought in 30 officers and 525 men.²⁶⁶

The federal success was complete. Only a small portion of the enemy escaped, and all of their material and equipment fell into Union hands. The immediate result of this battle was the evacuation of Harper's Ferry by the Confederate army, and the abandonment by the Confederacy of western Virginia, or at least that is what the North had hoped.

Northern newspapers hailed the fight at Rich Mountain and Laurel Hill a stunning success. McClellan did not hesitate to take the credit. On July 16th he issued another proclamation summing up the results of his campaign which read well in the press that began to call him "The Young Napoleon": "Soldiers of the Army of the West! . . . You have annihilated two armies, commanded by educated and experienced soldiers, entrenched in mountain fortress fortified at their leisure. . . . You have taken five guns, twelve colors, fifteen hundred stand of arms, thousand of prisoners . . . Soldiers! I have confidence in you, and I trust you have learned to confide in me." The country was eager for good news, and took McClellan's proclamation as true, placing McClellan as the Country's first war hero.²⁶⁷

In summary, the *Ninth* had an agreeable time in the mountains of western Virginia in the

summer of 1861. It was more like a summer outing than real war. True, the *Ninth* saw action at Philippi on June 3rd; skirmishes at Laurel Mountain on July 7th through the 9th, Belington on July 10th; and again saw action at Carrick's Ford on July 13th and 14th. But this type of fighting would seem child's play for what was to come.

During the three months of service, the *Ninth* lost three enlisted men killed in action, two enlisted men died by disease, and three enlisted men deserted.²⁶⁸ The actions in western Virginia won for the *Ninth* the sobriquet of the "Bloody *Ninth*." It would be a sobriquet that the *Ninth* would later earn in earnest when the actions in western Virginia would only seem a pleasant memory.

Chapter 2


WESTERN VIRGINIA TO TENNESSEE

On August 2 the *Ninth*, having returned from the war in western Virginia, was mustered out of service. The next day Indiana's Adjutant General announced the reorganization of the *Ninth* Regiment for three years service, and again appointed Robert H. Milroy its commander. Rendezvous was to be at Westville, in LaPorte County. Most of the men, after being mustered out of service, stayed in Indianapolis, as none had yet to be paid for their service, and rumor had it that all would be paid within the week. During this period, a few of the officers of the old *Ninth*, as well as officers of the other ninety day units, began a campaign of recruitment in order to fill the ranks of the newly formed regiments. The *Ninth*, as a regiment of volunteers, had a newly authorized strength of 47 officers, 30 non-commissioned officers, a regimental band and 986 enlisted men. The regiment was to be divided into ten companies each having 3 officers and 98 men, plus 24 men in the regimental band giving the new *Ninth* 250 more men than the old *Ninth*.²⁶⁹

An effort was intensified to recruit men from the same counties where the men from the old *Ninth* had enlisted. Companies were formed in the *Ninth* Congressional District from the following Counties: "A" from Carrol, "B" and "F" from LaPorte, "C" from Elkhart, "D" from Marshal, "E" from Lake, "G" from Jasper, "H" from Porter, "I" from Saint Joseph, and "K" from Cass.²⁷⁰ In the old *Ninth* almost everyone came from the county in which the company was organized, but in the new *Ninth* only about fifty percent came from the county of origin. Again the vast majority of the enlisted men came from the sparsely populated counties of the northwestern part of Indiana. The typical member of the new *Ninth* was 22 years old, 5'8" tall,

blue eyed, light complected, and had either sandy or dark hair. Most of the men listed "farmer" as their former occupation.²⁷¹

By pay day, August 9, 1861, a large number of the men from the old *Ninth* had signed up for three years of service, and each one was asked to begin a recruiting drive to fill the ranks of the Regiment. Governor Morton, because of the problems caused by the defeat at Bull Run, urged all companies that were in the process of formation to hurry into camp. Notice was given that all should report to Camp Colfax in LaPorte by August 19th instead of reporting to Westville as



originally planned. Some of the non-commissioned officers were mustered into service on the 27th, and on the 29th the officers came into service. Of the 37 officers of the old *Ninth*, nine re-entered service with the new *Ninth*, fourteen entered service with other regiments at a higher

rank, and fourteen left service altogether.²⁷² By September 5th all the remaining men had been mustered into Federal service.²⁷³

By the time the men arrived at Camp Colfax there were some barracks; however, most of the men were supplied with Sibley tents, a bell-shaped structure supported by a center pole which rested on a tripod. Each tent was equipped with a stove, the pipe of which passed through an opening at the apex. About a dozen men slept in each tent, lying in the manner of wheel spokes, with feet at the center and heads near the circumference. Each company had eight tents. The tents were organized in rows with a street running between them named after the company. Perpendicular to the company streets at the front of the camp was the color line, and at the rear in rows paralleling the color line were the quarters of the noncommissioned officers. There was a row for the company officers and finally, box-shaped tents with sloping roofs for Colonel Milroy and his staff.²⁷⁴

After the companies were formed, they were divided into two platoons per company and each platoon into two sections or squads. Training began at the squad level, then the platoon, but most time was spent at the company level. Drill consisted mainly of exercises in the handling of arms, practicing various positions for firing the rifle and performing the simple maneuvers of march. The officers taught the men such fundamentals as how to stand erect; face left or right; march forward or to the rear. In arms training they learned to load "in nine times," "in four times," or "at will"; to fire in standing, kneeling and prone positions; and parry and thrust with the bayonet. As training progressed and the company exercises were improved, the platoons were launched into skirmish drills.²⁷⁵ Skirmish drill was sometimes enlivened by the firing of blank cartridges, but rarely was live ammunition used during training. A typical day at Camp

Colfax lasted seventeen hours, from 5 a.m. to 10 p.m., including two company drills, a dress parade, two squad or platoons drills and of course, breakfast, lunch and dinner.²⁷⁶

By the time uniforms were issued to the new *Ninth*, the sheep gray state uniform had been replaced by a blue federal type.²⁰ This uniform consisted of a dark-blue jacket called a blouse, which became the favorite coat for field service; light-blue trousers; rough black shoes; wool flannel shirt; cotton flannel underwear; (many of the boys having never worn them before questioned their use), socks; and a long blue overcoat with cape. The uniform also came with a blue forage cap with black visor and a cap badge with a 9 on it, but most veterans of the old *Ninth* choose to keep their old tall crown hat.

All training was open to the public and Colonel Milroy requested the local farmers and town folks from LaPorte County to "come and bring full baskets of provisions for these brave and gallant boys."²⁷⁷ Crowds attended daily dress parades. Occasionally, Colonel Milroy would parade the men through the streets of LaPorte. The Regimental "band played, cheers were given, hats went high into the air and handkerchiefs were waved" as residents acknowledged their family members and friends."²⁷⁸

After three weeks of training and equipping, the Regiment received orders and took the Lake Shore Railroad to western Virginia. Like most of the other regiments, it received ovations in every town and city through which it passed. In Toledo, the City gave the Regiment a reception and dinner. This was the last real meal that they were destined to eat for months. On September 15th the Regiment reached the Ohio River, crossed into western Virginia at Bellaire

²⁰ During the first months of the war the state Quartermaster General had the responsibility of issuing all clothing, blankets, and other equipment to troops raised in the state. The 6th through the 28th regiments and the 45 as well as some of the cavalry and artillery units were clothed and equipped by the state. After August, 1861, an Assistant

and proceeded by rail to Webster where it disembarked for a march to Elkwater. The march lasted four days in a pouring rain as the troops passed through Phillipi, around Laurel Mountain, Beverly, Huttonsville, and into Camp Elkwater at Elkwater River on September 19th.²⁷⁹ This camp was established by General J. J. Reynolds to guard access to the Huttonsville-Huntersville Turnpike.



On September 25th, six days after setting up camp at Elkwater, the *Ninth* was ordered to march immediately for Cheat Mountain, as the Federal expected an attack on the fort. They marched without tents, blankets or other camp equipment in preparation for entering immediate combat upon arrival. However, they found no battle when they arrived in the late morning of the 26th. There had been no provision made for feeding or housing the new regiment, and there was no shelter of any kind that could be used by the men, except clustering under the bending pines. For two days and nights the *Ninth* was exposed to a terrible rain storm, the rain pouring down in torrents making it impossible to build fires and the temperature hovered just above freezing. Without overcoats, tents or rubber blankets the men suffered intensely. Fourteen horses perished from the effect of the rain and cold, and many of the men never recovered from their intense suffering amidst the clouds on Cheat Mountain Summit. It took a week after the rain had quit just too dry clothing and equipment.²⁸⁰

While the *Ninth* was reorganizing in LaPorte, Robert E. Lee had taken over command in western Virginia. He planned an attack near on at Cheat Mountain with the hope of securing

Quartermaster of the United States Army stationed in Indianapolis was in charge of the issuance of supplies.⁵

that part of the state for the Confederacy. His campaign failed, and with that failure the initiative switched to the Union army who was determined to take the fight to the Confederates.

On October 3rd, General Joseph J. Reynolds,²¹ in whose brigade the *Ninth* had been placed, hastily concentrated his troops for an attack on the Confederate works at Camp Bartow commanded by Colonel Rust. The camp was on the south fork of the Greenbrier River in the Greenbrier Valley west of the Allegheny Mountains, twelve miles east of Cheat Mountain at present-day Bartow.²² The Union brigade, totaling approximately 5,000, marched down the east side of Cheat Mountain on the Parkersburg-Staunton turnpike. The *Ninth* was given the advance to attack and drive in the Confederate pickets, but met no opposition until the wooden covered bridge over the Greenbrier River was reached just at daylight. A Confederate company of the 12th Georgia stationed on the bridge commanded by Colonel Edward Johnson delivered a volley and immediately fled on receiving return fire. The first man from the new *Ninth* was killed on that assault. The *Ninth* crossed the bridge and traveled south along the Greenbrier River to turn the enemy flank. As the *Ninth* moved, the Confederates sent three regiments (3d Arkansas, 23d

²¹ Reynolds entered Wabash College at Crawfordsville, Indiana and a year later went to West Point where he graduated in 1848 as a classmate of Ulysses S. Grant. Reynolds had taught at the Academy for several years following his graduation. At the beginning of the war he was engaged in business in Lafayette, Indiana, and immediately tendered his services to Governor Morton who appointed him colonel of the Tenth Regiment (three months service). The fact that he was appointed by Morton even though he had not voted for Morton in the 1860 election was cited by Morton's friends as evidence of the sincerity of the Governor's claim that it was a "no party" war. Reynolds left the Army due to the death of his brother, but was again commissioned Brigadier General in September 1882, and was later promoted to Major General in November. He saw service in the eastern theater during the first part of the war. During the latter part of the conflict he was with the Army of the Cumberland and commanded the XIV Corps at Chickamauga and the XIX against Mobile. He remained in the army after the war, and during reconstruction was in command of the military district comprising Louisiana and Texas. Reynolds was commanding the advance of Crook's expedition when it attacked and captured a Sioux village (Crazy Horse's winter hideout) on the Powder River on March 17, 1876. He took the village and pony herd, but did not destroy the dismounted warriors who were fighting fiercely from the woods. He prematurely ordered a retreat, leaving his dead and a wounded private in the hands of the Indians who promptly cut the soldier limb from limb. Reynolds' conduct in the attack was the subject of a general court martial and he resigned, his army career wrecked.

²² After Lee's attack failed at Cheat Mountain, Rust's troops took up their former positions at Camp Bartow.

Virginia and Hansbrough's Virginia Battalion) against the *Ninth*. Volley after volley was poured into the lines. Union artillery soon took up the attack driving the Confederate troops back into their fortifications. The engagement then settled down to an artillery duel that lasted over four hours.

As the artillery duel continued the *Ninth* was ordered to climb a high hill south of the river, from which point Reynolds could view the Confederate's entire Camp. He deemed it not advisable to attack their fortifications, and ordered the *Ninth* with the rest of the brigade back to Cheat Mountain. This attack was described "a recognizance in force" by Reynolds, but it cost the *Ninth* two men killed and six wounded. The brigade lost ten killed and thirty-two wounded, with the Confederate losses were listed at thirty-five.

After the attack, Rust lost confidence in the ability of Camp Bartow to withstand a determined Union assault, and accordingly convinced General Loring to order the camp closed. Rust and his troops were moved into winter quarters at Camp Allegheny.

The *Ninth* marched back to Cheat Mountain again using the Parkersburg-Staunton Turnpike, expecting a long stay at this position to guard their part of this important road. The cold nights, and a severe storm that drifted snow around their tents four or five feet deep convinced Colonel Milroy to prepare winter quarters. The *Ninth* set about completing log houses, when they were ordered to the very summit of Cheat Mountain to build and occupy a secondary fort. The winter quarters they built consisted of ten big log houses, one for each company, all connected for mutual protection, and loopholes for rifle firing. These military defenses were across the turnpike to the southwest and commanded the road; in fact, it almost straddled it.²⁸¹ A semi-subterranean passage connected the main camp with this smaller

enclosure.

Since the Confederate efforts to retake western Virginia had failed, and Union military control over that part of the state was firm, the statehood referendum took place as scheduled on October 24, 1861. The voters overwhelmingly endorsed a new state, but the turnout was surprisingly small. Pro-Confederate voters in more than a dozen southeastern counties boycotted the election.


After the election Colonel Milroy believing that there would be no more fighting in western Virginia began an informal campaign to have the *Ninth* removed from western Virginia and sent west. He contacted Congressman

Schuyler Colfax of his *Ninth* Indiana district to get President Lincoln to send his regiment where "we would have no big mountains for Confederates to hide behind, but where we could get there and give us a square fight."

He complained that his men were not accustomed to the mountainous country, and

"wanted to fight them on level ground where our western boys could thrash treason right out of them."²⁸² Colonel Milroy hoped to have his regiment in Missouri by spring. While Colonel

Milroy was using informal means to get his regiment transferred, Governor Morton was making demands on the Federal Government that all Indiana regiments in western Virginia should be transferred to Kentucky. The government took no action on either Colonel Milroy's or Morton's request.





It was at this time, November 15th that Colonel Milroy was commissioned Brigadier-General and given command over all troops in the Cheat Mountain district. Gideon C. Moody from Rensselaer, Indiana, then Lt. Colonel of the *Ninth*, was promoted to succeed Colonel Milroy as its commander.²³

On December 13th Milroy, having learned the layout of Camp Allegheny from five deserters of Colonel Hansbrough's battalion, took his new command to attack that strongly entrenched encampment. The Confederate stronghold was located on the summit of Allegheny Mountain where the Parkersburg-Staunton Turnpike and the Green Bank Road intersect²⁴, nine miles east of the place where Reynolds had attacked in October. At an altitude of 4,400 feet, this camp was one of the highest of all Civil War camps. Milroy learned that the camp was divided into two parts. One half was on the north side of the Parkersburg-Staunton Turnpike where the log cabin quarters were located. The other half was located south of the Turnpike and east of the Green Bank Road. This part of the camp was entrenched with batteries located so as to sweep both the Parkersburg-Staunton Turnpike and the Green Bank Road.

Milroy's plan was to divide his command into two columns to strike the flanks of the camp simultaneously. The 13th Indiana (300 men), the 25th Ohio (400 men), the 32nd Ohio (130

²³ Gideon C. Moody was born in Portland County New York 10/16/32. He studied law in Syracuse, N.Y. and moved to Indiana in 1852. Governor Wright appointed him district attorney of Floyd County. He later moved to Rensselaer, and in 1860 elected to the state legislature as a republican. In April 1861 he enlisted in the company raised by Milroy, and made a Lieutenant Colonel of the Ninth. He was commissioned Colonel of the Ninth on November 15, 1861. On the same day William H, Blake of Michigan City, Indiana was commissioned Lieutenant Colonel.

²⁴ This Camp was also known as "Camp Baldwin", and often called in letters home and in later reunion notes as "Buffalo Mountain" by the men of the Ninth, and was later officially named by the United States Post Office as "Top of

men) and a small detachment of Bracken's Cavalry (30 men) marched east from Cheat Mountain, crossed to the north of the Confederate camp and climbed the very steep and rocky Allegheny Mountain northeast of the Confederate camp. That part of the Camp, Milroy had learned, was not entrenched. According to Milroy's plan, once in place this column was to wait for the second column that was to attack the camp from the southwest. While so waiting, this column was discovered by the Confederate pickets who alerted the camp of the pending attack. Battle lines were drawn by both the Union and Confederates defenders and hard fighting commenced at about 7:15 a.m. The Confederates, numbering 1,200 men, consisted of the 12th Georgia, 25th, 31st, and 52nd Virginia and Hansbrough's battalion with two batteries. The Confederates were led by Colonel Edward Johnson who commanded the camp. Johnson first tried to take the Union right and then the left, but could not force them off the mountain. The lines moved back and forth for several hours. At one time the Union forces moved into the center of the north portion of the camp, but were repulsed when the Confederates turned their artillery on those troops causing many to run disgracefully from the field thus reducing the attacking force. With ammunition exhausted, this column of Milroy's force was required to fall back, just as the other column launched its attack on the camp's entrenchments on the left front.

The second column consisted of the *Ninth*, down to 650 men, and a small detachment of 250 men from the 2nd Virginia. This column had marched east by a bridle path over Buffalo Ridge and up Allegheny Mountain to the front and left of the camp. The *Ninth* was guided by a Virginian named Slater who lived three miles from the camp. Due to difficulty of this guide to find the way, and the snow and the mountain terrain, the *Ninth* did not arrive at its assigned

Allegheny."

position until the forces under Milroy had withdrawn from the field.²⁸³ The Confederate works were skillfully constructed and nearly a half mile in length, with emplacements for several batteries. The entrenchments were built on a narrow ridge one hundred fifty yards at its widest point. At the front where the *Ninth* attacked there was but one approach, the narrow path that the *Ninth* had used.²⁸⁴ The regiment charged the entrenchments and a Confederate officer, P. B. Anderson, thinking the advancing men were his own pickets returning to camp, invited them in while ordering his own men not to fire. This mistake cost Anderson his life, and allowed the *Ninth* to advance to within 150 feet of the enemy works.²⁸⁵ Taking advantage of the fallen trees in front of the Confederate's breastworks, the *Ninth* maintained a vigorous fire into the Confederate camp. The fire from the *Ninth* was so intense that Colonel Johnson later reported to Confederate headquarters in Richmond that "they appeared in force -- not less than 5,000 men."²⁸⁶ Colonel Moody, hearing no firing from the rear of the camp, and receiving no word from the column that should have been attacking the rear, ordered his command to retire at 2:00 p.m. The Confederates did not attempt to pursue or move out of their entrenchments, which allowed the *Ninth* to remove all of their dead and wounded.²⁸⁷

The attack failed because the two columns did not begin the fight simultaneously, allowing the Confederates to shift their forces from north to south resulting in numerical superiority for the defending force. In the action, Confederate forces lost 20 men killed, 98 wounded and 28 missing, while Union forces lost 20 killed and 107 wounded. Like the attack by Reynolds, nothing was gained by this assault²⁵ except the loss of 8 killed and 13 wounded within the ranks of the *Ninth*. The *Ninth* was singled out and commended for bravery in this last major

²⁵ Losses of Confederate forces at Camp Allegheny due to the harshness of winter, combined with the logistical

action in western Virginia in 1861.²⁸⁸



The skirmish between Milroy's command and the Confederate force at Allegheny Mountain brought an end to the campaign in western Virginia. Governor Morton's request to transfer Indiana regiments to Kentucky was granted on November 19th,²⁸⁹ but Milroy would not make the trip with his beloved *Ninth*, as he had taken over his new command in western Virginia.²⁶ The *Ninth*, not knowing that Morton had secured their transfer to Kentucky, waited the winter out buried in the ice and snow atop Cheat Mountain at a camp called Milroy; it would be the most miserable and uncomfortable quarters the regiment would spend in service, the bitter cold and damp conditions costing many lives.

Outpost duty fell into a tiresome routine filled with cutting wood, carrying water, maintaining facilities, guard duty, and scouting expeditions.²⁹⁰ On January 8th, to the shouts of joy, the *Ninth* was happy to receive orders to move west. General Milroy accompanied his old regiment down the mountain, bidding them a final farewell. The *Ninth* marched to Beverly, through Phillipi and Webster, then by rail to Fetterman, where they arrived on January 18th.

nightmare of keeping the camp supplied contributed to the decision to abandon this camp in April of 1882.

²⁶ Robert H. Milroy's distinguished appearance won him the name of the "Gray Eagle." After the Cheat Mountain district position he was engaged in the Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1862, and promoted to Major General. He later commanded an "Independent Brigade," attached to Sigel's corps, at the battle of Second Manassas. The following June, in command of some 6,000 to 8,000 men at Winchester, he was outmaneuvered, outfought, and virtually "gobbled up" by Ewell's 2d Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia while Lee's army was advancing into Pennsylvania on their way to Gettysburg. He lost 3400 prisoners, all twenty-three pieces of his artillery, and many dead and wounded. Milroy himself, with two hundred cavalry made good his escape to Harpers Ferry. Because Milroy's forces were taken by surprise and suffered such heavy losses, he became the subject of a military investigation that lasted 10 months. Milroy was later exonerated of any blame, but thereafter held no further command in the field. Three years after his Ninth Regiment was ordered to Nashville, Milroy followed to serve under G. H. Thomas organizing and assigning militia regiments.

While in Fetterman, the Regiment succumbed to measles. For a month the *Ninth* fought not Confederates but this childhood disease and lost a large number. By the time the *Ninth* reached its next duty post, one third of the Regiment was dead or not fit for duty because of the disease.²⁹¹

On February 20, 1862 the Regiment was again able to move west, and was ordered transferred to the Army of the Ohio under the command of General Don Carlos Buell. The *Ninth* traveled on freight cars through Parkersburg leaving West Virginia for good, and then through Chillicothe to Cincinnati. From Cincinnati the Regiment took a steamboat for Nashville, stopping on the 24th at Louisville to drop off the sick. As the *Ninth* passed down the Ohio River and up the Cumberland River, it passed a great army of boats loaded with soldiers, cannons, and tons of equipment, all on its way to Nashville.

Because of its participation in the West Virginia campaign, the *Ninth* helped to establish statehood, as the statehood referendum of October brought about the constitutional convention in January 1862 that established boundaries for the new state that included fifty counties. This convention also changed the name of the proposed state to "West Virginia" instead of "Kanawha" as purposed at the earlier convention. The "restored state legislature of Virginia" sanctioned the creation of the new state of West Virginia on May 23, 1862. At that time, West Virginia had a population of about 380,000, including 15,000 who were slaves. Congress required emancipation as a condition of West Virginia's statehood in a bill passed by the Senate in July 1862 and by the House in December. West Virginians accepted this condition, and the new state came into the Union on June 20, 1863, with a constitution freeing the slaves born after July 4, 1863, and all others on their twenty-fifth birthday.



It was on March 3, 1862, or a week after the pickets from General William Nelson's Division first entered the suburbs of Nashville, when the *Ninth*, still commanded by Colonel Gideon C. Moody of Renesselaer, reached Nashville's landing on the Cumberland. They were immediately assigned to Colonel William Babcock Hazen's Nineteenth Brigade. Colonel Hazen was a thirty-two year old professional soldier. Born in Vermont in 1830, he moved to Ohio in his early youth, and was appointed to the United States Military Academy from Ohio; he graduated 28th in a class of 34 in 1855. He was assigned to the west and was wounded during an Indian fight. After healing from his wounds, he taught tactics at West Point until September 1861, during which time he received two promotions: First Lieutenant on April 1, 1861 and then to Captain on May 14th. He left the Academy to join the 41st Ohio and was commissioned its Colonel on October 29th. His regiment was assigned to General's Buell army in Kentucky. In December he was given command over the 19th Brigade which was then comprised of the 41st Ohio, the 6th Kentucky.

The Nineteenth Brigade was part of the Fourth Division Commanded by General William Nelson. Nelson, then thirty-eight years old, was born near Maysville, Kentucky in 1824 to a well-to-do family. He attended Norwich Academy (Now Norwich University) in Vermont in 1837-39, and then joined the Navy as a Midshipman in 1840. Nelson served in the fleet that supported General Winfield Scott's landing at Vera Cruz in 1847. By 1855, he was a full Lieutenant and 330th senior person in the Navy. When his family friend, President Lincoln, made his brother Thomas minister to Chile, he requested William "Bull" to conduct surveys of

political sentiment in Kentucky and report his findings directly to him. In April, 1861 Lincoln sent him into Kentucky to distribute 10,000 rifles to loyal Kentuckians and to recruit for the Union army. In doing so he established Camp Dick Robinson in Garrard County, a rallying place for loyal Kentucky Union partisans. He was made a brigadier general of volunteers in September, and given command of the Fourth Division in December.²⁹²

Nelson was a man of enormous build, six feet-four inches tall, weighing three hundred pounds or more. He was a man of many achievements, spoke several languages, and was bestowed with a strong intellect and a memory which enabled him to repeat, verbatim, page after page of that which he just read. A fluent and captivating talker when he wished to please, a man of genial and companionable nature to his friends, he had a quick and impetuous temper and an imperious disposition, and when irritated or opposed, was offensively dictatorial and dogmatic.²⁹³

In addition to the Nineteenth Brigade, the Fourth Division had also assigned to it the Tenth Brigade commanded by fifty-four year old Colonel Jacob Ammen from Ohio. It had the 24th Ohio and the 36th Indiana with Colonel William Grose in command, and the 6th Ohio. The Division also had the Twenty-Second Brigade which was made up entirely of Kentucky regiments and commanded by Colonel Pennybacker of the 20th Kentucky.²⁹⁴

The division went into quarters at Camp Andrew Jackson near the Murfreesboro Road twelve miles southeast of Nashville. When the *Ninth* was assigned to the Nineteenth brigade it was the only regiment that had seen action. Because of this combat experience Colonel Hazen expected that the regiment would show more soldiership than the other regiment in his command. He was mistaken as he later wrote, "it was not only far behind the others, but seemed

fixed in many vicious habits, acquired while in the three months' service in Western Virginia.

To correct this, some severity was indispensable; and in exercising it, while most of the officers gave ready support, a very few took umbrage. . ." Hazen sent the following order to Colonel

Moody:

The colonel commanding the Ninth Indiana Volunteers will take the orders of his division and brigade, and the Army Regulations and Tactics, as his invariable guides in the performance of all military duties. In order to facilitate his success in the duties of a regimental commander, he will convene all the officers of his regiment each evening and read to them these orders, the Articles of War, and the Regulations of the Army, until they are properly understood by all. In order that the drill may be taught successfully and correctly, he will notify his regiment what portion of the Tactics will be employed on drill from day to day, and caution the officers to study such parts. His attention is called to the 'Manual of the Sword, or Saber, for Officers,' on Page 190 of 'Revised Tactics,' and will see that his officers are made conversant with it. His attention is also called to the subject of 'Color Guard,' page 10 of 'Revised Tactics,' and he will immediately establish his guard in conformity with these instructions, placing the colors in ranks where prescribed. He will also cause his regimental officer of the day to instruct the sentinels of the police-guard in their duties, strictly in conformity with the Regulations, their first duty being to walk their post, which few of them are in the habit of doing. He will also take measures to prevent any further shouting, such as was faintly heard on the return of the regiment from the execution yesterday. He is also reminded that marching of regiments by flank, unless to pass defiles, is prohibited.²⁹⁵

Most of the time at Camp Jackson was spent in training; first came company and regimental drills, day after day for the first week or so. The men did not take to that kind of drill readily. They would not keep in line, turned to the left when they were ordered to the right, etc. The regiment was often called a mob by Hazen, and told that they did not deserve the name of regiment. Nelson, not generally liking anyone or thing that came from Indiana, seemed to have a prejudice against the *Ninth*, which the regiment took no pains to dispel while in Nashville.²⁹⁶

After the company and regimental drills the *Ninth* was introduced to the brigade drill and then later in the month, the divisional drill. The *Ninth* had not participated in either brigade or

divisional drills before arriving at Camp Jackson, as none were given in western Virginia. In the brigade drill, there were combined exercises in which the three infantry regiments that made up the brigade worked together in practicing attacks, withdrawals and other battle maneuvers. In divisional drills, one brigade might oppose another brigade in simulated combat and blank ammunition was used to give the simulation a realistic appearance. In one drill the infantry was joined by artillery and cavalry imitate a joint attack. These exercises gave to each man confidence in his effectiveness and in the co-operation of another in arms. A new replacement wrote home concerning cooperative drills: "We had our first brigade drill day before yesterday. There were in one field four regiments of infantry, a battery of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry. The cavalry charged down on us and for the first time I saw something that looked like fighting. The artillery blazed away, and we had a regular sham battle. It was a beautiful sight, and our officers expressed themselves well satisfied with the drill."²⁹⁷

The men of the *Ninth* found the strict discipline of General Nelson and Colonel Hazen very different from their military experience in western Virginia. The severe punishments that were inflicted for the most trifling offenses did not meet with the men's approval, which, of course, meant little to the officers and nothing to the Generals. It appeared, however, that the more severe the punishment, the more rapid progress the regiment made.²⁹⁸ The soldiers grew to dislike and despise Hazen as later reported by Lieutenant-Colonel W.P. Lasselle: "it was a subject of remark in our regiment that whilst the men did not like you [Hazen] in camp on account of your strictness of discipline."²⁹⁹

The *Ninth* remained at Camp Jackson a short time, for on March 17, 1862, all the sick and disabled were sent to Nashville, and the regiment, brigade division and army struck tents and

started a march south-westward. The march from Nashville on the first day presented a pageant not often presented by a moving army. They marched on a broad, level turnpike in line by platoons. At the head of nearly every regiment was a brass or martial band. At intervals in the column there were groups of horsemen, with guidons, which separated the divisions from the brigades, and the brigades from the regiments; here and there in the great line of men were the broken spaces occupied by the batteries of field artillery. This spectacle did not last long but was exchanged for the regular order of "column of fours," and "route step." The army passed through Franklin and stopped the first night at Spring Hill.

The *Ninth* had acquired some peculiar traits during the West Virginia campaign that Hazen found troubling. In climbing around over the mountains, creeping in through the lines of the rebels, often out scouting for days together, the men had acquired the habit of often replenishing their canteens from the sweet mountain streams which came in their way without getting permission to leave the line of march. During the march from Nashville these traits got a lot of the men in trouble. Often when crossing or marching near a beautiful stream of water the men were tempted to fall out of ranks to change the brackish water in their canteens for the sweet spring water in the flowing stream. This always brought disaster. Hazen always seemed to be around and the offending soldiers went under guard or were tied to wagons for the remainder of the day.³⁰⁰

By March 20th the division encamped near the Duck River, a delay that was made necessary when the Confederates destroyed the bridge over river. Alexander McCook's Division, which was in the lead, had found the stream impassable. The bridge had to be rebuilt as McCook did not believe that the river could be forded since it was over two hundred yards

wide. The water was deep, rapid, and very cold.³⁰¹

Nelson was irritated by the delay and finding a place where the water was only three to four feet deep, obtained permission from Buell on March 27th to attempt a ford of the river, under the assurance that if successful in getting his men and artillery over, his division should have the lead. "We must have the advance and get the glory" he told his brigade commanders.³⁰² The attempt was made on March 29th and was successful; the men stripped themselves of their pants which were held on high by rifled bayonets, secured their cartridge-boxes about their necks, and stepped into the icy water. Cavalry were stationed in the river to point out the ford, break the force of the current, and protect the infantry, if necessary. The ford was tortuous and the further bank was made so slippery by the dripping of water from the troops who preceded, that it was with difficulty for even the strongest man to make it to the top. The artillery and the wagons that held the knapsacks and other supplies were helped over by the infantry with ropes. Most of the troops and their wagons forded Duck River on Sunday March 30th.

After making the crossing, the march continued for about four miles and the *Ninth* camped on the plantation of Colonel William H. Polk. Nelson's headquarters were at the house of General Gideon J. Pillow whose plantation adjoined that of his brother confederate officer.

Another trait that the *Ninth* had acquired in West Virginia was scavenging. If there were chickens in the area, the men of the *Ninth* considered them wild, even if they were in pens, and help themselves to the offering. Both Nelson and Hazen often called the regiment a "gang of thieves." When some of the men were found with these wild chickens, they would be arrested and brought up on charges. When it happen on the march from Nashville, Nelson came to the regiment, called them into formation, and yelled at them as "a pack of thieves. You won't

fight. Thieves never fight," he remarked.³⁰³


From Columbia, where the Duck River was crossed, the distance to Grant's Savannah, Tennessee headquarters was about ninety miles. Nelson directed the brigade commanders to conduct the march so as to reach Savannah on Monday April 7, 1862, as "we are not wanted there before that time."³⁰⁴ Repeated rains set in. The march continued through a very poor and hilly part of the country and the roads, inadequate without rain, became steep and slippery with mud and pot holes in abundance making the march inordinately toilsome. The *Ninth* went into camp near Savannah shortly after noon on Saturday, April 5th. It was a hot sultry day and most men of the *Ninth* took their first swim of the season in the waters of a small stream that was near the camp. That night, the pickets from the *Ninth* noticed at frequent intervals from 8 to 10 o'clock the appearance of signal rockets in the direction of Pittsburgh Landing, some ten miles away.³⁰⁵

Chapter 3

BATTLE OF SHILOH

After the evacuation of Nashville, General Albert Sidney Johnston's Confederate army fail back to Murfreesboro. From this position Johnston could cover and protect the approach into east Tennessee. However, after taking Forts Henry and Donelson the Union plans no longer contemplated a move into east Tennessee, even though Lincoln would have preferred such an advance to afford relief to the many suffering Unionists in that part of the State. The Union military desired to cut the Confederacy in half, and in order to do so, they would use the advantages gained by the hard fought river campaign just completed under the leadership of U.S. Grant. The Union's main

objective was to take Corinth, Mississippi. At Corinth, a small town just south of the Tennessee border, two major railroads intersected. The Memphis & Charleston lead east from Memphis, through Corinth and Tuscombia, to



Chattanooga, where it branched south, through Atlanta, to Charleston and Savannah, and the other north, through Knoxville, to Lynchburg and Richmond. The second rail line through Corinth was the Mobile & Ohio which lead south from Columbus, Kentucky through Jackson, Tennessee to Corinth and south through Tupelo and Baldwin, Mississippi then cut east to Mobil,

Alabama. These railroads were the only east-west and north-south supply remaining to the Confederacy, and if seized would split the upper south in half. What made Corinth attractive to the Union generals was its location only twenty-two miles southwest of the Tennessee River now under the control of Union gun-boats.

On March 5, 1862 General Pierre G. Beauregard took over command of the Confederate forces in the newly formed "Department of the Mississippi," and placed his headquarters at Corinth. Beauregard's army consisted of troops which had been in service for the last few months in Tennessee. On the same day that Beauregard took command, Johnston started moving all his troops out of Murfreesboro in an effort to united his army with that of Beauregard. Johnston's troops begin arriving in Corinth on March 18th and continued to arrive through the 24th. To this army gathering at Corinth was added General Leonidas Polk's 17,500 man force. This brought Johnston's army to 27,000 men.³⁰⁶

With the loss of Forts Henry and Donelson, followed by the further loss of Kentucky and middle Tennessee, the Confederate government was forced to take action to protect what was left. President Jefferson Davis was concerned about the adverse public reaction that was being heaped on his friend Johnston. Davis wrote Johnston, "We have suffered great anxiety because of recent events in Kentucky and Tennessee." However, Davis added, "I suppose the Tenn. or Mississippi River will be the object of the enemy's next campaign, and I trust you will be able to concentrate a force which will defeat either attempt."³⁰⁷

In addition to being concerned over their recent losses, the Confederate government made an effort to reorganize its military forces in the field. In the first stage of the war troops had been enlisted for only twelve months, and during the early months of 1862 this term was

expiring. Many of these soldiers would re-enlist, but a large number would not. Calls were issued upon the State of Mississippi for seven regiments, upon Alabama for twelve, upon Georgia for 12,000 men, upon North Carolina for five regiments. These new levies plus those that re-enlisted would be in the field by the 1st of April. In mid march all leaves of absence were revoked, and the men ordered back to their regiments. In addition, provision was made to bring into the army, by conscription, all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. Those men who were already in the army and who were between these ages were compelled to remain, even though their term of enlistment was ending.³⁰⁸

To supply more troops, Mobile and the lower southern east coast was stripped of its forces and Major General Braxton Bragg with 10,000 soldiers was ordered to Corinth. Bragg, a quick-tempered West Pointer graduate was 5th in the class of 1837. Bragg had been transferred with the understanding that he would become Johnston's chief of staff with the right to retain command of his troops. When he arrived at Corinth he injected some discipline into an army dispirited by defeat, and in need of training and development.³⁰⁹ Brigadier General Daniel Ruggles with 5,000 troops was ordered up from New Orleans. With the army now numbering sixteen brigades, 71 regiments and 40,335 men,³¹⁰ it was renamed the "Army of Mississippi." Johnston and Beauregard reorganized this army into four corps: 10,000 men under Polk as the 1st corps; 16,000 men under Bragg as the 2d corps; 7,000 men under William J. Hardee²⁷ as the 3d corps; 7,000 men under General George Crittenden as the 4th corps, (Crittenden was soon

²⁷ Hardee was an able professional soldier who had made a name for himself before the war as author of the two-volume Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics that came to be known simply as Hardee's Tactics after being endorsed by the War Department. This work was used by both the North and South as the training manual for new officers.


replaced by General John C. Breckinridge) and 15,000 men under General Earl Van Dorn as the 5th Corp, not yet arrived from his

defeat at Pea Ridge (Elkhorn

Tavern), Arkansas of March 7-8th.²⁸

Since most of the soldiers were new to the army, Beauregard proscribed rigid training schedules for them.³¹¹ On the 24th President

Davis again wrote Johnston. "You have done wonderfully well, and now I breathe easier . . ."³¹²




On March 1, 1862, Union Major General Henry W. Halleck ordered General U. S. Grant, who was then at Fort Donelson, to proceed south up the Tennessee River to Eastport, Mississippi, continuing the advance so well begun. Grant hurried from Donelson to Fort Henry to set the machinery in motion for another major movement of his army. Four days later, however, Grant was ordered to stay at Fort Henry while General Charles F. Smith was put in

²⁸ Confederate Major General Earl Van Dorn with 16,000 men tried to encircle the right flank of Union Major General Samuel R. Curtis, whose 12,000 men held a defensive position 30 miles northeast of Fayetteville, Ark. Curtis, discovering the movement and quickly swung around to head off the attack, and Van Dorn withdrew after two days of stubborn fighting. Federal losses were about 1,300, and Confederate, about 800 plus.

command of the Union advance up the Tennessee River.²⁹ By March 11th Halleck was given over-all command of not only the Department of Missouri, but that of Kansas and part of the Department of the Ohio. The *Ninth* Indiana now fell under General Halleck's command.

Under Halleck's orders Smith led a column of sixty-three transports with 25,000 men and twelve batteries of artillery up the Tennessee River to cut the



Memphis & Charleston Railroad at Bear Creek, near Eastport, Mississippi. Smith's hope was that such a move would sever the major east-west railroad artery that provided interior mobility and crucial supplies to the Confederate Army of Mississippi. Smith's column stopped at Savannah as Halleck had chosen that place as a base of operations, and a place of rendezvous with Buell's Army that he had ordered there.

As the army moved south, a captain of the gunboat informed William T. Sherman about Pittsburg Landing, and Sherman landed there as it was the only landing site above water.

²⁹ Grants later writes: "I was left virtually in arrest on board a steamer, without even a guard, for a week, when I

Sherman looked the place over and determined that it provided a strategic position from which a strike further south could be made. He reported his findings to Smith at Savannah that the Landing afforded an "admirable camping ground for a hundred thousand men," and the terrain "admits of easy defense by a small command".³¹³ On March 15th Smith ordered Sherman to disembark his troops and those of General Stephen A. Hurlbut at the landing and to leave room for Smith's Division.³¹⁴

Pittsburg Landing was set amid nine square miles of woods, small fields and orchards on a plateau 100 feet up a yellow-clay bluff from the landing. The plateau was an irregular triangle in outline, with the sides four miles long. The east side bordered the Tennessee River, the north-west bordered Snake Creek and its tributary, Owl Creek, and on the south-east side there was a range of hills which bordered Lick Creek. Deep ravines started from the plateau and emptied into the Tennessee River, principal among them were Dill's Branch, six hundred yards south of the landing. At the foot of the hills next to the plateau started a number of surface drains that formed creeks. These creeks ran a mile and a quarter from the river, almost due north, and formed a deep hollow, which divided the plateau into two main ridges. The landing itself was three-quarters of a mile above the mouth of Snake Creek, and two and a quarter miles below the mouth of Lick Creek. A small log Methodist meeting-house called Shiloh Chapel³⁰ was on Oak Creek two and a half miles south-west of the landing.

The Principal roads were the River road, which crossed Snake Creek at the bridge and ran a mile west of the landing, obliquely along the ridge crossed Lick Creek three-quarters of a

was released and ordered to resume my command."

³⁰ "Shiloh" is a Hebrew word for "Place of Peace."

mile from the river at the east end of the hills; The Hamburg and Purdy Road, which branched from the River road a mile and two-thirds in a straight line south of the landing, and extended north-west 400 yards north of Shiloh Church; and two roads that started at the landing, cross the River Road two-thirds of a mile apart and ran into the Hamburg and Purdy Road nearly opposite the church. The Corinth Road which ran from the landing has two principal branches. The western branch passed by the church, and the eastern branch went pass a mile east of the church into the Bark Road which extends along the crest of the Hills. There were other wagon trails that connected the small farms and run from field to field.

Most of the land on the plateau was wooded, sometime sparse, but often impenetrable to horseman. There were occasional cleared fields scattered throughout the plateau of from 20 to 80 acres.³¹⁵ This plateau gave plenty of room for drilling and training the northern army that would soon be camped along its roads.

As Sherman's and Hurlbut's divisions came ashore at Pittsburg Landing, General Buell, now under Halleck command was ordered by Halleck to march his army from Nashville toward Savannah and there to rendezvous with Grant's army. Buell concluded that he could "move in less time, in better condition, and with more security. . ." by marching overland rather than move by river. However, there were 122 miles of bad road between Nashville and Savannah. While the *Ninth* and the rest of Buell's army marched southwest over the back roads, rutted and muddied by early spring rains, General Benjamin M. Prentiss', McClelland's and Smith's divisions came into camp at Pittsburg Landing.

Halleck on the same day that he gave orders to Buell exonerated Grant and restored him to field command. When both armies had joined, Halleck intended to take field command of the

75,000 men and attack the Confederate stronghold being built at Corinth.³¹⁶ In this regard Grant was ordered by Halleck not to attack; "We must strike no blow until we are strong enough to admit no doubt of the result." Later Grant was instructed: "Don't let the enemy draw you into an engagement now. Wait till you are properly fortified and receive orders."³¹⁷

By April 1st there were at Pittsburg Landing McClelland's First Division with three brigades. Smith's Second Division was commanded by W.H.L. Wallace in the absence of General Smith, who was suffering from a leg injury.³¹ Hurlbut's Fourth Division was also made up of three brigades of twelve infantry regiments. Sherman's Fifth Division, the largest and newest division, was made up of four brigades of fourteen regiments. Benjamin M. Prentiss' Sixth Division was made up of only two brigades of seven regiments. Lew Wallace's Third Division of three Brigades of eleven regiments was at Crump's Landing, five miles upstream and on the opposite (east) bank from Pittsburg Landing; there guarding the army's supply depots. All totaled Grant had eighteen brigades with 78 regiments containing 42,682 soldiers, most new and untrained, although some were hardened by combat.³¹⁸

To follow the Battle of Shiloh it is important to know where each of the Union Divisions were encamped. Following the initial occupation of Pittsburg Landing these divisions were arranged with a concern for favorable camping facilities and not defense.³² Sherman the first to

³¹ In climbing from one boat to another Smith had suffered a flesh wound on his leg. Although this did not seem serious it led to incapacitation, and by the time of the landing of troops at Pittsburg Landing he had given up his command and was lying ill in Savannah. The wound became infected and Smith died from it within the month on April 25, 1862.

³² In order to perceive the battle that was to follow, it is important to appreciate the placement of the Union troops as they were found by the Confederates on the morning of the attack. The camp grounds of the divisions should be located on the map, but with Sherman's Division it is the placement of his brigades that are noted.

arrive moved inland and was the farthest west on the plateau. His division was drawn up in the vicinity of Shiloh Church, with his headquarters³³ next to the church. Prentiss' Division³³ was

camped on the Corinth Road, between Stuart's and

Hildebrand's brigades. East of Buckland's and

Hildebrand's brigades camped McClelland's

Division and nearest the landing was W.H.L.

Wallace's Division. Both divisions were made up of

experienced troops. Between Wallace's Division

and Stuart's Brigade camped Hurlbut's Division of three brigades which belonged to the Army of Ohio,

and had been sent to reinforce Grant before


Donelson. "Men were everywhere," wrote a young

soldier. Another volunteer noted that a person

might' march for miles and see nothing but the white

tents of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. . . The sound of drums and the blowing of trumpets, "fill my ears from morning to night," he observed.³¹⁹

Grant did not entrench his men at Pittsburg Landing because he did not expect to fight there, nor did he want to rob them of their aggressive spirit. He later wrote that he considered it better to give them time to drill than time to dig.³²⁰ Regiments laid out their camps with no idea of forming a defensive line. Not a single breast-work or a single protection for a battery was in place on April 4th. Grant's picket posts and patrols were inadequate to detect enemy movements



³³ Prentiss' Division of 2 brigades was made up of raw troops, having been formed only days before arriving at

more than a few hundred yards from the camp. The time had not yet come when the armies on either side had realized the all-important lesson of artificial protection; but it was inexcusable that a permanent encampment of the size of Pittsburg Landing should have been so entirely void of entrenchments.³⁴

Grant's headquarters was not at Pittsburg Landing, but at Savannah, in the same home where Smith lay ill. He made daily commuter steamboat trips to the landing and by the first of April his main concern was getting ready to move out for Corinth as soon as Buell's army arrived.



On April 2nd Confederate General Johnston, having received a telegram from cavalry scouts that Lew Wallace at Crump's Landing was on the move, concluded that Wallace's aggressiveness suggested a junction of Buell's and Grant's armies would soon to take place. The Confederates knew that when Buell and Grant joined they would advance in strength on Corinth. To avoid the certainty of a Federal attack, Beauregard, acting as Johnston's chief of staff urged an immediate strike on the Union forces at Pittsburg Landing. Johnston was said to be reluctant, but ordered preparations for an advance at six a.m. the following morning. Final plans and arrangements were written by Beauregard early in the morning of April 3rd, and by mid-afternoon, the advance elements of the Confederate army left Corinth.³²¹

Beauregard's plans called for a march by four different corps to deploy for battle on April 4th. The plans were better suited for veterans than for green troops and inexperienced staff

Pittsburg Landing.

officers. Few of these southern soldiers had ever made a one-day march of twenty miles, and fewer still had seen combat. Due to widespread confusion over what roads to take the march moved slowly. The march turned into a nightmare as the divisions of one corps blocked the road where divisions of another were supposed to pass. Units took wrong turns and got lost, and drenching showers turned the roads, already soft, into vast quagmires of mud and standing water blocking troop movement and bogging down wagons and artillery.

The orders issued by Beauregard on the morning of the 3rd contemplated that on the 4th, the three corps would have reached the vicinity of Pittsburg Landing, so that an attack might be made during the early morning of April 5th, but by the appointed hour only Hardee's Corps was in position and the rest of the Confederate army lagged far behind.³²² By the late afternoon on April 5th, when most of the troops were finally deployed Beauregard was in despair and wanted to call off the attack. The two-day delay, he said, would mean that Buell had reinforced Grant. Beauregard was also certain that the noise made by southern soldiers firing off their guns to see if rain-dampened powder still worked had eliminated all chance of surprise; they will be "entrenched to the eyes" he argued.³²³ Bragg, in a surly mood likewise urged a withdrawal. But at a council of war on the afternoon of April 5th, supported by Polk, Johnston overruled the objections. Having finally gotten the army into position to fight, Johnston was not about to back down. "Gentlemen, we shall attack at daylight tomorrow." No matter if Buell had reinforced Grant, he reasoned, the Union could present no greater front than the Confederates, and thus he would "fight them if they were a million."³²⁴

Johnston's battle plan called for succeeding waves of infantry, with corps in tandem

34 Grant & Sherman had apparently failed to remember the lesson learned centuries before by Clodius the Praetor.

aligned across the entire front. He hoped to turn the Union left flank to force the Federal troops back against the Owl Creek, and cut off the Union's line of retreat to the Tennessee River. In doing this he had to remain out of sight of the Tennessee River as he did not want the Union gunboats to cut his troops to pieces. With retreat cut off he would push the Federals into the low lands near Owl Creek and destroy them; Johnston reasoned they "will be obliged to surrender." To his troops Johnson proclaimed: "the eyes and hopes of eight millions of people" were resting upon them.³²⁵ "Remember the dependence of your mothers, your wives, your sisters, and your children on the result. . . . With such incentives to brave deeds . . . your generals will lead you confidently to the combat."³²⁶

The attack was to be made in three lines. The front line was composed of the third corps and Gladden's Brigade, part of Bragg's Corps to be commanded by Hardee. The total of troops under Hardee was 9,024. Hardee's line was too extended from Owl Creek to Lick Creek, a distance of more than three miles. Hindman's division of two brigades occupied the center, Cleburn's brigade had the left, and Gladden's the right wing. The second line in the rear of Hardee, was under Bragg who commanded five brigades. The brigades were, in order from right to left: Chalmers, Jackson, Gibson, Anderson, and Pond. This second line was 10,731 men strong. The third line was composed of the first corps under Polk with 9,136 men, and a reserve, under Breckinridge of 6,439 men. Polk was to advance on the left of the Bark Road at an interval of about eight hundred paces behind Bragg's line, with Breckinridge's troops to the right of that road. To these three lines was added a cavalry detachment numbering 4,300 to guard the Confederate flanks and outposts. The entire force attacking was estimated in the Official Records by Beauregard at 40,335 men.³²⁷



Sherman underestimated the enemy threat, even though one of his regiments while drilling in an open field heard firing in the nearby woods and alerted them to a large Confederate force. When the regiment reported, Sherman scoffed at their alarmist report of having encountered a strong enemy force. Sherman sent a routine report to Grant suggesting that his regiment encountered a brigade making a reconnaissance in force. Grant receiving this, and other reports of attacks on the army's outposts, came to Pittsburg Landing late on the night of April 4th to investigate for himself. He arrived in a rainstorm, but was unable find Sherman's camp. In the darkness Grants' horse fell pinning Grant's leg, causing a swollen ankle so sever that Grant for the next several days was unable to walk without crutches.

The next day some of Sherman's front-line colonels expressed concern to Sherman that the increased noise and activity off to the south on April 4th and 5th indicated the buildup of something big. Sherman dismissed this commotion as nothing more "than some picket firing," but just in case he orders that all his pickets be strengthened, and instructed them to be vigilant.³²⁸ Sherman reported to Grant: "I have no doubt that noting will occur today more than some picket firing. The enemy is saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday, and will not press our pickets far. I will not be drawn out far unless with certainty of advantage, and I do not apprehend anything like an attack on our position."³²⁹



On the afternoon of April 5th the *Ninth* Indiana as part of Nelson's Division arrived near Savannah. Nelson's Division was the first part of Buell's army to arrive near the Tennessee River. But neither Grant nor Buell felt a sense of urgency, so they did not send this division forward to Pittsburg Landing or hurry the arrival of the other divisions of Buell's army. When the officers under Nelson ask for transportation, they were informed that Grant had no boats available to transport Nelson's division up river. Grant himself assured Buell's officers when they wanted to march from Savannah to Pittsburg Landing:

"You cannot march through the swamps; make the troops comfortable; I will send boats for you Monday or Tuesday, or sometime early in the week. There will be no fight at Pittsburg Landing; we will have to go to Corinth, where the Rebels are fortified. If they come to attack us, we can whip them, as I have more than twice as many troops as I had at Fort Donelson."³³⁰

All of Nelson's brigades, the 10th, 19th and 23rd, reached Savannah on April 5th. The *Ninth* encamped on the southwest side of the town, about half to three-fourths of a mile from the brick house where Grant made his headquarters. As the division was to remain there for some days, orders were issued for a review and inspection to take place the next day, Sunday, April 6th at 9:00 a.m.

While Nelson's Division was bedding down, General Charles F. Smith, ill from his leg injury, joked with Nelson's officers that the enemy is "all back in Corinth, and, when our transportation arrives, we have got to go there and draw them out, as you would draw a badger out of his hole."³³¹



The Union Generals having determined that an attack was not eminent abruptly dismissed any reports of Confederate buildup, and instructed their men not to be alarmed, that everything was "all right."³³² An "Officer of Day" not believing that everything was truly "alright" went to 1st Brigade commander Colonel Everett Peabody. Peabody not wanting to be caught by surprise sent out a patrol of five companies under the command of a veteran regular army officer, Major James E. Powell. Powell's patrol ran into Brigadier General S.A.M. Wood's Confederate brigade at 4:55 a.m. and a sharp fire fight occurred. Powell's men continued firing until about 6:30 a.m., when Hardee's Corps marched from the woods. The first assault column numbered more than twenty-two regiments with 9,000 troops. Powell, with only a few hundred men sounded retreat and the patrol made its way back to camp in haste.³³³ Peabody seeing some of the wounded men returning to camp sent a second regiment to reinforce Powell's patrol. This group of reinforcements had just joined Powell's retreating men when they were overrun in a wooded knoll south of their camp causing the enlarged patrol to scatter in disarray. These troops were driven back towards camp, and close upon their heels, the Confederate Army followed.³³⁴

At the same time Prentiss began his fight, Sherman's regiments began to ready themselves for battle. Sherman did not become convinced of the attack until about 7:00 a.m. when he came to the camp of the 53rd Ohio and saw for himself the Confederate line forming in the woods near Rhea field. As Sherman rode forward to see what was happening, a volley rang out to Sherman's right and his orderly fell dead at his side. A buckshot ball struck Sherman in the hand. "My God, we're attacked!" he cried, finally convinced.³³⁵

Sherman acted with great promptness and coolness. He ordered all troops under arms. He posted brigades to guard the bridge over Owl Creek on the right and the ford at Lick Creek on the left. Additionally, he placed cannons of the 1st Illinois, commanded by A.C. Waterhouse, at a strategic position on a ridge near Shiloh Church. At a ridge to the left he placed a second battery commanded by Barrett to act as cross-fire.³³⁶ He requested General McClelland to come to his support on the left, and sent word to Prentiss that the enemy was in his (Sherman's) front in force, and then called upon Hurlbut to come to Prentiss's aid.

Due to the rough terrain south of Shiloh Church, the Confederate force that attacked Sherman experienced difficulty in maintaining its battle line. This force commanded by Brigadier General Patrick Cleburne attacked four separate times and each charge was cut down by cannon fire into their flank from Waterhouse's battery which was atop a nearby ridge. Fire from other Union regiments forced the Mississippians back with a loss of 300 out of 425 that had begun the assault. So thick did the dead lie from this charge that a man could have walked across that valley without touching his feet to the ground.³⁵ Not able to move forward against Hildebrand's brigade which was just south of Shiloh Church, Cleburne turned his attention to Buckland's brigade located to the north of the Church. Fifteen hundred of Cleburne's men attacked, but they too were repulsed by the Union troops who were positioned in dense woods.

Cleburne's attacks having failed, he waited for support which arrived at about 8:30 a.m. This support came by the advance of Bragg's second Confederate battle-line. Like Cleburne's forces they became intermixed by the rough terrain and the attack slowed. The third battle

35 Grant later writes: "Shiloh was the severest battle fought at the West during the war, and but few in the East equaled it for hard, determined fighting. I saw an open field, in our possession on the second day, over which the Confederates had made repeated charges the day before, so covered with dead that it would have been possible to

line of Polk soon joined in the morass. Out of this quagmire of men and equipment came two brigades, one from Bragg's command and the other from Polk's command. This band of Confederates advanced against Waterhouse's guns and seeing this advance the two regiments supporting the Union guns broke and ran.³³⁷ These guns were loss to the Confederates.

After the fall of Waterhouse's battery the Confederates over ran Barrett's battery, but only after the 77th Ohio of Hildebrand's brigade turned and "ran like sheep."³³⁸ The fall of Barrett's battery and the rout of the 77th Ohio so completely demoralized the rest of Hildebrand's Ohio regiments that they disappeared in complete disorder from the front, leaving three pieces of artillery in the hands of the Confederates.³³⁹ This brigade was not heard nor saw the remainder of the day.

After three hours of hard fighting, and only after the loss of Hildebrand's brigade, Sherman ordered Buckland's regiments and Colonel John A. McDowell's right flank brigade to fall back to the Purdy-Hamburg road, 500 yards to the rear. This necessitated the abandonment of Sherman's entire encampment. As Sherman's men began to reform in the middle of the road, Frederick Behr's 6th Indiana battery came careening down the road at a full gallop, through the troops, followed not only by deserters running for the rear, but the onrushing Confederates. This resulting turmoil caused the men to become panic-stricken. Sherman's Purdy road line gave way and they abandoned their guns without firing a shot leaving five pieces of artillery to the rapid advancing Confederates. Sherman's division as an organized body disappeared from the field at that point in the battle until he could rally them near the end of the days fighting.³⁴⁰ Only McDowell's Brigade, which was the furriest from the onslaught, remained somewhat intact.

walk across the clearing, in any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground."

After Sherman withdrew, the troops that had swept aside Prentiss's division bent their whole force upon McClernand's position, and were joined by many of Hardee's, Polk's and Bragg's men which had pushed back Sherman. McClernand's 3rd brigade got caught up with Sherman's fugitives and were of little support. McClernand's regiments fought hard, but by 11:00 a.m. they were overwhelmed. The division fell back, having lost more than half its artillery. The retreat was in good order, bringing them out on a line with Wallace. The Confederates were unable to pursue McClernand's troops, as they were weakened by the losses sustained in the morning attacks, and were nearly out of ammunition. The Confederates halted until they could receive reinforcements and replenish their ammunition. This delay allowed McClernand and Sherman to piece together a defensive line in the mist of McClernand's camp, supported on the right with the remnants that remained from Sherman command.

Sherman's fourth brigade, on the opposite side of the battle field from Sherman, was commanded by Colonel David Stuart, a Chicago lawyer turned soldier. This isolated brigade was on the extreme left (south-east) near Lick Creek and was originally assigned to watch the bridge over the creek. During the morning Stuart shifted his men from one position to another, not knowing where to stand and fight, finally stopping on the Hamburg Road. This shifting of his men from one location to another caused the Confederates to believe that Stuart's 2,811 man brigade was a division that might swing around and take the Confederate flank. Breckinridge's Reserve Corps was ordered up to counter this threat. Two front line brigades, Chalmers' and Jackson's, which had helped to overrun Prentiss's Camps, were pulled out and ordered against Stuart's troops. The shifting of these two brigades, as will be seen later, was a bad mistake and caused a delay of several hours in engaging the main body of retreating Union troops.

It was at about 11:00 a.m. on the Hamburg road, where Stuart had stopped to fight, that Chalmers' and Jackson's brigades came on the field and attacked him. Stuart was strongly posted on a steep hill near the river, covered with thick undergrowth, and had an open field in front of him. Stuart's Brigade held it fire until Chalmers's men were within forty yards, and then delivered a heavy and destructive volley. After a hard fight, Stuart was unable to hold his position and fell back from ridge to ridge, making a valiant resistance at each ridge.³⁴¹ Fighting "like Indians," behind trees and logs in heavily wooded terrain Stuart's men tried to hold their ground. With ammunition nearly exhausted Stuart considered a full retreat just as McArthur's brigade arrived to add assistance to hold the left flank. At noon Breckinridge's Reserve Corps had also arrived to assist Chalmers and Jackson. With this Reserve Corps, the Confederates had 8,000 men and four batteries. An intense fire fight erupted, but the reinforced Confederates were unable to shatter the Union line. Unknown to McArthur or Stuart their troops were the end of the left flank of the Union Army. If they retired, the road to Pittsburg Landing would lay open to a Confederates victory.³⁴²



At about 7:30 A.M. Grant at Savannah was advised of the sound of gun fire coming from Pittsburg Landing. He dictated several messages to Buell's officers ordering them to be ready to move to the Landing. He then headed upriver to Crump's Landing, five miles from Pittsburg Landing. Without stopping the boat, he called out to Wallace as he went by, "General, get your troops in line ready to execute any orders you might receive." Wallace shouted back that his troops were already under arms and prepared to move.³⁴³ Grant then proceeded to Pittsburg

Landing arriving on the field at 9:30 a.m. He road from one division to another conferring with each commander, he moved regiments to new positions and ordered up ammunition.

Seeing for himself that there was a major battle on hand, he sent orders to Lew Wallace to "come up." These orders did not get to Wallace until about 11:30 a.m.³⁶ He began the march following a half-hour delay for lunch, but took the wrong road and got lost. He did not arrive to assist until after the first days fight. Grant in addition to sending for Wallace sent another letter back to Savannah for Buell:

GENERAL: The attack on my forces has been very spirited since early this morning. The appearance of fresh troops on the field now would have a powerful effect, both by inspiring our men and disheartening the enemy. If you will get upon the field, leaving all your baggage on the east bank of the river, it will be a move to our advantage, and possibly save the day for us. The rebel forces are estimated at over 100,000 men. My headquarters will be the log building on the top of the hill, where you will be furnished a staff officer to guide you to your place on the field.




At about 9:00 a.m. Hurlbut sent one brigade of his command to support Sherman, and with the other two he marched west to support Prentiss. As he approached he could see that Prentiss's troops would be retreating since the outer perimeter had already been routed.

Observing this condition he formed his line a half mile behind Prentiss' camp. The position Hurlbut took was strong. It fronted open ground, and most of his men were able to take cover

36 Captain Baxter later wrote: "On Sunday, between the hours of 8 and 9 o'clock a.m., April 6th, 1862, Adjutant-General Rawlins, of General Grant's staff, requested me to go to Crump's Landing (five miles below) and order General Lew Wallace to march his command at once by the River Road to Pittsburg Landing, and join the army on the right. At the same time, General Rawlins dictated the order to General Wallace, which was written by myself and signed by General Rawlins. On meeting General Wallace I gave the order verbally, also handed to him the written order. General Wallace said 'he was waiting for orders, had heard the firing all the morning, and was ready to move with his command immediately -- know the road and had put it in good order.'"

behind a split rail fence. A ten-acre peach orchard near his front provided additional cover. To support his line Hurlbut position three batteries to provide crossing fire through the open field.

While Hurlbut was deploying his two brigades, the brigades of Chalmers', Adams' and Jackson were preparing to attack him. Just as the skirmishers became engaged, orders, as previously mentioned, came to pull back and pursue Stuart's troops near the Lick Creek. With this order



implemented, Adams brigade was the only one facing Hurlbut, and he did not wish to attack such a stronghold alone. For two hours Adams waited for reinforcements to assist him. This protracted delay allowed the remnants of Prentiss' division to form as an extension of Hurlbut's right flank. Prentiss' fragmented division included Peabody's regiment, the 25th Missouri to which was joined by the 23rd Missouri that had just arrived by transport that morning. Prentiss' command now numbered about 1,000 and they took cover in a sunken road that was worn down by many years of wagon travel. These men were supported by eight field guns all that remained of Prentiss' artillery.³⁴⁴

The two hour delay in sending reinforcement to Adams' brigade also allowed W.H.L. Wallace to move his division along the same road that Hurlbut had followed. Wallace took

position an hour later along the right flank of Prentiss and to the rear of Duncan Field. The two divisions and the fragmented force of Prentiss' Division formed an arc a half mile long, with Hurlbut's Division on the east, Prentiss's troops at the apex and Wallace's Division forming the western flank. This loosely tied line had more than 11,000 men and seven batteries totaling thirty-eight field guns.³⁴⁵

By noon the entire Union army was driven in, routed for the most part, having lost a great part of their artillery and leaving three large encampments in the hands of the Confederates. The two divisions that remained intact, Hurlbut's and W.H.L. Wallace's barred the Confederates from the depots of ammunition and the transports at the landing.

At about noon, Bragg ordered the Brigade of Colonel Randall Lee Gibson to attack. Gibson himself, a knightly soldier, was aided by colonels, three of whom afterward became generals. Gibson marched toward that part of the Union line that was covered by thick undergrowth; the sunken road where Prentiss was set to welcome them. Gibson's men were cut down in quick fashion and the remaining men broke and ran back, calling the line the "valley of death." Bragg seeing this route, ordered Gibson to attack again. Gibson protested, but again he led his Louisiana and Arkansas troops against the sunken road. Wallace seeing the on coming attack sent a regiment to Prentiss' support. This time the Union infantry prepared for the Confederate attack by lying prone in the sunken road. The Union artillery fired charges of double canister into the attacking Confederate line taking out large segments with each shot. Finally, as the Confederates approached within twenty yards of the road, the Union infantry jumped to their feet and delivered a point-blank volley. So many men were cut down, their bodies lying in piles in front of the sunken road, that one of Gibson's men labeled the area the

"slaughter pen." Bragg seeing Gibson's men returning, and unhappy with their performance, again ordered another frontal attack. Gibson asked that artillery should be sent him; but it was not at hand. Gibson's Colonels thought it hopeless; but Gibson led them again to attack, and again they suffered a bloody repulse.³⁴⁶ "It's a hornets' nest in there!" the gray-clay soldiers cried, recoiling from the charge.³⁴⁷ After four attacks it was nearly 2:00 p.m.³⁴⁸



As Breckinridge's Reserve Corps came to assist Chalmers and Jackson on the far east side of the plateau, the army's commander, Albert Sidney Johnston joined them. When Breckinridge had trouble rallying a Tennessee brigade to attack the Peach Orchard, Johnston stepped in to encourage them. He rode out in front and slowly down the line. His hat off, his sword rested in its scabbard. In his right hand he held a little tin cup, the memorial of an incident that had occurred earlier in the day.³⁷ His voice was persuasive, encouraging and compelling. His words were few; he said: "Men! They are stubborn; we must use the bayonet." When he reached the center of the line, he turned. "I will lead you!" he cried.³⁴⁹ Word soon passed from one brigade to another that "The General" would be leading this attack.

Johnston's plan called for the entire line to move forward in a coordinated attack against the Union line at the Peach Orchard as well as against McArthur's and Stuart's brigades on the far left flank of the Union Army. At about 2:00 p.m. the long line of Confederates began their attack and swept forward. Most were clad in motley garb, varying from the favorite gray and

³⁷ Johnston passing through a captured camp, he had taken this toy, saying, "Let this be my share of the spoils

domestic "butternut" to the blue clad of Louisiana regiments. Over them waved flags and pennons as varied as their uniforms. With the charge there went up a wild yell, heard above the roar of the artillery. As the Kentuckians advanced, they sang in chorus their war-song: "Cheer, boy, cheer; we'll march away to battle."³⁵⁰

Johnston's bayonet attack against the Peach Orchard caused Hurlbut's men to fall back allowing the Confederates to clear the orchard. While the attack was in progress Johnston was struck by a minie ball that entered his right leg behind the knee joint and cut the large artery.³⁸ Because of Johnston's high boots no one noticed the wound until he collapsed in the saddle. Governor Isham Harris of Tennessee, who was acting as his aide, asked: "General, are you wounded?" "Yes, and I fear seriously," replied Johnston. Unfortunately for Johnston he had ordered his personal physician, Dr. Yandell to remain with some Union wounded near Prentiss' camp.³⁹ No one with Johnston thought of applying a tourniquet, which would have save his life.³⁵¹ At about 2:30 p.m. Albert Sidney Johnston, the highest ranking general in the entire Confederate Army was dead from an acute loss of blood. A few moments later Beauregard was notified that he was now in command of all Confederate forces. As word spread of Johnston's death a lull occurred in the battle just as the Confederates had taken the momentum.³⁵²

With the Union left flank retreating a gap was created that would have allowed the

today."

38 Beauregard later writes: "General Johnston was not wounded while leading a charge, as has been so frequently asserted, but while several hundred yards in the rear of Statham's brigade after it had made a successful advance, and during the absence of Governor Harris of his staff, whom he had dispatched to Colonel Statham, some two hundred yards distant, with orders to charge and take a Federal battery on his left."

39 Johnston told Dr Yandell to stop there, establish a hospital, and give them his services. He said to Yandell: "These men were our enemies a moment ago; they are our prisoners now. Take care of them."

Confederate army the freedom to march a mile and half towards Pittsburg Landing cutting off the Union retreat in that direction, thus fulfilling Beauregard's original plan of attack. However, with Johnston's death, no one took charge of the eastern part of the field so as to take advantage of this opening.³⁵³ This brief opportunity to end the battle with a Confederate victory was soon lost.

Hurlbut, holding the position right of McArthur and Stuart saw his left flank over run by Confederates. He shifted a brigade out of line to hold the left flank. At about 3:30 p.m. when Hurlbut observed this brigade faltering he ordered a retreat. The withdrawal turned into a confused route which left only one regiment to cover the maneuver. With Hurlbut's troops gone, the flank of the original Hornet's Nest under Prentiss and Wallace became exposed. To make things worse for the Union, Confederate General Ruggles brought up all the artillery he could muster. It was the largest concentration of artillery yet used in the war, a total of sixty-two guns.³⁵⁴ Prentiss attempted to cover the left by shifting some of his men in that direction, just as the cannonade began. Bragg seeing the opportunity ordered a frontal attack on the Hornet's Nest. Prentiss's and Wallace's troops were soon encircled.


With his division surrounded, under a massive combined artillery and infantry attack, Wallace ordered a full retreat. Two regiments in their attempt to retire left their position by way of a ravine that was subjected to Confederate fire from both sides; it was dubbed Hell's Hollow. Wallace, himself, tried to pass the encircled Confederates through Hell's Hollow, only to receive a mortal head wound. Only one regiment, the 7th Illinois escaped intact, and most of Wallace's Division surrendered, or were so panic-stricken that they rushed weaponless to the river bank at the landing.

Prentiss' troops remained at the Hornet's Nest for another thirty minutes when they were attacked and pushed back by a cavalry charge led by Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest. Attacked on three sides, Prentiss, at about 5:00 p.m. gave orders to retreat, but like Wallace it was too late. Prentiss surrendered the troops with him. Altogether 2,000 troops that fought in the Hornet's Nest surrendered to Polk. This capitulation was the largest capture of Union prisoners yet made in the war.³⁵⁵ Although not a professional

soldier, Prentiss had accomplished an extraordinary military feat by keeping the Confederates from over running the whole Union line. The fight at the Hornet's Nest had lasted for over six hours. Prentiss' and Wallace's men had repulsed over a dozen separate charges with a frightful cost to the Confederate Army.

While the battle was going on at the Hornet's Nest, Sherman and McClelland on the far right flank had established a defensive

line. There a running battle was fought for several hours with attacks and charges made by both sides. At about 5:00 p.m. Trabue's brigade of Breckinridge's Reserve Corps attacked and pushed Sherman's and McClelland's troops to within a quarter-mile of the landing.³⁵⁶ One more good attack by Breckinridge's Corps and Sherman and McClelland would be knee deep in the water of the Tennessee River.



As the Union was forming this last line of defense, the Confederate Generals Bragg, Breckinridge and Polk were organizing a final attack to be started at dusk. In the hour before dark, they push all available men forward to the last ridge facing a deep ravine know as "Dill Branch."



In the early hours of April 6th, the men of Nelson's Division, including the *Ninth* were preparing for a parade and review that was to take place at 9:00 a.m. It was a bright, clear and beautiful day, balmy and fragrant with the odors of spring's early bloom in the air, when they heard the sound of heavy, distant cannon. This sound was not an uncommon occurrence when near a large army, but as it continued and increased without any cessation; all concluded that a battle had commenced at Pittsburg Landing.

Nelson ordered all brigades to ready themselves to move to Pittsburg Landing either by boats or through the swamp. Between their encampments and the landing lay roads along the river that were swampy on good days, and were now in most parts covered by the flooded Tennessee River. Both Buell and Nelson sent out separate cavalry units to find a practicable route through the swamp.

The *Ninth* was soon under arms, inspected, three days ration in haver sacks, cartridge boxes filled, every gun examined, all ready to move out in a moment's notice. By 9:00 a.m. the *Ninth* had marched to Savannah, ready for further orders. As the *Ninth* stood by, both Buell and Nelson awaited on the banks of the Tennessee for boats to be sent by Grant. Both became very impatient, as there was no cessation, no diminution, in the sounds of battle. The sounds

appeared to be coming nearer and growing more distinct; yet there was no appearance of boats coming down the river from the battle-field. The cavalry units returned from their scouting mission and reported they could find no way through the swamp. They were ordered by Nelson to try again.

Nelson's Division stood by and waited on the banks of the Tennessee for several hours, as boats appeared to be the only means of reaching the landing. The second cavalry scouting mission reported back at about 11:00 a.m., and like the first could find no way through the swamp.

About, 1:00 p.m. a local doctor was found who know a backwoods route, estimated at eight miles, five of which were through a "black mud swamp." At about 1:30 p.m. Nelson's Division, including the *Ninth* began their arduous journey through the swamp, with Ammen's Brigade in the lead.³⁵⁷

Three miles on a narrow wagon path were quickly covered by the division, but the guide then led the troops down into the low slimy black-mud swamp that gave rank growth to an almost continuous forest of sycamore and cottonwood trees. Stagnant ponds and mimic lagoons filed the area. The day was hot and sultry and the dense growth forbade a breath of cool fresh air. Mud often came up to the knees, and standing was difficult, marching almost impossible. The only way out of the mud was when the men crossed the log bridges that covered the ditches filled with water. If there were any roads, the subsiding waters left but a indistinct trace. Knapsacks were thrown away, and the men relieved themselves of every possible impediment of extra clothing. As the *Ninth* marched, the roar of cannons continued and the volleys of rifle fire could be distinguished. As bad as the marching was the men did their best to hurry on, no

stopping at the end of hour; no lagging behind, for all the men of *Ninth* appeared to be eager to reach the fight.

The lead brigade got orders: "to hurry up or all will be lost; the enemy is driving our men." The officers pushed and encouraged the men to move faster, and the pace was accelerated. Some regiments had lost a third of their numbers from fatigue, the men dropping from the ranks as if shot, and left to recover or die at their leisure.³⁵⁸ Human endurance had been taxed to the limit, when the column pushed through a dense forest and into a field that bordered on the Tennessee River. The lead brigade sent a group of men to work cutting a road down the bank to enable the men and horses to get to the boats.³⁵⁹

The northeast bank was low; the opposite bank at Pittsburg Landing was high, over 100 feet or more. A sight to behold greeted the arriving division; the dense smoke floating off in the air above, told of the heat of battle. The malevolent spurts of flame and smoke along a zigzag line which terminated in a curve to the right showed where the opposing lines of battle were placed. The space between the top of the bank and the river was a half a mile or more and was crowded with men milling about; the river was full of boats with steam up, and these boats had many soldiers on them. The men on the boats and on the river bank numbered ten to fifteen thousand; all discouraged, skulkers, malingerers, panic stricken and demoralized to an extent that they were dangerous to each other. They were mostly unarmed; many were wounded; some dead.³⁶⁰ A few in their attempts to place the river between them and the threatened danger drowned while trying to swim across. The gunboats were throwing shells into the Confederate lines.³⁶¹

It was about 4:30 p.m. when Ammen's Brigade of Nelson's Division reached the

Tennessee River across from Pittsburg Landing. For almost an hour they waited for transport to take them across the river. The first regiment of Ammen's Brigade, the 36th Indiana, reached the shore of Pittsburg Landing at about 5:20 p.m.; they were followed by the 6th Ohio.³⁶²

With only two regiments of Nelson's Division a shore, and the rest being slowly transported across the Tennessee, Grant waited for the oncoming attack at his last line of defense. This attack would be directed at the extreme left flank nearest the river where Hurlbut's remnants and Ammen's brigade awaited. The Confederates at about 6:00 p.m. advanced into Dill Branch ravine, but were beaten back by heavy artillery and rifle fire. Bragg brought up reinforcement to join in the attack when one of his brigades, Jackson's, suddenly pulled back.³⁶³

Unknown to Bragg or to the other front line Confederate generals, the new field commander Beauregard had ordered a halt to the fighting for the day and a withdrawal by the front line troops to the captured Union camps. At the time of this order Beauregard was in Sherman's captured tent near Shiloh Church, and had been convinced by his staff to put an end to the day's fight because of disorder, confusion and widespread looting in the Union camps now located in the Confederate rear. Further, since Beauregard, was away from the scene of the fighting, and did not have first hand information. He had been informed that Nelson's Division would not be able to reinforce the Union army before mid-afternoon of the next day. He felt that victory was sufficiently complete for the day, and he could pick up and finish the job the next morning.³⁶⁴ A general staff officer came to Bragg and said: "The General directs that the pursuit be stopped; the victory is sufficiently complete; it is needless to expose our men to the fire of the gunboats."³⁶⁵ Bragg replied: "My God, was a victory even sufficiently complete?"³⁶⁶

While the last attack of April 6th was being played out, the rest of Nelson's Division

including the *Ninth* crossed the Tennessee River. The trip across the Tennessee to the battle field was difficult. Each side of the steamboats that took the men of the *Ninth* across were crowded with demoralized soldiers, so many in fact that only three or four companies could cross on a boat at a time. On the passage across these malingerers said their regiments were cut to pieces and that Buell's men would meet the same fate. The troops on the bank told the same story, and provided a torrent of queries and ejaculations: "It's no use;" "I'm the last of my regiment." There were men among them whose uniform showed the rank of Colonel.⁴⁰ On all sides came the tidings of disaster, yet the men of the *Ninth* pressed through the crowd without showing any signs of fear. Some of these skulkers, seeing Nelson's arrival took heart and joined them.³⁶⁷

Throughout the night the rest of Buell's advanced troops were ferried across the river, and still others who did not make the march through the swamp were brought up from Savannah by boat. By daylight two of Buell's division Nelson's and Thomas Crittenden's would be at Pittsburg Landing. Buell's army was ashore by early morning on the 7th when the third division was ferried across the river. This brought Buell's army to about 15,000 men. These divisions placed themselves at the far left, next to the Tennessee River.

At about 7:15 p.m. Lew Wallace's division of approximately 7,000 men finally made it to the Landing. They took a position at the extreme right, next to Sherman troops.³⁶⁸

Grant did not meet with Buell that night; however, Buell did meet with Sherman and obtained a crude map of the terrain that Sherman had drawn. Buell advised Sherman that he

⁴⁰ Grant later writes: "In two cases, as I now remember, colonels led their regiments from the field on first hearing the whistle of the enemy's bullets. In these cases the colonels were constitutional cowards, unfit for any military position. But not so the officers and men led out of danger by them."

planned an attack at first light. With the information obtained from Sherman, the orders were issued for an attack at daylight. Buell acted on his own in issuing the attack order, for he considered his army independent of Grant's and merely "presumed" that Grant would be in accord with his plan to attack.⁴¹ Without knowing Buell's plans, Grant likewise considered a daylight attack, but issued no specific orders that night. When some of Grant's officers advised that they should retreat before the Confederates could renew their assault in the morning, Grant replied: "Retreat? No. I propose to attack at daylight and whip them."³⁶⁹

There was little rest for anyone including the men of the *Ninth* that night, for at about 9:00 p.m. the commander of the Navy gunboat Taylor, sent a note to Nelson asking how he could be of service. Nelson ordered the gunboat to fire its 8-inch naval guns at ten minute intervals at the Confederate positions.³⁷⁰ At 1:00 a.m. the gunboat Lexington joined in the bombardment. Little damage was done the Confederates by this shelling except keeping the men of both sides awake with the 32 pound shell sweep by at tree top level. Few soldiers slept on this "night so long, so hideous," as one Union officer wrote: "my men lay in the water and mud, were as weary in the morning as they had been the evening before."³⁷¹

To make things worse on both sides, ten thousand were wounded on the first day and these wounded lay everywhere. "Some cried for water," a Union soldier remembered years later, "others for someone to come and help them. I can hear those poor fellows crying for water. . . God heard them, for the heavens opened and the rain came." Scores of wounded men collapsed and died while drinking from a mud hole near the Peach Orchard, reddening its water and giving

41 Buell wrote later: "I had no consultation with General Grant, and knew nothing of his purpose. I presumed that he would be in accord, but I had been only a few hours within the limits of his authority, and I did not look upon him as my commander, though I would zealously have obeyed his orders."

it the name "Bloody Pond." The raging thunderstorm lasted until dawn, and during the flashes of lightning the men could see hogs feeding on the ungathered dead.³⁷²

Beauregard slept that night in Sherman's bed, near Shiloh Church, believing tomorrow would bring victory. Earlier Beauregard had sent a victory telegram to Richmond: "After a severe battle of ten hours, thanks be to the Almighty, [we] gained a complete victory, driving the enemy from every position." Tomorrow's task would be simply one of mopping up.³⁷³

On the morning of Monday, April 7th, the reinforced divisions were in position to attack with Buell's army occupying the left flank and Wallace the right. The commands right to left were placed as follows: Lew Wallace at the extreme right, then Sherman with about 1,000 men,⁴² then McClelland, Hurlbut,⁴³ then Buell's army with Brigadier General Alexander McCook, General Thomas L. Crittenden and on the extreme left General William Nelson. Nelson's Division was placed on a line from right to left in the following order: 19th Brigade (6th Kentucky, *Ninth* Indiana and 41st Ohio in reserve), the 22nd Brigade and on the far right the 10th Brigade in reserve. After the last attack on Sunday, Nelson's Division took and occupied the ravine known as Dill's Branch, 600 yards from the landing, and the division's pickets held ground beyond the ravine during the night.³⁷⁴ Before dawn, at about 4:00 a.m., with the rain still falling General Nelson gave an order to Hazen to put his Nineteenth Brigade in motion as soon

42 In Sherman's official report he noted: "In this position we rested for the night. My command had become decidedly of a mixed character. Buckland's brigade was the only one with me that retained its organization. Colonel Hildebrand was personally there, but his brigade was not." Buell later writes: "The division [Sherman's] did not exist except in the person of its commander. . . The number of men present could not have been large. Less than 1000, including Buckland's 2 regiments after they were found, would have told the number that lay on their arms in Sherman's ranks on Sunday night."¹⁷

43 General Buell says of Grant's army that there were "not more than five thousand men in ranks and available on the battlefield at nightfall. . . The rest were killed, wounded, captured, or scattered in inextricable and hopeless confusion for miles along the banks of the river."¹⁸

as he could see to move: "find the enemy and whip him." The *Ninth* was in line, ready to attack.³⁷⁵

With first light, the skirmish line was strengthened and advanced several hundred yards beyond Dill's Branch. The *Ninth* went through the undergrowth of Dill's Branch ravine and ascended the steep, high bank; first one line advanced far enough to allow the second to cross, halted and adjusted alignment. When all were crossed, the skirmishers advanced slowly and cautiously.³⁷⁶

After reforming from Dill's Branch at about 5:20 a.m., the *Ninth* moved about one mile forward meeting only light resistance from elements of Forrest's cavalry. After pushing this token opposition back, they came upon Hurlbut's camp where the troops were driven from the day before. The *Ninth* was halted near an open field by Buell, as Nelson Division had moved farther forward than expected and his right flank was exposed.³⁷⁷ Crittenden's Division was moved up to the right of Nelson's Division.

About a half mile beyond Hurlbut's camp near a small clearing called Wicker Field, just north of the Bloody Pond, the Confederates had a composite force embracing Chalmers' brigade, Moore's Texas regiment, part of Withers' Division, the Crescent Regiment of New Orleans and the 26th Alabama, all supported by well-posted batteries.³⁷⁸ The batteries were both in front of the Division's left and commanding the woods on the right flank in front of the *Ninth*. As the *Ninth's* skirmishers moved forward, they encountered the battery in the woods and three or four regiments of infantry that had fought at the Hornets' Nest the day before. The *Ninth's* skirmishers were quickly repulsed by the infantry and driven back. The Confederate batteries were then turned upon them with grape and canister stopping its advance.

At about 6:30 a.m. the *Ninth* again pushed forward to a clump of log houses and against a fence, to engage a battery on the far edge of the field.³⁷⁹ The *Ninth* advanced, while suffering heavy losses to the woods. They came upon a cannon of the "New Orleans Washington Artillery" and they captured it.⁴⁴ Nearly every horse to gun and caisson were down and the Confederate men laid thick about it.

It was at this time the unexplained absence of Colonel Moody was noted and Lieutenant-Colonel Blake took command of the *Ninth* for the remainder of the days fight.³⁸⁰ The regiment soon became sharply engaged with the Confederate infantry. The fight continued for a short time which resulted in the *Ninth* being rejected from the woods, narrowly escaping capture, when the Confederates were reinforced and advanced against them. The southerners recovered the cannon captured by the *Ninth* and began a push forward.³⁸¹

The Division began to give ground as the heavy artillery and tremendous rifle fire began to take its toll. Nelson asked for artillery support as his artillery had been left at Savannah for want of transportation. Buell ordered Captain Mendenhall's battery of the Regular Army forward to give Nelson's Division some relief. The artillery took up the fire fight and an hour later the Confederates ceased firing giving the *Ninth* an opportunity to replenish their ammunition.³⁸²

At about 8:00 a.m. as the *Ninth* was replenishing their ammunition, the Confederates attacked the Division where the 36th Indiana was holding the left flank against the Tennessee River. This regiment had its hands full as the Confederates had massed a large front, apparently determined to carry the left flank. The 36th was on good ground for defense, concealed in the

44 Wiley Sword notes that "although not positively identified, this Confederate artillery probably was Robertson's

heavy undergrowth, and in a position to repulse a superior force. When the Confederates attacked, the men of the 36th jumped to their feet. The front rank fired and then the rear rank fired driving the attacking force back. Buell, seeing that the left of the whole Union army was in great danger, ordered Captain William R. Terrill's company of U.S. Artillery into action against the attacking Confederates. This artillery drove the Southerners back and allowed the Division to advance slowly. The Confederates were falling back slowly and stubbornly, but were losing ground.³⁸³

As the attack on the left was subsiding, a strong force of six regiments, three from Texas, the 11th Louisiana, one from Mississippi, and one from Kentucky, came out of the woods on the right of the Division, several lines deep, with unfurled flags and with the procession of a parade. Their pace quickened, they broke into a run, and with a wild yell bore down upon the *Ninth*. The Confederates were attempting by a flanking movement to push the Division back. The *Ninth*, posted on the line of a rail fence that offered little or no protection was ordered to hold fire, and as the Confederates approached to within a few yards of their line, Lieutenant-Colonel Blake gave the order to fire. The solid and well placed shot broke the momentum of their advance, but the attack continued. Hazen ordered the 6th Kentucky to support the *Ninth*, and brought up the 41st Ohio which was in reserve behind the *Ninth*. Mendenhall's and Terrill's batteries were called upon for support, and they opened with canister as the Confederates poised to overrun the *Ninth*. The right wing of the *Ninth* was ready to give way, but the imperturbable coolness of Lieutenant-Colonel Blake came into play. His strong voice rang out over the sound of the cannons: "Steady, *Ninth!* We know our business!" It was enough. The line remained firm

Alabama Battery."

as the Confederates came forward with loud shouts. One rank of the *Ninth* fired, and then another fired, loaded and refired. The Confederates found the aim too accurate and the bullets too numerous to continue the advance. They fell back, but soon again renewed the attack. Each time they attacked they were repulsed until finally, at about 9:30 p.m. after almost two hours of hard fighting, they sank back into the recesses of the shade, and the attack ended.³⁸⁴ Nelson observed the fight from behind the *Ninth*. When the Confederates ended their advance, Nelson took off his hat in response to the cheers of the men, and addressed them saying: "Men of the *Ninth* Indiana, the State of Indiana shall hear in my next general order, how gallantly you have behaved this day."⁴⁵

As the Confederates fell back, Nelson led his division forward. A particularly unnerving sight to these advancing troops were the casualties from the day before's action. Ambrose Bierce, a First Lieutenant in Company "C" later wrote:

Knapsacks, canteens, haversacks distended with soaken and swollen biscuits, gaping to disgorge, blankets beaten into the soil by the rain, rifles with bent barrels or splintered stocks, waist-belts, hats and the omnipresent sardine-box--all the wretched debris of the battle still littered the spongy earth as far as one could see, in every direction. Dead horses were everywhere, a few disabled caissons, or limbers, reclining on one elbow, as it were; ammunition wagons standing disconsolate behind four or six sprawling mules. Men? There were men enough; all dead, apparently, except one, who lay near where I had halted my platoon to await the slower movement of the line--a federal sergeant, variously hurt, who had been a fine giant in his time. He lay face upward, taking in his breath in convulsive, rattling snorts, and blowing it out in sputters of froth which crawled creamily down his cheeks, piling itself alongside his neck and ears. A bullet had clipped a groove in his skull, above

45 General Nelson notes in his report on April 10, 1862: "I refer the general to the reports of the brigade commanders for the part each regiment took in the action, reserving to myself only to mention that during the action I rode up and thanked the *Ninth* Indiana Regiment for its gallantry." Colonel Hazen, commander of the Nineteenth Brigade wrote on April 9th: "It is proper here to say that the *Ninth* Indiana Volunteers, which lost one officer and several men in the morning's engagement, showed remarkable coolness and fortitude during the entire time." After the battle Nelson ordered a "Stand of Colors" which he planned to present to the *Ninth* for the gallantry shown in their first fight under his command. In Wicker Field the State of Indiana placed a monument in honor of the *Ninth*'s valor.

the temple; from this the brain protruded in bosses, dropping off in flakes and strings. I had not previously known one could get on, even in this unsatisfactory fashion, with so little brain. One of my men, who I knew for a womanish fellow, ask if he should put his bayonet through him. Inexpressibly shocked by the cold-blooded proposal, I told him I though not; it was unusual, and too many were looking.³⁸⁵

Others noted: "Some wounded men had huddled together for warmth during the night. Many had died there, and others were in the last agonies as we passed." "Their groans and cries were heart-rending. . . The gory corpses lying all about us, in every imaginable attitude, and slain by an inconceivable variety of wounds, were shocking to behold."³⁸⁶

As the day wore on, the "Hornets' Nest" was in front of Crittenden's left brigade, and the peach orchard and the ground where Albert Sidney Johnston fell was in front of Nelson.³⁸⁷ General Buell and Nelson were both just in the rear of the Hazen's brigade, and the preparations for attack occupied their attention. General Buell gave the command to advance which was followed by Hazen's command to move to protect Nelson's exposed flank by changing front obliquely to the west.³⁸⁸ Only the *Ninth* remained in line facing south and advanced to the edge of the cotton field near the William Manse George Cabin.³⁸⁹ Diagonally across the field Hardee's troops were in wait.

Some time between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m. Hardee ordered the Confederate infantry in the vicinity to attack. Spearheading the assault was the 2nd Confederate Regiment, and with a wild yell they burst from the underbrush and crossed the corner of the open cotton field near the William Manse George Cabin. Buell, who was with Nelson just in the rear of *Ninth's* line, ordered an immediate counterattack.³⁹⁰ The order "Fix bayonets! Forward, Charge!" was given by the *Ninth's* Lieutenant-Colonel Blake. The men charged loading and firing as they went forward upon the outnumbered Confederate attackers and swept the Southerners out of the Sarah

Bell's Old Cotton Field and into a Union camp deserted early Sunday near the Hamburg-Purdy Road. The Confederates made a desperate stand for some minutes grabbing ammunition from the boxes stacked in the camp as they fought among the tents. As the *Ninth* pushed forward, a Confederate battery belonging to Hodgson's Washington Artillery opened upon the regiment from the left flank creating considerable havoc.³⁹¹ After expending almost all their ammunition in the fire fight that followed, the men of the *Ninth* succeeded in driving the Confederates from the Union camp. This charge virtually ended the fight for the *Ninth* as well as for Hazen's brigade. The regiment remained on the south east side of the Davis Wheat Field on the Hamburg-Purdy Road until mid afternoon.³⁹²



As to the rest of the battle on April 7th, when Nelson began his attack on the left a daylight, Grant came up, and gave Lew Wallace the "direction of attack." At about 7:00 a.m. Lew Wallace commenced his attack, but he moved so slow and cautiously with little opposition that he did not make much progress from his starting position. The primary reason for such slow advancement on the part of Lew Wallace was that Sherman's troops who were on Wallace's right did not proceed with Wallace's column, and Wallace was obligated to call a halt to his advance. Wallace waited for Sherman to no avail, and finally McClelland's Division was ordered to his support. At about 9:00 a.m. Hurlbut's troops moved out and formed one brigade on McClelland's left.³⁹³

When Lew Wallace began his second advance with McClelland on his left the Confederates fell gradually back to the edge of the camp of McClelland. At about 10:00 a.m.

what remained of Sherman's division formed a line obliquely in the rear of the McClernand's camp ready to move foreword. The contest that followed in and around McClernand's camp involved the whole of Grant's available force and McCook's division of the Army of the Ohio, and continued with great voracity from 10 a.m. until 4 o'clock p.m.

About 4:00 p.m. the *Ninth* was moved out on the line of Confederate retreat. The roads were filled with disabled cannon, baggage wagons and broken ambulances. A mile out onto the Eastern Corinth Road the *Ninth* was recalled.³⁹⁴

Neither Grant nor Buell wished to pursue the retreating Confederate Army even though the Confederates bivouacked only two miles beyond the battlefield. Both were willing to prepare a defense "for tomorrow's fight."³⁹⁵ Grant wrote a note to Buell:

"Under the instructions which I have previously received, and a dispatch also of today from Major-General Halleck, it will not then do to advance beyond Pea Ridge, or some point which we can reach and return in a day."³⁹⁶

When the fighting stopped, the shock of the carnage that had occurred was overwhelming; thousands dead, and more thousands wounded. The heaped and stacked dead bodies, already swollen by the heat of the afternoon sun presented a gruesome sight as men walked the battlefield in a state of bewilderment which only added to this terrible ordeal. A cold rain that started to fall at dusk further added to the misery of men that bedded down to tried to move.

After the battle, Beauregard sent a note to Grant asking that he be allowed to send men to bury the Confederate dead. Grant replied that he had already seen to the burial, due to the warm

weather conditions.⁴⁶ The Federal and Confederate dead were placed in separate long trenches on the battle field.⁴⁷

One hundred thousand men fought at Shiloh. Nearly one in four was a casualty. Three thousand four hundred and seventy-seven men died, more than all the Americans who died in all the battles of the Revolution, the War of 1812 and the war with Mexico, combined.³⁹⁷

Remarkably, the casualties were almost the same for both sides. The Official Records report that there were 44,895 present for the Union, including noncombatants. Grant's losses as reported were 1,513 killed, 6,601 wounded, 2,830 captured or missing; bringing the total casualties to 10,944. The Army of the Ohio had 241 killed, 1,807 wounded and 55 missing for a total casualty count of 2,103. Accordingly, the Union Casualties were 13,047, with 1,754 being killed. In addition General W. H. L. Wallace was killed, Grant and Sherman wounded, and Prentiss captured.

The trophies taken by the Army of the Ohio were twenty pieces of artillery, a great number of caissons, and a considerable number of small arms. Many of the cannon that were captured were those that were lost the previous day.⁴⁸ Several stands of colors were also recaptured by Buell's men.³⁹⁸

46 Grant later writes: "After the battle I gave verbal instructions to division commanders to let the regiments send out parties to bury their own dead, and to detail parties, under commissioned officers from each division, to bury the Confederate dead in their respective fronts, and to report the numbers so buried.

47 Four years after the battle the Union dead were removed and reburied in a new national cemetery. The Confederate dead still lie in five suitable marked trenches; the largest containing 721 bodies stacked seven deep. The trenches are part of Shiloh National Military Park.

48 On the 6th Sherman lost 7 pieces of artillery, McClernand 6, Prentiss 8, and Hurlbut 2 batteries. On the 7th Sherman captured 7 guns, McClernand 3, and Buell's Army captured 20.

Confederate loses were estimated at 1,728 killed,⁴⁹ 8,012 wounded and 959 captured. Major General Albert Sidney Johnston and Brigadier General A. H. Gladden were killed and Major General W. S. Cheatham, Brigadier Generals C. Clark and B.R. Johnson were wounded. The Confederates claim to have taken away 30 pieces of artillery, 26 stands of colors and nearly 3,000 prisoners of war.

The Forth Division went into action with 4,541 men of whom 6 officers and 84 enlisted men were killed, 33 officers and 558 enlisted men wounded and 58 enlisted men missing, making a total of 739 casualties. More than half of the division's loss occurred in the Nineteenth Brigade.

The *Bloody Ninth* suffered the heaviest loss of any regiment in the Army of the Ohio at Shiloh. The *Ninth* came to the battle with 569 fit for action, of these 31% would end up as casualties. Seventeen men were killed, including two officers, Captain James Houghton of "I" Company⁵⁰ and Adjutant Thomas J. Patton⁵¹. There were 150 men wounded including 6 officers and 4 men were missing. Fifteen of the wounded would later die from their wounds including 1st Lieutenant Joseph S. Turner of "K" Company. This brings the total losses suffered by the *Ninth* to 174.

49 Grants later writes: "This estimate must be incorrect. We buried, by actual count, more of the enemy's dead in front of the divisions of McClernand and Sherman alone than here reported, and four thousand was the estimate of the burial parties for the whole field."

50 From Mishawaka, Indiana.

51 From LaPorte, Indiana.

Chapter 4

CORINTH TO LOUISVILLE

For ten days following the battle of Shiloh, the men of the *Ninth* endured the discomfort through night and day of constant exposure to the rain and cold. The daily rain made the roads almost impassable, so that the wagons containing the camp equipment left behind at Savannah did not reach the regiment until April 17th. During that time the men had to live in the open air in muddy camps and experienced frequent cold drenching rains. The food and provisions had to be carried two miles each day from the river to the camps over roads so muddy that it was difficult travel even for horses. These conditions produced a serious effect on the health of the soldiers as dysentery developed throughout the regiment. The arrival of the camp equipment, clothing and personal gear, as well as a change of location to high ground, away from the impure water and stench arising from the unburied carcasses of horses, and the atmosphere of the battle-field brought a favorable change in the health of the men.³⁹⁹ When the equipment arrived, the *Ninth* camped on a high ridge, between two deep ravines bordering Lick Creek.⁴⁰⁰

For twelve days the men of the *Ninth* rested and regained their health, performing only ordinary outpost duty when called upon. General Nelson was a frequent visitor to the *Ninth's* camp, checking on the men's welfare, their wants and needs, and making sure his favorite regiment recovered its fighting spirit. One draw back was the arrest of the *Ninth's* commander Colonel Gideon C. Moody. The charges against Colonel Moody related to his explained absences from the battle-field while the *Ninth* was fully engaged in the conflict. Colonel Moody was placed under arrest and relieved of command as well as any other duties associated with the

regiment. His side-arms and sword were taken and he was confined to the regiment's encampment. Lieutenant-Colonel William H. Blake⁵² was given temporary command pending the outcome of the Court-Martial.⁴⁰¹ With Lieutenant-Colonel Blake in command the mood and temper of the men improved.

It did not take as long for the news about the battle of Shiloh to reach the outside world as it did for the camp equipment to reach the *Ninth*. When dispatches concerning the battle first reach the Union and Confederate capitals, both the north and south treated the results as a defeat. The shocking number of casualties on both sides helped to explain the opinion that the public formed concerning the battle's outcome. Never before had there been so many Americans killed in one battle. To a large extent the press was to blame for the north not accepting the outcome as a victory. The first news the north received was from newspapers reporter who came to the battlefield and gathered their reports from the skulkers and malingerers hiding near the bluffs. They reported Ulysses S. Grant's army was caught by "complete surprise," soldiers bayoneted in their tents, and his army "cut to pieces." After the battle the news papers carried stories that Grant was drunk, unable to command and only saved by the arrival of Don Carlos Buell's army. Buell's officers who talked more freely to reporters than did Grant's officers helped sway public opinion against Grant.

With the reports that a large number of Ohio regiments ran to the rear at the first sight of battle, Ohio Governor Todd sent his lieutenant governor to Shiloh to investigate. He later announced that the Ohio men were not cowards, but were caught off guard as a result of the "criminal negligence" of the high command. Disgraced officers, such as the Colonel of the 53rd Ohio who called to his regiment to "Retreat! Save yourselves!" told tales back home that Grant

was lazy and incompetent and should be replaced.⁴⁰² The hero of Fort Donaldson was now the goat of Shiloh, and it looked as if he would be forced from the army. Finally, when Republicans came to Lincoln calling Grant a political liability and advising that he must go, Lincoln simply replied, "I can't spare this man; he fights."⁴⁰³

Beauregard fared no better in the south than did Grant. He first described the battle as a southern triumph, but as the facts became known he was blamed for having snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by refusing to order a final twilight assault on the first day.⁴⁰⁴ The government at Richmond knew that the Union had won a strategic victory when Confederate troops were turned back at Shiloh. The battle was fought in an all-out bid to regain the initiative in that theater of war and it failed. There were calls for Beauregard's discharge, but with three Union armies twenty-two miles from Corinth, a crucial strategic point for the South, he remained in command.

Four days after the battle of Shiloh ended; Major General Henry Halleck left Saint Louis heading to Pittsburg Landing to take personal command of the Union army. When he arrived he began reorganizing Grant's Army of the Tennessee, Buell's Army of the Ohio and General John Pope's Army of the Mississippi which he had summoned from Island No. 10.⁵³ The first step in the reorganization was to relieve Grant of his command over the army of the Tennessee, and assign him as his second in command of the combined forces. This move placed Grant in a secondary roll, as his new position was merely honorary and had no duties; he was placed on the

⁵³ When Confederate General Polk withdrew from Columbus, Kentucky as part of the preliminary moves of the Shiloh campaign, he sent 5,000 men to reinforce the 2,000 men then occupying a Mississippi River position, known as Island No. 10. This inland blocked Union navigation of the river. Pope had a canal cut through the swamps so that gun-boats could by-pass the defenses of Island No. 10. On April 7th, 1862 four regiments under gun-boat protection crossed the Mississippi and cut the Confederate line. Pope's victory opened the Mississippi to Fort

shelf as Halleck undervalued Grant's worth, and had little faith in Grant's ability. Halleck also ordered General George Thomas⁵⁴ Division of Buell's army to join him and gave Thomas command over Grant's former Army of the Tennessee. Further, Halleck assigned McClernand as commander of reserves, and assigned him his old division, plus Lew Wallace's division.

Buell's Army of the Ohio was now down to four divisions: William Nelson's with the *Ninth*, Alexander Mc Cook's, Thomas L. Crittenden's and Thomas J. Wood's. Buell was not pleased with Halleck's reorganization, and he informed Halleck of his displeasure: "You must excuse me for saying that, as it seems to me, you have saved the feelings of others very much to my injury."⁴⁰⁵ As unhappy as Buell was with the reorganization, Grant was more unhappy, for Grant had no troops to command. When he complained, Halleck advised: "I have done everything in my power to ward off the attacks which were made upon you. If you believe me, your friend, you will not require explanations; if not, explanations on my part would be of little avail."⁴⁰⁶

Halleck's three armies had fifteen divisions that totaled 120,172 men and more than 200 pieces of artillery.⁴⁰⁷ It was the largest army ever assembled in the Western Hemisphere. Remarkable and imposing as this army was in numbers of men, it was still more remarkable for its array of distinguished leaders. Among them were the future generals-in-chief of the armies of the United States, Halleck himself, and after him the three most successful of all the soldiers that fought for the Union: Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan. Other great leaders assembled were Thomas, Buell, Pope, and Rosecrans, all to lead armies during the war. Near the end of the

Pillow.

⁵⁴ George Thomas was promoted to Major General as a reward for his victory over Felix Zollicoffer at Logan's Crossroads on January 18, 1862.

month, with his reorganization completed, Halleck was ready to push forward to take Corinth.



Beauregard withdrew his army from the field of Shiloh, took position again within the defenses of Corinth, and called for help to stay the advance of Halleck's newly formed army. Of the 40,000 men who marched off to Shiloh, 30,000 were back at Corinth by April 9th. Van Dorn's 20,000 man army, unable to arrive at Shiloh to give aid on the last day of the battle as hoped by Beauregard, finally crossed the Mississippi River and arrived in Corinth in mid April. Major-General Edmund Kirby Smith⁵⁵ sent every available regiment from East Tennessee. Major-General John C. Pemberton sent troops from his command in South Carolina and Georgia.⁴⁰⁸ As the need for more troops at Corinth became apparent, the Confederate Congress enacted stringent law for conscripting every white male between the ages of 18 and 35. The law passed on April 22nd was not in time to provide much help for the men at Corinth. Beauregard's army dug in and waited.

Corinth, however, was not a pleasant place to be in April 1862. It was jammed with the sick and wounded back from Shiloh. The churches, hotels, stables and stores were crowded with the wounded. For lack of sanitary precautions, and an inadequate water supply, which became contaminated, Beauregard's army was cut by 18,000 who were placed on the sick list. While diarrhea and dysentery claimed its toll both measles and typhoid fever reached epidemic

⁵⁵ Smith graduated from West Point in 1845, and fought in the Mexican War. He resigned in 1861 as a Major, and was commissioned a Colonel of Calvary. Later promoted to Bridge-General, he commanded a brigade in the Shenandoah at the Battle of Bull Run where he was severely wounded. He was promoted to Major General and given command of a division under Beauregard. In March, 1862 he assumed command of the District of East Tennessee with headquarters at Knoxville, Tennessee.


proportions.⁴⁰⁹ Of those that were fit for duty, 5,000 were on detached service and 4,000 were on extra duty. There were "present for duty" 53,000 officers and men. One-third of them belonged to the Army of the "West" under Van Dorn and two-thirds to the Army of the Mississippi, commanded by Braxton Bragg.⁴¹⁰

Corinth was a crucial strategic point for the South and it had to be held. At this small town, two major railroads intersected: the Memphis & Charleston and the Mobile & Ohio. These railroads were the only east-west and north-south supply lines the Confederacy had left, and if seized, would split the upper south in half. "If defeated here," wrote Beauregard two weeks after Shiloh, "we lose the whole Mississippi Valley and probably our cause."⁴¹¹



The principal roads

out of Pittsburg Landing lead in the direction of Corinth. All these roads were narrow, unimproved, dirt roads. The land was low and marshy, and in late April almost impassable. The country was flat, with some hills along the larger creeks that criss-cross the area; it was thickly wooded and had dense undergrowth.



At the end of April, Halleck meet with his Generals, "we can march forward to new fields of honor and glory, till this wicked rebellion is completely crushed out and peace restored to our country."⁴¹² Thus he moved his army out toward Corinth, with Buell in the center, Thomas at the right, and Pope at the left; McClernand brought up the rear with his reserves. Halleck telegraphs Washington on May 3rd, "I leave here tomorrow morning, and our army will be before Corinth to-morrow night."⁴¹³ Halleck's army was not at Corinth the next night, for he moved cautiously, and entrenched every time that he halted. Fifteen days later he approached within four miles of Corinth, where he dug in and fortified a line extending from the Mobile and Ohio railroad on the northwest to Farmington on the southeast. The trenches were five miles long, and when completed Halleck brought up his heavy siege guns. By the 25th of May he was where he promised Washington he would be "tomorrow" and almost ready to open with siege guns upon the Confederates, whose entrenchments were hardly a thousand yards to his front.

The *Ninth* helped Halleck burrow his way to Corinth. It left Pittsburg Landing on May 2nd with the rest of Nelson's Division. They marched to approach Corinth from the northeast using mainly the Corinth Road. Three miles from Shiloh they were assigned the duty of covering the work parties that were constructing bridges and repairing the road as the division moved toward Corinth. On May 18th, near Farmington, a small town four miles east of Corinth, a heated skirmish occurred as the Confederates harassed the 19th brigade throughout the day, but by evening the *Ninth* had driven them back to their entrenchments, only to have a Confederate battery open fire upon them. After that skirmish the *Ninth* was assigned regular trench duty, digging all day and sleeping each night in the newly constructed trenches, under arms ready to repulse any attack the rebels might launch.

It was about this time that the *Ninth* had important visitors from back home in Indiana. Governor Morton, Adjutant General Lazarus Noble, Dr. J.S. Bobbs, and Professor Miles J. Fletcher had left Indianapolis on May 11th for Halleck's army. Their intended purpose was to arrange transportation back to Indiana for the Hoosier soldiers wounded at Shiloh. Additionally, it was hoped that suitable hospital arrangements could be made for those soldiers that were to sick to be moved. Back on April 10th Morton had sent to Shiloh thirty surgeons when he first received word of the casualties from the great battle.⁴¹⁴ He hoped to persuade some of the Indiana doctors to stay with these seriously wounded men until they could be moved back home. While he was in the area he visited each Indiana regiment to see how well the soldiers had recovered from the bloody shock of Shiloh.⁴¹⁵ He promised that he would send his personal representative to each camp to check on "his troops" to determine if they needed anything. When Morton left, the men of the *Ninth* considered Morton a true friend, and a person in high office that would look after their wants and needs. On May 22nd Morton wired Stanton: "The enemy are in great force at Corinth, and have recently received reinforcements. They evidently intend to make a desperate struggle at that point, and from all I can learn their leaders have utmost confidence in the result . . . It is fearful to contemplate the consequences of a defeat at Corinth."⁴¹⁶

When Morton departed the soldiers of the *Ninth* returned to their digging. By May 28th they had hollowed out to within three-fourths of a mile from the Confederate trenches.⁴¹⁷ The next day the siege guns would open up on Corinth and the battle would began.



While the Union forces were digging their way to the Confederate stronghold, Beauregard concluded that he would not be able to hold onto Corinth once the contest became a siege. He feared that he might even lose his army in such a siege, since Corinth had both poor water, and a shortage of food. With this thought in mind, he called a counsel of war that brought Bragg, Van Dorn, Polk, Hardee, Breckinridge, Price and Beauregard together on April 25th. "The situation . . . requires that we should attack the enemy at once, or await his attack, or evacuate the place."⁴¹⁸ The matter was fully debated, and Hardee was most adamant, that Corinth should be abandoned and the army moved south along the line of the Mobile and Ohio railroad. The others agreed and Beauregard issued the orders that night.⁴¹⁹

Beauregard's plan was to evacuate Corinth in complete secrecy. So secret were his plans that only a few line officers know that there would be a retreat. The soldiers were given three days rations and ordered to the front ready for an all-out-attack. The sick were removed to the rear, and all supplies were removed by rail out of the city. On the night of the 29th the men were ordered to cheer whenever a train arrived, so as to delude the Union into believing that they were being reinforced. During that night trains keep arriving, and troops were moved about creating the impression that there would be an attack at day break.⁴²⁰

Pope sent a message to Halleck in the early hours of the 30th: "The enemy are reinforcing heavily in my front and on my left. The cars are running constantly, and the cheering is immense every time that they unload in front of me. I have no doubt that I shall be attacked in heavy force at daylight."⁴²¹ Halleck ordered Buell to prepare to support Pope, since an all out

attack would be made the next morning. Beauregard's rouse had worked, for while Pope, Buell and the *Ninth* were preparing to resist a daylight onslaught, the Confederate snuck out of town leaving only dummy guns and dummy cannoneers to serve them.

At 4 o'clock in the morning of the 30th a Confederate soldier came into General Nelson's camp and reported that his whole army had evacuated Corinth. Nelson ordered a general advance to verify the report, and by 6:30 a.m. he informed General Buell that his troops were in Corinth. Nelson found the town on fire and took 130 prisoners who were too sick to go with the retreating army.⁴²² Only two families remained in town, the rest of the citizens had left with the southern troops.



Halleck's grand army of more than 120,000, the largest army ever amassed in the United States, had spent one month planning and one month digging, only to capture a burned out railroad intersection. It was not the victory that Halleck wanted, for he did not destroy the Confederate army, he only caused it to move further south. Halleck sent Pope in pursuit, and by the evening of the 30th Pope reported he had captured a hundred barrels of beef, several hundred wagons, and several thousand rifles. He also reported that the area was full of rebels, as many as 10,000 were scattered about, and would come in within a day or two. Halleck reported to Washington on June 4th: "General Pope, with 40,000, is 30 miles south of Corinth, pushing the enemy hard. He already reports 10,000 prisoners and deserters from the enemy and 15,000 stand of arms captured. "Thousands of the enemy are throwing away their arms." Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton wired back to Halleck: "Your glorious dispatch has just been received, and I

have sent it into every State. The whole land will soon ring with applause at the achievement of your gallant army and its able and victorious commander."⁴²³ When Halleck sent his wire to Washington, the truth was that Pope was only four miles outside town, and Beauregard with his entire army was still within twenty-seven miles of Corinth and nobody was pushing him. He had already been there several days, and he remained there three or four days longer. There were no wagons taken, and only 2,000 old muskets were found a Booneville, along with 2,000 sick men, none of which were taken prisoner.⁴²⁴

After sending his wire to Washington, Halleck ordered Buell to move south and assist Pope who believed he was again going to be attacked near Baldwin. Buell with two divisions, including the *Ninth*, moved out on June 4th. When he reached Pope's position, Buell as ranking officer assumed command over the entire force of 60,000 men. This force chased and attacked the Confederate's rear until they reached Guntown, Mississippi, 59 miles south of Corinth. At this point on June 9th Halleck called off the pursuit as his line of supply had grown too thin. The *Ninth* returned from Guntown and went into camp at Booneville, where it stayed the night.

Beauregard continued his retreat to Tupelo, Mississippi thirteen miles further south of Guntown where his army went into camp. Since the Union forces were no longer in pursuit, he took an overdue medical leave, planning to be away at Bladon Springs, a resort north of Mobile, for a week or ten days. For this purpose, Beauregard, on June 17th turned over his command to Major General Braxton Bragg his next in command. When President Davis heard that Beauregard had left without his permission, he took advantage of the situation by relieving Beauregard of his command⁵⁶ and gave it to Braxton Bragg,⁵⁷ an old friend and Mexican War

⁵⁶ Beauregard, after recovering his health, returned to Charleston in command of the defenses of the Carolina and

comrade.



Halleck having halted the pursuit began dismantling his grand army, believing it necessary for the health and well being of the men now suffering in one hundred degree heat. The march on Corinth was costly on the health of the Union army, one-third or more of the northern soldiers were ill. Nearly half of the twenty-nine Union generals came down sick during the Corinth campaign or its aftermath, including Halleck himself and John Pope with what was ruefully called the "Evacuation of Corinth" (diarrhea). Sherman contracted malaria. Halleck's fear of even greater disease morbidity if the army stayed intact was justified considering that the northern soldier was unaccustomed to the heat and diseases of the Deep South.⁴²⁵

More important than the fear of disease to the operations of this grand army was the temperament of the soldiers; they were demoralized and disappointed in not having taken the Confederate army to task. The heat, disappointment, and discontent resulted in large portions of the army taking leave, with or without permission. Those that stayed performed their duties without enthusiasm. Some even considered captivity better than service.⁴²⁶

Georgia coasts. In early 1864 he defeated Butler at Drewry's Bluff and bottled him up in Bermuda Hundred. He fought off the Petersburg Assaults of June 15-18, 1864, and later that year returned to take charge of the Western theater in 1864.

⁵⁷ Bragg after graduating from West Point in 1837 fought in the Seminole War, served on the frontier, and in the Mexican War before resigning in 1856. While running his Louisiana plantation, he designed a drainage and levee system for the state. He was commissioned Colonel and then Major General in the Louisiana militia early in 1861. Appointed Confederate Brigadier-General on April 7, 1861. He thereafter commanded the coast between Pensacola and Mobile and was promoted to Major General on September 12, 1861. Foreseeing important events in Kentucky, he asked to be sent there, and was appointed Chief of Staff under A. S. Johnston.

On June 9th Halleck ordered Pope,⁵⁸ later Rosecrans to guard and defend Corinth. Buell's Army of the Ohio, best fit for service, was ordered east with four divisions to take Chattanooga, gate way to Knoxville and Atlanta. Sherman with two divisions was ordered to guard Memphis and repair the railroad system in that area of Tennessee. McClernand, with about 10,000 men was assigned to guard Jackson, Tennessee and to improve the Unions supply lines. Halleck would remain at Corinth directing the operations of all four commands, while Grant would remain, without troops to supervise, as Halleck's second in command.⁴²⁷



Buell's campaign into east Tennessee was the only offence that Halleck had planned for the summer of 1862. All Buell had to do was to march out of Mississippi, across Alabama, traverse the Tennessee River twice where the bridges had already been burned and attack a city held by Confederate forces. This plan was fraught with problems. His army was in the heart of the deep South where he could expect no cooperation from the civilian population, and any move would be watched by a thousand eyes reporting everything to his enemy. Most importantly his supply line was over stretched and ill protected. His army of 35,000 men would require more than 300 tons of food and forage each and every day of the campaign.⁴²⁸ The supply and transport line, the rivers that had moved men and equipment south in the spring had all but vanished with the drought that had replaced the spring rains. The Tennessee River that had proved so helpful in supplying Pittsburgh Landing was now all but worthless as a supply line. The Memphis & Charleston Railroad leading east out of Corinth had been torn up by the


⁵⁸ Major General John Pope was selected by Lincoln to take command of the Army of Virginia, and did so on

retreating Confederate army. The same line west of Corinth leading to Memphis had likewise been destroyed between Chewalla and Grand Junction and completely abandoned thereafter.

To overcome this supply problem Halleck ordered Buell to travel as diligently as possible along the Memphis & Charleston Railroad and make the necessary repairs. He was to leave troops along the way to guard the repaired tracks. Sherman would repair the same line west of Corinth as he moved west to garrison Memphis. Buell's needed supplies could therefore, be transported down the Mississippi

River to Memphis and then by rail to Buell.

On June 10th Buell started his army moving east across northern Mississippi. Two divisions moved out of Corinth along the railroad, and two moved



from Booneville where the *Ninth* had been encamped; both joining in Iuka, Mississippi.

The *Ninth* camped in Iuka while repairing and guarding the railroad line in that area. From Iuka the *Ninth* moved east to Tuscumbia, Alabama and went into Camp near the celebrated spring at that place. From there three divisions, including the 4th under General Nelson, along with the *Ninth* march to Florence, crossing the Tennessee River by extemporized ferries. When these divisions crossed the Tennessee they placed the river between them and the railroad line. From Florence the army marched 45 miles to Athens arriving on June 28th. Buell's

June 26, 1862. Command of the Army of Mississippi fell to William S. Rosecrans.

other division stayed on the south side of the river and continued the repairs of the rail line to Decatur, where it crossed the Tennessee by a very inefficient ferry arriving peace-meal in Athens between the 1st and 6th of July.

Despite all of the work in repairing the Memphis & Charleston Railroad from Corinth to Decatur, not one pound of food reached Buell's army by that route. No sooner had the Union forces repaired the tracks than the Confederates would attack and destroy them. Further, the line was not supplied with rolling stock, as the Confederates had taken most of the rail cars to Tupelo on their retreat from Corinth and burned what was left. Buell's army was at its limit as far as transporting food and supplies were concerned. It required every wagon that could be found to haul supplies from Corinth. Because of this problem, the troops were put on half rations after they arrived in Athens. Buell would not let the men forage, and gave stern orders against the practice. He believed foraging would discourage southern civilians from returning to the Union. On half rations, and having orders not to forage, the men believed Buell was less concerned with their hunger pains than he was with the comfort of the enemy. Other generals at that time in the war shared Buell's beliefs concerning foraging, and enforced their views just as sternly; notably among these was Sherman.⁴²⁹


Buell, knowing the problems he was having getting supplies from Corinth only 109 miles from Athens, determined that a better way to feed his army was from his home base at Louisville, Kentucky, 290 miles from Athens. These supplies would be transported by rail from Louisville to Nashville on the Louisville-Nashville Railroad, then by rail through Columbia to Athens via the Central Alabama Railroad. The only problem was that the bridge over the Elk River was destroyed making necessary a forty mile wagon haul around the break.

Buell moved McCook's and Crittenden's divisions east to Huntsville reaching there on June 29th, and by July 4th had reached and garrisoned Stevenson, only forty-four miles from Chattanooga. Stevenson was on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad at the place where it intersected the Memphis & Charleston railroad. This gave Buell an additional supply line, and Buell planned to make Stevenson his supply depot.

To keep both lines open, he left Wood's and Nelson's divisions, including the *Ninth* at Athens to protect the Railroad. The *Ninth* camped outside of Athens, and in the late afternoon of July 4th they were

ordered to participate in a parade through Athens to the fair grounds where a big review was performed for any who came to watch. It was an unpleasant affair, for the temperature was over 100 degrees, the roads dusty and the civilians unfriendly.⁴³⁰

To provide further protection for his supply line Buell assigned regiments to guard each bridge, station, culvert and junction all along the route on both the Central Alabama and Nashville-Chattanooga lines. The *Ninth* was sent north from Athens thirty-seven miles to Reynolds Station, between Columbia and Pulaski, Tennessee on the Central Alabama. It was the *Ninth's* job to guard and repair that section of the line. Several weeks later on orders of General Nelson, the *Ninth* moved fifty miles north to Franklin, with instructions to guard the rail line



from threatened cavalry attack.⁴³¹

July 13th, Nathan Bedford Forrest, with three regiments, struck Murfreesboro and damaged a large portion of the railroad.⁵⁹ This was the first appearance of any large body of the enemy in Buell's rear. Buell ordered Nelson and his entire 4th Division to move and occupy Murfreesboro, via Columbia and Nashville.⁴³² The Brigade, along with the *Ninth* went into camp on the outskirts of Murfreesboro and stayed there until August 17th.⁴³³ One soldier wrote: "We are expecting an attack all the time, but we are not afraid, we almost think the 9th Ind. can't be whipped. We get up every morning at ½ past three o'clock and stand in line of battle till after daylight to be ready in case of a surprise. So if they come they will be apt to find us ready to give them a warm reception."⁴³⁴

With Confederate raiders in Buell's rear cutting off the supply line needed for further action, Buell, on August 16th, ordered General Nelson to turn over command of the 4th Division to Brigadier General Jacob Ammen⁴³⁵ who had commanded a brigade in that division, and to proceed at once into Kentucky to organize all the troops he could find for the purpose of halting the raiders. With his new rank as Major-General, Nelson was given Command of the Department of Kentucky and was ordered by Buell to take charge of all defenses in the state. Two days after Nelson's appointment President Lincoln, unknown to Buell, appointed Major-General Horatio G. Wright⁶⁰ as commander of the Western District of Kentucky, and for this

⁵⁹ Buell wrote in his official report: "It appears from the best information that can be obtained, that Bridge-General Crittenden and Colonel Duffield of the 9th Michigan, with the 6 companies of that regiment and all of the cavalry, were surprised and captured early in the morning in the houses and streets of the town, or in their camp nearby with but slight resistance and without any timely warning of the presence of the enemy."²³

⁶⁰ Wright was a 1841 graduate of West Point and an experienced Engineer, and taught Engineering at West Point before the war. He was chief Engineer in April 1861 on the expedition to destroy the Norfolk Navy Yard, was

reason Nelson would only be second in command in Kentucky and under Wright's authority.

To carry out his orders, Nelson attempted to move from Nashville to Bowling Green with a couple of field-batteries and some experienced cavalry and infantry officers, but was forced back to Nashville by Confederate cavalry. Having been forced back Nelson choose the *Ninth* to act as his escort, and the regiment marched out to Bowling Green on August 17th with Nelson and staff under their protection. After delivering Nelson safe and sound at Bowling Green,⁶¹ the *Ninth* marched back south and went into camp near Edgefield to guard the railroad bridge over the Cumberland River just north of Nashville. They built a stockade and reinforced it with earthworks⁶² to resist artillery fire, and christened it "Fort Nelson" in honor of their beloved General.⁴³⁶

captured, and released shortly there after. He was volunteer aid-de-camp to Heintzelman when he crossed the Potomac and took possession of Arlington Heights opposite Washington, and was his Chief Engineer at the 1st Bull Run battle. He was appointed Brigadier-General in September 1861, and commanded the Hilton Head expedition that year. Leading the 1st division south during fighting in Florida, and particularly Secessionville, Florida, he was promoted Major-General on July 18, 1862.

⁶¹ On reaching Kentucky, Nelson was ordered by General Wright to proceed to Lexington and assume command of all the troops at that place and Lebanon, and all in the vicinity of those places. These troops mostly comprised new regiments, which had been hastily thrown into Kentucky from the adjoining states, principally Indiana.²⁵

⁶² The Stockade was built like a small fort out of trees split in half and set upright in a trench three feet deep and extending eight to ten feet above ground. Generally, the stockade was good protection from a musketry fire but would not stand up against artillery fire. The stockades guarding the bridges over the Cumberland Rive, and Manscoe Creek, built by Company "E" of the *Ninth* were reinforced by earthworks in and around the timber in the hope that such addition could resist artillery to some extent.²⁶



Colonel Moody did not make the march with the regiment. As the *Ninth* journeyed from the battlefield at Shiloh to mid Tennessee, Colonel Moody remained under camp arrest. During the time the army was in movement through Mississippi and Georgia there was little time to convene a Court-Martial. This delay allowed Colonel Moody the opportunity to wage a personal campaign with the *Ninth's* officer corps for support. His intent was to have his friends place pressure on those who were expected to be called as witnesses for the prosecution. Chief among those that rallied to Colonel Moody's support was his good friend, the politically well-connected regimental surgeon, Dr. Mason G. Sherman.⁴³⁷ As time passed almost all the *Ninth's* officers became embroiled in the controversy. Those supporting Colonel Moody's Court-martial were Lieutenant-Colonel Blake, Major John B Milroy, and many of the other officers who witnessed Colonel Moody's absence. These officers were expected to be key prosecution witnesses.

Before joining the Army, Colonel Moody was a lawyer in Rensselaer, Indiana and as a result of his legal training, developed a defense based on a conspiracy theory. He alleged that the charges being brought against him were the result of a coup d'etat among the leading officers in his regiment for the purpose of assuming control and taking over.⁴³⁸ Chief among the alleged conspirators were Lieutenant-Colonel Blake and Captain I. C. B. Suman of Company "H", who was then senior captain in the regiment. Colonel Moody in a letter to Governor Morton wrote: "Capt. Suman has been almost ever since the reorganization of the Regiment my most bitter and vindictive enemy. Has caused me much trouble . . . He has caused nearly all the trouble in my Regiment and has treated me with a venom and a malignancy ill unbecoming an officer."⁴³⁹

Once Colonel Moody's defense was formulated and with the belief that he had enough witnesses to support his theory, he sent a letter on July 1, 1862 to Colonel James B. Fry, Buell's Chief of Staff requested that the matter be set for trial without further delay.⁴⁴⁰

During the week of July 7-11, while the Army was in Athens Georgia, a Court-martial was convened. Among those on the Court were Colonel. C. S. Pennebaker, 27th Kentucky., an eminent lawyer and Colonel G. T. Mygath of the 21st Ohio.⁴⁴¹ The prosecution called its witnesses and presented its full case against Colonel Moody for being criminally absent in the face of the enemy. After several days of testimony, the prosecution rested, and the Court recessed in order to hear further testimony in another court-martial proceeding. However, Colonel Moody's Court-martial was never reconvened as the army was on the move in response to the Confederate raiders. With the members of the court at distant locations, Colonel Moody pressed for his hearing to reconvene. Colonel Fry arranged for a new court to be assembled, but Colonel Moody claimed double-jeopardy and no further evidence was ever presented. Colonel Moody was finally released from arrest and resumed his command on August 9th, 1862.

When Lieutenant-Colonel Blake received the order that Colonel Moody was to resume command, he wrote Governor Morton on August 13th resigning his commission alleging that "service forbid me serving under him [Moody], and further wishing to relieve myself from the bitter annoyance of a controversy that has been encouraged and kept alive by the unscrupulous and persevering ingenuity of Dr. Sherman, who has no higher motives than some selfish benefits he may reap in the future." He asked Morton to be reappointed to another regiment.⁴⁴²

Lieutenant-Colonel Blake sent his resignation to Hazen who understood the circumstances surrounding the request and approved it, sending it on to General Nelson who reluctantly

approved it. The resignation was then sent to General Buell for final approval; normally just a formality. Buell knowing the facts surrounding Colonel Moody's Court-Martial furnish his own judgment. A note was sent to Hazen by Buell's Adjutant General: "I am directed by the General Commanding to say that he is compelled to decline the resignation of Lt. Col. Blake, 9th Ind. Vols. against his earnest appeal, and in opposition to your wishes. He has, however, ordered Col. Moody to report to Col. Miller Carrol at Nashville for duty at that place. The General desires you to see that this action does not operate against Lt. Col. Blake in the regiment."⁴⁴³ On August 12, 1862 by order No. 131 Colonel Gideon C. Moody was relieved of command of the *Ninth* and sent off to Nashville.⁶³ The officers that had supported Colonel Moody, in a last ditch effort, wrote Governor Morton on August 19th requesting his reappointment.⁴⁴⁴ Morton responded by appointing Lieutenant-Colonel Blake the *Ninth's* new Colonel based on the recommendation of General Buell that he was "an officer of merit."⁴⁴⁵ At the same time Isaac C. B. Suman of Valparaiso, Indiana was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel from his position as Captain of Company H.⁴⁴⁶

The day Colonel Moody was mustered out, the *Ninth* also lost its regimental band.⁴⁴⁷ This act, pursuant to the army's general order of July, cost the regiment their musicians and, despite the need for men, a strict view of the status of the bandsmen was adopted. It was felt that musicians, having enlisted as such, could not be simply converted to riflemen. The bandsmen were therefore mustered out.⁴⁴⁸

⁶³ Gideon C. Moody was later appointed a Captain in the 19th U.S. Infantry. He was placed in command of the Nineteenth Battalion at Stones River and performed well. General Thomas later made Moody chief mustering officer in the field of the Army of the Cumberland. He resigned his commission in the Regular Army in 1864 and moved with his family to Yankton, Dakota, where he was appointed by President Hayes to the Supreme Court of the Territory of South Dakota. He was also a member of the Constitutional Convention of South Dakota and chosen as




Unknown to Buell, Bragg, the new Confederate commanding officer, also planned a late summer offensive. Bragg planned to move his army from Tupelo westward toward Chattanooga, and then to strike north into Kentucky. Bragg reasoned that if he took the war to Kentucky, he would force the Union armies out of Mississippi and Alabama, as those Union forces would have to retreat back into Kentucky to protect their gains in that State. Bragg also hoped that with the aid of Kentuckians, he could establish a Confederate government in Kentucky. He was certainly justified in assuming the offensive, for although the Confederates had been steadily losing territory, they had, in the meantime, by this very constriction, been steadily gaining men. Detached forces had been drawn in from all parts of the Confederacy, and were now available to him at this most critical point of the conflict. The Conscription Act also had brought into the field large numbers of fighting men.

Bragg's plan was to transfer the bulk of his forces to Chattanooga, and to assume the offensive before Buell was ready to oppose him. He then planned to march through Tennessee into Kentucky, and call upon the people of those States to rise up and help him drive the Union forces north of the Ohio River. In furtherance of this plan, Van Dorn was assigned the duty to defend Vicksburg and keep the Union from occupying the north-eastern part of Mississippi. General Price was assigned to watch Grant and prevent him from sending reinforcements to Buell. General Kirby Smith was directed to prepare for an advance from Knoxville into Kentucky. On July 21, 1862 Bragg's army started for Chattanooga, the infantry was sent south

provisional Senator to the U.S. Senate, and later elected to that position until 1891. He was chief counsel of the celebrated Homestake Mine near Deadwood. He died in Los Angeles, California, March 17, 1904.²⁴

from Tupelo, Mississippi by rail to Mobile, and then to Montgomery, Alabama through Atlanta north to Chattanooga. To cover the movement, Bragg sent Joseph Wheeler with a brigade of cavalry on a raid into west Tennessee.⁴⁴⁹

On August 16-22, in accordance with Bragg's plan, Smith with a force of about 17,500 men crossed the Chamberland Mountains from his home base in eastern Tennessee. He left his largest division of about 7,500 men in front of Chamberland Gap, to keep General George Morgan's federal force which was holding Chamberland gap in check.⁶⁴ The remaining force



was divided into two divisions, one commanded by Thomas Churchill and the other by Patrick Cleburne. Having made the difficult trip over the Mountains, Smith rested his men for a week (August 18-25) at Barbourville, Kentucky.


The news of Smith's invasion threw the border counties of Indiana into alarm, fear and shock and led Governor Morton to make frantic efforts to send new untrained reinforcements into Kentucky. Nelson assigned these recruits to the 1st and 2nd Brigades, Army of Kentucky, stationed near Richmond, Kentucky. Richmond was the principal town on the south side of the

⁶⁴ When Buell left Nashville in March to start his long southward journey, he instructed General G. W. Morgan to take command of the Seventh division, then being formed, and to operate on the Chamberland Gap road from Kentucky to east Tennessee, and to take and hold the Chamberland Gap if he could do so with his limited resources. The division was at first only partially formed, and it took several months for it to move south from Nashville. On June 17th, Morgan march through Big Creek and Rogers's Gap forcing the Confederates to evacuate Chamberland Gap. Morgan took possession of the Gap on the 18th and immediately fortified the place, which by nature was already strong. There the Seventh division stayed, blocking the Gaps use to the Confederacy. When Smith by-passed the Chamberland Gap on his way North, Morgan was down to only thirty day worth of provisions

Kentucky River, which was about fifty miles southeast of Frankfort.

The Confederate cavalry entered the State capital and took the City on September 6th.

Cincinnati was only 83 miles from Frankfort, and the North anticipated that Smith would next attack and capture that city. The confusion and fear in Cincinnati was so great that martial law was proclaimed, all places of business were ordered closed, and the citizens were required to take arms in defense of the city.



The protectors of Cincinnati and Louisville had more than Smith to be concerned about, for on

August 28th Bragg's Confederate army left Chattanooga to join Smith in Kentucky. The season for this movement was well timed. If successful, the abundant harvests of the Kentucky and Ohio valleys, already ripening in the fields, would fall into the hands of the South.

Buell had likewise heard about Bragg's move north with what he thought was fifty regiments, "well armed and with good artillery."⁴⁵⁰ Buell first believed that Nashville was Bragg's target, and he ordered his army north to Murfreesboro, to enable him to be between the Confederate army and Nashville. This order meant that North Alabama, Chattanooga, and most of middle Tennessee was free of northern troops without the south firing a shot. However, Nashville was not Bragg's objective, for his army entered Sparta on the 3rd of September, and made its way to Glasgow, where it arrived on the 14th, having crossed the Chamberland River at

and it appeared improbable that his supplies would be replenished.

Carthage. At Glasgow Bragg, hoping for an influx of new recruits joining "the cause" issued a proclamation:

Kentuckians, I have entered your state with the Confederate Army of the West, and offer you an opportunity to free yourselves from the tyranny of a despotic ruler. We come not as conquerors or as despoilers, but to restore to you the liberties of which you have been deprived by a cruel and relentless foe. We come to guarantee to all the sanctity of their homes and altars, to punish with a rod of iron the despoilers of your peace, and to avenge the cowardly insults to your women. . . .

Kentuckians we have come with joyous hopes. Let us not depart in sorrow, as we shall if we find you wedded in your choice to your present lot. If you prefer federal rule show it by your frowns and we shall return from where we came. If you choose whether to come within the folds of our brotherhood then cheer us with the smiles of your women and lend your willing hands to secure you and your heritage of liberty.

Bragg displayed the need for a military commander to have a good understanding of public relations, but his statement had little effect in the recruitment to the southern army. Most of those inclined to defend the southern cause had long since joined the ranks of Morgan, Kirby Smith, and others, and very few now joined Bragg.

Having been wrong about Nashville as Bragg's objective, Buell concluded that Bowling Green, where a large supply of provisions had been stored for Buell's campaign might be Bragg's objective. On September 7, 1862, Buell ordered the bulk of his army north to that City, leaving two and half divisions, and a large number of convalescents to hold Nashville under the command of General Thomas, then acting as Buell's second in command.⁶⁵ Buell wrote Washington: "I propose to move with the remainder of the army against the enemy in Kentucky." By this time Halleck had enough of Buell and his inaction; he replied: "March where you please, provided you will find the enemy and fight him."⁴⁵¹ As Buell marched north, he picked

⁶⁵ Buell left Thomas at Nashville with the divisions of Palmer, Negley, and Schoepf while he took the divisions of McCook, Crittenden, Ammen, Wood, Rousseau and R.B. Mitchell, and a cavalry division under Kennett to

up the *Ninth* at Edgefield Junction. The *Ninth* was tired, their uniforms in tatters, their shoes worn through, and their moral at an all time low. It seemed to them they were giving up ground that was hard fought for without even seeing the enemy or hearing a rifle shot.⁴⁵²


It took Buell a week to move the 66 miles north to Bowling Green where he arrived on the 14th with his cavalry and two divisions of infantry. There, the men of the *Ninth* rejoined their brigade.⁴⁵³

Once arriving at Bowling Green, Buell ordered his Army to Louisville, believing that Bragg would attack there. Although the

Confederates had destroyed the bridge across Green River, Buell's command forded that river, and made its way to Louisville.⁶⁶

Since the *Ninth's* supply wagons were sent far to the west of their line of march to keep the supplies out of Confederate reach, the march was made without food, as the men of the *Ninth* carried only coffee, salt and flour. To make the march more difficult, the drought pervading in Kentucky made water scarce. The last day's march of twenty-two miles from West Point to Louisville was made in less than eight hours.⁴⁵⁴ By the 25th the Union column reached the city, and all seven divisions were within the city by the 27th.

On the Day the Union forces arrived in Louisville, Bragg wrote his Government:



Bowling Green.

I regret to say we are sadly disappointed in the want of action by our friends in Kentucky. We have so far received no assassin to this army. General Smith has secured about a brigade -- not half our losses by casualties of different kinds. Unless a change occurs soon we must abandon the garden spot of Kentucky. . .⁴⁵⁵

Bragg left Bardstown with his staff to confer with Kirby Smith at Lexington, and they both proceeded to Frankfort where on the 4th of October, he and Smith attended the installation of their hand-picked man, Richard Hawes, as Confederate Provisional Governor of Kentucky.

⁶⁶ Military writers describe a forced march to be eighteen to twenty miles per day.

Chapter 5

THE BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE

On Friday, September 26, 1862 the *Ninth* arrived in Louisville, Kentucky,⁴⁵⁶ feet sore & weary after a thousand mile march through western Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, eastern Tennessee, and Kentucky. When the *Ninth* arrived, they found that the city was packed with new recruits having new supplies and equipment that were temporarily denied the arriving veterans. The *Ninth's* tents and camp equipment did not arrive for three days. This left the troops without shelter and without the facilities to make camp or prepare a proper meal. The citizens came to the rescue by opening their homes and buildings and providing what they could to the arriving soldiers. They knew these ragged and dirty troopers were the bulwark of their own and the city's safety.⁴⁵⁷

Even with the adoration of the town's people, moral was as low as it had ever been in Buell's army. With home just across the Ohio River, the main problem facing Buell's veteran regiments was not the lack of camp equipment or even good food, but with desertion. Thousands of soldiers left Louisville for home,⁴⁵⁸ including fourteen from the *Ninth*.⁴⁵⁹

When Buell arrived in Louisville, General Halleck issued an order placing Buell in command of all troops in the area, including those of Major-General Wright who was in command of the Department of Ohio. Buell found Louisville filled with newly formed regiments or fragments of regiments hurried into service by Indiana, Ohio and Illinois. A reorganization of the Army of Ohio was Buell's first effort to bring these new troops into meaningful service. Buell hoped that through reorganization, he could change the uncertain defensive mode of his army into an aggressive attitude believed necessary to retake Kentucky

and Tennessee. He organized his infantry into three corps of three divisions each. The First Corps was given to Major-General Alexander McDowell McCook, and General T. L. Crittenden was given command of the Second Corps. The Third Corps' command fell to Major-General C. C. Gilbert. The command had been assigned to Gilbert temporarily at first when Nelson was sent to Louisville, but with Nelson's murder, the command was made permanent. The Ninth was made part of Gilbert's division.

McCook was thirty-one and often acted as "an overgrown schoolboy," but much was expected of the arrogant former West Point instructor.⁴⁶⁰ Crittenden, a Kentuckian with potent political connections with little military sense, had the dignity of his rank, but his talents were mainly those of a country lawyer.⁴⁶¹ A few weeks before, Gilbert had been just a captain of infantry in the regular army who was in the right place at the right time. He was appointed a Major-General by Wright.⁶⁷

Once establishing his command structure, Buell took some of the new regiments and formed the Tenth Division. He gave command of it to General Ebenezer Dumont of Indiana.⁴⁶² This division of about 15,000 men was designated to guard Louisville when Buell's army again moved south. The remaining new troops were assigned to the brigades that were existing, intermixing the old with the new, so the new might learn from the veterans. Buell also ordered that the veterans be supplied with equipment⁶⁸ and clothing, including new shoes which were so badly needed after the long backtracking march.⁴⁶³ The *Ninth* got shoes, but were not supplied

⁶⁷ Gilbert was an 1846 graduate of West Point, and served in the Mexican War and on the frontier. His General's commission expired March 4, 1863, not having been confirmed by the Senate, and he returned to the rank of captain. On July 2, 1863 he was commissioned Major in the 19th Infantry and retired from the regular army in 1886 as a colonel.³³

⁶⁸ Light cooking utensils were given to each soldier that they would carry, thus dispensing with wagons carrying these

with other essentials. The old worn, ragged and dirty uniforms remained.⁴⁶⁴

The *Ninth* was in the Fourth Division under the command of General William Sooy Smith.⁶⁹ General Ammen who had commanded the Division until Louisville gave up the post unable to bear the strain of command.⁴⁶⁵ The *Ninth* remained in the Nineteenth Brigade still under the authority of William Babcock Hazen. As a result of Buell's reorganization the 110th Illinois was added to the brigade. This was a new regiment fresh from home with a full compliment of ten companies. There were 101 men in each company. The men had new uniforms and full knapsack. Each company carried its own flag, an item given up by veteran regiments after the first hint of combat.⁴⁶⁶ This brigade was assigned to the Second Corps commanded by Crittenden.

Buell was not the only one thinking about reorganizing the Army of the Ohio. Lincoln had his own thoughts on the subject, and ordered Henry W. Halleck to remove Buell as its commander. Indiana Governor Oliver P. Morton may have had his hand in this decision, as he disliked Buell and wanted him replaced. Halleck's order, giving command of the army to General George Thomas, was sent by special courier and received the morning of Nelson's murder. When Buell received the order he wired Halleck "I have received your orders . . . and in further obedience. . . I shall repair to Indianapolis."


In Halleck's orders to Thomas he advised the new commander that the government expected "energetic operations," and that is just what they got from him. He wired back:

types of supplies. Each regiment was then supplied with one wagon that would carry a few necessary articles for officers and one wagon for hospital supplies, besides the ambulances.

⁶⁹ William Sooy Smith was sixth in his class of 1856 from West Point, who resigned from the army after one year and became a engineer and bridge builder until commissioned Colonel of the 13th Ohio in June 1861. He was promoted the Brigadier General after the battle of Shiloh while on the march on Corinth, and given command of the Fourth Division

"General Buell's preparations have been completed to move against the enemy, and I therefore respectfully ask that he may be retained in command. My position is very embarrassing."

Halleck replied: "You may consider



the order as suspended until I can lay your dispatch before the Government and get instructions."

Thomas then assumed the position as second in command, while Buell remained in charge, wiring Washington: "Out of sense of public duty I shall continue to discharge the duties of my command to the best of my ability until otherwise ordered."⁴⁶⁷




At the end of September Bragg, with about 22,500 men, ordered his trains eastward toward Harrodsburg, leaving a strong force at Bardstown, 35 miles southeast of Louisville. Kirby Smith's army of about 18,000 men was located in the area of Frankfort-Lexington, 30 to 60 miles east of Louisville. Both Bragg and Smith took time from their armies to attend the inauguration of Mr. Richard Hawes as Provisional Governor of Kentucky, held on October 4, 1862. Before leaving for Frankfort, Bragg gave command of his army to Major-General (Bishop) Leonidas Polk, with orders to fall back eastward if attacked by a superior force.

when Nelson was assigned to the District of Kentucky.³⁴



After a full week's rest at Louisville Buell, on October 1, 1862, put his reinforced army of 60,000 men in motion. His army left Louisville marching in four columns. Three columns comprised Buell's main force, and each column was made up of an army corps. Each corps traveled by a different route to reach the Bardstown area

where Buell believed Bragg's army waited. The First Corps on the left marched through Taylorsville. The Third Corps formed the right and went by way of Shepherdsville. The Second Corps with the *Ninth* marched through Mount Washington. Each Column



marched about ten miles a day. The weather was hot for October, the roads dusty, and the drought pervading the landscape continued drying the creeks and streams and turning the rivers into brackish pools of foul smelling water. The *Ninth* followed the 110th Illinois, and by the second day the new men lined the roadside with superfluous clothing and equipment, eagerly picked up by the men of the *Ninth* in need of a change of raiment.⁴⁶⁸

As the main force moved southeast, the fourth column moved east to Frankfort where Cleburne's and Humphrey's divisions of Kirby Smith's Confederate army was known to be located. Informed of the Union column moving towards Frankfort, Bragg believed that it was Buell's main thrust and ordered Polk on October 2nd to move north out of Bardstown to attack this column's flank and rear. Kirby Smith was ordered to attack it from the front. Polk, having

been informed by his cavalry that a strong Federal force was heading for Bardstown, disobeyed Bragg's orders, and in accordance with his previous order fell back southeast to Harrodsburg on October 3rd. At the same time Polk directed Major-General William J. Hardee's corps to move to Perryville, ten miles southwest of Harrodsburg.

The three Union corps continued their track south, skirmishing with the Confederate cavalry and artillery as they went. Buell believed that he would meet the combined southern forces of Bragg and Smith near Danville southeast of Bardstown. He ordered McCook to move on Harrodsburg, while Still was ordered to forgo his advance on Frankfort and to rejoin McCook by forced march. Crittenden with the *Ninth* was ordered to move from Lebanon to Danville, while Gilbert was ordered to Perryville, just east of Danville.

Perryville was a small farming town that had a population of several hundred residents. The rolling hills to the west and northwest known as Chaplin Heights were covered with alternate patches of woods and open farm field. The hills though in some places steep, were generally suitable for infantry and cavalry maneuvers. To the West of these heights ran Doctor's Creek which ran north to join Chaplin River as it meandered northward from the center of the town. Because of the drought, none of these creeks had much water.

As the Union army approached Perryville, General Hardee prepared his Confederate troops in a line for battle. When Gilbert moved on Perryville in the afternoon of October 7th a large skirmish between the advance forces of Gilbert's corps, and Hardee's Confederate veterans, occurred stopping the Union advance three and half miles north of the town.

After the skirmish, Hardee reported to headquarters that a "limited force" had attacked him at Perryville. Bragg, still believing that only part of Buell's army was at or near Perryville

and believing the main force was marching on Frankfort, issued orders for Polk to send Withers' division to Kirby Smith. Polk was then ordered to take the other division, commanded by Benjamin F. Cheatham, to Perryville and to "attack the enemy immediately, rout him, and then move rapidly to join Major-General Smith, as before ordered."⁴⁶⁹ When Hardee⁷⁰ at Perryville received a copy of Polk's orders he sent a note to Bragg:

Do not scatter your forces. There is one rule in our profession which should never be forgotten, it is to throw the masses of your troops on the fractions of the enemy. The movement last proposed will divide your army and each may be defeated, whereas by keeping them united success is certain. . . Strike with your whole strength first to the right then to the left.⁴⁷⁰

Bragg disregarded Hardee's suggestion, his orders remained as written and Polk with only Cheatham's division arrived at Perryville about midnight on October 7th. Polk, being the senior officer, took command from Hardee and placed his men in line ready for battle. The Confederates had amassed about 14,500 infantry and 1,500 cavalry. When Buell received word that the Confederates had aligned for battle, he ordered McCook to march at three o'clock the next morning to take position on the right of Gilbert's corps. McCook did not get his orders until 2:30 a.m. and did not move out until five o'clock. Buell also ordered Crittenden's corps to move and take position on Gilbert's left. However, in order to find water, Crittenden's corps had made a detour off their expected path and was ten miles further back than Buell had expected.⁴⁷¹ Buell did not want to bring on a full attack until all three corps were in their expected positions. He advised Thomas, his second in command traveling with Crittenden's corps, "We expect to attack and carry the place tomorrow."⁴⁷²

Buell, apprehensive of an attack while Gilbert's corps was isolated, directed Gilbert to

⁷⁰ Hardee was the author of the two-volume Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics that came to be known simply as


select a strong position and wait.⁴⁷³ Gilbert moved his other two divisions forward to take a position on Chaplin Heights and along the Springfield road which crossed these heights on its way to Perryville. At about 9:30 a.m. Crittenden's corps with the *Ninth* arrived and formed on the heights south and to the right of Gilbert's corps.⁴⁷⁴ By 10:30 a.m. McCook's corps had arrived and positioned itself along Mackville Road on the north and left side of Gilbert's corps. Only a 400 yard wide valley, where Doctor's Creek ran, separated the two corps.⁴⁷⁵ Buell now had his army where he wanted it. Eight divisions, of 55,000 men lined a front six miles long.



In sending Polk to Perryville, Bragg had ordered him to "attack the enemy immediately." Early on October 8th he received a note from Polk dated "Perryville, 6 a.m. reporting "that Union pickets had started the fight and he would give them battle vigorously."⁴⁷⁶ After receiving Polk's note Bragg waited four hours at Harrodsburg, and hearing no sound of battle went to Perryville to find the reason for delay. When Bragg found Polk he was informed that he thought it best not to attack as ordered, as Polk believed that Buell's whole army was before him. Bragg was informed that both Polk and Hardee thought the best course was to assume the "defensive-offensive, to await the movements of the enemy, and to be guided by events as they developed." After Bragg made a quick reconnaissance he changed the location of his divisions and ordered Polk "to bring on the engagement."⁴⁷⁷


Hardee's Tactics after being endorsed by the War Department.

The Confederate divisions of Cheatham, Buckner and Anderson were positioned in a line of battle from North to South. These three divisions were facing three corps and were out-numbered four to one. Cheatham's division was sent to the North end of the Union line opposite Terrill. Under the cover of woods he readied his troops for an attack on McCook flank. Two of Buckner's brigades were to join with Cheatham's division in the attack while the two remaining brigades were to drive in the gap between McCook's and Gilbert's corps. These two brigades along with Anderson were to prevent Gilbert from sending troops to support McCook. This attack was to be made with a heavy concentration of artillery on McCook's position.



At 2:00 p.m. the order for the Confederate advance was given, but instead of hitting the Union left flank as planned, Cheatham's troops slammed into the front of McCook's corps.⁴⁷⁸ While McCook's left was being pushed back, Buckner's two Confederate brigades attacked in the gap between McCook's and Gilbert's corps; here some of the heaviest fighting took place.⁴⁷⁹

As the attack progressed against McCook's corps Sheridan, from his position to their right, watched the gray clad army move across the valley. He turned his guns in their direction, and as the Confederate flank passed his line of fire he opened upon them cutting down large numbers and throwing their advance into confusion; nonetheless they drove forward.⁴⁸⁰



Various divisions and brigades were sent to McCook's command in the hopes of stopping the Confederate assault. McCook's command, which had numbered thirteen thousand that morning, now had only seven or eight thousand men left capable of fighting.⁴⁸¹ With great difficulty McCook held his own during the day and saved his command.⁴⁸²

Gilbert had stood apart with some 20,000 men, and gave only two brigades of assistance to McCook. Crittenden's corps with 22,500 men contributed nothing to help McCook in his hour of need, nor did he contribute to the battle itself,⁷¹ even though two of his divisions, Smith with the *Ninth*, and Van Cleve, were in position by 10 a.m ready to give assistance. With no orders from Buell, Crittenden stood his ground until sunset when the corps went into bivouac. Captain Leonidas A. Cole of Company "E" of the *Ninth* later wrote: "Gen. Crittenden's corps lay in plain sight of that furious fight made by their comrades in McCook's corps. . . and yet, though the men of our corps were impatient to go to his relief, no help was given him by us for want of order from Gen. Buell."⁴⁸³ It was not only Crittenden who had no orders from Buell, for both McCook and Gilbert conducted the engagement from their respective positions without orders from Buell, and without any recognized plan of battle. It was apparent that the only object of the Union struggle was to maintain their ground by repulsing the attackers.⁴⁸⁴

Buell gave orders that night that the attack should be resumed the next morning. He knew that McCook's corps was in no condition for more fighting, so he ordered Thomas, his second in command, to tell Crittenden "to press his command forward as much as possible [during the night] and be prepared to attack at day-light. Crittenden replied: "I am ready."⁴⁸⁵

⁷¹ The 41st Ohio of Hazen's Brigade (the brigade in which the *Ninth* was assigned) did have a fire-fight with some Confederate dismounted cavalry who took a farm-house in front of the brigade. Hazen ordered his brigade forward, and they ended the day nearer Perryville than any other troops of Crittenden's Division.³⁸

At first light Crittenden's Corps, including the *Ninth*, stood ready for battle, ready to advance, ready to take the fight to the rebels. Hours passed as the men stood waiting. Buell sent a staff member to find out why Crittenden had not attacked as ordered. Crittenden replied "that he had received no orders to attack," only to have his troops ready to attack. If Buell wanted to attack, he should give the order. Buell told Crittenden to move, and so they did.⁴⁸⁶ At 9:00 a.m. Crittenden marched forward. The *Ninth*, while maintaining a line of battle, maneuvered down Chaplin Heights and advanced to Walker's Spring, a suburb of Perryville.⁴⁸⁷ They found no army to fight.

Bragg ordered his troops off the battlefield at mid-night with orders to "fall back at daylight on Harrodsburg." He also ordered Kirby Smith to leave the Lexington area and move his command to join with his army at Harrodsburg.⁴⁸⁸ The battle of Perryville was over, and the *Ninth* had not fired a shot.

For its size, the battle of Perryville was one of the bloodiest battles of the Civil War. Bragg lost about twenty percent of his 16,000 men: 3,396 casualties, out of which 510 were killed, 2,635 were wounded and 251 missing.⁴⁸⁹ The loss was also very heavy on the Federal side. In Rousseau's division alone the casualties amounted to 2,192; in Jackson's division the loss was greater at 3,299.⁴⁹⁰ The totals for the Union were: 4,211 casualties with 845 killed, 2,851 wounded, and 515 missing. The *Ninth* suffered no casualties.

As Bragg's army moved to Harrodsburg, Polk established a line of battle two miles west of town waiting for the Union onslaught. Polk waited and waited and was finally advised by the rear-guard cavalry that Buell had not ventured beyond Perryville. The next day, October 10th, Kirby Smith arrived, and for the first time Bragg had his whole force concentrated in one place.

Buell's force arrived several hours after Kirby Smith and placed his army four miles to the west and south of Harrodsburg. The Nineteenth Brigade with the *Ninth* as its lead element waited three miles south of Danville for orders from Buell to advance on the enemy. Buell, hearing that Kirby Smith had joined Bragg, called a halt to the advance. He ordered Sill's division from Frankfort and awaited their arrival before venturing forward.⁷²

As Buell waited, Kirby Smith begged Bragg to bring on the fight: "For God's sake, General, let us fight Buell here."⁴⁹¹ But Bragg also waited. That night the two large armies lay face to face outside Harrodsburg, or at least until midnight when Bragg ordered a withdrawal east away from the Union forces to Bryantsville. Bragg's commanders, including Smith, Hardee and Polk, found this maneuver outrageous and appalling, but yet they followed orders and the combined armies moved east through Dicksville across the Dick River into Camp Dick Robinson.

The next morning Buell readied for battle, first sending reconnaissance patrols out, only to find his prey had eluded him again. The *Ninth* was ordered to reconnoiter Danville. The

⁷² On the march from Frankfort, General Sill was attacked near Lawrenceburg by a portion of General Kirby Smith's army, but he repulsed the attack, and arrived at Perryville on October 11th, 1862.

Regiment was deployed as skirmishers⁷³ and marched through the fields in double column, with the cavalry disposed on the flanks. A unit of rebels were found drawn up in line of battle at the Danville Fair Grounds, one mile from town with both cavalry and artillery as support. The Southern cavalry, upon seeing the Ninth approach, dismounted and posted themselves as infantry. As the *Ninth* moved toward the town, the artillery opened on them without effect. The Hoosiers pushed forward and drove the Confederates into the town where a brisk house-to-house combat took place. Finally the regiment was able to push the Confederates through the town and about two miles beyond when they were recalled.⁴⁹²

For the previous month Danville had been occupied by a body of cavalry, covering the gathering of supplies from that rich area of Kentucky. Its people were very pro-Union, and when the *Ninth* returned through the town after being recalled, the citizens put on a demonstration of happiness and treated the *Ninth* as liberators. One soldier in a letter home wrote:

I never in all my life witnessed such demonstrations of joy as was exhibited by the inhabitants of that place. They could see but a few of us as we were scattered, they almost seemed to think us supernatural, being able to drive so many; men, women & children came into the streets regardless of the danger and showered their blessing upon us, hailed us as their deliverers, it was impossible for them to keep their hands off of us. They shook hands, and insisted that we should go in and get dinner. Some of the women would hallow "O, we've got something good for you to eat," & hurried for our blue jacketed boys & God bless you and all such exclamations. . . It was a proud day for the old 9th.⁴⁹³

⁷³ Skirmisher is where half of a regiment is placed in line; each man positioned ten to twelve feet apart. Fifteen to twenty feet behind this line a second line might be formed. Behind these lines the remaining companies, in block company formation take position., i.e..³⁹

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In the skirmish several southerners were killed while only four members of the regiment were wounded. In addition 30 Confederate cavalry soldiers with their horses and 400 sick or wounded men in Danville's hospital were captured.⁴⁹⁴ After a short stay the *Ninth* returned to the brigade and returned to the encampment with the 4th Division, leaving Danville to its citizens.⁷⁴

The following day the Union army moved on Camp Dick Robinson, but again Buell refused to fight, even though the Confederates formed a line of battle ready to take on the Union troops. For a full day Bragg stayed there ready for combat, but only withdrew when Buell moved the Second Corps to the south threatening his line of retreat. The southern army left Camp Dick Robinson and marched south in two columns. Bragg's command with Polk and Hardee went by way of Crab Orchard, while Kirby Smith with a large train of captured supplies moved via Big Hill to London.⁴⁹⁵

On October 14th at midnight Hazen's Brigade was assigned the task of pursuing the retreating Confederate army, his instructions were not to bring on a general engagement. At daylight the brigade with the *Ninth* in the lead took on the Confederate artillery and cavalry at Stanford, Kentucky. The remainder of Crittenden's corps followed through Danville and Stanford to Crab Orchard, while Gilbert's corps reached the same town by way of Landcaster. The Confederates put up a strong rear guard action and resisted the head of each column with cavalry and artillery whenever they could find favorable positions.⁴⁹⁶

⁷⁴ The citizens of Danville followed the exploits of the *Ninth* the remainder of the war, with published accounts in the local news paper calling the attention of its readers that the *Ninth* would be remembered as "the regiment that drove the rebels out of our town so handsomely," and reported "our people will be pained to know the calamities of war have fallen so heavily on this regiment."⁴⁰

From Crab Orchard southward to the Chamberland Gap the country is barren and rough, affording only meager supplies. Buell, believing that Bragg would not stand and fight, halted McCook's and Gilbert's corps sending them west to Bowling Green and Glasgow.⁴⁹⁷ Crittenden's corps with the 4th division in the lead continued south to Mount Vernon. The *Ninth* and 6th Kentucky were on the point following the retreating southern army and were in a continuous skirmish during most of the days that followed. The *Ninth* pushed past Mount Vernon on October 16th where they found the Confederates posted with dismounted cavalry and artillery in their favorite position upon a hill-side opposite an open valley. One wing of the *Ninth* command by Lieutenant-Colonel Suman made a rapid movement and succeeded in flanking the Confederates. They captured 40 men and one captain.⁴⁹⁸ The *Ninth* along with the Brigade bivouacked the night of October 17th at Big Rockcastle Creek.

The next day the *Ninth* pushed past Camp Wild Cat and moved on to Nelson's Cross Roads where another spirited skirmish took place. In the fight the Confederates lost several officers and men, without a loss to the *Ninth*. The following day Hazen's Brigade pushed further south but the progress was slow because the road was obstructed by fallen trees. The Confederates would fell trees until the Union infantry would reach them. Then they would fall back rapidly and chop away again, never allowing the infantry to get ahead fast enough to stop the cutting. The night of October 20th was spent at Pitman's Cross-Roads, where another sharp skirmish took place about sundown. Fifty prisoners were taken. Many of them were deserters who begged that they should not be exchanged.⁴⁹⁹

As the *Ninth* move from Mount Vernon south, the road over which they passed was through narrow gorges, occasionally turning into narrow valleys. There was poor forage in this

area of Kentucky and the animals suffered terribly. The supply wagons were stopped for fear of them being lost, and the artillery slowed to a near stop.⁵⁰⁰ Hazen's brigade with the *Ninth* pushed on without tents, and with poor and insufficient food. They experienced drenching rain that had ended the summer drought in London. They then marched to Manchester, taking 25 more prisoners. On October 22nd the Brigade was stopped with orders to return to Camp Wild Cat ending the pursuit of Bragg's army. The *Ninth* in eight days had engaged in six skirmishes, killed some 20 of the enemy, wounded many more, and captured 500 to 600 prisoners.

Buell calling off all further pursuit and wired Washington:

"The enemy has been driven into the heart of this desert and must go on, for he cannot exist in it. For the same reason we cannot pursue in it with any hope of overtaking him, for while he is moving back on his supplies and as he goes consuming what the country affords we must bring ours forward. . . I deem it useless and inexpedient to continue the pursuit, but propose to direct the main force under my command rapidly upon Nashville, which General Negley reported to me as already being invested by a considerable force and toward which I have no doubt Bragg will move the main part of his army."⁵⁰¹

Bragg's column moved faster in the withdrawal than did that of Kirby Smith. Bragg passed through Barbourville and was in Knoxville, Tennessee by October 22nd, while Smith was still north of the Chamberland Gap. Smith was very much disgusted over the way Bragg had conducted the campaign, and as soon as he could he resumed command of the Department of East Tennessee, thus separating himself from Bragg's authority. When he received orders from Bragg to leave 3,000 men at the Chamberland Gap and to prepare for another joint incursion, he became enraged and replied: "Having resumed the command of my department, I am directly responsible to the Government for the condition and safety of my army." He wanted nothing more to do with Bragg, for his army was "worn down," very much in need of shoes, clothing, blankets, and rest. His force had decreased from 17,500 men to about 6,000 effectives.⁵⁰² On

October 24th Smith slipped into Knoxville in the dead of night to avoid a public reception that was planned in his honor.⁵⁰³

There were no honors planned for Bragg. He was called to the Confederate Army Headquarters at Richmond, Virginia to answer for his poor strategy and tactics. The hopes of the South were high at the beginning of this incursion, and the battle at Richmond, Kentucky aroused expectations and beliefs that the Kentucky campaign would result in the recovery of Confederate power in the central and eastern portions of Kentucky and Tennessee. After the retreat, the censure which fell upon Bragg was severe and almost universal. The Government was convinced that he could easily have met and beaten Buell and maintained himself in the rich and productive plains of Kentucky. Bragg was criticized for failing to concentrate his forces and attack Buell on September 18, 1862 south of Munfordville. Many thought he could have, after the surrender of Munfordville on September 21st, reached Louisville with all the forces in Kentucky, taken the city, and then made a concentrated attack upon Buell. Others thought, at a minimum, that he should have doubled back after Buell had passed him in the race to Louisville and captured Nashville.

To overcome the critics he summarized his gains in his official reported dated May 20, 1863:

With a force enabling us at no time to put more than 40,000 men of all arms and in all places in battle, we had redeemed North Alabama and Middle Tennessee and recovered possession of Chamberland Gap, the gateway to the heart of the Confederacy. We had killed, wounded and captured no less than 25,000 of the enemy; taken over 20 pieces of artillery, 17,000 small-arms, some 2,000,000 cartridges for the same; destroyed some hundreds of wagons and brought off several hundreds more with their teams and harness complete; replaced our jaded horses with fine mounts; lived two months upon supplies wrested from the enemy's possession; secured material to clothe the army, and finally secured subsistence from the redeemed country to support not only the army but also a large force of the

Confederacy to the present time.⁵⁰⁴

Bragg would remain in command.



The Federal government was not happy with Buell's performance either, and was more severe in their denunciation of him. They criticized him for failing to anticipate Bragg's envision into middle Tennessee, and more importantly his failure to occupy Chattanooga. The government was convinced that he could have halted Bragg as he crossed the mountains before entering Tennessee. Further, Halleck believed that Buell could have saved Munfordville and its garrison of 4,200 men. He also believed that proper strategy and tactics at Perryville would have destroyed the southern army, and that the plainest principles of soldiering demanded throwing forward a column to cut off Bragg's retreat at Camp Dick Robinson. The government thought that at least after the commencement of the conflict at Perryville, Buell should have pressed close to his enemy and forced Bragg into a continuous battle which would have resulted in the destruction of the Confederate Army.

When Governor Morton heard about Perryville he was convinced that it showed bad generalship on Buell's part. He telegraphed Lincoln on October 21st:

An officer just from Louisville announces that Bragg has escaped with his army into East Tennessee, and that Buell's army is counter marching to Lebanon. The butchery at Perryville was terrible, and resulted from a large portion of the enemy being precipitated upon a small portion of our troops. Sufficient time was thus gained by the enemy to enable them to escape. Nothing but success, speedy and decided, will save our cause from utter destruction. In the Northwest distrust and despair are seizing upon the hearts of the people.⁵⁰⁵

The men of the *Ninth* were equally critical of Buell's performance. Captain L. A. Cole

wrote:

When we remember that dozens of fine regiments fresh from home were thrown into this unprofitable race after Bragg and almost entirely ruined, and many of the veterans contracted disease from the strain and exposure, we can scarcely conceal our contempt for the incompetence which planned and carried out a campaign so wearing and disastrous to his own soldiers, and effected so little in crippling the forces or even hindering the movements of his adversary. It seems as though a mere tyro in the art of war ought to have done better than did this theoretically fine general.⁵⁰⁶

Most importantly Lincoln was dissatisfied with Buell's indecisive action, and on October 24th Halleck advised Buell of Lincoln's wishes:

General: The President directs that on the presentation of this order you will turn over your command to Maj. Gen. W. S. Rosecrans, and repair to Indianapolis, Ind., reporting from that place to the Adjutant General of the Army for further orders.⁵⁰⁷

Lincoln's action pleased Morton and in conjunction with Illinois Governor Richard Yates, he telegraphed the President on October 25th, "We were to start to-night for Washington to confer with you in regard to Kentucky affairs. The removal of General Buell and appointment of Rosecrans came not a moment too soon. The removal of General Buell could not have been delayed an hour with safety to the army or the cause."⁵⁰⁸

Chapter 6

THE BATTLE OF STONES RIVER

When the Confederates reached the Tennessee border on Braxton Bragg's retreat from Kentucky, General Don Carlos Buell called a halt to the pursuit and ordered Alexander McCook's corps to Bowling Green, Kentucky and C. C. Gilbert's corps to Glasgow.⁵⁰⁹ By October 22, 1862 T. L. Crittenden's corps was likewise ordered to Glasgow with the exception of William Hazen's brigade and the *Ninth*, which remained in pursuit of the retreating southern army. When that pursuit was called off, the brigade was ordered to Wild Camp Mountain. By October 30, 1862 the brigade, with the *Ninth*, had moved from Camp Wild Cat across the Muldraugh's hills to Columbia, Kentucky. They made the march without their supply wagons, camp equipment or adequate food. During the march, they encountered a severe snow storm that left snow six inches deep. This severe storm brought about severe suffering; forcing the *Ninth* to camp without tents and left a majority of the men without the comfort of a blanket. What made things worse they totally lacked any type of winter clothing. For the next few days, they marched in miserably cold and damp weather. When the brigade reached Columbia they found their tents and baggage but by that time it was too late as a vast majority was sick and in need of medical care.⁵¹⁰ Three days later they limped into Glasgow and joined their Division.⁵¹¹ Thirty days after arriving at Glasgow the *Ninth* had 130 men still in the hospital; some would never recover from the intense suffering encountered during this march.⁵¹²

The 110th Illinois that had joined the brigade and started from Louisville with over 1,000 men was down to less than 500 men. The early determination that the regiment showed seemed to fade away; five weeks after joining the brigade, more than forty men died of nostalgia,

without any real assignable disease.⁵¹³ They seem just gave up and succumb to death.

While the *Ninth* was on that horrible march, Buell was replaced by Major General William S. Rosecrans who took command of the newly formed Department of the Cumberland. This department encompassed that portion of Tennessee lying east of the Tennessee River, with a prospective enlargement from other areas of Alabama and Georgia that might be captured by the newly reformed army. The name of his army was likewise changed from the Army of the Ohio to the "Fourteenth Army Corps"⁵¹⁴ which became popularly known as the "Army of the Cumberland."⁷⁵

With his new Department came the urging from Washington that Rosecrans should take his army into east Tennessee, but Rosecrans did not believe that such a move should be done in haste. He, like Buell, thought that Nashville was in danger from the Confederates concentrating in the Murfreesboro area. Accordingly on November 4th, Rosecrans ordered his army to Nashville. Crittenden left the 4th division with the *Ninth* at Glasgow and proceeded with the rest of his corps to Nashville.

With Nashville safe from siege, Rosecrans began to address the problems of putting his army in fighting shape. He found that the veteran portion of his army needed rest and re-equipment. The new regiments needed training and discipline.⁵¹⁵ He reorganized his army and gave Major-General Crittenden the "Left Wing." The *Ninth* was part of Smith's division, still part of Hazen Brigade and now part of Crittenden's Wing. Later this was changed and the *Ninth* became part of the Second Division, Second Brigade of the Left Wing, Fourteenth Army Corps.

⁷⁵ This army changed names several times. First under Robert Anderson and William T. Sherman it was known as the "Army of the Cumberland." Under Buell it was known as the "Army of the Ohio" and under Rosecrans back to the "Army of the Cumberland."

However, in all official reports Rosecrans continued to designate the units by the names of their respective commanders, i.e. Hazen's Brigade was still called Hazen's Brigade.⁵¹⁶

After reorganization, the next problem Rosecrans faced was his supply line. He reopened the Louisville and Nashville railroad to Mitchellsville a few miles north of the south tunnel. A temporary depot was established there, and all supplies were transported from that depot to Nashville by wagon. Rosecrans assigned Thomas the job of repairing and protecting the railroad link as well as placing him in charge of all transportation of supplies to the Nashville depot.

Next Rosecrans assigned Crittenden's "Left Wing" to the far side of the Cumberland River at Silver Springs, fifteen miles northeast of Nashville. With this new assignment the 2nd Division, with the *Ninth*, moved from Glasgow by way of Gallatin to Silver Springs and rejoined their Wing. In early December General William Sooy Smith was transferred as commander of the 2nd Division and sent to Ulysses S. Grant's army where he took command of the 1st Division. Smith was replaced by newly promoted Major-General John McAuley Palmer. Palmer was an Illinois lawyer and Democratic legislator who became an early Republican. He was a delegate to the Washington Peace Conference in 1861, but when the Conference failed, he joined the Union Army as Colonel of the 14th Illinois. He was promoted to brigadier general in December 1861 having fought at New Madrid, Point Pleasant and Island No. 10. During his time in Grant's army he commanded the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions. He was transferred to Buell's army in September, 1862 where he took command of the 13th Division.⁵¹⁷ On November 29, 1862 Palmer received his new rank, along with command of his new division including the *Ninth*.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ After the war Palmer became governor of Illinois (1869-73) and after rejoining the Democrat party became U.S. Senator (1891-97). He ran for president as a National (or Gold) Democrat in 1896.



At the end of October, Braxton Bragg was summoned to Richmond to explain his retreat from Kentucky. Bragg's difficult personality, compounded by the lack of success in the summer campaign, made his senior subordinates lack confidence in his ability to lead an army.⁵¹⁸ But President Jefferson Davis was his friend, and even with the officer corps against him, he kept his post as commander of the Army of Mississippi. On October 31, 1862 Bragg returned to Knoxville and made preparations to advance to Murfreesboro where Major-General John C. Breckinridge was already posted putting his headquarters at Murfreesboro.⁵¹⁹

Rumors of discontent and unrest within Bragg's officers' corps reached Richmond, and the lack of cooperation between the armies in the West was becoming evident even to President Davis. On November 24th, Davis appointed General Joseph E. Johnston⁷⁷ to take charge of the western armies. In appearance he was small, soldierly and graying. Johnston had commanded the Department of the Potomac and was the fourth ranking officer in the Confederacy, although he thought that he should have been first since he held the highest rank in the Regular United States Army before joining the Confederacy. After being twice wounded at Seven Pines, he was relieved of command on June 1, 1862 by General Robert E. Lee. Returning to duty in November, President Davis assigned him to his new post and he took charge of all armies in the West.

⁷⁷ Joseph E. Johnston was a 1829 graduate of West Point and served in the Black Hawk expedition, the frontier, and the Seminole War. He resigned from the Regular Army in 1837 to become a civil engineer in Florida. During the Mexican War he was five times wounded, won three brevets, and led the storming column at Chapultepec. After the War he served as Lt. Colonel in the 1st U.S. calvary on the frontier and in Kansas during the Border disturbances. He was appointed Brigadier General in the Regular Army in 1860. He resigned to join the

Johnston's responsibilities were enormous, for he now had the duty to maintain control over the Mississippi River Valley and to save Vicksburg. Johnston established his headquarters at Chattanooga and immediately thereafter visited Murfreesboro where he inspected Bragg's army, and meet with Bragg's lieutenants. Bragg and Johnston agreed that Rosecrans would make no aggressive move until spring, and so he went into winter quarters around Murfreesboro. In doing so he sent Nathan Bedford Forrest with 2,000 cavalymen to molest Grant, and John Hunt Morgan into Rosecrans' rear to attack the Northern army's supply line: the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. These planes deprived him of the greater portions of his cavalry . Bragg then settled down for a long winter's rest at Murfreesboro, with an effective strength of 39,304 infantry, 10,070 cavalry and 1,758 artillery; making a total of 51,132 men.⁵²⁰

Murfreesboro was thirty miles southeast of Nashville and situated on the railroad to Chattanooga, in the midst of the great plain stretching from the base of the Cumberland Mountains toward the Cumberland River. It was surrounded by gently undulating country, exceedingly fertile and highly cultivated. Extending in every direction from the town were numerous roads. Stones River, named after an early settler, was formed by the middle and south branches of a stream that united, and flowed in a northerly direction between low banks of limestone. In December of 1862 the river was so low that it could be crossed everywhere by infantry. The Nashville Railroad crossed the river about two hundred yards above the Nashville Turnpike bridge. Open fields fringed with dense cedar woods surround the town.⁵²¹


Confederacy as Major General of Virginia.⁴²



By mid December, Rosecrans had re-equipped and trained his army and had built up supplies at Nashville to such an extent that even with Morgan raiding deep behind his lines, there were ample provisions for a lengthy campaign. Further, Rosecrans concluded that Bragg had gone into winter quarters and was not expecting trouble from the Northern army as he had sent off a large portion of his cavalry under Forrest and Morgan. This was a fortunate event for Rosecrans. One Brigade of the enemy's cavalry under the best horseman of the Confederacy was out of the field. Further, Bragg so believed that Rosecrans would take no offensive action before spring that he had failed to post any heavy force on either of the roads leading to Murfreesboro. Polk was at Murfreesboro, while Hardee with his corps held the left between Franklin and Triune and an advanced guard at Nolensville.⁵²² Rosecrans deemed that his opportunity had arrived to make the advance.

Since it is the prerogative of the army on the defense to choose the battlefield, Rosecrans believed that Bragg would choose to make his stand along Stewart's Creek, a narrow steep-banked stream that flowed across the Union's line of march fifteen miles northwest of Murfreesboro. With the help of Thomas, Rosecrans made plans to attack Bragg at the Creek. McCook's Wing of three divisions would move on the Nolensville Pike to Triune, 28 miles south to attack Hardee. Crittenden, with Wood's, Van Cleve's and Palmer's divisions, including the *Ninth*, was to march on the east side of the advance toward Murfreesboro by way of La Vergne. Thomas, with two divisions under Negley and Rousseau would march by the Franklin and Wilson pikes to Nolensville and threaten Hardee's left flank. When he reached Nolensville,

Thomas would be in position to help either McCook or Crittenden should they need to be supported. Should Bragg reinforce Hardee, Thomas would support McCook. If, on the other hand, Bragg should attack Crittenden, then Thomas would move to support Crittenden by attacking the Confederate's left flank.



Both armies were almost equally matched. Bragg's effective strength was 39,304 infantry, 10,070 cavalry, and 1,758 artillery, for a total force of 51,132. Rosecrans had present for duty 51,822 infantry and artillery, and 4,849 cavalry for a total of 56,671.⁵²³

On the far east of the Union line of march, Crittenden's wing moved out of Nashville and Silver Springs with Palmer's division in the front toward La Vergne. They passed through rough and difficult country that was intersected by forests and cedar woods. The division became engaged after a short time with heavy skirmishing, which increased as the command moved south.⁵²⁴ Crittenden's cavalry surprised a detachment of Wheeler's troops two miles from La Vergne on the Murfreesboro Pike. This was Wheeler's first inkling that the Federal force was marching on Murfreesboro. Wheeler quickly brought up his brigade and formed a dismounted line of battle just across Hurricane Creek, a narrow stream that crossed the road northwest of the town. Palmer came up at dusk and anxious to attack before nightfall, sent the *Ninth* and one

other regiment across the creek. Once across, the *Ninth* formed skirmish lines and slowly advanced. A sharp fire fight quickly ensued when the Confederates attacked the regiment's flank killing one of the *Ninth's* men and wounding another.⁵²⁵ When the *Ninth* turned to face them, they remounted and fell back into La Vergne. After the fight Palmer called a halt to the advance with his division just sixteen miles from Murfreesboro.⁵²⁶

Wheeler sent dispatches in quick succession to Bragg reporting Rosecrans's movements, but it was not until late that night, after prisoner interrogation, that Bragg concluded that Rosecrans was making a general advance. The swiftness of this advance surprised Bragg, because Crittenden was just outside La Vergne and closer to him than his own troops under Hardee stationed at Eagleville, twenty-four mile away. Yet Bragg was reluctant to order a concentration of his army at Murfreesboro until he knew what Rosecrans' real objective might be. When Hardee advised Bragg that the Union army was in force at Nolensville, he knew he could no longer wait and issued orders for Hardee to join him at Murfreesboro. On the morning of December 27th the Confederate army was on the move.

While Bragg was issuing his orders, Rosecrans was making ready for the next day's advance to carry forward his plan. He ordered Thomas to move Negley to Stewartsboro and Rousseau to Nolensville. Crittenden was ordered to advance on Stewart's Creek, while McCook was directed to march on Triune and press Hardee.⁵²⁷

The weather turned from bad to worse on December 27th. The temperature turned cold and rain kept falling. Crittenden's Wing marched in this drenching rain driving a detachment of Confederates through La Vergne and across Stewart's Creek. Hazen had been ordered to save the bridge over Stewart's Creek. The brigade, with the *Ninth*, moved the five miles by way of

the Jefferson Turnpike and marched so quickly that Wheeler's pickets could not burn the bridge.⁵²⁸ Van Cleve's division, following Hazen's brigade encamped north of the creek. Crittenden's other two divisions spent the night at Stewartsboro next to Negley's division.⁵²⁹

With the Union army only a few miles from Murfreesboro, Bragg sent a wire to General Johnson asking for reinforcements. He was certain that the battle would be fought at or a little north of Murfreesboro, and so he issued orders to his army: "The line of battle will be in front of Murfreesborough [sic]; half of the army, left wing, in front of Stone's River; right wing in rear of the river. Polk' corps will form left wing; Hardee's corps the right wing." McCown's division was ordered to be in reserve opposite center. Hardee and Polk were ordered to form "two lines from 800 to 1000 yards apart," and the cavalry was "to fall back gradually before the enemy, reporting by couriers every hour."⁵³⁰

Stones River was a stream which flowing eastward, crossed the Nashville pike a mile north of Murfreesboro, where it abruptly changed its course flowing northward and parallel with the road. Hardee, knowing the locality better than Bragg, criticized Bragg's battle plan as being unsuited for the terrain. He argued that the country in the vicinity of Stones River rendered it difficult to operate successfully. It was a broken and heavily-wooded country that offered excellent shelter for approaching infantry and at the same time could hamper cavalry movements. The open ground near the woods was well adapted to the use of infantry and artillery, but the dense cedar thickets were impervious to artillery. Additionally, Hardee argued, Stones River was not a barricade to attack as it could be crossed anywhere. The water was no more than ankle deep, and if Stones River rose as it might do because of all the rain, his forces might be separated. Bragg, as he did at Perryville, disregarded Hardee's assertions as he thought

Stones River was the only place he could concentrate the army and still cover the roads leading to his supply depot in Murfreesboro.⁵³¹ In accordance with Bragg's battle plan, the Southern army marched unchallenged into their designated positions on Sunday morning.

In the afternoon of December 28th, Rosecrans issued orders to bring his army together planning to attack across the river the next morning. Crittenden moved his corps to within three miles of Murfreesboro near Stones River, with Wood's division on the far left near the River and Palmer's division extending the line southward into a dense cedar woods in front of a large cotton field. The *Ninth* was ordered to the front line and positioned on the land that belonged to Mr. Cowal, about 2 1/2 miles from Murfreesboro. The site was near the Nashville Turnpike and about 800 yards south of the Chattanooga Railroad. It was good ground for it commanded everything in all directions with covers of woods and embankments. The 6th Kentucky and the 41st Ohio were in the front line. The *Ninth* and the 110th Illinois were in the second line.

As the lines became set that night only a third of Rosecrans' army was in position and they were facing the entire Confederate army. Not knowing that he had the overall advantage, Bragg determined to wait for the Union attack he believed would come at dawn. His soldiers laid down on the wet ground without fires, under a drenching rain, in line of battle that covered all the approaches to Murfreesboro.⁵³²


Bragg, believing he had fewer soldiers than Rosecrans, decided that his best policy was to await an attack he was sure would be forthcoming the morning of December 30th.⁵³³ He spent the day on horse back riding from one position to another readying his troops for the expected attack. The Confederate line of battle by late night consisted of Breckinridge's division located across Stones River on the east. On the west side of the river were Withers' and Cheatham's

divisions under General Polk. Next to him was Hardee's Wing with Cleburne and Cheatham in the center and McCown on the far west.⁵³⁴ Bragg had no reserves, but since he did not believe an attack would come from the right he considered Breckinridge's command available for support as needed. The battle line of each army was continuous, save for Breckinridge who was on the far side of the river. Between the two armies there was almost continuous open ground, except for Sheridan's division which was embowered in a dense cedar thicket and oak grove.⁵³⁵

Rosecrans finally had his troops where he wanted them. At nine o'clock on the evening of the 30th, the corps commanders met at Rosecrans' headquarters in the cedars near the Murfreesboro pike to learn the details of the plan of battle for the next day, and to receive their final instructions.⁵³⁶

Rosecrans' plan of battle was a wheeling maneuver to his left. McCook was to hold the right in check for at least three hours, while Thomas and Palmer were to open with skirmishing and gain the Confederate center and left as far as the river. Crittenden was to throw Van Cleve's and Wood's divisions across the river, advance against Breckinridge, and take Murfreesboro. If successful in driving back Breckinridge, Wood was to place his batteries on a high hill and open on the Confederate center.⁵³⁷ Negley would then press the center while Palmer would swing around through Murfreesboro and take the force confronting McCook in the rear, driving it into the country toward Salem.⁵³⁸ In giving the orders, Rosecrans emphasized to McCook the need for him to hold his ground for at least three hours. As an added piece of deception, Rosecrans ordered that fires should be built for two miles beyond McCook's right flank in the hopes that Bragg would send troops from the right to cover his left.

Rosecrans was not the only one planning an attack. Bragg had enough waiting, and he thought it was time to take the initiative. Bragg's plan was for a turning movement directed against the Union right flank led by McCook's and Cleburne's divisions and Wharton's cavalry as support. They



were to gain the Federal rear and create as much turmoil as possible. Polk would then take up the attack executing a wheel to the right with Cheatham and Withers, in succession, his right flank serving as pivot.⁵³⁹ The object of this was to make an impetuous attack to force the Union army back upon Stones River and cut it off from its supplies at Nashville.⁵⁴⁰

Each of the commanding generals was therefore equally intent upon executing essentially identical plans. Bragg planned to whip McCook and push Rosecrans off from the pike connecting him with Nashville. Rosecrans' design was to crush Breckinridge and rapidly following up the blow by taking Murfreesboro. Neither had any expectation of being attacked by the other.⁵⁴¹ If both armies had moved simultaneously, they might have swung round and round, like a pair of dancers,⁵⁴² so it might have been but for the timing of the attacks. Rosecrans' orders were for the troops to breakfast before daylight and attack at seven o'clock. Bragg issued orders to attack at daylight.⁵⁴³

Every soldier on that field knew that he was about to be engaged in a struggle unto death.

As the night set in with the armies only a few hundred yards apart, and while the generals were putting finishing touches on their battle plans, the respective bands of each army competed with one another alternating northern and southern turns. Northern musicians played out "Yankee Doodle" and "Hail Columbia," and they were answered by "Dixie" and "The Bonnie Blue Flag."⁵⁴⁴ Then one band struck up "Home, Sweet Home" another joined in, and then another, until 78,000 men from both armies were singing together.⁵⁴⁵

The men of the *Ninth* were ready for what tomorrow might bring. They had been instructed by Hazen: (1) that all clerks, orderlies, servants, and cooks were to take arms and to be in the ranks. In a case where there might be an insufficient supply of arms on hand, they were nevertheless to report to the ranks and depend on the battlefield to supply the deficiency; (2) that ten men from each regiment, the most distinguished for bravery and good conduct, were placed ten paces in the rear of the regiment with bayonets fixed with special instructions to stop any man falling to the rear unnecessarily; (3) that any man wounded could not expect to receive attention until after the fight was over, excepting only those who could make it to the surgeon's corps; (4) that the officers were not expected to use their guns on the enemy, but were only expected to keep their men in their places, seeing that they perform their duties correctly.⁵⁴⁶



As the dawn broke on the last day of 1862 with a light fog covering the field, the Union infantrymen rose from the frozen ground to build their breakfast fires. At about 6:20 a.m. union pickets saw 4,400 butternut⁷⁸ clad soldiers in a double line coming across the open fields. It was

⁷⁸ Cloth, like everything else was scarce in the Confederacy. The principal source for Southern soldier apparel

McCown's division with Cleburne's division following 500 yards to the rear. The rebels had formed battle lines at first light and, without breakfast, they moved straight at Johnson's division on their far left.⁵⁴⁷ Like Fort Donelson and Shiloh before, they had caught the Federals off guard, half asleep and at breakfast.

When the pickets saw the Confederate wave moving toward them they fired a few shots in their direction and fell back. General Edward N. Kirk, commanding the Second Brigade, hearing the shots sent the 34th Illinois forward to check things out. The regimental commander seeing the column hurrying upon him called for reinforcements. It was too late. After a short fire fight, in which Kirk was mortally wounded this brigade was swept from the field.⁵⁴⁸


Next to fall before the onslaught was General August Willich's First Brigade, then commanded by Colonel Joseph B. Dodge. This brigade was ready for a fight and had been on the lookout for an attack, but had been ordered to breakfast by Willich. Four of Willich's five regiments fronted west leaving their flanks exposed to an oblique attack which was executed by Brigadier General James Rains' and M.D. Ector's Confederate brigades. Dodge corrected the error, but the Union brigade was then prevented from firing upon the attacking Confederates by Kirk's runaways blocking their line of fire. Willich's troops joined Kirk's, neither having held their positions long. In the short fight Kirk lost 473 men killed and wounded, and 350 by capture, while Willich lost a few less in both categories; but more than 700 were captured, including Willich when attempting to rejoin his brigade.⁵⁴⁹

became captured Union uniforms. The soldiers changed the color by dyeing the clothing in a mixture of walnut hulls, acorns, and lye. This changed the tint to a light tan which Southerners labeled "butternut."⁴³

McCown now had the field and began a mopping up action against the scattering remnants of Johnson's two brigades fleeing west in their retreat. He had taken over 1,000 prisoners and eight guns in the brief action. His pursuit of the retreating Union troops threw him off course heading left away from the main Union line, and away from the right wheel tactic called for in Bragg's battle plan.⁵⁵⁰

When McCown moved west Cleburne's troops, who were following him unexpectedly, found themselves in the front line. Cleburne later noted: "I was, in reality, the foremost line on this part of the field in that McCown's line had unaccountably disappeared from my front." Cleburne elected to continue the right wheel maneuver and struck Davis' division, which then formed the right flank of the Union army.⁵⁵¹

Cleburne advanced with difficulty in line of battle over rough ground cut up with numerous fences and thickets. Cleburne's left brigade under St. John Liddell pushed



northward against Johnson's third and reserve brigade commanded by Colonel Philemon Baldwin. Baldwin had positioned his troops a quarter mile northwest of Davis' division and behind a fence on the perimeter of wooded ground which lay to his rear. There he posted four regiments and a battery with one regiment in reserve.⁵⁵²

Baldwin's artillery opened on the advancing Confederates at 150 yards and his infantry,

who were crouched behind this split-rail fence, opened fire on Liddell's line at 100 yards. The 6th Indiana fired volley after volley causing Liddell's right to halt. As Liddell's troops wavered and were about to falter, General Evander McNair's brigade of McCown's division came up and charged the right flank. With this attack, Liddell's Arkansans renewed their frontal advance and came on in such overwhelming numbers that after half an hour's stubborn resistance Baldwin's line collapsed. The brigade barely made their escape, for a moment longer his entire command would have been surrounded and captured.⁵⁵³ Baldwin fell back to the edge of the woods⁵⁵⁴ where he tried to make a stand. Liddell and McNair pushed forward finally driving Baldwin from the field.⁵⁵⁵ With Baldwin's retreat, McCook's Second Division under Johnson in less than one hour was out of the battle with casualties of 2,560.

In the meantime, Cleburne's interior brigade, under the command of General Bushrod Johnson, attacked the right of Davis' division held by Colonel Philip Post's brigade which was positioned near the Franklin road. The Confederates swept down in heavy masses upon both the flank and front charging with the rebel yell.⁵⁵⁶ Cleburne's right brigade under S.A.M. Woods drove on a cedar thicket hiding Colonel William Carlin's brigade. The Union soldiers waited in the dense under-growth until the Confederates were just a few yards away before opening fire halting the southern advance. Polk, receiving word that Cleburne's right brigade had wavered, issued orders bringing regiments across the Franklin road and into a right wheel against Carlin's right flank. With this attack, Wood advanced a second time against the cedar thicket. By the time Wood had begun his second assault, the attack against Post by Bushrod Johnson had ended with Post being forced from the field. Carlin, hearing that Post's brigade had retreated and not wanting to be over run, ordered a withdrawal that turned into a route when a bullet unhorsed

Carlin. In a little over an hour, five Union brigades had been forced to leave the field with added losses by Post of 324 and Carlin of 821.⁵⁵⁷



Cheatham's Confederates, after some prodding from Bragg for lagging behind and exposing Cleburne's right, began their attack on Sheridan's forces at about 7:00 a.m. Instead of sending his whole division forward, Cheatham advanced one brigade at a time in poorly coordinated charges against Sheridan's men who lay in dense cedar thickets. Cheatham's piecemeal tactic allowed Sheridan to re-deploy his men after each attack to repel each successive attack in turn. The first of Cheatham's brigades to move forward was Colonel J. Q. Loomis's Alabamians. They crossed an open cornfield to face Davis' last element still intact; William Woodruff's brigade, which was positioned on a ridge behind a fence in the cedars. Once in range, the Union riflemen chewed up Loomis' men who were forced back by a counterattack from Joshua Sill's brigade. Sill was killed leading the attack, and command of the brigade passed to Colonel Nicholas Greusel.⁵⁵⁸

Seeing Loomis repulsed, Colonel Alfred Vaughan's Tennessee brigade moved forward through the same corn field and while taking heavy losses, forced two of Woodruff's regiments from their lair. The Tennesseans were, in turn, forced back in a vigorous counterattack, but Vaughan reformed and charged the Union thicket again causing Woodruff's line to falter, then flee.⁷⁹

At about 8:00 A.M. Cheatham's third brigade, commanded by Colonel Arthur Manigault

⁷⁹ In his reports, General Leonidas Polk recounting the days activity would single out Vaughan and his troops for


struck in an unsupported attack and like those that had preceded him, was mauled and repulsed. During the following lull, Sheridan repositioned his troops with those soldiers who remained from the shattered brigades of Baldwin, Carlin, Post and Woodruff. He formed his second position near a farm house and protected this new location with his three batteries.⁵⁵⁹

Cheatham came up during this lull and in an attempt to rally his men, shouted as he led his division forward, "Give 'em hell, boys!" Polk, the Bishop of Louisiana riding beside him, shouted in turn; "Give them what General Cheatham says, boys!"⁵⁶⁰ Cheatham's men moved forward; Manigault, with the aid of George Maney's brigade, struck Sheridan a second time, but under the murderous fire of Sheridan's artillery, they were stopped in the open field fronting the farm house. Sheridan's third brigade led by Colonel George Roberts then launched a bayonet counterattack against the stalled Confederate line forcing the shaken Confederate attackers back from whence they came. Sheridan, during the lull that followed, quickly withdrew to a third position stationing Roberts' brigade in the woods along Wilkinson Pike with Schaefer's and Greusel's brigades to his right. Some Confederate elements, however, broke through Sheridan's position and managed to capture and scatter the brigade's ammunition train causing considerable confusion in Sheridan's effort to resupply his units with ammunition.

At about 9:00 A.M. Sheridan was facing three brigades along the Wilkinson Pike: Manigault and Maney facing Roberts, while Vaughan was opposite Schaefer and Greusel. At about this time Sheridan became aware that Cleburne's division with the brigades of Wood, Polk and Johnson were right-wheeling eastward towards him. He ordered Greusel and Schaefer to withdraw, but as they were readying themselves to do so, Cleburne struck.

special praise.

In ninety minutes of raging combat, Sheridan's division had held off almost half of the Confederate Army. With Sheridan's artillery ammunition almost exhausted and the individual riflemen nearly out of cartridges, Brigadier General Alexander Stewart's brigade along with Polk launched a new attack on Sheridan's front. In the



attack, Roberts was killed and the Union batteries were overrun and captured. Without new supplies of ammunition forthcoming, Sheridan gave orders to withdraw and at 10:45 a.m. Sheridan's men broke contact and moved northward.⁵⁶¹ In the fight all three of Sheridan's brigade commanders were killed and more than one-third of his men were casualties, but it had been able to stem many of the initial Confederate successes.⁵⁶²

With Johnson, Davis and Sheridan gone, McCook's entire "Right Wing" had now been swept from the field. McCook himself played little part in the early hours of the battle. He rode aimlessly about as if the shock of battle had overcome his own will to resist.⁵⁶³



Just before Sheridan pulled out, Rousseau's division arrived and took position on Sheridan's right. When they arrived so did the confederates. The task of dislodging Rousseau fell upon McCown. In the rear of Rousseau's first position was open ground. At that point the railroad and Nashville Turnpike are about 800 feet apart and there is a slight depression that


forms a natural rifle-pit. A short distance back of the depression is a small hill. When the first attack came, Rousseau withdrew two of his brigades to this favorable position. Batteries were posted on this small hill a short distance to the rear of his infantry.

John Beatty's brigade remained in the woods south of the turnpike unaware that Rousseau had withdrawn the other two brigades. He had repulsed one charge made by Leonidas Polk's men and during a lull, noticed the absence of the sound of battle from the other brigades. Beatty had been ordered by Rousseau to hold his line "until hell freezes over." Now nearly surrounded by a Confederate division, Beatty concluded "that hell has frozen over" and he ordered a withdrawal to the rear.⁵⁶⁴ Just as the rearward maneuver was put into effect Polk, with the aid of Vaughan, struck again. The force of the attack was sufficient to panic Beatty's men and they were swept through a cotton field toward the Nashville Turnpike to where Rousseau had stationed his other brigades. Upon these troops the Confederates charged in dense masses, flushed with the victory of the early morning and elated with the hope of continued success. They emerged from the cedars with yell after yell, firing as they came, rushing forward four lines deep in an attempt to cross the open field. Rousseau's division opened fire on the advancing columns, and with the batteries sending double canister into their thick ranks, the Confederates were driven back suffering great loss. On reaching the cedars these troops were rallied by their officers, and with a determined effort to carry Rousseau's position, advanced once more. After a most desperate struggle, they were again driven back. Again and again they returned to the assault in four deliberate and fiercely sustained efforts, each time to be repulsed.⁵⁶⁵ Rousseau men held on until their ammunition began to run out and they then fell back.

Next to be pressured by the Confederates was William Grose's brigade of Palmer's

division. Grose was on the far west of the "Round Forest" and when pressed by Rains, the Indiana, Illinois and Ohio regiments were driven pell-mell through the woods across the cotton fields to where Rousseau had established his artillery.

A gap was created by Sheridan's, Rousseau's and Grose's withdrawal which the Confederates exploited. Negley's division then, on the point, fought hard when Stewart attacked in the gap while Anderson maintained pressure in front. Negley's men held on until their



ammunition began to run out; they then fell back to the Nashville Turnpike to avoid being enveloped.⁵⁶⁶

The Union line, which at daylight had extended from Stones River to the Franklin road, had been now forced back into the shape of a bent jack-knife. The hinge was located in a patch of woods along the railroad and Nashville Turnpike at the "Round Forest" where Hazen's brigade with the *Ninth* held the key to the Union defense and the fate of Rosecrans' army.



The "Round Forest" was a four acre dense cedar thicket and oak grove that lay about three feet above the winter wheat and cotton fields that encircled it. South of the thicket was the burned framework of a brick farm house that belonged to Mr. Cowal which sat on a rise that also

commanded the surrounding fields, and afforded cover to the attackers. Palmer's 1st brigade, commanded by Charles Cruft, was on the west side of the thicket; Wood's second brigade, commanded by George D. Wagner, was on the east side; and William Hazen's brigade with the *Ninth* was in the center. Grose's, Shepherd's and Hascall's brigades were to their rear.

At about 7:00 a.m., Hazen's brigade had moved forward to the burned Cowal's farm house and remained there until Palmer ordered them to fall back. Hazen fell back a short distance and took a place in the "Round Forest" vacated by the 40th Indiana, one of Wood's regiments.⁵⁶⁷ The first attack on the stronghold came from Leonidas Polk's division at about 9:00 a.m., when James Chalmer's Mississippi brigade started across the cotton fields, yelling as they had yelled at Shiloh. When the troops got to the farm house half went to the west and came against Cruft and the 31st Indiana. These Southern men were cut down in such numbers that the ground they crossed was labeled the "Mississippi Half-Acre." The right side of the brigade came against Hazen's line, and after a fire-fight with the 41st Ohio and the 110th Illinois they took cover before they met the same fate as their comrades. An hour later Daniel Donelson led a second attack on the Round Forest. His Tennessee brigade ran into the remnants of Chalmers' force hiding around the burned farm house. Like the brigade before, Donelson divided his force with two regiments going east against Hazen. These regiments were quickly cut down and forced to run for cover. The regiments that marched on the west side of the farm house fared better. In a fierce fire-fight Cruft's brigade was unable to withstand the attack from these Confederate brigades, and was pressed back into the woods, where it made a second stand. When Negley's division, to his right withdrew, Cruft's brigade was enveloped, and it was forced to retreat.⁵⁶⁸

With Cruft's withdrawal, Rosecrans sent Colonel Shepherd's brigade which was in reserve behind Hazen to fill the gap in the hopes of providing time to reline the Union's forces on the west side of the Round Forest. For twenty minutes, these federal regulars held off the attackers of Donelson, Stewart and the regiments from Maney and Anderson who were following Negley's withdrawing troops. In this short and severe contest, Sheppard's command lost in killed and wounded 26 officers and 611 enlisted men out of the 1,566 that started the fight,⁵⁶⁹ but their efforts so decimated their attackers that the charge stopped at the edge of the thicket. The sacrifice of Union regulars allowed Grose's brigade to position itself perpendicular to Hazen in the round forest.

Hazen alone now held the key to the Union defense.⁵⁷⁰ His position was where the hardest combat of the day was to be fought. The fight there continued with the 8th and 38th Tennessee attacking and re-attacking Hazen. Hazen faced his two right regiments, the *Ninth* and 6th Kentucky, to the rear where the Confederates' assault upon Cruft had borne them. At the same time he moved his remaining regiments, the 41st Ohio and 110th Illinois, a short distance to the left.

When the ammunition of the 41st Ohio was nearly exhausted, an order was given to "Fix bayonets and hold your ground!" To the 110th Illinois who had no bayonets and whose cartridges were expended, Hazen ordered them to use their muskets as clubs, but to hold the ground. At this point in the fight, the *Ninth* was ordered to relieve the 41st Ohio. They moved by the left flank, and dashed across the line of fire from Confederate batteries giving a shout that inspired their comrades. Cannonballs tore through their ranks but they were rapidly closed, and the men took their position in the front line, the 41st Ohio and the 110th Illinois retiring with thinned ranks

to refill their empty cartridge boxes.⁵⁷¹

The *Ninth* formed in a position with the right on the road and left near the railroad.⁸⁰ The Confederates occupied the burned house with one battery and their infantry partially covered by the out-houses and a stockade fence that extended to the road. The *Ninth* opened fire on the infantry which was returned by the battery. The shelling lasted three-quarters of an hour but then slacked off when a brigade of infantry made up of the 9th and 10th Mississippi advanced from their rifle-pits and marched obliquely at the *Ninth*. As they continued to approach, long range rifles of the *Ninth* started to thin their ranks. As they drew nearer, the Mississippians charged. The *Ninth* poured a galling and deliberate fire, bringing down three color bearer and killing all the officers. Their numbers seem to be overwhelming as they closed ranks and with fixed bayonets drawn down on the *Ninth*. With the *Ninth* having nearly exhausted their 60 rounds, all seemed lost when Colonel Blake commanded "Fix bayonets." All jumped to their feet, bayonets going on with a crash, and a counter attack was commenced that struck consternation in the Confederates ranks, some running back and others crawling back over the cotton field seeking shelter behind the cotton ridges. Some laid down in the cotton furrows and opened fire causing numerous casualties, including Lieutenants Colonel Isaac C. B. Suman who received two bullet wounds.⁵⁷²

At about 11:00 a.m. Negley's division to the right of the *Ninth* had given way, allowing large numbers of Confederate troops to cross from the burned house to the woods. The *Ninth* opened fire on them as they moved by the flank. Facing the rear, the *Ninth* opened fire upon the rebels and with the support of the 110th Illinois, the Confederates were forced to leave the field

⁸⁰ Where the Hazen monument now stands.

about noon.⁵⁷³ One Confederate regiment lost 207 out of 402 men, and another regiment lost 306 out of 425. Polk, seeing that his troops had been so severely mauled that they were unable to renew the attack, applied to Bragg for reinforcements.⁵⁷⁴

With the Tennesseans' withdrawal, a silence settled over the battlefield. General Hascall, whose brigade was held in reserve, later wrote regarding Hazen's position, "The line they were trying to hold was that part of our original line of battle lying immediately to the right of the railroad. This portion of our original line, about two regimental fronts, together with two fronts to the left, held by Colonel Wagner's brigade was all of our original line of battle but what our troops had been driven from; and if they succeeded in carrying this they would have turned our left, and a total rout of our forces could not then have been avoided."⁵⁷⁵ Bragg in his report noted: "The slaughter was terrific every point, on both sides in this assault, which resulted in driving the enemy from every point except his extreme left. This point, which was the key of the enemy's position, was called the Round Forest."⁵⁷⁶

The need to attack Hazen with fresh troops became evident to Bragg, and the only fresh troops left to the Confederate army were those of Breckinridge's division which lay across the river. Since the early aborted maneuver by Van Cleve in crossing Stones River, Breckinridge had been convinced that the Union was readying an attack on his forces. He kept begging Bragg for reinforcements to counter this expected attack, and would not move his force across the river to help the other Confederate divisions. At 1:00 p.m. Bragg ordered him to cross Stones River and to attack the Round Forest. Breckinridge protested, but sent two brigades commanded by Daniel Adams and John Jackson. He later forded the river himself with his other two brigades

led by J. B. Palmer and William Preston.

Adams was the first to report to Polk, and the first in the afternoon to be sent against the Round Forest. With a long line of infantry, Adams' Louisianans emerged from behind the hill. Adams was on the right, and Donelson's and Chalmers' badly cut brigades were on the left. On they came in splendid style, 4,500 strong. The Union artillery sent volley after volley of grape-shot against them and the *Ninth*, 41st Ohio and 6th Kentucky joined in, but still the line pressed forward, firing as they came until they met a simultaneous and destructive volley of musketry⁵⁷⁷ Here again there was no lack of valor. One defender said of the charge that it was "without doubt the most daring, courageous, best-executed attack which the Confederates made on our line between pike and river."⁵⁷⁸ At this point Wagner charged Adams' right and his flank turned. Adams ordered his men to pull back out of range, leaving 426 dead and wounded on the field.⁵⁷⁹ The ground where they fell was dubbed "Hell's Half-Acre" by the soldiers who were forced to cross it in the face of such devastating fire.⁵⁸⁰

As Adams cleared the field, Jackson's brigade stepped forward. It was with ease that the Union troops repulsed this fourth attack. The slaughter of these last Confederate attackers sickened all that witnessed it.⁵⁸¹ One soldier from the *Ninth* described the battle in a letter to his girl; "This sight I saw was truly awful. After I was wounded, I got upon a hill that overlooked a field where I could see the masses of humanity being swayed to and from a deadly conflict, horses running without riders, ambulances going without drivers, teamsters hurrying their teams from the field as fast as their mules and horses could run, no artist could paint so terrible a picture as this was in reality."⁵⁸²



The slaughter was not over for the *Ninth* on that last day of the year. At about 4:00 p.m., as darkness was setting in, Breckinridge's other two brigades made another assault on the Round Forest over the blood-soaked cotton field where so much killing had taken place during the day. After the formation of the Confederates in two lines with a wild yell, Breckinridge's troops broke through the cedar thickets and advanced as if to charge once more. "The battle had hushed," Hazen wrote in his report, "and the dreadful splendor of this advance can only be conceived, as all descriptions must fall vastly short." At once a terrific fire of artillery and infantry opened on them. Deafened by the uproar, Confederates plucked the cotton from the bolls at their feet and stuffed it in their ears. Huge gaps were torn in the Confederate line at every discharge. The Confederate line staggered forward half the distance across the fields, when Hazen's brigade and some other fragments of troops that Hazen picked up to strengthen his line, added minie-balls to the fury of the storm.⁵⁸³ The Confederates wavered and fell back. By 4:30 p.m. the fire of the Confederate infantry ceased while that of their batteries continued until the close of the day. Finally darkness set in and the first day's fight was over.⁵⁸⁴ Polk noted in his report: "The brigades of Adams, Jackson, Preston, and Palmer had pointed out to them the object to be accomplished, --to drive the enemy's left, and especially to dislodge him from his position in the Round Forest. This point carried, and his left driven back on his right, would have completed his confusion and insured an utter rout. It was, however, otherwise."⁵⁸⁵

The *Bloody Ninth* had fought hard that last day of 1862, firing over 37,000 rounds of ammunition.⁵⁸⁶ Many of its soldiers were wounded, but chose to remain with the regiment on

the field and in battle showing unfaltering courage. Not all the men, however, acted with heroism. A sergeant, ten enlisted men, and one corporal deserted during the struggle.⁵⁸⁷



As the night set in the temperature plummeted; the ground froze, and a heavy mist rolled over the battle field. As guns became silent, the voices of thousands of wounded and dying men who blanketed the fields and woods became deafening. A mutual truce was granted in which the soldiers of both sides, without arms and without interruption, gathered their wounded comrades. The fierce acerbity of the deadly strife had given way to the mutual expression of kindness and regard.⁵⁸⁸ To evaluate the numbness of battle and the pain from the bitter cold, the armies on both sides ignited campfires in violation of orders from their commanders.

At midnight, Rosecrans met with his lieutenants to plan the army's next move. The Union army had been set back about four or five miles from the most advanced positions it had held at dawn. The army had lost about 25 percent of its total strength in battle casualties. Supply trains had been wrecked in great numbers by Wheeler's cavalry. McCook advised retreat. Thomas had fallen asleep in his chair before the discussion got underway. When the word "retreat" came through to him, he opened his eyes, rose directly to his full height and belligerently shouted, "This army doesn't retreat!" and fell back to sleep.⁵⁸⁹ Phil Sheridan wanting to fight on, jumped to his feet and requested "permission for my division the honor of leading the attack tomorrow."⁵⁹⁰ Crittenden advised that his men would be very much discouraged to have to abandon the field after their good fight of the day, during which they had uniformly held their position.⁵⁹¹ The other officers deferred to Rosecrans' judgment. Rosecrans

rode off with McCook, bidding the others to remain until they returned. They came back within a few minutes, and the commanding general ordered his subordinates to "prepare to fight or die."⁵⁹² Rosecrans ordered that all the spare ammunition should be issued. In doing so they found that there was enough for another battle, the main question being where the battle was to be fought. During the night Rosecrans positioned his left to a more advantageous position; the rest of his troops remained along the Nashville Turnpike.


The Confederate line formed by Polk and Breckinridge on the right and Hardee on the left extended from Stones River in a direction almost at right angles to its original line.⁵⁹³ Bragg, believing that he had won a great victory, sent a wire to Richmond, "We assailed the enemy at 7 o'clock this morning, and after 10 hours hard fighting have driven him from every position except his extreme left where he has successfully resisted us. We captured 4,000 prisoners, . . . 31 pieces of artillery, and some 200 wagons and 44 teams. Our loss is heavy; that of the enemy much greater." He added "God has granted us a happy New Year."⁵⁹⁴ Bragg was confident that when he awoke on New Year's Day he would see the Union army in full retreat. His cavalry had reported that the turnpike was full of troops and wagons which were moving toward Nashville. In reality these wagons were full of the thousands of wounded men heading for the National Hospital in Nashville which was established by Rosecrans in his careful pre-offensive preparation.⁵⁹⁵

With daylight, Bragg found Rosecrans' army still in his front and now digging in to resist any assault. The Union position was so strong that Bragg feared to make an attack, and contented himself with skirmishing and a few cavalry raids. He believed, or at least hoped that the Federal troops would be gone from his front on the morning of January 2, 1863. As New

Year's Day passed, the feeling grew that the Confederate opportunity for a victory had passed.

The weather of January 2nd had turned gray, cold, cloudy and gloomy, as did the hopes of the Southern army. Bragg, early in the morning, directed a heavy cannonade against the Federal center from four strong batteries, and made demonstrations against the right. But this show of attack was not followed up, and indeed, was intended merely to discover whether Rosecrans still kept his positions in force.⁵⁹⁶

Bragg, seeing that the Union army was now entrenched, determined that he must take it by assault. He realized that Beatty was on the east bank alone and his location on a rise commanded Polk's line. Either Polk must withdraw or Beatty must be dislodged. At noon he concluded that he must push Beatty back across the river and take from him the high ground that commanded the entire field of battle.



Breckinridge, against his protest, was ordered to concentrate his division and assault Beatty at 4:00 p.m. Near dusk, with a sleet storm in progress, Breckinridge formed his line with Hanson's brigade of Kentuckians on the left, supported by Adams' brigade and Palmer's brigade, now commanded by General Pillow, on the right. Preston was in reserve. All totaled the gray line was estimated at 6,000 men. The assault was to be preceded by a cannonade.

In the attack that followed Hanson hit the left of Beatty's line in a bayonet charge, while Pillow's made successive strokes on the right. The numerical strength of the assailants

convinced Beatty to order a retreat. The Confederates followed and "in the madness of pursuit all order and discipline were forgotten."⁸¹ Both Union and Confederate soldiers moved in a confused mass down across the fields toward the river.⁵⁹⁷ The sun had set just as the Union soldiers reached McFadden's Ford. To cover the union retreat fifty-eight pieces of artillery fired from the west bank on the mass of Confederates pursuing Beatty's men. One hundred shots per minute of artillery shells fell on the attackers with a dreadful effect. One Kentuckian later wrote: "The very earth trembled as with an exploding mine, and a mass of iron hail was hurled upon us. The artillery bellowed forth such thunder that the men were stunned and could not distinguish sounds. There were falling timbers, crashing arms, and whirling of missiles in every direction, the bursting of a dreadful shell, the groans of the wounded, the shouts of the officers, mingled in one horrid din that beggars description."⁵⁹⁸ For a few minutes the brave southerners held their ground, but the force of the artillery barrage caused the line to waiver and stop.

When the last of Beatty's men had crossed the river, Union brigades which were poised on the west bank opened fire on Breckinridge's command, causing them to recoil and fall back. The Union troops hurried across the river in pursuit. Hazen's brigade and the *Ninth* with loud cheers, dashed forward after the retreating Southerners. The Union line advanced and took possession of the ground from which Beatty had been driven an hour before, halting only because nightfall made it too dangerous to go on.⁵⁹⁹ Both armies bivouacked for the night upon the battlefield. In the assault, Hanson was killed and his brigade lost over 400 men. The loss in Breckinridge's attacking division was 1,410; nearly one-third of those engaged had fallen.⁶⁰⁰

The sleet and rain that had started with Breckinridge's attack continued the next day.

⁸¹ Statement from a soldier in the Kentucky Brigade.⁴⁴

Rosecrans held his defensive perimeter west of the river with the Right and Center Wings of McCook and Thomas. Crittenden's Wing with Palmer's division and the *Ninth* remained in their position on the north side of the River. If Bragg had deemed Polk's position untenable the day before with only a single division holding Wayne's Hill, now that it was occupied by nearly a whole corps. This made it absolutely necessary for the Confederates to withdraw. By 10:00 a.m. Bragg determined to give up the contest and to withdraw believing that Rosecrans had been reinforced and that further assaults would prove more devastating than those terrible losses already suffered. Although a tactical victory for the Confederates, in the two days of hard fighting Bragg had lost 1,236 killed, 7,766 wounded, and 868 captured, for a total of 9,870 or 26 percent of his army.⁶⁰¹ The Southern leadership also suffered with Generals James E. Rains and Roger M. Hanson killed, and Generals Chalmers and Adams disabled.

Bragg began his withdrawal from Murfreesboro under the cover of darkness at about 10:00 p.m. on January 3rd, leaving 2,500 wounded men at the Murfreesboro hospital. By 11:00 p.m. the whole of Bragg's army, except his cavalry, was in full retreat. As he moved toward Shelbyville the rain continued, the thermometer hovered near freezing, and his army suffered immeasurably. Bragg lost what confidence the Southern soldier had placed in him on that retreat. One soldier later confided to his wife: "I can't see for my life why Bragg left Murfreesboro after whipping them so badly."⁶⁰²

The cavalry held the front at Murfreesboro until Monday morning, when they fell back and covered Bragg's rear.⁶⁰³ Polk would occupy Shelbyville and Hardee would make camp near Tullahoma, 25 miles south of Murfreesboro. For the second time in three months, the Army of Tennessee had retreated after its commander claimed to have won a victory.⁶⁰⁴

Rosecrans choose not to pursue Bragg, for he recognized that he would have great difficulty in pushing the enemy with his army now nearly exhausted by exposure and fatigue. The Federal army had been mauled in what turned out to be, considering the numbers engaged, one of the bloodiest battles of the whole war. Twenty-nine percent of the Union forces engaged in the battle were casualties; 1,636 killed, 7,397 wounded, and 3,673 were missing or taken as prisoners for a total of 12,706 out of the 41,400 who had marched south after Christmas.⁶⁰⁵ Like the army as a whole, Hazen's Brigade was badly hurt with 409 casualties out of the 1,391 officers and men that fought. The *Bloody Ninth* entered the battle with only 345 enlisted men and 27 commissioned officers and out of that 109 men or 29 percent were casualties. One officer, Second Lieutenant Henry Kesler⁸² and 10 enlisted men were killed, 5 officers and 82 enlisted men were wounded and 11 men ended up missing.⁶⁰⁶ Of the 82 enlisted men reported as wounded nine would later die of their wounds.⁶⁰⁷



Rosecrans reported the results of the battle briefly in a telegram to Washington, "We have fought the greatest battle of the war and are victorious."⁶⁰⁸ The news of the battle spread quickly. Although Rosecrans had not really gained an actual victory, he had at least not been beaten back, as had the other two Union armies during December.⁸³ The spin doctors in the North turned Rosecrans' tactical loss into a decisive victory with overstated claims of battle success. The Chicago Tribune, a pro-administration paper, printed a headline: "Rosecrans Wins

⁸² From Delphi, Indiana.

⁸³ In Virginia at Fredericksburg General Ambrose Burnside lost over 12,000 men in a series of brutal assaults. In

a Complete Victory; the Enemy in Full Retreat."⁶⁰⁹ This "victory" was what Lincoln needed to quash the anti-war sentiment that had been growing in the Northwest as reported to him by Governor Morton. "God bless you, and all with you." Lincoln wrote Rosecrans. "Please tender to all, and accept for yourself, the nation's gratitude for your and their skill, endurance, and dauntless courage."⁶¹⁰ The Secretary of War wired, "This country is filled with admiration of the gallantry and heroic achievement of yourself and the officers and troops under your command. . . There is nothing you can ask within my power to grant to yourself or your noble command that will not be cheerfully given." Even Halleck, who had days before threatened Rosecrans' termination wired after he received verification in Confederate newspapers, "Rebel accounts fully confirm your telegrams from the battlefield. . . You and your brave army have won the gratitude of your country and the admiration of the world. . . All honor to the Army of the Cumberland--thanks to the living and tears for the lamented dead."⁶¹¹

Indiana's General Assembly sent a congratulatory resolution to Rosecrans, "The Army of the Cumberland, Murfreesborough [sic], and the name of each fallen and serving patriot soldier who took part in the perilous struggle, are forever linked together in historic renown, and Indiana will preserve, and gratefully cherish, their memory to the latest generation, as among the brightest jewels of an undivided republic."⁶¹²

On January 4th Captain Amasa Cole, with a detail from the *Ninth*, returned to the Round Forest to bury the brigade's dead.⁶¹³ He selected the spot where the *Ninth* had fought in battle and where 43 men from Hazen's brigade fell. This would be the place where they would be put

Mississippi Generals Grant and Sherman failed in their efforts to take Vicksburg.

to final rest.⁸⁴

Not until January 5th did the Union army occupy Murfreesboro. On January 10th the *Ninth* and Hazen's brigade marched through Murfreesboro on the way to Readyville, Tennessee, taking their sick and wounded with them. There the *Ninth* would remain until June 24, 1863.⁶¹⁴



During the late spring, as Hazen's brigade camped at Readyville, its commander meditated on the hard duty that his brigade had just completed at the battle of Stones River. He thought that his men could not have performed any better, and that they were in need of recognition to a greater extent than that permitted in Rosecrans' General Order No.19.⁸⁵ Hazen determined, after a discussion with his regimental commanders, to build a monument to the dead of his brigade. It was agreed that the monument would be placed where the brigade fought, and where it had saved Rosecrans' army from being routed. The monument would be placed at the position that the brigade had occupied and held during five separate and brutal attacks and the place where the brigade's 55 dead were buried. Men from each regiment were assigned the task of building the monument, with overall authority given to the *Ninth's* First Lieutenant Edward K. Crebbin⁸⁶ of company "I".⁶¹⁵ Even though no records exist, the process of building the

⁸⁴ At this site in the Stones River National Battlefield stands the Hazen Brigade Monument and Cemetery.

⁸⁵ Rosecrans published General Order #19 proposing the creation of a "Roll of Honor" to "establish a method of pointing out to this army and the nation those officers and soldiers of this command who shall distinguish themselves by bravery in battle, by courage, enterprise, and soldierly conduct" This roll was kept from company to brigade level and compiled at each division's headquarters.


⁸⁶ Crebbin came to the Ninth from LaPorte, Indiana on September 5, 1861 as a sergeant. He was promoted to 2d Lieutenant on August 22, 1862 and again promoted to 1st Lieutenant on April 18, 1863. He was dishonorably dismissed from service on March 15, 1864, but re-instated in September 15, 1864, and remained until the regiment

monument had to be officially sanctioned, at least at the divisional level and most probably by Rosecrans himself.

The design of the monument was chosen by Hazen and it was built out of Tennessee limestone. Isaac C. Suman, later Colonel of the *Ninth*, stated that he had discussed the monument with Hazen at the time it was built, and that Hazen suggested that the Monument be topped with a shaft that would be surmounted by a bronze figure of an infantryman "in recognition of the heroism of the rank and file of his brigade."⁶¹⁶ This bronze figure was never added, although after the war there was some thought of adding a bronze figure of General Hazen to the top of the monument.⁶¹⁷ The monument was built in the summer of 1863. The stone fence or dry wall was completed in December, 1863.⁶¹⁸

Three sides of the monument were inscribed in 1863.

The west side is etched: THE BLOOD OF ONE THIRD OF ITS SOLDIERS TWICE SPILLED IN



TENNESSEE CRIMSONS THE BATTLE FLAG OF THE BRIGADE AND INSPIRED TO GREATER DEEDS. Lt Col. Geo. T. Cotton, 6th Ky. Vols; Capt. Chas S. Todd 6th Ky. Vols; Capt Isaac M. Pettit, 9th Ind. Vols; 1st Lt Calvin Hart 41st O, Vols; 1st Lt L. T. Patchin 41st O.

was mustered out.

Vols; 2nd Lt Jesse G. Payne, 110th Ill. Vols, Killed at Stones River Dec 31st, 1862. The north, closest to the railroad tracks reads: "ERECTED 1863 UPON THE GROUND WHERE THEY FELL BY THEIR COMRADES, Forty First Infantry Ohio Volunteers, Lt. Col. A Wiley; Sixth Infantry Kentucky Volunteers, Col. W. C. Whitaker; Ninth Infantry Indiana Volunteers, Col. W. H. Blake; One Hundred and Tenth Infantry Illinois Volunteers, Col. T.S. Casey; Cocherills Battery, Co. F. First Artillery Ohio Volunteers; Nineteenth Brigade, Buell's Army of Ohio, Col. W. B. Hazen, 41st Inf'try O. Vols Commanding." On the east side is inscribed: "THE VETERANS OF SHILOH HAVE LEFT A DEATHLESS HERITAGE OF FAME UPON THE FIELD OF STONE RIVER. Capt. James Houghtan, 9th Ind. Vols; 1st. Lt & Adj. T.J. Paton, 9th Ind. Vols; 1st Lt Joseph Tuner, 9th Ind. Vols; 1st Lt. Franklin E. Pancoast 41st O. Vols; 2nd Lt. Chauncey E. Talcott 41st O. Vols; 2nd Lt. Anton Hand 6th Ky. Vols, Killed at Shiloh April 7th 1862." On the south side they recorded: HAZEN'S BRIGADE TO THE MEMORY OF ITS SOLDIERS WHO FELL AT STONE RIVER DEC. 31, 1862 'THEIR FACES TOWARD HEAVEN, THEIR FEET TO THE FOE.'" INSCRIBED AT THE CLOSE OF THE WAR--CHICKAMAUGA--CHATANOOGA."

Hazen's Brigade Monument was the first of its type to be built on any Civil War battle field. It is unique for it was constructed within six months of the battle while the outcome of the war was still in doubt.⁶¹⁹

Chapter 7

TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN



Company "C" of the *Ninth* Indiana at Readyville, Tennessee.

After the battle of Stones River, the *Ninth* stayed on the outskirts of Murfreesboro, Tennessee until it was assigned a new position. On January 10, 1863 the *Ninth*, along with William Hazen's entire brigade, marched through Murfreesboro on the way to guard the extreme left flank of William S. Rosecrans' army. They went into camp at Readyville, Tennessee, a hamlet of about a dozen houses twelve miles east of Murfreesboro, and four miles away from the nearest Union outpost. The weather was cold with lots of rain and sometimes snow that made the new encampment less than a pleasant place to exist. The men built log huts of the "pen" type after the fashion of frontier cabins, with slanting roofs of boards covered with the "A" shelter tent or piece of canvas to keep out the rain. The cracks in the sides were filled with mud. The huts were heated by fireplaces built of sticks and daubed with clay and topped by one or more

barrels. Floors were normally of boards or split logs laid with the flat side up, and those less willing to work covered the ground with straw or even left it bare. The huts were designed for the accommodation of four men.⁶²⁰ The *Ninth* would remain in Readyville until June 24, 1863.⁶²¹

The winter months were the worst time for many of the men. Inactivity and boredom prevailed, and morale was severely tested. As time passed, the humor that prevailed within the ranks of the *Ninth* slipped away; manners of compatriots that once were comical became contemptuous. Tempers, resentment, and impatience ran high. These winter months would have been perfect for furloughs, but furloughs were rare commodities for the *Ninth* as they were in the entire Union army. In one letter a newly commissioned Second-Lieutenant writes home:

- - - I sent in an application to General Rosecrans for leave of absence, but it came back "not accepted". . . It was approved by General Hazen, Palmer and Crittenden, but Rosecrans vetoed it. . .⁶²²

Drinking, gambling and profanity became a by-product of camp life during the winter stay. Poker, twenty-one, euchre, and keno were common any night of the week. Alcohol consumption grew. Most of the whiskey brought or smuggled into the camp could be classified as "mean" even for that day. A Hoosier soldier analyzed one issue of whiskey and with a straight face adjudged it to be a combination of "bark juice, tar-water, turpentine, brown sugar, lamp-oil and alcohol."⁶²³ The potency of the liquor was readily evident from some of the nicknames given to it, "Old Red Eye", "Oil of the Gladness", "Oh, be Joyful", "Rifle Knock-Knee", "How Come You So", and "Help Me to Sleep, Mother." The effect of these drinking sprees varied with individuals and beverages. Some were aroused to extreme pugnacity while others became exceedingly happy, lifting their voices in laughter or song, while still others were

reduced to misery and tears.⁶²⁴ The problems caused by drinking were in all ranks within the *Ninth*. For example, First-Lieutenant Lewis S. Nickerson, Company "E", was placed under arrest after a long night "for making too much noise after taps. He was cutting up and laughing."⁸⁷

No service agencies, post exchanges, lounges, or libraries existed for the men, and no camp shows or entertainment groups ever visited the troops. Newspapers were the only contact with the North, but they were a rarity in camp. Home sickness prevailed, and letter-writing became the most popular occupation of the lonely soldiers. One sergeant from the *Ninth*, after two years away from home, wrote to his girlfriend:

I don't want you to misconstrue these words, nor think that I do not love you with my whole heart. For I think too much of myself to have it said that I trifle with the affections of any young lady, but if you are willing to take the chance of my getting through this war safe, with your consent, I pledge you my sacred honor as a gentleman which I prize, as nearly as my life, that if I get home safe and my circumstances are such as to enable me to defray expenses, that we will be husband and wife at such time as we may agree upon after we have seen each other again. This may be a novel way of "popping the question," but I am writing it down just as the subject presents itself to my mind, and you may laugh if you please, and I shall not take offense, but it remains now for you to say yes or no, and I will abide the consequences.⁶²⁵

Shortly after establishing camp, Hazen received word that the Army of the Cumberland was being reorganized again in accordance with General Order No. 9 of the War Department. Rosecrans' Center, Right and Left wings were made *corps d'armee* with designation of Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first Corps under the same commanders, who were advanced to the position of corps commanders. Thus, the *Ninth* was now placed into the Twenty-first U.S.

⁸⁷ After being placed under arrest, Nickerson insisted upon being brought to Court-Marshal. He remained under arrest until the battle of Chickamauga where he was killed in action on September 19, 1863.⁵¹

Army Corps and still under the command of Major-General Thomas L. Crittenden, Second Division under the command of John M. Palmer, Second Brigade under William B. Hazen.⁶²⁶

Within two month after arriving at Readyville, Hazen established a general school for the officers on the theory of war and battles using "Hardee's Tactics" as the textbook. During the training, all officers were required to recite from the textbook daily from 10 to 11:30 A.M. As to the men, practical instruction on the use of arms was also started and continued daily, except for Sunday. The brigade was divided into small groups for training, including bayonet exercise. The bayonet was rarely used by most troops during the war, but the *Ninth* would have need for it in the months to come. The drills with the bayonet were an integral part of Hazen's morning training. In the afternoon there was battalion and brigade drills.

It was at about this period of time that Colonel William Blake of the *Ninth* became ill. His arduous army life and rough experiences on the frontier preyed upon a weakened frame and as a consequence of his fast failing health. Colonel Blake reluctantly resigned the Colonelcy of the *Ninth* on April 16, 1863.⁸⁸ Colonel Blake was a natural leader and a brave and capable commander. He was an excellent disciplinarian and good tactician, and possessed the ability of holding his troops well in hand and ready to face any emergency that might beset them on the field.⁶²⁷ The officers and men of the *Ninth* would miss him, as expressed in a letter home:

Our Colonel has resigned and gone home, and we feel as though we were forsaken. He was a brave man, kind to his men, beloved by all and oh "how we miss him. I don't know why he resigned. The regimen turned out in line. He wished to bid them farewell. He rode out in front of the battalion. He was so deeply affected. All he could

⁸⁸ William Blake was later appointed by President Lincoln as U.S. Consul at the port of Manzanilla, State of Colima, Mexico, on the Pacific Coast in which position he served for many years. He left that post and accepted the position of Professor of English Literature at the State University at Guadalajara, Mexico. He died on October 25, 1882 in Guadalajara.⁵²

say was, "Soldiers, I bid you farewell", and rode quickly to his quarters.⁶²⁸

Unlike promotions made in many Indiana regiments, there was little political leverage employed from outside the army for advancements in the *Ninth*.⁸⁹ Of course, politics within the *Ninth* was a different story. Many of the officers of the *Ninth*, presumably at the request of Isaac C. B. Suman of Valparaiso, Indiana, petitioned Governor Morton for his appointment to succeed Colonel Blake as commander of the *Ninth*.⁹⁰ After all he was the Lieutenant-Colonel and had a right by seniority to the appointment. The petition was signed by fifty percent of the officers, mostly those that had supported Colonel Blake and Lieutenant-Colonel Suman a year before when they took over command of the regiment.⁶²⁹ This time, however, there was no counter-petition or opposition filed by Lieutenant-Colonel's fellow officers to his appointment. This may have been an attempt to end the schism that had developed within the officers corps as a result of the Courts-Martial of Colonel Moody. The failure of any opposition could also have been in fear of possible retaliation by a Lieutenant-Colonel; if he was not appointed he still

⁸⁹ Political influence to further a career was almost universally observed throughout the army. Even commanders of the famed "Iron Brigade" received their commission through political friends. "The americans of the day were a crudely political people, and had not abandoned their habits because of the war."⁵³

⁹⁰ Isaac C. B. Suman was born in Middleton, Md. on January 4, 1831, the next to the youngest of a family of seven children. He was reared in Maryland, and received a public-school education. In May, 1846 he enlisted in the First United States Artillery for the Mexican War under Major Ringgold of Maryland. He remained in the artillery service about two years, and was then transferred to the Second United States Dragoons, and served a total of five year. He was under General Taylor, and participated in the engagements of Palo Alto, Monterey, Buena Vista, and all the movements of Taylor's army after crossing the river at Brownsville until the capture of Mexico City. At the close of the war he returned to Maryland. His father had been a large slave-owner, but after his failure in business and his death, the family was left in reduced circumstances. Suman came west with only \$8.00 in his pocket, first to Ohio in 1852, then to LaPorte, Indiana in 1853 where he was engaged as a carpenter and builder. He moved to Valparaiso later in 1854 where he made his home. Suman was one of the first to enroll as a volunteer in a company formed at Valparaiso, and assigned as First-Lieutenant in Company "H" in the *Ninth*, three month service. On the reorganization of the *Ninth* for three year service Suman was made Captain of Company "H" and on August 20, 1862 promoted Lieutenant-Colonel of the *Ninth*. Suman was twice severely wounded by gunshot at the battle of Stones River, first in the shoulder. After it was dressed he returned to the regiment, only to receive a second more serious, almost mortal wound that would keep him invalidate from duty for months.⁵⁴

would remain as the *Ninth's* Lieutenant-Colonel. Even the politically well connected Surgeon, Mason G. Sherman, who had lead the previous attacks on Colonel Blake and Lieutenant-Colonel Suman remained silent.

Despite this silence the appointment was not without opposition. It came in the form of a letter addressed to the Adjutant-General of Indiana with the intent that it should be presented to Governor Morton. The letter was from General William B. Hazen, commander of the brigade in which the *Ninth* was placed, and who had presumably known and watched Lieutenant-Colonel Suman over the past year. Hazen writes:


I am strongly opposed to the promotion of Lt. Col. Suman on the ground of incapacity and a want of high moral character. Although a brave and daring soldier, he is an unaccomplished commander and very illiterate; a specimen of his composition is enclosed. His notions of the rights of property owned by Government or citizens where an army may occupy are such as to be very deleterious to the moral character of the troops. This Regiment, the 9th I.V., has been suffered to fall into a state of moral turpitude very deplorable which is certain to unfit many of its members from ever again assuming the high and proper character of honest and honored citizens. It has dealt more largely in counterfeit money, has pilfered from the country more generally than any Regiment within my notice.⁶³⁰

Lieutenant-Colonel Suman was appointed, notwithstanding the criticize of General Hazen, for Governor Morton had made it his practice to have his own agents within the various armies to watch and report to him the condition of Indiana regiments, their officers and soldiers. For this the Indiana troops would applaud Morton as a "soldiers' friend"⁹¹ while the army would criticize him for interfering in national military affairs.⁶³¹ For Suman it would provide a basis for his promotion to Colonel of the *Ninth*, his commission dating back to April 17, 1863. He would remain in command of the *Ninth* for the duration of the war.⁶³²

⁹¹ A newspaper reported "In all our armies, from Kansas to the Potomac, everywhere I haved met Indiana troops, I have

Although seniority was a prime factor in the appointment of the *Ninth's* colonel, popularity and not ability seem to be the method of selecting the officers at the company level. Two officers of the *Ninth* were ordered to tender their resignations or face dismissal after failing their military oral examinations.⁶³³ These tests were ordered by General Hazen on March 4, 1863 in an attempt to improve the officer ranks. They were administered by a board of officers chosen by Hazen at the brigade level and given to each officer after a required course of study. Every officer of the *Ninth* as well as all the officers in Hazen's brigade were required to appear before this board.⁶³⁴ During the stay at Readyville, nine officers of the *Ninth* left service with the regiment. These included Colonel Blake; Adjutant Ezra Willard of Elkhart, Indiana who resigned March 2, 1863; Assistant Surgeon Alexander W.

Gilmore of LaPorte who was dishonorably dismissed March 11, 1863, but who was later re-commissioned; First-Lieutenant Frank P. Gross, Company "A" of Lafayette who resigned on April 25, 1863; First-Lieutenant Samuel Sidenbender, Company "A" of Delphi, Indiana who resigned May 31, 1863, and re-entered service as a private in the 11th Cavalry, later promoted to Second-Lieutenant; Captain Joseph W. Harding, Company "B" of Calumet, Indiana who resigned April 22, 1863 and re-entered service as First-Lieutenant in the 155th Regiment; Captain James McCormick, Company "B" of Westville, Indiana who resigned June 2, 1863; First-Lieutenant



encountered some officer of Governor Morton going about among them."⁵⁵

Reuben Platt, Company "B" who was dishonorably dismissed of February 9, 1863; Captain Douglas G. Risley, Company "C" who was dismissed on February 13, 1863.⁶³⁵

The numbers of effective fighting men in the *Ninth* also dwindled during its stay at Readyville. Only eight new men joined the regiment during that stay, as recruits were hard to come by, particularly since no one back in Indiana was recruiting on their behalf. Only 141 recruits had joined the *Ninth* since it left LaPorte, Indiana for western Virginia back in September 1861; 19 new men arrived in 1861 and 114 recruits came during 1862. By the time of their stay at Readyville, the regiment had been reduced to less than 290 enlisted men.

With such a small regiment, each company in the *Ninth* was required to spend every fourth night on picket duty. The company would be scattered around in the woods about a mile from camp, three or four in a group to stand guard. During the night one member of the squad would keep watch while the others tried to sleep. They would relieve each other every two hours.⁶³⁶

The monotony of camp life, daily drill and picket duty was relieved only by foraging expeditions. The excursions were conducted at some risk. Not infrequently the men and wagons were attacked by the confederate cavalry that routinely patrolled the area.

The only operation of interest during the *Ninth's* stay at Readyville was lead by Hazen on April 2, 1863. This was an attack on Woodbury, Tennessee, seven miles from Readyville where Smith's Cavalry regiment was stationed. Colonel Suman led one column consisting of the *Ninth*, 1st Kentucky and the 110th Illinois. After capturing the forward pickets, the *Ninth* drove and scattered the vedettes⁹² with a bayonet charge, and then began to move on the main force. By

⁹² Vedettes are mounted sentinels stationed in advance of pickets to watch an enemy and give notice of danger.

the time that the Union troops reached Woodbury, the Confederate cavalry had fled eastward out of the valley.⁶³⁷ In the action three Confederates were killed, 25 taken prisoner and all the southern regiment's baggage and provisions were captured.⁶³⁸ One man from the *Ninth* was listed as missing.⁶³⁹



While Rosecrans was enjoying the fruits of victory at Stones River, Braxton Bragg was being raked over the coals by the southern press for his premature wire announcing that God had granted the Confederacy a Happy New Year by a victory at Stones River. The press alleged that the loss was due to Bragg withdrawing from Murfreesboro against the advice of his lieutenants when victory was at hand. President Davis sent General Joseph E. Johnston to investigate and determine "whether [Bragg] had so far lost the confidence of the army as to impair his usefulness in his present position. . . As that army is part of your command. . . You have a right to direct its operations and do whatever else belongs to the general commanding."⁶⁴⁰ On February 13th Johnston reported to Davis that he found the men "well clothed, healthy, and in good spirits. . . positive evidence of General Bragg's capacity to command. . . To me it seems that the operations of this army in Middle Tennessee have been conducted admirably. I can find no record of more effective fighting in modern battles than that of this army in December, evidencing great skill in the commander and courage in the troops. . . General Bragg should not be removed."

Davis, not satisfied with Johnston's investigation, ordered Johnston to direct Bragg to report to Richmond and ordered Johnston to assume "direct charge of the army in Middle Tennessee." When Johnston arrived to assume command, he found that Bragg was home with

his critically ill wife, having first given his duties over to others. Johnston assumed command, but as a matter of courtesy "on account of Mrs. Bragg's critical condition", did not order Bragg to report to Richmond. By the time Mrs. Bragg had recovered, Johnston had become ill, a flare-up of his war wounds, making it necessary, by default, that Bragg remain in command.⁶⁴¹



While Bragg was having problems with Richmond, Rosecrans started his own problems with Washington. Henry Halleck, as commander of the armies, wrote a letter to both Generals Grant and Rosecrans offering the position of Major-General in the regular army to the general who should first achieve an important victory.⁹³ Grant made no comment to the offer putting it away for further reference. Rosecrans, however, was offended by the offer and wrote Halleck on March 6th: "as an officer and as a citizen" he felt "degraded as such an auctioneering of honors. . . Have we a general who would fight for his own personal benefit when he would not for honor and for his country?"⁶⁴²

The effect of Rosecrans' letter widened the breach between the authorities in Washington and himself. All requests thereafter by Rosecrans for men, equipment and supplies were treated with indifference. His repeated request for more cavalry and better arms had gained little attention, even though Washington kept pressure on Him to move against Bragg. Rosecrans kept coming up with excuses to stay put as he continued planning, thinking and conferring while demanding the transportation facilities that would make feasible his advance. Secretary of War

⁹³ Halleck saw nothing improper in offering a promotion in advance as a reward for good work. Before returning to the army he was a plaintiff's lawyer in California principally devoted to the establishment of the validity of land grants in favor of his clients and himself worked for contingent fees.

Stanton heartily disliked Rosecrans and it is fair to say that this was a factor in the bad blood and low priority between the war department and his army. The Army of the Cumberland became known as the "stepchild army."⁶⁴³

By mid June 1863 Rosecrans gathered enough supplies and transportation to make his move. In fact, he had gathered a total of 43,023 horses and mules or one for every two soldiers in his command. In Murfreesboro alone, Rosecrans had brought 40,000 cases of hard tack, large quantities of flour, salt, pork, vinegar and molasses.⁶⁴⁴ In addition, his army had grown to 87,800 effective of all arms, but twenty-five percent of these would be required to garrison Nashville, Clarksville, Murfreesboro and other vital places when the army was ready to move out.




The Confederate army lay about thirty miles south of Murfreesboro along the Duck River which was a deep, narrow stream with few fords or bridges. At that point the army guarded the railroad which ran from Nashville to Chattanooga. Polk, with 18,000 men, was strongly entrenched at Shelbyville, where five miles of earth-works had been constructed. On his right, at Wartrace was Hardee's corps of 12,000 men that guarded the mountain approaches from the north at Liberty Gap and Hoover's Gap. In the rear, eighteen miles south of Duck River, another entrenched camp lay behind a mountain range at a small village called Tullahoma⁹⁴ where Bragg had established his main supply depot. Besides Polk's and Hardee's corps at Duck River, Bragg had another corps under Simon B. Buckner in East Tennessee with 10,000 men.

⁹⁴ Tullahoma, got its name from the conjunction of two Greek words. Tulla meant "mud" and homa meant "more

All totaled, Bragg had less men available to him than Rosecrans, about 46,000 men, but he had a superior cavalry force that would hamper any long advance made by the Union. If the Union was to succeed, Rosecrans had to cut off Bragg from withdrawing to Chattanooga or into Alabama. He had to force Bragg to fight where he was in Tennessee, but on Rosecrans terms. It was with this idea that Rosecrans made his plans for a summer campaign.

Rosecrans' battle plan was well conceived and used the advantages of the terrain. The road to Shelbyville where Polk's troops were located was the easiest approach, while those farther eastward led through dangerous mountain passes at Hoover's Gap and Liberty Gap, both of which were strongly guarded by Hardee's Corps. An advance on Polk would result in a battle in his entrenchments and at the place chosen by Bragg for battle. Success in attacking Shelbyville would only be gained with great loss, and would leave Bragg with an open door for retreat to his second line of

entrenchments at Tullahoma. However, if Bragg was to believe that an attack was to be made on Shelbyville, he would be compelled to move Hardee's corps to help Polk and vacate the mountain approaches through which the Union army could rush. Once through



and beyond these mountain passes Rosecrans could move rapidly on Manchester and Winchester. This rapid movement would cut off Bragg's retreat, avoid his entrenchments at

mud."

Shelbyville altogether, and provoke a battle on ground of Rosecrans' selection where the numbers were in his favor. It was therefore important to Rosecrans' plan to keep Bragg's attention on the movement to Shelbyville until the main force reached Manchester. To carry out this plan Granger's corps and most of the Union Cavalry would make a faint on Shelbyville, while the other three corps of Thomas, Crittenden and McCook would wait to move through the mountain passes.⁶⁴⁵ To confuse Bragg even more, a supplementary diversion was designed by Rosecrans. This act of deception would be made by Crittenden's corps on the far east at Woodbury through Bradyville toward McMinnville. The difference in this diversion was that it was intended to be recognized as such in the hopes that Bragg would think that this movement was to cover the main attack at Shelbyville.


Day 1. June 23, 1863 when all was ready as to men and supplies, the weather hot and the roads dry and hard allowing for rapid movement, Rosecrans put in motion the First Cavalry Division in the faint on Shelbyville. It moved out of Triune and drove in the Confederate pickets at Eagleville, Rover and Unionville, while General Granger's Corps and one division from General Thomas's corps moved from Triune to Salem. They were told to build an array of campfires at night to make the Confederates think that the main attack would be coming from that direction and that Rosecrans' whole army was in that area.⁶⁴⁶ On the far east side, part of General Palmer's division of Crittenden's Corp moved from Cripple Creek and Readyville on Woodbury and Brandyville for the purpose of securing the gap through a defile leading to an obscure road that ran to Manchester. The remaining troops in Crittenden's Corp were ordered to be ready to march. Each soldier was to carry twelve days' of rations of bread, coffee, sugar, and salt, and six days' rations of pork. Another six days of beef was kept on the hoof for speed and

ease of transportation and would be driven with the army.⁶⁴⁷

When this was accomplished, Rosecrans called each of his corps commanders to a meeting in the early hours of June 24th and gave them written marching orders.⁶⁴⁸ He would not, however, give Washington his detailed plans as he thought that governmental leaks might reveal them to Richmond. With this done, Rosecrans sent a telegram to Washington: "The army begins to move at 3 o'clock this morning."⁶⁴⁹

It took time to gather the rations for those troops that were stationed away from Murfreesboro. It took the full day and all night of June 23rd for the wagons to travel the twelve miles to and from Murfreesboro and for the *Ninth* to retrieve the necessary rations. It was not until 8:00 a.m. the next morning that the ammunition and rations were distributed.⁶⁵⁰

Day 2. As the rations were being passed out to the *Ninth*, it began to rain and it continued almost uninterrupted for the next fourteen days.⁶⁵¹ Rosecrans later described the rain as "one of the most extraordinary rains ever



known in Tennessee at that period of the year." "No Presbyterian rain either, but a genuine Baptist downpour" an Illinois soldier described it.⁶⁵² The *Ninth* marched in the drenching rain all day and stopped two miles past Brandyville on the far east side of Rosecrans army. There it

bivouacked for the night as part of Palmer's division. Woods' division camped only a few miles away, but Van Cleve's division would not make the march with Crittenden's corps as it remained in Murfreesboro to garrison the town.

Day 3. The *Ninth* moved south in a drenching rain along with the rest of Crittenden's corps. The roads along which they marched became very bad, but satisfactory progress was made until the head of the column reached Gillies Hill. There the ground was so softened on the dirt roads as to render it next to impassable. Gillies Hill was steep, and the teams of horses pulling the wagons would, even on a dry road, have great difficulty, and thus the loads in each wagon had to be reduced. The troops reached Hollow Springs having marched six miles during the day, but only a few wagons could move up the hill. During the next two days Crittenden's corps along with the *Ninth* stayed at Hollow Springs. They spent their time in the mud on Gillies Hill pulling, pushing and carrying the wagons and artillery up the hill.⁶⁵³ It became common for the horses and mules to flounder in the mud. When they did they were unhitched, and the artillery and ammunition wagons were then dragged through the deep morasses by the infantry. All along the hill the moving troops would find mules that had perished in the mud, unable to extricate themselves from the quagmire.⁶⁵⁴

Day 4. On June 26th The Ninth along with the rest of Crittenden, Granger and McCook remained bivouacked.⁶⁵⁵

Day 5. Thomas took Manchester. With Manchester under Federal control, Bragg would either be forced to fight to stop any further Union advance or abandon middle Tennessee altogether. While Thomas was taking Manchester, Crittenden moved forward on the 27th slowly, but as rapidly as the incessant rains that had fallen since the opening of the campaign and bad

roads would permit. The *Ninth* brought up the rear and the roads although level had been turned into quicksand by the troops, wagons and artillery that had passed over them previously. Along the route the men found wagons mired and abandoned by other units while dead mules and horses lined both sides of the road. At times it took ten, twelve and even twenty horses to drag artillery or the regiment's wagons through the mire. Late in the day the exhausted men of the *Ninth*, having struggled through knee-deep mud all day, came into camp just four miles from Manchester.⁶⁵⁶

Day 6. The *Ninth* now in the lead of Crittenden's corps, marched to within one mile of Manchester. By day's end, McCook had joined Thomas at Manchester where Rosecrans had established his headquarters.⁶⁵⁷ The Union army was now concentrated and ready to move against Tullahoma.

Day 7. On June 29th the *Ninth* marched through Manchester and went into camp one mile south of the town.⁶⁵⁸ Thomas, McCook and the rest of Crittenden's corps closed to within two miles of Tullahoma.

Day 8. Thomas sent two brigades to reconnoiter the Confederate position for the attack that would be made the next day. These soldiers all returned with reports that the enemy was in force within a mile or two of the town. It appeared that Bragg would not leave Tullahoma without a fight, and that is just what Rosecrans had wished would take place. In the hopes of gaining the Confederate rear, Rosecrans ordered Palmer's division along with the *Ninth* to march south of Manchester.⁶⁵⁹ Bragg fearing he might be cut off was now forced to think about saving his army by a full retreat south, leaving both lines of entrenchment and his supply depot at Tullahoma.

Day 9. On the morning of July 1, 1863 the *Ninth* along with Palmer's division under orders to march with "minimum transportation," leaving the men's knapsacks behind moved out early in the morning for a point near Hill's Chapel, where it was to take position in line on the left of Thomas' Corps. The road were softened and seemed to have been lost as the *Ninth* passed through woods with bottomless mud. The *Ninth* did not arrive in position until 4:00 p.m.⁶⁶⁰ By that time Thomas had learned that Bragg had evacuated Tullahoma, and was in full retreat to the Elk River. Four hours before the *Ninth* got into position, Union troops entered Tullahoma without a fight.

Having taken the last stronghold of Bragg's army in Tennessee, Rosecrans ordered an immediate pursuit by Rousseau's and Negley's divisions. Palmer's division with the *Ninth* was ordered to move south to cut off Bragg's retreat. Palmer could only move a short distance that night because in moving out in line of battle, he crossed a treacherous area filled with quicksand which only needed the soaking of the week's rain to render it impassable. There his artillery and ammunition wagons became caught in the mud and had to be dug out. The horses had to be unhitched and the vehicles pulled through the morasses by his soldiers.⁶⁶¹

In the race for south Bragg had come out ahead, securing his military road which he had constructed five miles east of the railroad. Bragg's army succeeded in crossing the Elk River at Estelle Springs without a battle.

On July 3rd Palmer's division along with the *Ninth* was ordered to retrace their steps back to Manchester where they went into camp.⁶⁶² The *Ninth* would remain in the Manchester area for the next several weeks drying out, refitting and waiting for the Army of the Cumberland to again move South.

The Tullahoma campaign, as it became known, was the most brilliant strategic campaign carried out to a successful conclusion in the Civil War, but Rosecrans made a great mistake in too readily assuming that the enemy would fight instead of retreating. The one thing, more than any thing else, that affected Rosecrans's plans, was the never-ceasing rain, a circumstance for which he, of course, was not accountable, and one upon which he could not have planned.⁶⁶³ Fair weather would have been the ruin of the Confederate Army of Tennessee. On the positive side the movements of the Union army took only nine days to drive out a strongly fortified enemy with the loss of only 85 men killed, 482 wounded and 13 captured. Bragg's loss in killed and wounded was never ascertained, but there were 59 officers and 1,575 men captured along with a large quantity of supplies and artillery.⁶⁶⁴

At the conclusion of the campaign, the Confederate army was once again in Chattanooga, and the Union army in possession of Middle Tennessee with Chattanooga as its next objective. Both armies were now back in the position they were in at the end of last summer, but in the interim both armies had marched through Tennessee and Kentucky and back again, fought two battles and lost thousands of men. As brilliant as Rosecrans' campaign was, it failed to destroy Bragg's army which meant that it would have the ability to fight at some other time and at some other place.

The Confederate army lost the campaign by retreating. The effective force in Bragg's army after reaching Chattanooga was about 40,000 men, or 6,000 short of his strength at Shelbyville. Two-thirds of this loss was by desertion. These deserters, chiefly from Tennessee regiments, came into the Union's camps on the days following Bragg's crossing of the Tennessee River.⁶⁶⁵ The loss of Middle Tennessee occurred within days of the surrender of Vicksburg and

the defeat at Gettysburg. This retreat marked the beginning of the end to the Confederacy and contributed to the general despair that would remain with the South following the disasters of July.

Chapter 8

ADVANCE ON CHATTANOOGA

On July 3rd 1863 the *Ninth* went into camp at Manchester, Tennessee with Hazen's brigade, their camp only a few hundred feet from Duck River Falls. For the first two weeks the roads leading to Manchester remained impassable for supply wagons, and the men of the *Ninth* were compelled to subsist on quarter rations or "hard bread and some old meat." One soldier noted: "They killed a beef the other day--it was so poor that they took it into the thick bushes so that the men could not see it before they killed it. They were afraid they would starve rather than eat it if they saw it."⁶⁶⁶ By July 12th some wagons were getting through and the troops were put on half rations, and within three weeks the trains were moving to Tullahoma so all were back on full rations.⁶⁶⁷

On July 24, 1863 until the brigade moved out of Manchester, Hazen resumed drills for the troops under his command. Company drills were from 6:00 to 7:30 a.m. Monday, Wednesday and Friday, followed by target practice from 8:00 to 9:30 a.m. Squad drills were on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, followed by bayonet exercise from 8:00 to 9:30 a.m. Every day in the afternoon there were battalion and brigade drills from 4:30 to 7:00 p.m., except Saturday and Sunday.⁶⁶⁸

When not on drill the men of the *Ninth* were sent into the country to cut trees for railroad ties. They cut some 5,000 that were used for the repair of the railroad from Tullahoma to the Tennessee River.⁶⁶⁹

While stationed in Manchester and for the second time within thirteen months, a commanding officer of the *Ninth* faced a Court-Martial. Colonel Isaac C. B. Suman was brought

before the Court to stand trial on August 10, 1863 on four charges brought by General Hazen that were set out in fifteen separate specifications. The sum and substance of these charges was that Colonel Suman, when a captain in Company "H", while the regiment was in the pursuit of Bragg from Kentucky, captured a Confederate captain near Pilot Knob, Tennessee and took his horse as Colonel Suman's own without turning it over to the army. The army charged him with "Fraud against the United States Government." A second charge dealt with Colonel Suman keeping a shotgun taken at Shiloh without turning it over to the army. The third charge involved conduct on Colonel Suman's part that was "unbecoming an officer and gentleman." The final charge alleged that Colonel Suman was unfit for the duties of command.

The court consisted of officers from two brigades of Palmer's division. The president of the court was Colonel William Grose, a well known Indiana lawyer, commanding the Third Brigade and former Colonel of the 36th Indiana. Also seated in the court were the commanders of the 1st Kentucky, the 2nd Kentucky, the 31st Indiana and the 90th Ohio of the First Brigade, and the commanders of the 36th Indiana and 6th Ohio of the Third Brigade.⁶⁷⁰ During the trial almost every officer in the *Ninth* was called as a witness except for three Second-Lieutenants.⁶⁷¹

For over a week the court heard testimony from various officers and enlisted men concerning Colonel Suman's conduct. As turned out, the evidence concerning the horse was in conflict as to whether Colonel Suman had in fact turned over the horse to the army. Colonel Suman claimed that he had turned the horse over for inventory and a week before the trial paid fifty-five dollars to the quartermaster for it. Colonel Suman was found not guilty on the "Fraud" charge.

Concerning the shotgun; it turned out that Colonel William Blake had taken several guns

and had given one of them to Colonel Suman. Colonel Suman in turn gave it to a private as a gift for taking care of Colonel Suman's horse. On that charge he was found not guilty.

There was very little evidence presented concerning Colonel Suman's conduct that might be considered "unbecoming an officer and gentleman." Apparently Colonel Suman had used inappropriate language to his fellow officers during a drill threatening them with bodily harm if they did not follow his orders. He was likewise found not guilty of this charge.

The last and most serious charge dealt with Colonel Suman's ability to command a regiment in the Union army. Apparently, Colonel Suman had difficulty with mastering the drill while commanding a regiment in practice at Readyville. The witnesses that were questioned about Colonel Suman's fighting ability testified that Colonel Suman was a fighting soldier in battle and a credit to the army. Even with these admissions, several officers of the *Ninth*, including Captain Joshua Healey of Company "G" testified that Colonel Suman was not fit for command because of his poor education and lack of military training. Others, including Lieutenant-Colonel William Lasselle, Major George H. Carter, senior captain Amash Johnson of Company "D" testified that he was proficient in his duties and was no worse than any other officer in the brigade and better than most. It was the opinions of these officers that Colonel Suman was more than competent to command a regiment.

General William B. Hazen, Colonel Suman's commanding officer, was called as a prosecution witness over the objections of the defense. Hazen blasted Colonel Suman as being unfit to command. He criticized him for his poor education in general, and in particular his poor use of the written English language. Evidently Colonel Suman couldn't spell and had difficulty transmitting his thoughts through written word. Hazen was critical of Colonel Suman's military

training and his ability to command troops during drill. During Hazen's testimony he was disparaging of Colonel Suman's fighting ability, but the next day Hazen submitted a written letter to the court in which he recanted that part of his testimony.

Colonel Suman was found guilty of some of the individual specifications, but even with Hazen's damning testimony, he was found not guilty of this charge. The Court acquitted him on all charges and on August 22nd he was released from arrest and ordered to resume command of the *Ninth*.⁶⁷² The hard feelings fostered by this Court-Martial, and in particular against Hazen would never be forgotten by Colonel Suman;⁹⁵ and he would act on those feeling within weeks of his acquittal.




General Bragg was in Chattanooga, a mountain-rimmed citadel with the wide Tennessee River in its front. Chattanooga had been the objective of General Don Carlos Buell's summer campaign in 1862 and now again was the object of Rosecrans' army. It was a stronghold which most regarded as impregnable, and Bragg continued to fortify it in preparation for an assault he was sure would to be made. Bragg deployed Leonidas Polk's corps in the vicinity of Chattanooga, with one brigade keep west on the Tennessee River to provide warning of Union activity in that area. William J. Hardee's corps was sent northeast of the city to guard against a Union thrust across the Tennessee River between Chattanooga and Knoxville. To guard his

⁹⁵ At the Reunion of the Nineteenth Brigade held on August 28th, 1900 after General Hazen's death, there was a proposal by Hazen's old regiment, the 41st Ohio, that a statue of Hazen be placed on top of Hazen's Monument at Stones River. Suman, who was chairman of the reunion, spoke against the proposal and stated that the men of his regiment would not contribute any money for such a venture. Suman advocated that if a statue was to be put on the monument it should be that of infantryman in recognition of the heroism of the rank and file of Hazen's brigade. The proposal failed and no

flanks, Bragg relied upon his cavalry; Nathan Bedford Forrest's command covered the army's right, extending northeast to almost Knoxville. Joseph Wheeler was to guard the left, but he permitted the bulk of his command to rest and refit far south of the Tennessee River.⁶⁷³

Rosecrans never considered a direct attack on the city like those made by Burnside at Fredericksburg or Grant's attacks on Vicksburg, as he knew the loss of life would be insufferable. To prevent this catastrophe, Rosecrans considered two plans. One was to



appear at the front of Chattanooga and reduce it by a lengthy siege. This plan had problems. Bragg was close to his line of supply, while Rosecrans had to rely on supplies coming by long wagon-haul from his nearest depot over rocky mountain ranges. Further, Chattanooga was in the deep South where Bragg could be reinforced quickly from remote points and thus break the siege.

The second plan and one of the most brilliant military schemes of the war was fraught with danger and difficulty. To understand the problems associated with this plan, it is necessary that the topography of the country should be considered. The first barrier between Rosecrans and Bragg was the Cumberland Mountains, which trend in a southwesterly direction, touching

statue was placed on the monument.

the Tennessee River a few miles east of Bridgeport. They then stretched westward to Athens. He could move directly south across these Mountains to reach the Tennessee River as Bragg had done in his retreat, but beyond the river, two other mountain ranges interposed--the 2,000 foot Sand Mountain and the 2,200 foot Lookout Mountain. The northern extremities of these mountains confront each other from opposite sides of Lookout valley in the immediate vicinity of Chattanooga. These mountain ranges trend to the southwest, and cross all the lines of movement south of Chattanooga. The top of these mountain ranges were covered with trees, very rough terrain, with but few roads that were almost impassable for wagons and artillery and nearly void of water.⁶⁷⁴ Beyond these ranges were a number of lesser ranges, and then the Atlanta Railroad running through Dalton. To the east of Lookout Mountain was Chattanooga Valley with the town located at its head. Beyond this to the east was Missionary Ridge, and parallel to it and just beyond was Chickamauga Valley, with its creek running north through the valley emptying into the Tennessee River just beyond Chattanooga. LaFayette Road ran from Chattanooga to Rome, and crossed Missionary Ridge into the Chickamauga Valley at Rossville and proceeded due south, crossing Chickamauga Creek at the Lee & Gordon's Mills.⁶⁷⁵


Rosecrans' plan was to cross the Cumberland Mountains, cross the Tennessee River below Chattanooga over the Sand Mountain into Lookout Valley, and from there to cross Lookout Mountain and the lesser ridges and strike the railroad at Dalton. This would cut Bragg's supply line and if the plan worked, Bragg would be obligated to vacate Chattanooga or be completely isolated. It was the same plan that had worked to remove Bragg from Tullahoma, and a plan that worked once might work again. To carry out his plan, supplies of food for forty-five days and enough ammunition to fight two large battles had to be accumulated before the

army could move.

Like Tullahoma, to make this plan work there had to be a little deception. Bragg must think that the Union army would attack across the Tennessee River from the North above Chattanooga. The attack from the North would appear to Bragg as a reasonable plan and good judgment on the part of Rosecrans, for it was rumored that Burnside would arrive in East Tennessee with what was presumed to be a supporting army.

While Rosecrans waited for supplies to be accumulated, the corn to ripen in the field, and some protection for his flanks, Henry W. Halleck and the War Department kept up the pressure to get moving. Finally

Halleck ordered him to move, "Your forces must move forward without further delay."⁶⁷⁶ When Rosecrans questioned the orders, a wire reply was received on August 5th: "the orders for the advance of your army, and that its progress be reported daily, are peremptory."⁶⁷⁷



Even without the needed protection of his flanks and rear, Rosecrans had no choice but to move. On August 16, 1863 his three corps began to move over the Cumberland Mountains each taking a different path. Thomas Crittenden's corps in three columns moved through the

Sequatchie Valley, just east of the Cumberland Mountains. General George H. Thomas' corps moved to Reynolds except James Negley's and Absalom Baird's divisions which went by way of Tantallon. Alexander McCook's corps moved by way of Salem and Larkin's Ford to Bellefont. All were ready to cross the river as soon as the Confederate troops were pulled back to Chattanooga.



To remove the Confederate troops guarding the river crossing, Rosecrans sent William Hazen's brigade with the *Ninth* to put on a diversion in front of Chattanooga. The brigade crossed the Cumberland Mountains and through the Sequatchie valley, one of the prettiest and most fertile in the State. They moved on over Waldon's Ridge into the Tennessee Valley which lies just north of the Tennessee River. The valley varies in width from half a mile to three miles; the high vertical face of Waldon's Ridge forms the northern edge.

To carry out Rosecrans' plan, Hazen took command of two brigades of infantry, his own and Wagner's along with John T. Wilder's mounted infantry, Robert Minty's cavalry and two batteries of artillery. On August 20th the *Ninth* went on a reconnaissance mission to Harrison's Landing, where they found the Confederates throwing up works. The next day Hazen's troops moved and took Poe's cross-road, twelve miles above Chattanooga, while Wilder's infantry went to Harrison's Landing forcing the southern troops to leave the Tennessee Valley. Wilder then moved to within eye sight of Chattanooga, while Hazen setup his headquarters at Poe's Tavern at the cross-roads.

On August 21st Wilder placed Captain Eli Lilly's 18th Indiana Battery on Stringer's Ridge

opposite Chattanooga and opened fire shelling Chattanooga from across the river. Lilly's bombardment which lasted for several days silenced the Confederate artillery, wrecked the Confederate pontoon train, sank two steam boats and created great apprehension among the citizens. This bombardment caused the city to be evacuated to points beyond the range of the guns. At midnight Bragg ordered noncombatants to leave town. Few needed to be told twice. For the next several days, train after train chugged south loaded with civilians hurried on their way by Lilly's continuous bombardment. By the 25th only a handful of defiant citizens and the army remained.⁶⁷⁸

While Wilder was busy with Chattanooga, Hazen's troops picketed the river and watched every possible point of crossing for fifty miles to make sure that Bragg was not sending troops after him.⁶⁷⁹ Once situated, the troops began to carry out the plan of deception. Hundreds of bonfires were lit as if the whole Union army lay opposite the town. Bands played in one area then quickly moved and played in another and another making it appear that hundreds of regiments were across the river. Men sawed the ends off planks and threw the scraps of wood into the Tennessee River while others pounded on barrels day and night, the noise carried across the river as if construction was going on building boats and bridges.

Bragg bought this subterfuge and ordered Patton Anderson's brigade, opposite Bridgeport, guarding the river downstream back to Chattanooga. Rosecrans could now cross the river without fear of attack. On August 29th the troops started to cross on pontoon bridges, hastily constructed trestle works, confiscated boats and rafts.⁶⁸⁰



Rosecrans' campaign plan after crossing the Tennessee River was elementary in its concept, though attended with numerous difficulties in execution. Crittenden was to threaten Chattanooga by a direct eastward advance. Thomas was to cross Raccoon Mountain and seize the gaps that lead through Lookout Mountain into McLemore's Cove, twenty miles south of Chattanooga. McCook was to move twenty miles farther south and across the mountains and threaten an advance on Rome.⁶⁸¹

By the time the last divisions of the army had crossed the Tennessee River, Thomas' and McCook's corps were already far advanced. In Thomas' corps, Negley's division had crossed Sand Mountain into Lookout Valley, and was encamped at Brown's Spring. In McCook's Corps, Davis' division, had crossed Lookout Mountain and was ready to move further south.⁶⁸²

To Bragg's utter surprise and disbelief he learned from a resident of Stevenson who had made his way to his headquarters that the main Union force had crossed the river and was now in his rear. The next day this information was confirmed by the 3rd Confederate cavalry which reported that the enemy was in "very heavy force" on Sand Mountain.⁶⁸³ With the Federal army now ready to cut off his supply line, it was clear to Bragg that Chattanooga was no longer tenable. On September 7th and 8th Bragg evacuated the city and fell back southward through Rossville Gap to a position from which he could block the continued advance of Rosecrans' army. In the early hours of September 9th, the mounted Infantry of Wilder's brigade rode into Chattanooga without firing a shot.⁶⁸⁴

Bragg stopped his southern movement twenty-four miles from Chattanooga with his left

flank at LaFayette and his right at Lee & Gordon's Mills on the Chickamauga Creek facing the eastern slope of Pigeon Mountain. He determined to meet the Federal army as its columns debouched from the gaps of the mountains. In this position he was nearer to any one of Rosecrans' three corps than they were to each other.



While all this was transpiring, Bragg was getting reinforcements for all points in the South. The units sent to Joseph E. Johnston at Jackson during the Vicksburg campaign had returned. Added to these were Buckner's troops from Knoxville, and still others, some 8,500 men in two divisions which arrived from Mississippi. When Bragg had left Tullahoma he had about 35,000 men; he now had 55,000 including calvary. It was about the same size as Rosecrans' force.

Still, more help was coming from the East. General James Longstreet's Corps less Picket's division was on the way from Virginia. Robert E. Lee's right-hand-man, "the Old War Horse" as Lee called him, was coming by rail

Unfortunately, Rosecrans knew nothing of this movement even though everyone in Richmond and Baltimore knew there was major troop movement about to take place. General Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, reported to the War Department the sudden disappearance of Longstreet's corps from his front. Still Washington failed to alert Rosecrans. When Longstreet would arrive, Bragg's army would be a formidable force of 71,500 officers and men, outnumbering Rosecrans' army of 57,000 men. Time was on Bragg's side.⁶⁸⁵



As Wilder's command entered Chattanooga, the *Ninth*, still in camp near Poe's Tavern, packed up and begin moving south to Friar's Island on the Tennessee River, six miles east of Chattanooga. Just after daylight on the 10th it forded the river, the water being only waist deep, and moved inland toward Lee & Gordon's Mills having camped at Ringgold on September 12th.⁶⁸⁶ In making the movement to the Mills, the *Ninth* drove "squads of the enemy" before them, indicating that the main body of the Confederate army was not very far away.⁶⁸⁷ Rosecrans warned Crittenden that a heavy force was nearby, and urged him to move the rest of his force as quickly as possible to the Rossville and LaFayette Road near the Mills. This Crittenden began to do on the following morning with the idea of concentrating his whole command at the Mills.⁶⁸⁸

While Crittenden was moving quickly south, Bragg decided to move his columns against Crittenden's divided corps. He ordered Polk's and Walker's corps to move immediately in Crittenden's direction. On the evening of September 12th, Bragg wrote again to Polk, notifying him of Crittenden's position and his vulnerability: "this presents you a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight tomorrow. This division crushed, and the other are yours. We can then turn on the force in the cove - - - I shall be delighted to hear of your success."⁶⁸⁹ Two other notes came that night ordering Polk to attack promptly at dawn on the 13th.⁶⁹⁰ One note came back from Polk (11 P.M. on the 12th) that he had taken a strong position for defense, and requested heavy re-enforcement. He was again ordered not to delay his attack.

The next morning Bragg went to the front and found that his orders had not been obeyed by Polk. He also found that Crittenden had arrived at Lee & Gordon's Mills after dark the night before and had united his three divisions on the west side of the Chickamauga Creek. There would be no attack on Crittenden.

The threats against Crittenden convinced Rosecrans that Bragg was not in retreat towards Rome or Atlanta, but was concentrated and ready to destroy his army. He now knew he was vulnerable anywhere along his line from Alpine where McCook was camped to Lee & Gordon's Mills where Crittenden had just arrived. There were 57 miles between his columns, and he could only hope that he could get them together before Bragg attacked. He later made note of the situation he found himself in on the 13th: "it was therefore a matter of life and death to effect a concentration of the army."⁶⁹¹

Crittenden was ordered on the 13th to leave Wood's division at Lee & Gordon's Mills and to move the remainder of his command to Missionary Ridge to keep the roads open back to Chattanooga "as long as he had a man under him."⁶⁹² This order required Palmer's division with the *Ninth* to march on the 14th west to the base of Missionary Ridge.⁶⁹³ When the *Ninth* arrived, they found no Confederates on the move, so on the 15th they returned to take position near Crawfish Springs just south of Lee & Gordon's Mills. Crittenden posted Van Cleve's division on the left and Palmer's division with the *Ninth* on the right.⁶⁹⁴

Bragg idly stood by at LaFayette while Rosecrans' army came together. During this time he had been contemplating an advance around Rosecrans' left in order to cut off Rosecrans' only available approach to Chattanooga. He had dispatched Wheeler's cavalry to his left to press the Union lines in order to divert attention from his planned movement. In this regard on the

afternoon of the 17th, the 4th Georgia Cavalry of Wheeler's command attacked the *Ninth* four miles from Crawfish Spring. The Southern horsemen were driven back after a brisk fire-fight losing in the process two killed, seven wounded and one captured with no loss to the Indiana regiment.⁶⁹⁵

As Wheeler's men pressed the Union right, Bragg sent Forrest's Cavalry to the Union left for the same purpose. Even with his right and left covered by cavalry, Bragg made no advance.⁶⁹⁶ By the night of the 17th McCook's command was in McLemore's Cove, and the three corps of the Union army were within supporting distance of each other for the first time since the crossing of the Tennessee River.


Why Bragg didn't attack during the four days he allowed Rosecrans to unite his army has never been answered. No General during the Civil War had such opportunities to destroy his enemy and so completely failed to take advantage of them. If his generals would not follow his orders, he should have replaced them from the ranks of divisional and brigade commanders. There can be no excuse for such blunders except poor generalship.

Chapter 9

THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA

The Cherokee Indians lived in a wooded area in North Georgia and camped on the banks of a slow moving creek. There they contracted small pox from a white pioneer which devastated the tribe. The Indians named the creek

Chickamauga which means "River of Death", a most appropriate name for what was to come. In 1863, Chickamauga Creek was a small meandering stream that took its rise from the junction of Missionary Ridge with Pigeon Mountain at the southern extremity of McLemore's Cove, and ran northeastwardly touching the LaFayette and Chattanooga Road at Lee & Gordon's Mill. The Creek moved northward passing near Ringgold and emptied into the Tennessee River four miles above Chattanooga. The creek was ten feet deep in places, and its banks were steep and rocky. In order for troops to cross the creek, bridges



and fords were necessary, and there were few in the area. Four and a half miles north of Lee & Gordon's Mill was Reed's Bridge. Between that point and Lee & Gordon's Mill there were several available crossings: Alexander's Bridge, Fowler's, and Lambert's Fords and several other

fords. The roads leading from Alexander's Bridge and the several fords were narrow. The land between Chickamauga Creek and Missionary Ridge was mostly an expanse of dark forest made up of oak, hickory and pine with thick and dense undergrowth. There were a few glens and several clearings around small farms near the site of rough log cabins, most notable the Snodgrass, Kelly, Poe, Dyer, Brotherton, Brock and Widow Glenn farms.⁹⁶

On September 17th, Braxton Bragg's army was stretched out on the east side of Chickamauga Creek. Nathan Bedford Forrest's division, along with John Pegram's cavalry, covered the far north or right of Bragg's army. Bragg had stationed 55,000 men along the creek and James Longstreet's Corps was on its way from Virginia.

William S. Rosecrans was afraid of being cut off from Chattanooga, and on September 17th he moved Thomas Crittenden's corps to the west side of Chickamauga Creek near Lee & Gordon's Mill where the road to Chattanooga via Rossville crossed the creek. He gave Crittenden orders to resist any advance in that direction, and in case of extremity, to fall back where he could guard the road to Chattanooga. Crittenden's posted his divisions as follows: Thomas J. Wood's division was posted at the Mills; Horatio P. Van Cleve's division was next to him in the center, and John Palmer's division with the *Ninth* to the North.⁶⁹⁷ George H. Thomas, also on the 17th, moved his corps from McLemore's Cove to along-side Crittenden next to Chickamauga Creek. He was joined that night by Alexander McCook's corps on his right.


That same night, Bragg issued orders that his army should cross the Chickamauga Creek and attack the Union army the next morning. Bragg's plan was for Bushrod Johnson to cross at Reed's Bridge and rapidly turn the left of the Union line, and sweep south along the

⁹⁶ The log cabin of Eliza Glenn and her two very young children, her husband having died in a Confederate hospital

Chickamauga toward Lee & Gordon's Mill. Walker's Corps on Johnson's left would cross at Alexander's Bridge and unite in the attack. Buckner would cross at Ledford's Ford and join the movement as it passed that point. Polk was to join in when he could cross the creek, while Hill was to cover the Confederate flank. Joseph Wheeler's horsemen would plug the gaps in Pigeon

Mountain preventing a breakout. Bragg's hope was to cut off Rosecrans from the north of it. If Rosecrans was deprived of his supply lines, he would be forced back through the mountain passes. Harassed by Forrest, while Bragg

Bragg's plan called for the Union army not get his units into position in time. Longstreet's command reached Chickamauga gave command to General Johnson's Division.



In the afternoon of the 18th, Bragg's plan of attack began with Johnson pushing aside the cavalry units that were at Reed's Bridge. He then swept southward with his 3,600 man division in front of the points where Walker's and Buckner's Corps had been ordered to cross, but by then it was too late in the day to push the Union army any further south.

At the time Johnson started to cross the creek, several miles south, Walker's Corps with

five months before hand, would forever be known as the Widow Glenn's house.

⁹⁷ John Bell Hood was a 1831 graduate of West Point and had been stationed on the frontier where he was wounded in Indian fighting. When he entered Confederate service he was assigned to command Magruder's cavalry force. In March 1862 he was given command of a Texas Brigade and fought at Gaines' Mill, 2d Bull Run and Antietam. He was promoted Major-General on October 10, 1862 and given a Division to command in Longstreet's corps. He fought at

two divisions crossed forcing the Union forces to retire.⁶⁹⁹ Bragg now had three divisions with over 15,000 men on the west side of Chickamauga Creek ready to push the Union army south and cut their access to Chattanooga.

The Confederate crossings, however, had taken too long. In the late afternoon Rosecrans figured out what Bragg was doing and ordered Thomas to move his corps north and take positions on the road near the Kelly's Farm. With this move, Thomas would be in an area to protect the way back to Chattanooga. Rosecrans instructed Thomas that he was to hold the road to Rossville, and if hard pressed, Rosecrans would reinforce him with the entire army.⁷⁰⁰ Thomas was to form his command to the north of Crittenden, and in front of the Kelly field. During the entire night of the September 18th, Thomas' corps moved north crossing in back of the *Ninth*.

On the morning of the 19th the left of the Union army rested at the forks of the road near the Kelly farm facing Reed's and Alexander's Bridges.⁷⁰¹ This move placed the Union army's left flank far north of where Bragg expected to find it when the battle opened that day.⁷⁰²



At 7:30 a.m. Thomas sent Brigadier-General John Brannan's division off to capture a detached Confederate force. As the Union troops moved to find the isolated brigade, they ran right into several Confederate divisions. A note was sent back to Thomas asking which, of the many brigades in his front, was the one it was supposed to capture.⁷⁰³

When the opposing forces made contact, Bragg learned for the first time that his units

Fredericksburg and while leading an attack against little round-top at Gettysburg was seriously wounded.⁶¹

across the Chickamauga Creek were not north of the Union army as he planned. In fact, his own flank was now in danger of being turned. With this information, he did the only thing he could do under the circumstances: he ordered troops to move north.⁷⁰⁴

Having received the note, Thomas rode forward and finding that his troops were in a hot fire-fight and nearly out of ammunition, he sent another division forward in support. These two divisions drove the rebels back a short distance.⁷⁰⁵ With the Southerners being checked all along the line, Bragg sent Benjamin Cheatham's five brigade division, the largest division in his army, forward at about 11:00 a.m. Jackson was the first to engage and pushed the Union forces back to within 400 yards west of the intersection of the Alexander's Bridge and Brotherton roads, but their advance was halted by the arrival of Brigadier-General Richard Johnson's division of McCook's corps.




Hearing the gun fire a mile and one half north of his position, Crittenden sent Palmer's division to Thomas' support. He instructed Palmer to vigorously attack the Confederate flank. The division with the *Ninth* in the lead marched at the double quick past the Widow Glenn's house at 11:45 a.m.⁷⁰⁶ As it passed the house, Rosecrans, who had made the house his headquarters, pulled General Hazen aside and gave him last minute directions for going into action. He recommended that he should advance "en echelon."⁷⁰⁷ This same instruction was later given to Palmer as he passed the Widow Glenn's.⁹⁸

⁹⁸ Palmer would note in his official report: "At this moment I received a note from the general commanding the army, which led to a slight, but what turned out to be a most advantageous, change of formation. He suggested an advance en echelon by brigades, refusing the right, keeping well closed up on Thomas. This suggestion was adopted. The brigades,

Palmer followed Rosecrans' suggestion as to the manner of advancement and arrived in position on the east side of the Lafayette Road just north of the Brotherton Farm. He ordered Hazen to move his brigade forward five hundred yards into the woods near the Brock Farm. He sent Cruft's brigade four hundred yards forward and the brigade of Colonel William Grose three hundred forward. Palmer's division was thus formed in an arc facing southeast next to and a little in front of Johnson's division. By the time the line was formed it was 12:35 p.m.⁷⁰⁸ The *Ninth* moving southeastward a half-mile through the woods and heavy undergrowth soon encountered the Confederate army. Hazen wheeled to the right toward an open field owned by John Brock. Just before entering the field he halted his regiments in the woods that fringed its northwest corner to readjust his alignment, placing the *Ninth*, the 124th Ohio,⁹⁹ and the 41st Ohio in line. On the opposite side of the cornfield was General Preston Smith's brigade of Cheatham's division. The Confederate brigade was made up of four Tennessee regiments and a Battalion of 252 sharpshooters, along with a Tennessee Battery.

Hazen's men started to cross the



at about 100 pace intervals, pushed forward. . .⁶²

⁹⁹ This was a new regiment to the Brigade having been formed only nine and a half months earlier, and had not yet seen combat.

cornfield just as Smith's Tennesseans with a wild yell charged into the field. From that point on it was a soldier's fight as both Hazen and Smith lost control of their brigades. The 13th and 154th Tennessee along with the sharpshooters challenged the *Ninth* for possession of the northern part of the field.⁷⁰⁹ The contest was terrific. The *Ninth* would advance pushing their adversary back only to be counter-attacked and pushed back. Back and forth the *Ninth* and the Tennesseans fought. Lieutenant William H. Criswell of Company "I" was killed along with several enlisted men and a great many more were wounded. Several of the wounded, bleeding from arms or legs, continued firing as the battle waged on. Private Jacob Miller of Company "K" who had enlisted from his hometown of Logansport, would later write of the terrible wound received in his face while crossing Brock's cornfield:

"At last I became conscious and raised up in a sitting position. Then I began to feel for my wound, I found my left eye out of its place and tried to place it back but I had to move the crushed bone back as near together as I could at first. Then I got the eye in its proper place. I then bandaged the eye the best I could with my bandanna. I could hear the firing not far away, some of the bullets even striking near where I was sitting."⁷¹⁰

Taking the brunt of Hazen's attack in the Brock Field, Smith called for relief and was replaced by Strahl's brigade. This rebel brigade rushed into the field and was met with a loud clatter of musketry that halted its progress. In one regiment alone Strahl lost 75 men out of the 242 who had hurried into the field.⁷¹¹ No better able to stand Hazen's fire than Smith, Strahl's men withdrew.⁷¹² The *Ninth's* ammunition nearly exhausted, each man in the regiment having fired more than 100 rounds,⁷¹³ and the six-mule wagon-load of ammunition that Hazen had brought with him virtually gone, the *Ninth* alone with the brigade was relieved by Turchin's brigade. It was about 3:30 p.m. when the *Ninth* was replaced on the line by the 18th Kentucky.

Nearly three hours after it had started, the fighting in the Brock field came to a stop. In this horrific fight, the *Ninth* lost more men killed and wounded in that fight than in any other engagement.^{100 714}

Hazen marched his command out onto the Brotherton road and following Palmer's orders, moved back to the Poe house to replenish their ammunition, fill their canteens, clean the guns and get a little rest. At this point Hazen noticed that some of the batteries near the Poe house had been left without infantry support, and he assigned his men to provide them cover.⁷¹⁵



As the day progressed the battle extended far up the Chickamauga Creek. All units along the entire Confederate line north of the Lee & Gordon's Mill had, at one time or another, was engaged with the exception of part of Buckner's Corps that held the extreme south of Bragg's army.⁷¹⁶ Bragg directed that Stewart's division be sent north to envelope the Union left flank. As Stewart moved north, he discovered a gap in the Union line near the Brock Farm between Palmer's division and Van Cleve's position.⁷¹⁷ He decided to take advantage of this gap and at 2:30 p.m. attacked part of Van Cleve's division which had seen no combat so far in the campaign and was unprepared for the shock.⁷¹⁸

Van Cleve was pushed back across the LaFayette road forming a bulge in the Union line near the Tanyard farms. With Van Cleve gone, Palmer's right became exposed, and pushed

¹⁰⁰ When the Chickamauga Battlefield, a unit of Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park was created, the State of Indiana, in honor of her regiments, placed limestone markers where each regiment had fought. Each marker weighed about 6,000 pounds and stood four feet, eight inches high and three feet square. Each marker bore a bronze tablet stating what the regiment had done at that place on the battlefield. The Ninth had five such markers. The first was placed at the north end of Brock Field 100' south of Brotherton Road and reads: "INDIANA--Ninth Regiment Infantry

back.⁷¹⁹ Hazen at the Poe farmstead replenishing his brigade's ammunition heard the fight to his right, moved his command including the *Ninth* to the Brotherton farm, arriving there a few minutes before 4:00 p.m. and just in time to see Palmer's right falling back. The Confederates moved against Hazen's new position. Hazen, and the remnants of Van Cleve's command were now all that was left to stop the Confederate advance against the Union center.

The *Ninth* lined up along a fence just east of the Brotherton cabin, just as the 58th Alabama sprung from the woods less than 100 yards away. A well-placed volley checked their advance, while the regiment's sharpshooters brought down the Alabamians mounted officers although none were killed.⁷²⁰ Seeing the attack, General Joseph J. Reynolds came to the *Ninth* and asked "What regiment is this?" The "*Bloody Ninth*" was the response. "That is all right", he said loud enough for the men to hear. The General made a little speech of encouragement and then moved down the line.⁷²¹ Meanwhile, the 58th Alabama hurried back for cover in the woods and there keep up a constant fire pinning down the *Ninth* against the rail fence.

Seeing the Union situation and knowing that both Van Cleve's and Reynolds' divisions had been pushed back, and it appearing that the Confederates would sweep the field,⁷²² Hazen determined to sacrifice his own brigade to stop the Confederate advance.⁷²³ An officer of the *Ninth* later noted that Hazen was "like a true soldier, letting his brigade go to the dogs if need be, while he seized the means within his reach to defeat the enemy, and save the battle."⁷²⁴ Hazen, believing he was the only general officer in the area, left his brigade and returned to the Poe house to gather all the cannons he could find. He formed a line of artillery in the open field hoping to stop the predestined Confederate advance.

(Suman), Second Brigade (Hazen), Second Division (Palmer), Twenty-First Corps (Crittenden) Saturday, September 19th, 1863 1 P.M. to 3:30 P.M."

With Hazen gone, the line of his brigade wavered, and when the 41st Ohio and 6th Kentucky were taken by the flank and fled the field, it left the *Ninth* alone to face the Confederate onslaught.⁷²⁵ To the dogs the *Ninth* was served, for the 58th Alabama was soon joined by the two Tennessee regiments. The fire into the right flank of the regiment from the Alabamians in the woods was murderous, yet the *Ninth* would not yield. When the two Tennessee regiments slipped past them to the left and started firing into the regiment's rear, Colonel Suman rejected any thought of withdraw. Suman had been placed in that position by Hazen and without a direct order from him, would not move. It appeared that Colonel Suman would not give Hazen another reason to testify against him at some later date. General Reynolds, seeing the lone Indiana regiment withstanding the brunt of the Confederate advance, rode up and took the decision away from Colonel Suman by directing him to fall back quickly to the fence at the edge of the Brotherton field before his regiment was captured. In the rush to the fence several of the men were captured.⁷²⁶ Two companies failed to hear Colonel Suman's order to withdraw.⁷²⁷ Seeing this small band of Hoosier, Bates ordered a charge and with the full benefit of their "rebel yell" they rushed forward. At that moment, one of men grabed Captain McConnell of Company "K" by the shoulder and shouted: "Cap, what is the use of staying here? The brigade is gone." With that the officer looked around to where the brigade had stood and saw only Confederate troops. "The next moment" he later wrote "my own men hurried past me like a flock of frightened partridges and I followed." As they rushed to rejoin the regiment, Bates' men opened fire upon them toppling several as they fled.⁷²⁸ "I could see the poor fellows drop before me. I could see the blood start from a wound in the thigh, body or arm."⁷²⁹

Within a few minutes the regiments had reformed near the fence and after a short hand-

to-hand struggle with an Alabama regiment, the *Ninth* was forced to fall back further into the woods.¹⁰¹ General Reynolds stayed with the *Ninth* as they withdrew and reformed a line on the right of the Poe house where Hazen had gathered twenty cannons, all loaded with canister and aimed to sweep the field. At 5:00 Bate's brigade rushed into the Poe field and in an instant all twenty guns let loose covering the meadow with smoke and death.⁷³⁰

Ambrose Bierce of the *Ninth* reformed his company in support of Hazen's guns, and with horror watched those guns slaughter his adversary. He later wrote: "When all was over and the dust cloud had lifted, the spectacle was too dreadful to describe. The Confederates were still there--all of them, it seemed--some almost under the muzzles of the guns. But not a man of all those brave fellows was on his feet."⁷³¹ With that Reynolds ordered every infantry unit in the area to pour in their fire.

The Confederates were unable to use their artillery, while the Union batteries in their front and on their right flank poured into their ranks murderous volleys of grape and canister. All along the line the Southerners met a fearful loss from the heavy infantry and artillery fire, but still they held their position.⁷³² This attack had created a major bulge in the Union line but without reinforcement, the Confederates could not remain in this advanced position.

It was about this time Negley from the right arrived from Widow Glenn's Farm and Brannan from the left arrived from the Kelly house to join in the attack. When they arrived their

¹⁰¹ The State of Indiana in tribute to the *Ninth* placed a large limestone monument where the regiment had fought. The monument reads: "September 19th this regiment went into action near the Brock Field, about 2 p.m. and lost heavily: near 3:30 p.m. retired and refilled boxes in the vicinity of the Poe House: moved to this point, there confronted an advancing column of the enemy in overwhelming numbers and compelled it to pause: engaged it for 30 minutes and lost heavily. -- September 20th at daylight in line at southeast corner of Kelly Field and held its line until 3:30 p.m. At Snodgrass Field assisted in repulsing Longstreet's last assault. Near dusk was sent to the right of Brannan's Division, and after the capture of the three regiments on the right and some of its own men, fired upon the capturing force and held its position until 8 p.m., when it withdrew.

joint effort pushed back the Confederates to the east side of the LaFayette Road.⁷³³ Colonel Bushrod Jones of the 58th Alabama later wrote in his official report:


The enemy gave way and fled in confusion. We pursued them through the woods about a mile. I halted the regiment a short distance before reaching the field in front, after repeated unsuccessful efforts, on account of the impetuosity of the men. I ordered the halt, thinking further pursuit fruitless and hazardous, as we had already gone far in advance of the general line of battle, and were exposed to an enfilade fire of grape from the right. The officers of the left wing not hearing the command "halt", on account of the noise and excitement, continued the pursuit several hundred yards farther, capturing 20 or 30 prisoners and passing a battery of three guns that had been abandoned by the enemy. . . Having halted the regiment and formed line, I waited about a half hour for the return of those who had gone ahead of the line and for support on the right and left. But believing the enemy were again advancing, I retired slowly and in good order about a quarter of a mile. . . The engagement of my command with the enemy began at 3 p.m. and lasted until nearly 5.⁷³⁴

The Confederate repulse ended the day's bloody work for the *Ninth* with a loss to the regiment of First Lieutenant Lewis S. Nickerson and Second Lieutenant Seth B. Parks, killed; Captains Merritt and Craner, First Lieutenants Criswell and Creviston, Second Lieutenants Shipherd and Franklin wounded; 16 enlisted men were also killed and 53 wounded, 8 missing of whom 5 were supposedly killed.⁷³⁵ Hazen's brigade suffered appalling losses with 439 officers and men killed and wounded. The 6th Kentucky was so devastated that its fragments were attached to the other regiments of the brigade.



After the Confederate withdrew back to the east side of the LaFayette Road, Thomas had time to reorganize his lines, believing that an attack would be renewed on his left. He selected a new position for Baird's and Johnson's divisions, then Palmer with the *Ninth* and Reynolds placed next in order. Brannan's division was placed in the rear and right of Reynolds as reserve.

A late night attack lead by Cleburne ended the battle for September 19th. To recap, when the battle began in the morning neither of the two armies were ready for combat, though Bragg was more ready than Rosecrans. If Bragg had been aware of Thomas' movement made the night before, the result of the morning's and, probably of the whole day's fighting, would have been far different. Bragg thought that the Union army was in the area of Lee & Gordon's Mills, and thus had



moved his own forces too far south, leaving only Forrest on his extreme right. During the day he moved units back to the right to meet the emergencies arising out of the engagement with Thomas. As Bragg retraced his steps, Rosecrans was given time to deliver more divisions to Thomas' support. The battle was fought with charges and counter-charges, in favor of first one side and then the other. Troops that were driven often rallied and drove back their attackers. In general, however, every attack made during the day by the Confederates had been repulsed. The forces engaged in the day's battle had been about equal on both sides. Bragg had a full 15,000 men who had not been under fire, including John C. Breckinridge's and Thomas C. Hindman's divisions which were still across Chickamauga Creek, Kershaw's and Humphreys's brigades, plus Longstreet's Corps, which had not totally arrived in time for the battle on the 19th. Not counting the reserve corps under General Granger at Rossville and two other brigades, Rosecrans' whole army was engaged in the fight.⁷³⁶ At day's end, the roads back to Chattanooga

were still in Federal hands. The LaFayette Road divided the contending forces from Lee & Gordon's Mills to the Kelly Farm. At the Kelly Farm Thomas crossed the road to the east and concentrated his forces.

During the day the injury inflicted upon both armies was extensive. The Confederates suffered the most as they had little opportunity to use artillery because of the thickly wooded country over which they moved.⁷³⁷ A Saint Louis newspaperman termed it a "soldiers' battle" because most of the conflict was fought in the woods and undergrowth where the officers had little control of their men. In this type of warfare, officers were required to expose themselves in order just to be seen by their troops.⁷³⁸ As a result, the Confederates had an exceedingly high rate of officers killed and wounded during the first day's action.⁷³⁹

During the day Rosecrans had spent most of his time at his headquarters at the Widow Glenn's Farm. There he would receive communications by messenger from General Thomas. He would pace back and forth in nervous excitement, while his aides attempted to locate the line of battle by the sound of the firing.⁷⁴⁰ Rosecrans should have been at the front where he could most effectually fight a battle by his personal direction of the conflict, not safely away from the fight at his headquarters.



During the night of September 19-20, 1863 a weather front passed over the battlefield, causing the temperature to plummet, and thick dense fog developed covering the Chickamauga valley. Both armies were ordered not to light camp fires as even a small light would draw gun fire from their counterpart. By day's end, most of the overcoats and blankets had been discarded.

The cold, dampness and lack of fire brought suffering to both sides.⁷⁴¹ Additionally, the Union army was without an adequate supply of water, and to a soldier that had been fighting all day, the lack of water brought on unbelievable distress. As bad as it was it would not be this suffering that the soldiers would long remember after the battle; it was the wail of the wounded that went on through the night. "The groans from thousands of wounded in our front crying in anguish and pain, some for death to relieve them, others for water", was heartrending a Hoosier would write later in his journal.⁷⁴² Many soldiers tried to do more than listen. Often, however, their attempts to give aid would result in a volley from the enemy's jittery pickets.⁷⁴³

The night of September 19th for most members of the *Ninth* would be the gloomiest ever spent in service, not only because of the terrible loss suffered within the regiment during the day, but because for the first time in the war the *Ninth's* wounded were within the Confederate lines and beyond the help of their comrades. The *Ninth* bivouacked on the battle ground, mindful that in the morning it would renew the struggle and many more would be wounded or meet a soldier's death. Defeat was not ever considered possible, for all knew that it would be victory or death.⁷⁴⁴ As the night wore on the brigade's quartermaster was able to bring up the supply wagons of ammunition, food, and such comforts as he could find.⁷⁴⁵ The ammunition would prove more valuable than the other comforts.



After the night attack, Thomas reformed his line to bring the units closer together, and in the same order that they were arranged when the days action concluded. The line extended in a semicircular around Kelly's Farm. The order from left to right was Baird's, Richard Johnson's,

and Palmer's divisions east of the LaFayette Road, while Reynolds' and Brannan's divisions were west of it. Baird's division faced north, the others faced east. Brannan's division was recessed in the undergrowth, and next to him was Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions under Crittenden's command, then Negley's, Davis's and Sheridan's division under McCook. This new line was much shorter than the one maintained on September 19th.

Before sunrise, the *Ninth* moved up on a ridge in the edge of the woods, facing to the east. The ground in their front was covered with timber, woods and brush as far as one could see. It would be here that the regiment would wait for the onslaught.⁷⁴⁶ The general placement of troops was two brigades from each division in double ranks on the front line, with one brigade from each division in reserve.⁷⁴⁷ In the rear of Johnson, Palmer and the *Ninth* was an open field, while farther back, on the other side of the road, were again dense woods. Granger's division was not on the field as it was kept in reserve guarding the road back to Chattanooga.

Lieutenant-General James Longstreet arrived by rail late in the afternoon at Catoosa, a few miles south of the battlefield.⁷⁴⁸ Bragg was asleep in an ambulance when Longstreet arrived. After being awakened the generals talked for about an hour, and Bragg laid out his plans for the next day's battle. Bragg's battle plan as outlined to Longstreet was for Polk to attack from his right at daylight, and to bring his divisions into action consecutively to his left. Longstreet would await developments and bring his divisions into action in a similar manner.⁷⁴⁹ One detail Bragg had overlooked was to advise Hill that his corps had been placed under Polk's command, or to inform him that his corps would be leading the attack at daybreak. In fact, Hill claims that the first time he ever saw the battle plan was nineteen years after it was issued.⁷⁵⁰ After the hour meeting, Bragg sent Longstreet on his way and went back to sleep, awaiting tomorrow's dawn


attack.

On the other side of the LaFayette Road, Rosecrans called a council of war at about 11:00 p.m. for all corps commanders at the Widow Glenn's house. Rosecrans wanted to know the state and condition of their commands, and to plan the next day's battle. Rosecrans concluded that the Union army had been too badly mauled to go on the offensive, and retreat was out of the question. Tomorrow's struggle would be a defensive one for his army, and so he wanted the line squeezed closer together. When Thomas returned to his troops, they had already begun to fell trees to provide cover against the attack that all knew would come with the sun. The sound of falling trees and the fear of what it meant would keep the southern troops awake throughout the night. As Thomas inspected his line, he received word from Baird on the extreme left (North) that his division did not cover all the area anticipated and that more troops were needed to fill the gap. Thomas immediately requested that Negley's division be ordered up, and received word back from Rosecrans that Negley would move at first light.⁷⁵¹



When Bragg awoke he moved with his staff to the rear of the center of his line to await daylight with the anticipated attack by Polk. He waited and he waited, but there was no sound of activity. It was a quiet Sunday morning in the north Georgia woods. When Bragg had enough waiting, he sent Major Pollock

B. Lee to find Polk to learn the cause for the delay. Lee found Polk was not with his troops, but had spent the night three miles behind his lines on the east side of Chickamauga Creek. Lee found Polk sitting on the second story gallery of a two story farmhouse, in a relaxed state reading a newspaper, waiting for his breakfast. Lee gave Polk Bragg's renewed orders to attack at once, and



then returned and informed Bragg of what he had seen. Bragg hearing the report, cursed, startling those around him got on his horse and rode off to find Polk himself. When he got to the farmhouse Polk was gone, but he had left a message for Bragg: "Do tell General Bragg that my heart is overflowing with anxiety for the attack. Overflowing with anxiety, sir."⁷⁵²

Irritated at this, Bragg departed for the front line to get the attack started himself. He arrived before Polk got to the field just about 9:00 a.m. There he found Confederate troops

sitting down to a leisurely breakfast and not ready or even thinking about any type of aggressive action. He discovered that no one had informed General Hill that there should be a dawn attack led by his troops. Bragg ordered the attack, and Hill slowly begin moving his troops into line and doing those things necessary to carry out the day's bloody activity.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the road, Rosecrans was up before dawn, riding among his men giving them encouragement: "Fight today as well as you did yesterday," he told his troops, "and we shall whip them!"⁷⁵³ This had a somewhat mixed effect. "I did not like the way he looked," a soldier later recalled, "but of course felt cheered, and did not allow myself to think of any such thing as defeat."⁷⁵⁴ As Rosecrans moved he checked the status of his defensive line. When he arrived in the extreme right he found that Negley had not yet come into position. He rode back down the line to hurry Negley along. Arriving there he found that Negley had not moved as McCook's troops were not ready to relieve him. He ordered Negley at once to move Beatty's brigade who was in reserve north to Thomas. Impatient over the delay in not being able to send the rest of Negley's division, Rosecrans ordered Crittenden to move Wood's division at once to fill Negley's position. Rosecrans then moved off to finish his inspection and to order troops to close up into a tight defense line. To his amazement, when he returned, he found Negley still in place as Wood's troops had not reached the line. Rosecrans rode over to Wood and gave him a nasty tongue-lashing in the front of Wood's staff. "What is the meaning of this, sir? You have disobeyed my specific orders. By your damnable negligence you are endangering the safety of the entire army, and by God, I will not tolerate it. Move your division at once, as I have instructed, or the consequences will not be pleasant for yourself."⁷⁵⁵ The actual words were probably more salty than those reported. Wood, a forty-year old Kentuckian, flushed at being

upbraided in the presence of his staff, jumped to obey and Negley moved North. As it turned out, this tongue-lashing would cost Rosecrans the battle¹⁰²



Palmer had not thought of providing his soldiers with the same type of protection. Before sun rise not a tree had been cut or a rock gathered. Colonel Suman, seeing the situation, paid a visit to Hazen and recommended that the brigade build a line of breastworks. It was an idea "that no one before seemed to have thought of" Hazen later wrote.⁷⁵⁶ Hazen was at first reluctant thinking that enemy artillery shells would strike the fortification splintering the logs and turning them into lethal missiles. Colonel Suman, a carpenter and builder by trade, explained to Hazen that he would build the breastworks in such a way as to prevent the problems Hazen feared by placing the heaviest logs and rails in front to absorb the impact of incoming shells.⁷⁵⁷ Hazen finally concurred giving orders that one rank work on the fortifications while the other stand to their arms.⁷⁵⁸ Hazen then went to Cruft whose brigade was stationed to his left and urged him to likewise throw up breastworks. While the building of bulwark was going on, General R. W. Johnson stopped by and objected to the construction on the basis that the noise would attract the attention of the Confederates and bring on an engagement. Hazen, swayed by Colonel Suman's arguments for the necessity of the breastworks, convinced Johnson to start his division to work as well.⁷⁵⁹

Behind this fortification completed within hours of sun rise, the *Ninth* and the rest of the Union army lay waiting for the attack to begin. At 8:30 a.m. skirmish firing opened the day's

102 Wood would later categorically deny that such an altercation had occurred.

blood-letting. By 9:30 a.m. Confederates began the movement that Bragg had planned for dawn. Pushing forward in one long line Breckinridge's three brigades encountered the Union line at its most northern point just where it began to bend back to the west. Here the Southern veteran troops quickly shattered the Union line and began to turn it. With an open field in back of the regiment, the *Ninth* had a splendid view of the Confederate's effort to turn the Union line. They saw the long lines of Confederate troops advance and drive the Union force before them and then saw the Federal troops rally and being re-enforced, push the rebels back across the field. Time and again, the *Ninth* witnessed the charge and counter charge and could hear the cheers of each contending side ring out above the din of battle.⁷⁶⁰

Without support, Breckinridge's brigades were driven back in confusion.⁷⁶¹ These Southern troops were to be supported by Cleburne's division, but while Breckinridge's men advanced with ease, Cleburne's division encountered the Union troops lying behind their log breastworks and were repulsed. This first check of the Confederate attack saved Thomas' left, especially as other divisions including Cheatham's on the left of Cleburne were beginning their attack with equal intensity as Bragg's assault swept from his right to his left. These attackers ran into the Union log fortifications. Colonel Suman's suggestion paid dividends as the Southerners met with a terrific fire of canister and musketry in front of these barricades. Polk's men pressed on and struck Johnson, then Palmer and Reynolds successively with equal ferocity.⁷⁶² The Union troops fought back with heavy artillery bombardment that pounded the attacking troops at five hundred yards.

At about 9:30 a.m. the Confederates made their attack on the *Ninth*'s position. As they moved forward, they crested a ridge just 125 yards from the regiment's log-works. These

fortifications were so completely camouflaged with trees and brush as to be invisible to the attackers. The 2nd, and the 3rd & 5th Confederate regiments rushed to within a few yards of these unseen strongholds only to receive the first of many volleys of gun fire. What followed that first volley was a most desperate and protracted assault. The Confederate brigade commander Lucius E. Polk later reported that his troops: "became furiously engaged, the enemy pouring a most destructive fire of canister and musketry into my advancing line-so terrible, indeed, that my line could not advance in the face of it."⁷⁶³ Colonel J. A. Smith, one of Polk's regimental commanders, would report: "When the attack was renewed we met the enemy at his works, which were located on the crest of a rise that commanded the space in front of it. The strife at this point was fearful. Such showers of grape, canister, and small-arms I have never before witnessed."⁷⁶⁴ For the men of the *Ninth* it was a turkey shoot. They would crouch behind the fortifications to shoot and then lay down to reload keeping out of sight of the attacking Confederates. The regiment fired volley after volley with parade-ground precision cutting down what appeared to be hundreds of men with each volley.⁷⁶⁵ Hazen later wrote that this attack was the only occasion in the war on which he saw two opposing lines deliberately advance within close quarters and "fire in each other's faces."⁷⁶⁶ The attack was maintained for two hours, with Polk sending his men against the Union line again and again only to be met and hurled back.⁷⁶⁷ Polk finally withdrew his whole line to a safe position some 400 yards to his rear, leaving hundreds of wounded and dead in front of the *Ninth's* breastworks.^{103 768} Hazen noted that

¹⁰³ The Indiana State stone marker in honor of the *Ninth* was placed on Battleline Road and reads: "INDIANA--*Ninth* Regiment Infantry (Suman), Second Brigade (Hazen), Second Division (Palmer), Twenty-First Corps (Crittenden) SATURDAY, September 19th, 1863 5:30 P.M. to SUNDAY September 20th 3:30 P.M." A second cast iron tablet east of Kelly Field, provides in part: "The log works were so well constructed that only thirteen enlisted men were wounded behind them during the early assault of the Confederates."

Colonel Suman's breastworks had a most important bearing on the fortunes of the day. Only 13 men were wounded in the brigade while fighting behind these fortifications. The previous day the brigade lost over 400 when it fought in the open.⁷⁶⁹ The *Ninth's* loss at this point of the day's fight was First Lieutenant George K. Marshall of Company "A" and 2 enlisted men wounded.⁷⁷⁰

On the Confederate side during this first attack of the day, Cleburne reported the loss of five hundred men in a few minutes, and Breckinridge's one brigade was almost annihilated, having lost its commander, General Helm,¹⁰⁴ with two colonels killed and two colonels wounded.⁷⁷¹ No further advance would be made by Cleburne's division.




While the attacks were in progress, Thomas sent messages to Rosecrans asking for reinforcement. McCook was ordered to move from his early morning position and reinforce Thomas.⁷⁷² As the battle increased in fury and moved gradually toward the center of the Union line, Thomas sent again and again for reinforcements. Van Cleve's division was sent to his aid. Two brigades of Negley's division were sent and other brigades were in the process of moving to provide support, including the reserve brigade from Brannan's division. The rest of Brannan's division remained in line, deep in the woods, between Reynold's division to the north and Wood's division to the south.

¹⁰⁴ General Helm was Lincoln's brother-in-law.

It was about 10:00 a.m. when Lieutenant-Colonel Van Schrader, one of the messengers sent by Thomas to request support, was returning from Rosecrans' headquarters along a woodland trail linking the Widow Glenn farm with the Kelly farm. As he passed the place where Brannan's division was concealed in the deep woods, he saw no Union troops.⁷⁷³ He reported to Thomas that a long gap

existed between Reynolds and Wood. This would mean that a dangerous hole existed in the center of the Federal line. Thomas immediately sent his aide Captain Sanford Cobb Kellogg to Rosecrans.⁷⁷⁴ Kellogg found him and his staff on a small knoll at the west edge of the Dyer Field. When Rosecrans heard the report he turned to



his senior aide to send the following order:

Headquarters Department of Cumberland. September 20--10:45 a.m. Brigadier General Wood, Commanding Division: The general commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible, and support him. Respectfully, etc. Frank S. Bond, Major and Aide-de-camp.⁷⁷⁵

Wood, irritated at the tongue-lashing he had received only hours before, and intent on maintaining his dignity, chose to follow the order without question, and he ordered his division out of line to march north. Instead of the nonexistent gap reported by Van Schrader, Rosecrans' orders created an actual gap a quarter of a mile wide between the division of Brannan and Jefferson C. Davis.

Wood marched around Brannan in search of Reynolds. Colonel Charles G. Harker commanding Wood's lead brigade found Van Cleve's division gone, and looked for the place where he could be of the greatest service. This turned out to be an area that later became known as "Harker's Hill" near the Snodgrass farm.⁷⁷⁶

The main body of Longstreet's troops were just across the Lafayette Road from their Union foes, with Bushrod Johnson's division straddling the Brotherton Road. When Longstreet received Bragg's order to renew the attack he did so in echelon formation. General John Bell Hood was in charge of three divisions.

At 11:10 a.m. Longstreet gave the order to start the massed attack against the Union center. Hood pushed his three divisions forward into this void left by Wood. His lead division was Bushrod Johnson, who rushed through the breach pushing aside the rear elements of Wood's division and continued forward for more than a mile. The two other Confederate divisions cut through the center of the Union line, scattering the fragments of those that stood and fought and divided the Union army into two parts. Out-numbering the Federal troops three to one the Southerners, 23,000 strong, charged forward shouting and yelling, compelling the divisions of Jefferson C. Davis and Philip Sheridan on the left to dash headlong from the field. These two divisions were soon followed by two more on the right, Van Cleve and Negley both fleeing over the ridge to the west.⁷⁷⁷

The Confederates pressed their advantage, pushing the Union center back about a half mile west of the LaFayette Road to an open ridge near the house of George Washington Snodgrass. The gentle curving ridge ran slightly northeast and was named by the Confederates "Horseshoe Ridge." This ridge had a high-notched knoll with its slopes indented by projecting

spurs. The summit was a hundred feet above the level of the surrounding country. Near the house, Horseshoe Ride consisted of three distinct hills; the first (Snodgrass hill #1) cresting 300 feet west of the house, the second (Snodgrass hill #2) cresting 700 feet west of the house, and the third (Snodgrass hill #3) crested about 1,000 feet west of the house. All three hills were heavily wooded with lots of underbrush. On the east side of the house there was a corn field that started 150 yards southeast and stretched some 600 yards north where it met another cornfield.⁷⁷⁸ The land between the ridge and Thomas' four divisions at Kelly Field was wooded, making the ridge advantageous for a defensive line.

When the attack came, hundreds of retreating soldiers came pouring through the woods to the ridge. With this crowd came Brannan with his shattered division, having been forced back to Snodgrass hill #1 in the attack. Joseph Kershaw's brigade, part of Hood's command, followed these retreating troops to the foot of the ridge. As the Confederates readied to attack, Brannan attempted to rally these broken and fleeing troops into a fighting force. He was joined on Snodgrass hill #2 by the 21st Ohio, armed with the five-shot Colt revolving rifles. Brannan used this regiment to anchor his skittish troops. These men were soon joined by fragments of division along with parts of brigades, regiments and even lone soldiers. A new Union line was formed with determined men that would be driven no further. These troops began building breastworks of rocks and fence rails along the southern edge of the ridge. By this time Harker's brigade, part of Wood's division, had placed themselves on the eastern side of the ridge, and were joined by parts of other units. There were some 1,200 Union troops arrayed along this open eastern spur that became known as "Harker's Hill."

While this new line was being formed Rosecrans, McCook and Crittenden all left the

field for Chattanooga. McCook went over Missionary Ridge, while Rosecrans and his staff, as well as Crittenden, went by way of McFarland's Gap. Along with the Commanding-General and two corps commanders followed the residue of the Union army, all rushing toward Chattanooga.

As far as the eye could see, there were thousands of Union troops scurrying away from the battlefield, along with artillery and supplies wagons in no orderly array along the Dry Valley Road. Bushrod Johnson seeing this churning mass placed artillery on a ridge overlooking the road and for a time was content shelling these retreating men while giving his triumphant soldiers a rest.

Not knowing of the calamity to his right, and Brannan's withdrawal that exposed his flank, Thomas was preparing for another assault by Bragg. He ordered what remained of Wood's decimated division to Horseshoe Ridge along with a brigade from Johnson's division and gave them instructions to resist as long as possible. He then shifted Reynolds' division so as to face the force threatening his exposed flank at the Kelly field.⁷⁷⁹

Thomas moved to Horseshoe Ridge and stayed on the ridge posting his troops on the lines where he thought they could best resist the onslaught; he placed himself with these troops and refused to be driven from the field. He rode up to Harker and ordered: "This hill must be held and I trust you to do it."⁷⁸⁰ He rode among his troops offering words of encouragement. Word of Thomas' presence quickly spread down the Union line, giving added determination to the soldiers who were about to defend the ridge. For this he would forever be known as the "Rock of Chickamauga."⁷⁸¹

Meanwhile on the route away from the battlefield, Rosecrans and his chief of staff, James Garfield, were at McFarland Gap. Here they halted in the midst of the driving masses of

teamsters, stragglers, and fugitives, all striving in hot haste to be among the first to reach Chattanooga. After questioning some of the fugitives and listening to the sound of the distant firing, they came to a different conclusion as to Thomas' fate. Rosecrans had already arrived at a conviction that the entire army was defeated, including Thomas. He judged that the firing he heard to the northeast was scattered and indicated disorganization. Garfield thought that the firing signified that the men were standing their ground. He concluded that Thomas was not beaten and asked permission to go to Thomas.

Back at the front at about 2:00 p.m. Bushrod Johnson, tired of shelling the retreating Union troops, turned his division to the north toward Snodgrass hills. Climbing the spur on the western end of the ridge he positioned himself so that he could attack the flank of the Union troops. Johnson was joined by Anderson's brigade. As these Confederate troops reached the top of the ridge they were met by a fresh Union force climbing the opposite side. These troops had just arrived on the field, being brought up by General Gordon Granger who had been positioned as a reserve corps several miles from the battlefield to guard the roads back to Chattanooga.⁷⁸²

Granger had heard the sound of battle, and as the firing increased in volume, he judged that Thomas might need his help. In violation of his orders he determined to get into the fight. "I am going to Thomas, orders or no orders", he told a staff officer, only to be advised that such action might bring disaster to the army and a court-martial to himself.⁷⁸³

Johnson, surprised by these new Federal troops, recoiled down the hill followed by the Union men in hot pursuit. When the last shots were fired, Thomas turned to Granger and acknowledged: "Fifteen minutes more, General, might have been too late."⁷⁸⁴

Garfield, having left Rosecrans some hours before, found Thomas on Horseshoe Ridge at

3:45 p.m. and sent a message back to Chattanooga. Rosecrans was conferring with McCook and Crittenden in the adjutant-general's office when the dispatch reached his headquarters. Hastily reading it he exclaimed, "Thank God!" and read the dispatch aloud:

I arrived here ten minutes ago, via Rossville. General Thomas has Brannan's, Baird's, Reynolds', Wood's, Palmer's, and Johnson's divisions still intact after terrible fighting. Granger is here, closed up with Thomas, and is fighting terrible on the right. Sheridan is in with the bulk of his division, but in ragged shape, though plucky and fighting.¹⁰⁵ General Thomas holds nearly his old ground of this morning. . . The hardest fighting I have seen to-day is now going on here. I hope General Thomas will be able to hold on here till night, and will not need to fall back farther than Rossville; perhaps not any. All fighting men should be stopped there, and the Dry Valley and Lookout roads held by them. I think we may in the main retrieve our morning disaster. I never saw better fighting than our men are now doing. The rebel ammunition must be nearly exhausted. Ours is fast failing. If we can hold out an hour more it will be all right. Granger thinks we can defeat them badly to-morrow if all our forces come in. I think you had better come to Rossville tonight and bring ammunition.⁷⁸⁵

Waving this over his head Rosecrans said, "This is good enough, the day isn't lost yet." Turning to McCook and Crittenden he said, "Gentlemen, this is no place for you. Go at once to your commands at the front." He then ordered rations and ammunition to be sent to Rossville.⁷⁸⁶

The *Ninth* back at Kelly field had been listening intently to the crash of musketry coming from the direction of the Snodgrass hill. While listening, they waited for the Confederates to renew the attack on their position, but none came. About 3 p.m. the *Ninth* moved to the right about a quarter of a mile into a thick clump of pines, and there Colonel Suman threw out three companies as skirmishers. One of the skirmishers was mortally wounded by Confederate sharpshooters.⁷⁸⁷

Hazen, believing that the serious assaults were being made at Snodgrass Hill, asked

¹⁰⁵ The part about Sheridan was untrue, where Garfield got this information is unknown.

permission of Palmer to go there in the hopes of providing support.⁷⁸⁸ Palmer conferred with General Johnson and they agreed to Hazen's plan, partly because he had requested permission and partly because Hazen still had ammunition, nearly forty rounds per man.⁷⁸⁹ At 4:30 p.m. the brigade was pulled from behind Colonel Suman's breastworks and started at the double-quick across the LaFayette Road and into the forest beyond. The woods were filled with Confederate stragglers, pickets, and sharpshooters. It appeared to most of the men that they would be captured, as the Confederates outnumbered Hazen's men. As the troops moved through the woods they became engaged in a sharp skirmish that drove the Southerners before them.

About this time Longstreet, seeing his Wing being chewed up at Horseshoe Ridge, called on Bragg for reinforcements. Bragg replied that the troops of the right wing "had been so badly beaten back" that they would be of no service.⁷⁹⁰ With this information, Longstreet straightened his line and brought up his reserves in the hopes of sweeping the hill before night. With an immense preponderance of strength, Longstreet assaulted with frequency and vigor, but was continually repulsed with great slaughter.⁷⁹¹ As the conflict wore on and became more desperate, Longstreet had difficulty in bringing his men to charge again and again after they had been driven from the ridge. He had put in his last division, and his troops were exhausted by their repeated assaults.⁷⁹²

Hazen, with the *Ninth* in the lead, reached Snodgrass Field in the rear of Harker's line an hour after he had left the Kelly field. There he found the 125th Ohio commanded by one of Hazen's former captains, firing by volley with great rapidity, against a desperate attack being made on that part of the Union line. Hazen ordered the *Ninth* to relieve the 125th, but its commander would have none of it. The regimental commander made it known that if Colonel

Suman wanted to help the 125th he could, but the 125th was not ready to be relieved. Colonel Suman agreed to alternate volleys with the Ohioans.⁷⁹³ He ordered firing by companies, that is: one company would advance up to the crest of the hill and deliver their fire, then fall back a few yards for shelter and to reload, while another company moved forward.¹⁰⁶ It was during this fight that the *Ninth* lost nearly all the men that were killed and wounded in the second day's battle.⁷⁹⁴

While the *Ninth* was engaged in this fight, the commander of the 35th Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Boynton who was stationed on Snodgrass Hill #2, reported to Brannan that he had discovered a column of troops in the ravine below the northwest slope of the hill ready to attack. He was ordered to hold his regiment in place as flank guard and promised he would send another regiment for support. Brannan went to Hazen for the purpose of acquiring the needed regiment, and Hazen selected his best. The *Ninth* was ordered to pull out and move west to Snodgrass Hill #2.⁷⁹⁵ With this done, Brannan advised Boynton that the *Ninth* was commanded by a colonel and would not take lightly to being ordered about by a Lieutenant-Colonel.⁷⁹⁶

The troops that Boynton had discovered was part of Colonel John Kelly's brigade that had joined Brigadier General Archibald Gracie's brigade near Snodgrass Hill #1. A third brigade of Colonel Robert Trigg was added to this force.⁷⁹⁷ All three moved up Snodgrass Hills #1 and #2, and about 80 yards from the top began firing on the Federals situated behind the cover at the top. "A contest ensued, which in its fierceness and duration had few parallels."⁷⁹⁸ For nearly an hour the two sides fired right into each other's ranks. The Union soldiers had the best of it for

¹⁰⁶ The Indiana State stone marker in honor of the *Ninth* was placed on Harker Hill and reads: "INDIANA--*Ninth* Regiment Infantry (Suman), Second Brigade (Hazen), Second Division (Palmer), Twenty-First Corps (Crittenden) SUNDAY September 20th 4:00 P.M to 5:30 P.M."

they were partly hidden and were firing downhill. When the hour was up the Southerners had taken the edge of this knoll, but could move no further as they were now too low on ammunition and too few in number to press their advantage. In that one hour, Gracie and Kelly lost 1,054 out of 2,879 men that they had started up the hill.

It was near 6:00 p.m. by the time the *Ninth* had moved off Snodgrass field and arrived on Snodgrass hill #2, and darkness was fast approaching. Boynton met the *Ninth* and imperiously ordered Colonel Suman to follow him with his regiment across the hilltop to the southwest side. Colonel Suman turned to Major George H. Carter and some of his staff accompanying him and asked, "What do you think Hazen will say if we follow the orders of that colonel?" Old Hazen would be hotter than hell", answered Adjutant Stephen P. Hodsden. Lasselle added: "He is trying to work you, Colonel." Colonel Suman advised Boynton that he would seek someone in authority to get orders from before letting his regiment be led off to some unknown location. Boynton tried a different approach, and turned to the men of the *Ninth*; looking past the officers he yelled out this "regiment is a lot of damned cowards!" The men of the *Ninth* had been in battle for two days and had lost dearly. Their blood was up and they were not about to be called cowards by some Ohio upstart. After all they were the *Bloody Ninth* and had seen more action than most regiments. The men began yelling back "we will go with you, colonel, what are your orders." The *Ninth* would show this parvenu what a real regiment was about. Colonel Suman was soon forced to give in and follow Boynton.⁷⁹⁹ The *Ninth* was placed in the woods next to Boynton's 35th Ohio on a slope facing down into a draw. The regiment began to throw up slight breast-works of log and rails. By the time the *Ninth* settled into position it was dark, so dark that no one could see more than a few feet in front of them. In fact, Captain D. B. McConnell of

Company "K" reported that he could not distinguish between the Union and Confederate dead that blanketed the slope, nor could he see the length of his regiment.⁸⁰⁰



Late in the afternoon, Thomas had received a dispatch from Rosecrans suggesting the withdrawal of the army to Rossville. Rosecrans had already learned from Garfield that Thomas was making a determined stand and that the Confederates were being repulsed all along the line. Since noon Thomas had been with the men on Horseshoe Ridge and knew that against the overwhelming numerical superiority he faced, he could not hold out much longer. In accordance with Rosecrans' suggestion, he prepared to retire from the field. His plan was to withdraw the forces from the Kelly field first, followed by those on Snodgrass Hill. Reynolds at the Kelly field was the first to be withdrawn. At 5:30 p.m. on his way to give Reynolds his withdrawal orders, Thomas found a Confederate line advancing to their rear. Upon this hostile force, Reynolds was ordered to charge. The charge was made with spirit and the Confederate force was driven beyond Baird's left clearing the McFarland's Gap Road so that the men at Kelly field might withdraw.

On Horseshoe ridge with Thomas gone, there was no one who would take the authority to coordinate the withdraw. With the sun down, Steedman quietly withdrew without being noticed by either side. Wood and Brannan likewise withdrew without the Confederates at their front being the wiser.

As the men of the *Ninth* waited in the dark on Snodgrass Hill #2 believing that the fighting for the day was over, they began to think that they were going to be the ones left behind

as the rest of the army retreated to Chattanooga. Strange thoughts occur to frightened men waiting in the dark. "Through the ranks. . . passed the whisper, 'The army is retreating, and we are placed out here and left!'"⁸⁰¹ As they waited, Captain Amasa Johnson heard a odd singular noise to the right of the regiment and he immediately went to investigate. To his surprise and astonishment he discovered three regiments just to the right of the *Ninth* being captured by a Confederate Division.⁸⁰² Johnson, seeing the critical position in which the *Ninth* was now placed, hurried to Colonel Suman advising him "that the rebels were in our works to our right." Colonel Suman could not believe the report since everything was so quiet in that area. He thought he would go investigate the situation himself. On the way into the ravine, Colonel Suman was stopped by some troops of the 63rd Virginia. The officer commanding the advanced unit, with a pistol leveled at Colonel Suman's head, ordered him to surrender.⁸⁰³ Quick thinking, Colonel Suman replied that he had already surrendered with the other regiments that were just taken. This seemed to satisfy the officer and he soon lost interest in Colonel Suman as his regiment moved up the ravine toward the *Ninth*. This regiment was joined by the 5th Kentucky which got to within 60 yards of the *Ninth's* position. There its commander, Colonel Hawkins, called out for the *Ninth* to surrender. He then started parleying with some of the officers in the hopes of having the *Ninth* join the other three regiments already taken prisoner. According to Colonel Suman's official report made nine days after the battle, Colonel Suman slipped away from the Confederates holding him prisoner and made it back to his own regiment. When he arrived he brought his two right companies to bear, and opened fire on the Confederates.⁸⁰⁴ In a letter written home to his future wife just four days after the battle, Lieutenant Thomas Prickett told a far different story concerning the actions of Colonel Suman while in the hands of the

Confederates. In the letter Colonel Suman was reported to be released by the Confederates so that Colonel Suman could return to his regiment for the purpose of surrendering it to 5th Kentucky.⁸⁰⁵

Whether Colonel Suman slipped away or was released, he returned to the *Ninth* and gave the order to fire on the Confederates, forcing them to scurry down the hill out of range of the *Ninth's* guns. Colonel Hawkins of the 5th Kentucky was outraged by this volley, and in his report he stated that he received word that the *Ninth* "announced that they were friends and then that they surrendered. Stealing this advantage, they treacherously fired upon us, killing and wounding several of my men and officers."⁸⁰⁶

When the smoke from the *Ninth's* guns had cleared, Colonel Suman went along the line and in a low tone ordered the men to fall back off the hill for they were now down to just one or two rounds of ammunition per soldier. He repeated his order as he went saying: "I am not going to surrender my regiment."⁸⁰⁷ The *Ninth* had moved just a short distance when Boynton galloped over to stop them. Boynton ordered Colonel Suman back to the hill. Colonel Suman repeated that he was not going to surrender his regiment and that the ravine was full of rebels who had just captured all the regiments in that area. Boynton replied, "These are not rebels. They are Steedman's men," to which Colonel Suman countered, "I have been among them and know that they are rebels."⁸⁰⁸ The heated discussion was overheard by Boynton's men and they began to jeer the Hoosiers for backing away from a position they were prepared to hold with bayonets and empty cartridge boxes. The men muttered among themselves and yelled for Colonel Suman to lead them back to the hill. With the jeer in the background and the willingness of the *Ninth's* men to return, Boynton threatened Colonel Suman with court-martial.

Colonel Suman, only weeks before having faced such a distasteful experience relented, and back to the hill marched the *Ninth*.

Their return had scarcely been done before a rebel force appeared in the gloom directly in their front. A mounted officer rode to within a few paces and yelled out: "Lay down your arms, now, and you shan't be hurt." Some of the men called out, "Who the hell are you?" And the reply came "I am General Gregg of Texas." With that, the regiment arose and delivered a volley in the direction of the voice demanding surrender. By the light of the guns he and his horse were both seen to fall.⁸⁰⁹ Some of the men in Company "D" went to find the fallen officer, who looked up and said: "Oh, what did you shoot me for?"⁸¹⁰ Corporal Richard Tyner secured his sword and pistols, and returned to his line where he gave the sword to Captain Amasa Johnson.^{107 - 811} This was the last volley fired by either side in the battle of Chickamauga.¹⁰⁸

As the men of the *Ninth* now out of ammunition lay in the dark, they could hear the Confederate line draw closer and closer to theirs. In one place along the line only a fence separated the confronting forces. An hour later the *Ninth* was ordered to withdraw and they followed the 35th Ohio from the hill.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Bushrod Johnson in his official report stated: "It will, however, be proper for me to state that during a halt, before Robertson's brigade reached the Chattanooga road, Brigadier-General Gregg rode out in front to reconnoiter the enemy's position. He very soon found himself near the enemy's line, and was suddenly halted by the Yankee skirmishers. Turning his horse to ride back to the rear he was shot through the neck. Having fallen from his horse the Yankees proceeded to take from his person his spurs and sword, when Robertson's brigade charged forward and recovered possession of him and his horse. Brigadier-General Gregg deserves special commendation for his gallantry and activity on the field. The brigade which he commanded in an excellent one, and is commanded by a worthy and able officer."⁶⁴

¹⁰⁸ A Tablet placed on the battlefield on Snodgrass Hill in part reads: "At this juncture the 9th Indiana was reported by General Brannan to the Commander of the 35th Ohio to reinforce his line. A movement of the confederates called out a volley which was responded to by them and was then followed by their withdrawl. This was the last firing of the battle." In his official report Lieutenant Colonel Boynton attempted to take credit for this last volley fired by the *Ninth*.⁶⁵

¹⁰⁹ The Indiana State stone marker in honor of the *Ninth* was placed on Snodgrass Hill 150' west of the tower and reads: "INDIANA--*Ninth* Regiment Infantry (Suman), Second Brigade (Hazen), Second Division (Palmer), Twenty-First

Weary, worn, tired and hungry, the men of the *Ninth* moved north leaving the battlefield to the Confederates. A Union officer later wrote: "we sullenly dragged ourselves along, feeling a shame and disgrace that has never been experienced." Those who fell out of the column because of wounds or exhaustion were left to their own inadequate devices by those who had only the strength to keep going. Behind them, beyond the intervening ridge, they could hear the Confederates celebrating their triumph with loud yells. Ambrose Bierce thought the sound was "the ugliest any mortal ever heard." As they moved north across the valley "across which that horrible yell did not prolong itself," he added, "we finally retired in profound silence and dejection, unmolested."⁸¹² The regiment moved back three miles and camped for the night.⁸¹³



Unaware that the Union army had been withdrawn, Bragg's army bivouacked on the field expecting to renew the fight in the morning. When the sun came up Bragg was dumbfounded to find the Union army gone from his front.

On September 21st a few straggling blows were directed against the Union army at Rossville. Thomas, feeling that he could not hold his position against the Confederate army, suggested to Rosecrans that he be ordered to Chattanooga. The order was issued at 6 p.m., and by 7:00 a.m. on September 22nd Rosecrans's army was withdrawn to Chattanooga without opposition.

The day following the battle the *Ninth* moved to the front, and took a position on a high ridge to the left of the Chattanooga road. They immediately began to fortify the position fully

Corps (Crittenden) Was sent to this position at dusk of September 20th from Snodgrass Field, lost some men by capture, with the three regiments which were captured on the right: fired into the capturing force and held this position until eight

expecting the Confederates to move against them. They waited and waited but nothing of importance occurred during the day and on the night of the 21st, the regiment fell back with the brigade to Chattanooga.⁸¹⁴



Thus the battle ended. Though driven from the battle-field, the Army of the Cumberland had succeeded in keeping the object of two years of struggle: Chattanooga. It had fought bravely, and had retired in good order, after having held its position for two days. Even after Longstreet's breakthrough, it held the battlefield and it repulsed every assault. It withdrew only when its ammunition and supplies had given out, and it had become certain that its position could not be held for another day. The solitary advantage which Bragg had to show as a proof of his victory was his final possession of the battlefield. The results proved a victory burdened with no lasting benefits, and produced no advantage for the immense drain of resources on the Confederacy.

The Union army had about 55,000 effective men in action during the battle. Of these, Rosecrans losses were killed 1,687, wounded 9,394, and 5,255 missing, for a total of 16,336.¹¹⁰ Bragg had about 75,000 effective, including large numbers of prisoners of war captured at Vicksburg and paroled by Grant. Bragg's army suffered more than did Rosecrans'. His losses were 2,673 killed, 16,274 wounded, and 2,003 missing, for a total of 20,950. Longstreet's losses alone on the 20th was 1,856 killed, 6,506 wounded, and 270 missing or 8,632.⁸¹⁵

p.m. when it withdrew.

¹¹⁰ In his 1961 book, *Chickamauga: Bloody Battle of the West*, historian Glenn Tucker listed the Union losses at 1,656 killed, 9,749 wounded, and 4,774 missing for a total of 16,179.

Colonel Suman reported that the *Ninth* suffered two officers and twenty-two enlisted men killed in the battle, six officers and fifty-nine enlisted men wounded, and seventeen enlisted men missing. Also reported captured was Lieutenant-Colonel William P. Lasselle of Logansport, Indiana. The total loss was 108 out of an effective force of 280 that entered the battle. Later reports listed 21 killed in the *Ninth* and 91 wounded.⁸¹⁶ Hazen, in his official report of the battle, wrote that Colonel Suman and the *Ninth* "are veterans of so frequent trial that it would be mockery to praise them with words. The country cannot too highly cherish these men."⁸¹⁷

Thomas may have been given the title "Rock of Chickamauga", but it was not Thomas' corps alone that stood with him. In fact, more men left the field from Thomas' corps than from Crittenden's corps. Crittenden and McCook each had eight divisions on the field when the battle started and Granger had three. Of these nineteen divisions, twelve were with Thomas when the sun went down. Palmer's division of Crittenden's corps along with the *Ninth* was with Thomas throughout the battle. If Thomas won the sobriquet the "Rock of Chickamauga" then these men, including the men of the *Bloody Ninth*, was the foundation upon which the Rock rested.

Chapter 10

THE BATTLES FOR CHATTANOOGA

When the battle of Chickamauga came to an end, the campaign to hold and keep Chattanooga began. By 7:00 a.m. on September 22, 1863, the Army of the Cumberland had withdrawn to the town without opposition. Chattanooga¹¹¹ was more of a western type of town than a southern town, with a population of 5,000 that remained close to its frontier roots. Most of the civilian population had already left the town by the time the northern army retreated and took up emergency quarters there. This army secured the abandoned Confederate inner defenses, and waited for an attack from the victorious Southerners.

During the retreat Rosecrans sent a dispatch to Washington: "We have met with a serious disaster; extent not yet ascertained. The enemy overwhelmed us, drove our right, pierced our center, and scattered the troops there."⁸¹⁸ Two days later in a wire to Lincoln, Rosecrans advised that the battle was lost and expressed the fear that "we have no certainty of holding our position." He requested that Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside be sent to his aid.⁸¹⁹ Lincoln replied: "We have unabated confidence in you and in your soldiers and officers . . . We shall do our utmost to assist you."⁸²⁰

Washington first sent orders to Burnside, Hurlbut and Sherman to move forward without delay to Rosecrans' assistance. General Joseph Hooker¹¹² had already been ordered to

¹¹¹ Chattanooga originally was the name of a small Indian village, situated near the base of Lookout Mountain, on the bank of Chattanooga creek. In the Cherokee language Chattanooga means "to draw fish out of water", others say it's an Indian word meaning "mountains looking at each other."⁶⁶

¹¹² Joseph Hooker, a member of the 1837 class of West Point, had served in the Seminole War and in the Mexican War. After the war he resigned and took up farming. When war came he offered his services to the Union and was repeatedly snubbed by the War Department. Finally he was commissioned and given command of a brigade in the defense of Washington. In 1862 he was given command of a division and fought at Yorktown, Williamsburg, Fair Oaks, Glendale, Malvern Hill, Bristol Station, 2d Bull Run and Chantilly. Promoted to Major General he commanded the III corps and then the First corps at South Mountain and Antietam. He commanded the Grand division at Fredericksburg and was then named commander of the Army of the Potomac on Jan 26, 1863. He was defeated at Chancellorsville and was relieved on June 28, 1863 by General Meade. The nickname "Fighting Joe Hooker" was given to him by the Associated Press in the Seven Days' battles.⁶⁷

Rosecrans' aid when Washington first learned that Longstreet had been sent west. With the news of the battle, Washington renewed efforts to move Hooker with the XI and XII Corps, some 20,000 men, as fast as possible. As it turned out, the transfer of Hooker's army westward to the Tennessee was accomplished with marvelous expedition. Although accompanied by its artillery, trains, baggage, and animals, this army moved from Virginia to Stevenson, Alabama, a distance of 1,233 miles, in just seven days.¹¹³ "Fighting Joe" Hooker reached Cincinnati on September 29th and during the first week in October his army was on Rosecrans' right flank at Stevenson.⁸²¹

By the time Hooker arrived, Rosecrans no longer was in need of more troops in Chattanooga for he could not feed or care for the soldiers that he already had stationed in the fortification built all around the town. What he needed now was food and supplies.



The next morning after the battle of Chickamauga, General James Longstreet and Nathan Bedford Forrest wanted to continue the attack on the Union army before it could reorganize behind the Chattanooga fortifications. Braxton Bragg was not so inclined, for his army had suffered appalling losses in killed and wounded, more than 30 percent of his effective force. He refused the pleas of his lieutenants for a rapid pursuit, a refusal that laid the groundwork for a bitter recrimination.⁸²²

The first Confederate troops did not appear on the outskirts of the town until two days after Chickamauga, when Bragg positioned his army in such a fashion that Chattanooga was surrounded. He had no inclination to storm it. For the first few weeks, what aggression Bragg did show was to his own generals. He suspended Bishop Polk for his failure to attack at Chickamauga on the morning of September 20th as directed, and ordered him to Atlanta to await

¹¹³ The transfer of Hooker's army was the longest and fastest movement of such a large body of troops until the twentieth century.

further orders. Next, Bragg took on Nathan Bedford Forrest and ordered Forrest to turn over all of his corps to General Joseph Wheeler, leaving Forrest with only one regiment. Forrest responded like only Forrest could; he marched into Bragg's headquarters and pointed his index finger in Bragg's face and threatened his well being.¹¹⁴ Bragg did nothing further to anger Forrest, a wise move on Bragg's part.

Unlike Forrest, Polk went to Atlanta as ordered by Bragg, but in return, Polk sent a blistering message to President Jefferson Davis charging Bragg with incompetence, and suggested that Bragg should be replaced by Robert E. Lee. Longstreet likewise sent a secret message to the President, as did most of the other senior generals, all calling Bragg unfit and asking that he be removed from command.

Davis traveled to Bragg's headquarters on the outskirts of Chattanooga to ferret out the command problems. He listened to the contentious generals and Bragg's rebuttals. Almost all the generals agreed that Bragg should go, but none of those that were qualified were willing to take his place, including Longstreet. In the end, Davis left Bragg in command more by default than by virtue of his ability to lead an army.¹¹⁵

Bragg determined that the best way to retake Chattanooga would be to place the town under siege, cut off all supplies to the Union army and slowly and pitilessly starve Rosecrans' troops to death.

Nature was on Bragg's side, for Chattanooga was almost surrounded by the Tennessee River, and if Bragg held the river he could force the siege. The town itself lay in a bend of the

¹¹⁴ Forrest is reported saying: "You commenced your cowardly and contemptible persecution of me soon after the battle of Shiloh, and you have keep it up ever since. . . You have played the part of a damned scoundrel, and are a coward, and if you were any part of a man I would slap your jaws and force you to resent it. You may as well not issue any order to me, for I will not obey them, and I will hold you personally responsible for any further indignities you endeavor to inflict upon me. You have threatened to arrest me for not obeying your orders promptly. I dare you to do it, and I say to you that if you ever again try to interfere with me or cross my path it will be at the peril of your life."


¹¹⁵ Davis sent a note to Bragg on October 13, 1863: "Regretting that the expectations which induced the assignment of that gallant officer to this army have not been realized, you are authorized to relieve Lieutenant General D. H. Hill from further duty with your command."

river at a place where the river turns abruptly south for two miles, butts up against Lookout Mountain and veers back north for two miles before forking at Williams Island. There the river reunites north of the island and forms a narrow channel through which the waters rush headlong for thirteen miles. This chasm was known as the "Suck." The velocity of the water is so great that steam boats cannot use the river, which necessitates a landing. This landing was called Kelley's Ferry and was located where the river becomes wide and the water placid. From that point the river was easily navigable all the way to the Federal supply depot at Bridgeport, Alabama, twenty-two miles away. Near Chattanooga at the place where the river reverses itself opposite Lookout Mountain, a peninsula is formed called Moccasin Point. Crossing the river at the town a road leads across Moccasin Point to Brown's Ferry.⁸²³

To the east of the town a partly cleared valley runs up against Missionary Ridge.¹¹⁶ The ridge grew out of the southern bank of South Chickamauga Creek and ran south to southeast for fifteen miles. At Rossville, Georgia a narrow gap sliced through the ridge. The top of the ridge was nearly five hundred feet above the town with slopes that were steep and precipitous and covered with woods. Lookout Mountain is another ridge extending eighty miles southward from the Tennessee River. At the river the mountain narrows to 600 feet wide and eighteen hundred feet high and it overlooks all of Chattanooga. Northwest of Lookout Mountain and directly west of the river is Lookout Valley. Between the valley and the river there was a chain of foothill that blocked access to the river.

¹¹⁶ Missionary Ridge was named after a Catholic mission by a priest from St. Augustine who came to the region to spread the gospel and began a school for the Indians.

In order for Bragg to carry out the siege, he assigned Longstreet on a line from the base of Lookout Mountain to the west bank of Chattanooga Creek, Breckinridge to occupy the center from the east bank to the middle of Missionary Ridge, and Polk's old Corps, temporarily commanded by Benjamin F. Cheatham, along the foot of Missionary Ridge to the East Tennessee & Georgia Rail Road.



Beyond this line, Bragg stationed a thin picket line to prevent a Union crossing in that area. Longstreet's troops soon occupied Lookout Mountain and extended a small number of outposts into Lookout Valley.

With their firm hold of Lookout Mountain, the Confederate batteries and sharpshooters commanded the river, the roads on the south bank including the railroad, and a road that was the shortest way north of the river. As all supply routes were closed save one; the longest and most indirect route over the mountains and through Walden's Ridge to the north of Chattanooga. During good weather this route was barely passable, and in bad or rainy weather, the sixty miles was impossible. In late September of 1863 the rains began to fall as they did every year in the late autumn which resulted in long stretches of mountain road being washed away.



With most of the supplies routes impassable, things became very bad in Chattanooga. Lack of decent clothing and an early autumn created misery for the Northern soldiers. Federal troops were accustomed to a new issue of uniforms after a hard campaign, but with the supply problems, their clothing grew threadbare.⁸²⁴ Many of the men were cold, almost barefoot, infested with vermin, and in need of shelter. Just to keep warm they had demolished houses and hacked down every tree and fence in the town for fuel. Rations were cut in half, then to a quarter, and each succeeding issue of rations were diminished thereafter. Guards stood at the troughs of horses to keep the soldiers from taking the scant supply of corn, but soon it was necessary to deprive even these animals' forage and they fell dead by the hundreds.⁸²⁵ What beef they had was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying with a faint facetiousness, that they were living on half rations of hard bread and "beef dried on the hoof."⁸²⁶

Observing the condition of the Union army, Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana telegraphed Secretary of War Stanton, who happened to be staying at the Galt House in Louisville, Kentucky and reported that Rosecrans was on the verge of ordering a retreat out of Chattanooga. Dana's telegram caused concern in the War Department and induced a wire addressed to Major General Ulysses S. Grant on October 16, 1863:

You will receive herewith the order of the President of the United States placing you in command of the Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee. The organization of these departments will be changed as you may deem most practicable. You will immediately proceed to Chattanooga and relieve General Rosecrans. You can communicate with Generals Burnside and Sherman by telegraph. A summary of the order sent to those officers will be sent to you immediately. It is left optional with you to supersede General Rosecrans by General G.H. Thomas or not.⁸²⁷

Grant assumed command formally on the 19th and chose to replace Rosecrans as commander of the Army of the Cumberland. On the 19th, immediately after assuming his new command, Grant telegraphed Thomas to hold on to Chattanooga. Thomas replied, "I will hold

the town till we starve." And, as matters stood, his chance of starving was very good.⁸²⁸



There were other changes that affected the *Ninth* even more than a change in the Army's commander. In late August 1863 just a few weeks after Colonel Suman's Court-Martial, while the *Ninth* was stationed at Poe's cross-roads north of Chattanooga, Colonel Suman made a request of Major General Palmer, his divisional commander, that his regiment be transferred out of Hazen's brigade. On September 1st Hazen advised Palmer that he agreed that it would be better, all things considered that a transfer take place with Colonel William Grose's brigade, the *Ninth* transferring to Grose, and the 6th Ohio transferring to Hazen.⁸²⁹ Palmer took no action at that time and the *Ninth* marched away to Chickamauga still part of Hazen's brigade.

After the battle, the *Ninth* marched through Chattanooga on the evening of September 22nd and took a position four miles northeast of town not far from Orchard Knob. There they dug in and waited for the attack that all expected would be launched against them. Within a few days Polk's old corps took position only three miles away from the *Ninth's* front. Some sharp skirmishing took place between the *Ninth's* pickets and the Confederate pickets during those first few days, but no one on either side was hurt. When things settled down, an agreement was reached with the Confederates to allow the brigade's ambulances to go back to the battlefield of Chickamauga and bring in the Union's wounded. In a letter home one officer of the *Ninth* noted:

They brought in the first day about 1,000. Some of those wounds had not been dressed, and the worms were in the wounds, so you can have some faint idea of the suffering of some of those poor fellows who fought bravely for the union until they fell.⁸³⁰

A few days later, information came to the *Ninth* that there would be changes at the divisional level; the *Ninth's* corps commander, Major-General T.L Crittenden, was relieved of command and ordered North to await a "Court of Inquiry" as to his conduct during the battle of

Chickamauga.¹¹⁷ At the same time, the orders came transferring the *Ninth* from Hazen's brigade to William Grose's brigade.¹¹⁸ The *Ninth* was now in the Third Brigade, First Division under the command of Brigadier-General J.M. Palmer;¹¹⁹ the IV Corps was commanded by Major-General Gordon Granger.¹²⁰ Grose's Brigade had three Illinois regiments, the 59th, the 75th and the 84th. In addition, the brigade had two other Indiana regiments, the 30th, and the 36th. One Ohio regiment, the 24th and the 77th Pennsylvania.⁸³¹ When the *Ninth* joined the brigade, Colonel Suman became its second ranking officer as all others in regimental command held a rank of Lieutenant Colonel or less.

On October 10th the *Ninth* was called before Crittenden to hear his farewell address and to be honored before their fellow soldiers.⁸³² In the company of Generals Palmer, Hazen and Charles Cruft, Crittenden called upon Corporal R. Stephens of the *Ninth* to bring forward a new stand of national colors which was to be presented to the *Ninth*. This flag was silk with gold fringe and cord and tassels and on it was inscribed "Shiloh--General Nelson to the 9th Indiana Vols."⁸³³

Crittenden came forward and made the following remarks:

¹¹⁷ Thomas L. Crittenden was blamed for the Union fiasco at Chickamauga, but a court of inquiry exonerated him. He next commanded the 1st division, IX corps, until December 13, 1864 when he resigned. He entered the regular army as a Colonel of the 32d Infantry on July 28, 1866, and served with that unit until his retirement in 1881.

¹¹⁸ William Grose was born in Ohio in 1812, moved to Indiana, and was at first a Democratic politician. He later joined and became one of the first organizers of the Republican party in Indiana. Before the war he served in the state legislature and on the bench. He organized the 36th regiment at Camp Wayne, Indiana and was commissioned Colonel of that regiment by his friend Governor Morton in August 30, 1861. In May, 1862 he was given command of a brigade in General Nelson's division.

¹¹⁹ J. M. Palmer had succeeded Thomas, and Granger had been placed at the head of a new corps formed by combining his own with those of the departed Crittenden and McCook.

¹²⁰ Gordon Granger graduated from West Point in 1845 near the bottom of his class. He fought in the Mexico War where he received two brevets. Later he participated in Indiana fighting and served on the frontier. He was named Colonel of the 2d Michigan in September 1861. In March 1862 he was promoted to Brigadier-General (USV) and participated in New Madrid, Island No. 10, and siege of Corinth. He later led various divisions and was appointed Major-General (USV) in September 1863. He led the Reserve Corps during the Battle of Chickamauga, and took over command of the IV Corps in the Army's reorganization at Chattanooga.

Soldiers, I come to bid you farewell. I once had the honor, as well as the pleasure, of being your commander. I am not your commander now. May you, however, receive this honor which has long been due you. That honor has to a great extent been denied you. This has not been the fault of your officers, nor of any of your commanders, but because you have failed to be on good terms with newspapers. But let me encourage you, fellow-soldiers, to go on in the discharge of duty and in the defense of your country as you thus far have done, and in the end full justice will be done you. God bless you; persevere till you with others have crushed this wicked rebellion.

Now I have a more pleasant task to perform. Your former commander, General Nelson, now dead, conscious of your worth, presented you that flag. In consequence of the untimely death of General Nelson the flag has never yet been formally presented to you. Through the kindness of your Colonel, I am requested, and I now have the honor, to present it to you. It is an honor of which I feel proud. Soldiers, take this flag; defend it. I know that you will never suffer it to be disgraced. This flag, the gift of that great, dead man, will be to you an additional inducement to be faithful -- although additional inducements you need not, yet an additional inducement is will be. Soldiers, still go forward! God bless you; good bye.⁸³⁴



After the ceremony the *Ninth* remained on the outskirts of Chattanooga for the next few weeks. During the stay it rained almost every day and the only shelter was provided by worn out tents. These tents were set three feet off the ground with open sides and ends. The tent roofs leaked and the wind had full sweep through every side providing little protection, so most of the men were continually wet. The tents had no fireplaces and no place to put anything away to keep it dry; consequently camping was a very cold and disagreeable experience. To provide excitement there was daily exchange of cannon shots between the men of the new brigade and

the Confederates only a few miles away. Neither shots caused any damage to the other side and so after a while the Confederates did not return the fire.⁸³⁵



Grant arrived at Chattanooga in the evening of October 23rd and saw the horror of a death camp; soldiers emaciated and somewhat deranged. There were signs of defeat everywhere. General Thomas was ready with a strategy to open the river supply line from Bridgeport. The plan that had been worked out before Rosecrans had been relieved by Major-General William F. ("Baldy") Smith, chief engineer for the Army of the Cumberland. If the plan could be carried out the supply line would be substantially cut both in distance and in time, and would eliminate much of the risk associated with the northern wagon route. The plan called for Hooker to follow the railroad east around the south flank of Lookout Mountain, then move north under cover of darkness, still following the railroad through Wauhatchie and close upon Brown's Ferry from the rear.⁸³⁶ Meanwhile, a force from Chattanooga would move down the river in pontoon boats under the cover of darkness and seize Brown's Ferry held by a small detachment of Confederates, fortify it and swing a bridge across the river to Moccasin Point.

On the 24th, General Palmer received orders to march with two brigades of his division, Cruft's and Grose's¹²¹ with the *Ninth*, to the north side of the Tennessee River, then by back road to Rankin's Ferry, opposite Whiteside where he would recross the river and hold the road in Hooker's rear.⁸³⁷ The *Ninth* left Chattanooga at 4:00 a.m. on October 25th carrying three days' rations and marched over Walden's Ridge on roads that were barely passable making the trip tedious and difficult. On the night of the 25th the brigades encamped about two miles from the top of the ridge and eight miles from Chattanooga. The next day they marched on better roads

¹²¹ Colonel P.S. Post commanding the brigade as Colonel Grose was sick.

through the Sequatchie Valley. On the 27th General Palmer, due to a wound which had become infected and life threatening, turned over the command of the division to General Cruft. The next day in a drenching rain the brigades arrived at Rankin's Ferry which was about twelve miles from Bridgeport, ready to support Hooker.⁸³⁸

Thomas' plan was successfully carried out and it gave the Union two good roads to Bridgeport from Brown's Ferry. One was thirty-five miles long running through Wauhatchie, Whiteside, and Shellmound, the other, ran from Brown's to Kelly's Ferry, a distance of eight miles by wagon, and then by boat to Bridgeport. The Confederates still held Lookout Mountain and they commanded these roads, but the Union batteries which had been posted on Moccasin Point north of the river prevented the Confederate artillery from inflicting any serious damage on supply trains. On November 1st the siege of Chattanooga was over, and from that time on Bragg was put on the defensive.⁸³⁹ Grant wired Washington:

General Thomas' plan for securing the river and south side road hence to Bridgeport has proven eminently successful. The question of supplies may now be regarded as settled. If the rebels give us one week more time I think all danger of losing territory now held by us will have passed away, and preparations may commence for offensive operations.⁸⁴⁰

Hooker had brought with him from the east a full supply of land transportation. His animals had not been subjected to hard work on bad roads without forage, and were in good condition. With the aid of Hooker's transportation and steam boats, the Army of the Cumberland began receiving full rations. Grant later noted: "It is hard for anyone not an eye-witness to realize the relief this brought. The men were soon reclothed and well fed; an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. Neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed."⁸⁴¹



The *Ninth* was on the North side of the Tennessee River ready to support Hooker if needed, when General Cruft received orders on October 29th to relieve General Geary's command at Shellmound with one of his brigades. Grose's Brigade with the *Ninth* was ordered to cross to the south side of the river and move to Whiteside, Tennessee. At Whiteside there was a gap through the mountains that led into Lookout Valley where a long railroad bridge once existed. Grose's brigade was to entrench in a strong position and defend the gap against any force that might be sent against it. The area to be guarded was about three miles in length and it required an unusual amount of labor to make the necessary slashing and throwing up the earth-works.⁸⁴² The *Ninth* made its camp at the summit of Raccoon Mountain near the place where Tennessee, Georgia and Alabama state lines meet.⁸⁴³ After the men were encamped, it became apparent to all that this would be the place where the *Ninth* would be spending most of their time thereafter. It was the opinion of most of the officers that if a battle was to be fought for Chattanooga, Grose's brigade and the *Ninth* would see no part of it.⁸⁴⁴



Bragg was disgusted over Longstreet's non-achievement in pushing Hooker from the Union supply line, and since he detested Longstreet anyway, he looked for a means to rid himself of Lee's "old war horse".⁸⁴⁵ On November 4th Bragg sent Longstreet an order "to drive Burnside out of East Tennessee . . . or better, to capture or destroy him."⁸⁴⁶ To accompany Longstreet, Bragg also sent Joe Wheeler's cavalry of about 5,000 men and artillery. With the stroke of a pen one third of Bragg's army, along with the General who had broken through the Federal line at Chickamauga, was sent away.

When Grant first heard of Longstreet's departure, he considered it an unfavorable


development to his own plans, and when Washington heard of the departure they began to push Grant to take some action to relieve Burnside. Grant was in no position to provide any help in that direction until he could defeat Bragg. With that thought in mind on November 7th he ordered Thomas to immediately attack Missionary Ridge in the hopes that such an attack would force Bragg to recall Longstreet. Thomas pointed out to Grant that his army was in no position from prolonged hunger to endure a sustained offensive, and that he had no animals necessary for artillery. Grant countered that mules should be detached from the wagons, the horses from the ambulances, and private horses of officers should be taken to move the artillery. Thomas pointed out the dangers of such a plan and after a reconnaissance of the area and further reflection, Grant concluded that such an assault did not promise success; he decided to await the arrival of Sherman's troops, then near Fayetteville, Tennessee.⁸⁴⁷

Having revoked his order for an immediate assault, Grant ordered Thomas to develop a plan that would place Sherman's army in a position to attack Bragg, with the proviso that Sherman must first approve the plan. Thomas turned again to his chief of engineers to develop the battle plan. Smith knew that the Confederate army was entrenched on the western slopes of Missionary Ridge and their line stretched across Chattanooga Valley to the western slopes of Lookout Mountain. His line of works, twelve miles in length, was occupied by less than 50,000 troops. This line, though appearing strong, was far too extended for the number of its defenders and seem vulnerable to Smith. If the Union could capture the two ends, the center would be left vulnerable; if Bragg abandoned his flanks at Lookout Mountain or at the northern part of Missionary Ridge, he would be forced to withdraw his entire army from Chattanooga.

Grant concluded, over Thomas' objection, that Lookout Mountain on the other side of Chattanooga was of no special advantage so Smith's battle plan made no provision for retaking it.⁸⁴⁸ It did, however, make provisions for Hooker to make a demonstration against the mountain while Thomas made a concurrent attack against the center of Missionary Ridge. These maneuvers were planned in the hopes that it would keep Bragg from sending troops against Sherman who would attack near Tunnel Hill.

On November 13th Sherman arrived. Since Sherman needed more troops to carry out the attack, the planned diversion on Lookout Mountain by Hooker was canceled.⁸⁴⁹ During this visit Sherman's observation of the Army of the Cumberland was in a far better condition than what Grant had told him. Grant told Sherman that they "had been so demoralized by the Battle of Chickamauga that he feared they could not be gotten out of their trenches to assume the offensive."⁸⁵⁰ For this reason, Grant wanted Sherman to hurry his army forward and take the lead in the attack that was then scheduled for November 21st.

Sherman's main body got caught on the same bad road that delayed the attack. Thinking that Sherman's delay would alert Bragg as to the real objective, Thomas ordered Howard's XI Corps to march into Chattanooga from Lookout Valley. Bragg fell hook, line and sinker for Thomas' deception. Seeing Sherman's divisions and Howard's corps cross the Tennessee River, he figured they were on their way to support Burnside in East Tennessee. On




November 22nd, he ordered Cleburne and Buckner to withdraw their divisions from the left side of the Confederate line on Missionary Ridge and move to Chickamauga Station, where they would take the train to join Longstreet. Again as the Union forces were gaining strength, Bragg cut away 11,000 more men from his army.⁸⁵¹

To take Howard's place in the valley, Thomas ordered the two brigades of the IV Corps, Grose's with the *Ninth* and Whitaker's recalled from their position down the river. The *Ninth* received their orders in the afternoon of the 22nd and by 10:00 a.m. on the 23rd twenty-two officers and two hundred seventy-one enlisted men of the *Ninth* were on the march into Lookout Valley. In the late afternoon of the 23rd after a march of 13 miles on roads that had been turned to muck and ooze, the *Ninth* with the remainder of Grose's brigade reported to Hooker.

It was here that the men of the Ninth saw for the first time the troops from the east that had come to save them. The Eastern troops wanted to soldier in style; they liked their boots shined, their campaign caps snapped smartly down and their knapsacks positioned just right on their back. They took it for granted that they were better men and fighters than their western colleagues.⁸⁵² The Easterners looked down on the Western

troops, with their dirty uniforms, their un-shined boots, and their un-soldier-like habits. To Hooker's troops the men of the *Ninth* looked more like Confederates than Union soldiers. They wore rounded-crown wide-brim hats and not the civil-war cap; they no longer used knapsacks with their blankets rolled up neatly on top like the eastern soldier, for now the men of the *Ninth* carried Confederate-type blanket rolls over their left shoulder.⁸⁵³

Most of the men from the *Ninth* worked until midnight bringing up the supply trains,⁸⁵⁴



and early in the morning went into camp not far from Hooker's headquarters near the foot of Lookout Mountain.⁸⁵⁵ The next morning they would be tired, but ready for whatever was assigned to them.



While the *Ninth* was on the north side of the Tennessee River, Thomas sent several corps to attack the Confederates holding Orchard Knob. Sherman was able to repair the bridge at Brown's Ferry, and Ewing's division got safely across. Sherman's fourth division under Peter Osterhaus was not able to cross on the 23rd as the bridge once again broke apart. Grant decided not to delay operations any longer and ordered Osterhaus's division to report to Hooker if it could not get across by 8:00 a.m. of the 24th.

With Sherman's fourth division and the two brigades from the IV Corps, including the *Ninth*, stranded on the North side of the Tennessee River, Thomas pleaded with Grant to allow Hooker to make an attack on Lookout Mountain. Thomas argued that Hooker's troops and the stranded troops from his Army were far more than was needed for just a demonstration. He argued that they should be allowed to make a serious effort to take Lookout Mountain. Grant was unconcerned about Lookout Mountain as his main attack was to be made by Sherman on Missionary Ridge and not an outpost on the other side of town. He conceded to Thomas' request, but stopped short of giving permission for a full-scale assault. He conferred on Hooker permission to take the point of Lookout Mountain only if his "demonstration should develop its practicability."⁸⁵⁶ To Hooker, Grant's order was permission for an all out attack and not just the planned demonstration.

The problems Hooker faced were enormous; the largest being the character of the mountain. From the river Lookout Mountain raises at a forty degree angle for twelve hundred feet where it changes grade and becomes almost level forming a small ledge between 150 to 300

feet wide. This ledge extended around the mountain, and was cultivated as a farm. The Cravens' farm-house was situated upon the upper margin of the farm. Below the farm the surface was rough and craggy down to the river. Above the farm the grade again rises sharply for five hundred feet and was covered with woods, ravines and outcrops, topped by gray rocks that rose another fifty or sixty feet. East and west from the farm house the surface was broken by furrows and covered with shrubs, trees, and large rocks.⁸⁵⁷

Intelligence by way of deserters had given Hooker a good concept of the Confederate position. He knew that near the foot of the mountain the Confederate pickets lined the east bank of Lookout Creek, while their main force, under Cheatham, was encamped near the Cravens' house. The summit east of the palisade crest was held by three brigades of Stevenson's division which was well protected by batteries and rifle-pits against any attack.⁸⁵⁸

The terrain around Lookout Mountain and the placement of Confederate troops were not the only problems Hooker had to contend with; he had troops from three different corps that originated from three different armies and who were strangers to each other. With all these difficulties Hooker perfected his plans with the idea that there would be full cooperation between units, even if they were strangers.


Hooker's plan was to send Geary's division and Whitaker's brigade to Wauhatchie where they would cross Lookout Creek. These troops would then sweep down the creek's left bank to clear it of Confederate pickets so that the remaining forces could cross unhampered. Grose was ordered to seize the common road bridge just below the railroad crossing and repair it. Osterhaus' division, then commanded by General Charles R. Woods, was to move from Brown's Ferry, cross Lookout Creek at a designated point and act in a supporting role.⁸⁵⁹ It was expected that these troops would meet up with Geary's division as it swept the Confederates around the mountain. To strengthen the attack, Hooker planned that all available artillery would smash the Confederate out-posts.

By 4:00 a.m. Hooker reported to Grant that he was ready for the assault on Lookout

Mountain and an hour later, the Union troops began to move out through drifting clouds that had enveloped the mountain.⁸⁶⁰ The fog prevented the Confederates from seeing the Union troops as they marched to their jump-off points, and thus "the movement was . . . a complete surprise to him."⁸⁶¹

At dawn Geary's men crossed Lookout creek and began their sweep of the west bank. For several hours these troops slipped and stumbled along the craggy western slope of Lookout Mountain without being discovered by Confederate pickets. At 10:30 a.m. they made contact with a Mississippi detachment and a brief fire-fight ensued.⁸⁶² After pushing these Southerners aside the Union column moved along the foot of the mountain without much difficulty until they ran into Walter Walthall's two regiments of reserves stationed between the base of the cliff and the Cravens' house.

Gross had been instructed by Hooker to move his command to a destroyed bridge near the railroad crossing of Lookout Creek, and to drive the Confederate pickets located in that area. The brigade moved out at 6:45 a.m toward Lookout



Creek with the *Ninth* bringing up the rear. Before reaching the bridge Grose halted the column in order for him to acquire tools that would be necessary to repair the bridge. At 9:00 a.m. the brigade arrived and found both confederate and Union pickets separated by only 70 feet, enjoying a friendly conversation which ended when the Union column was spotted.⁸⁶³

The creek was more swollen than was expected, and the only means of passage was to repair a 15 foot space in the center of the bridge that had been pulled out by the Confederate pickets. As the brigade moved closer to the bridge the Confederate pickets and skirmishers on the opposite bank made it impossible to make the necessary repairs.

At about 10:30 a.m. Hooker saw the impracticability of Grose's effort and directed him to take four regiments including the *Ninth*, to a position a mile to the right where General Woods' brigade of Osterhaus' division was constructing a pole bridge. When Grose got his four regiments across the newly constructed bridge, they joined the left of Geary's line of attack, forming a double line of battle with the 36th Indiana and the 59th Illinois in the front line. The *Ninth* in the second line moved obliquely up the slope of the mountain as fast as the men and officers could climb in an effort to catch up with the union flank which had passed them while they were forming their line of battle.⁸⁶⁴ While climbing the mountain, the men of the *Ninth* were under the constant fire from Confederate sharpshooters resulting in two enlisted men being wounded.⁸⁶⁵

During the day the Confederates had suffered from a terrible artillery barrage, and with the sight of advancing Federal troops coming out of the fog, they became panic stricken, fled from their trenches and scattered in all directions. Hundreds of these fleeing gray backs were captured. All during the fight the batteries on Moccasin Point north of the Tennessee had been engaging the Confederate artillery on the extreme point and highest peak of the mountain. The heavy clouds, which in the morning had enveloped the mountain's summit, had gradually settled into the valley, veiling it completely from view. With the top now clear the batteries on Moccasin Point kept up their fire, and the fight in the afternoon became known as "The Battle above the Clouds."¹²² As the clouds settled the *Ninth* came in range of two pieces of artillery from the top of the mountain. The Confederates readied one of these pieces and fired at the *Ninth*, but their gun exploded and part of the fragments fell in the ranks of the *Ninth* doing no harm.⁸⁶⁶

After carrying the works and camps on the hill-side, the Union column stormed the Confederate works near the Cravens' house. By 1.30 p.m. the *Ninth* had come upon the Cravens'

¹²² Grant later scoffed at this appellation: "The battle of Lookout Mountain is one of the romances of the war. There was no such battle and no action even worthy to be called a battle on Lookout Mountain. It is all poetry."⁷⁸

field where the Confederates were making a stand. Colonel Suman brought the *Ninth* into line of battle, but was halted by Grose before they could advance. A half hour later he allowed a line of skirmishers from the regiment to move 400 or 500 yards beyond the Cravens' house, but no further.⁸⁶⁷

All along the front log barricades were rapidly constructed by most of the Union regiments that were in the forward lines. Behind these fortifications the remainder of the afternoon was spent in sharp skirmishing with the Confederate troops that were sent down from the mountain top. With the heavy fog that enveloped that part of the mountain, a vast amount of ammunition was uselessly consumed by regiments on both sides with trifling results.

Two regiments were farther advanced than the *Ninth*. They had been in an hour long fire-fight and were out of ammunition. Before nightfall Grose sent the *Ninth* and the 59th Illinois to relieve them. As the *Ninth* moved forward an officer, representing himself as belonging to the regiment that was being pressed and out of ammunition, offered to guide the *Ninth* to the point where his regiment was engaged. After moving a short distance, Colonel Suman found that this officer's regiment was nowhere near the point that Grose had ordered the *Ninth* to move, and so the *Ninth* left the officer and moved further up the mountain. Colonel Suman sent out skirmishers and soon engaged part of six Alabama regiments¹²³ at a range of about 125 yards. The fog was so thick that it was impossible to see anything at that range which resulted in most of the rebel bullets flying over the *Ninth* without damage. After several hours of skirmishing the *Ninth's* ammunition was about exhausted and the men were greatly fatigued from climbing the mountain and having had little sleep the night before. Colonel Suman sent Grose a note requesting to be relieved by fresh troops. After waiting until the last round was fired which they had taken from the bodies of the *Ninth's* wounded and dead, Colonel Suman sent Major Carter to see why they had not been relieved. At 8:30 p.m. the order to pull back was

¹²³ 37th, 40th, 42nd Alabama from Moore's brigade and 20th, 23rd, 30th Alabama from Pettus' brigade

received and the *Ninth* was relieved by the 36th Indiana. Exhausted and out of ammunition the *Ninth* moved back to the open fields near the Cravens' house, and camped for the night. During the day's fight the *Ninth* lost 1 enlisted man killed and 15 wounded. One more enlisted man would later die of his wounds.⁸⁶⁸

While these engagements were transpiring Hooker sent a report indicating that the battle for Lookout Mountain had been won:

After the fog lifts I expect to descend into the valley, unless I receive orders to the contrary. . . Our communications on the left with Chattanooga is established. In all probability the enemy will evacuate to-night. His line of retreat is seriously threatened by my troops.

Hooker was right, for Bragg hearing that Stevenson had lost the slopes of Lookout Mountain, knew that he could not hold the summit and therefore at 2:30 p.m., he ordered Stevenson to withdraw from the mountain to the east side of Chattanooga Creek. In order to make the withdrawal feasible Stevenson keep Walthall's, Pettus' and Moore's troops at the front and in contact with the Union troops. He then withdrew his and Cheatham's divisions from the mountain.⁸⁶⁹ This withdrawal was only suspected⁸⁶⁹ by Hooker and unknown by the Union soldiers spending the night on the side of the Mountain, for they believed that the battle for Lookout Mountain would resume at daylight.

Hooker had suffered, or would suffer in the course of the three-day action, a total of 629 casualties, including 81 dead, 540 wounded and 8 missing. Even by a critic's standard this seemed rather a bargain price for nearly half a mountain that practically everyone, North and South, had judged to be impregnable.⁸⁷⁰

A cessation of firing at about mid-night lead Hooker's staff to believe that the Confederates had evacuated the top of the mountain as well as the east slope and their works in the valley. This result was anticipated by Hooker, however it had to be confirmed through

reconnaissance. The two brigade commanders from the IV Corps, Whitaker and Grose, were summoned to headquarters and given orders to send a group of volunteers at first light to scale to Lookout Point and plant the national flag upon it. This endeavor required the men to club up the rocky palisades, fifty to eighty feet high through the narrow defiles that were cut through the solid rock by time.⁸⁷¹

Whitaker, believing that the Confederates had left the mountain, approached the 8th Kentucky with orders "for a few volunteers to climb that cliff and see if the enemy is still there."⁸⁷² An officer and five men volunteered.⁸⁷³ Grose chose the *Ninth* where some 30 men volunteered for the expedition and permission was given that Colonel Suman take charge of the excursion himself. Colonel Suman believed that there were Confederates guarding the summit that would cut down his volunteers as they ascended through the narrow defiles to the peak. To him and the men in his regiment this expedition was nothing more than a "forlorn hope" with scant chance of survival. Before dawn this small band of volunteers, holding Nelson's new flag at their front, passed a line formed by their comrades, and as they did each pressed their hands and bade farewell. Colonel Suman's men crept slowly up the wet rocks expecting to be fired upon with each step. When they arrived near the summit they saw the National Colors from the 8th Kentucky being raised atop Lookout Point.⁸⁷⁴ The honor of being first to crest Lookout Mountain was given to the 8th Kentucky, and no one ever remembers who was second.¹²⁴



After loosing Lookout Mountain Bragg sent reinforcement to his right anticipating an attack by Sherman. Grant, at his headquarters on Orchard Knob, issued orders for a simultaneous attack by Sherman on Bragg's right and by Thomas in the Center. Sherman was ordered to attack at dawn at the point most advantageous, while Thomas was ordered to either carry the

¹²⁴ General Geary also sent a squad under the command of Colonel Richards of the 29th Pennsylvania to climb the east side of the palisade and plant the flag. They, like the Ninth arrived to see the 8th Kentucky's flag atop the mountain.

rifle-pits or ridge directly to his front.⁸⁷⁵ Wanting to protect his own flank, Thomas ordered Hooker off Lookout Mountain to make a demonstration against Bragg's left on Missionary Ridge.


When the sun came up on November 25th and the fog burned off, Grant learned that Sherman had only taken the detached hills the day before and still had some distance to go before reaching Tunnel Hill. There was now no reason for Thomas to attack the center since the movement was only for the purpose of supporting Sherman's sweep of Missionary Ridge.

Hooker, however, was to continue his maneuver hoping that his force would sweep Missionary Ridge in the opposite direction thus catching the Confederates in a pincer movement.

The battle shifted to Sherman's attempt to drive the Confederates from Tunnel Hill. This hill was steep, its crest narrow and wooded with Cleburne's position protected by long breastworks, and in back of that a higher hill packed with artillery that commanded the ground across which the Union troops had to move. Sherman made little headway against the entrenched enemy.

Seeing that Sherman's advance had stalled Grant sent Howard's corps giving Sherman seven divisions, three of his own plus three from Howard's Corps (Eleventh), and Davis' division from the Fourteenth. When Bragg saw Howard's corps move to support Sherman, he directed the rest of Cheatham's and Stevenson's troops be hurried to Hardee. With that move, a chasm was created between the Confederate center and the right. This separation corresponded with the interval separating the Union armies under Sherman and Thomas.

When Howard's troops got into position, Sherman ordered another assault on the Confederate stronghold. This onslaught was met and repulsed by Hardee's counter-attack



driving the union troops in disorder down the hill.



On the other side of Chattanooga, Hooker had been ordered off Lookout Mountain to cover Thomas' right flank, and to make a demonstration on Bragg's left. Hooker immediately begin moving his troops down the face of the mountain, with Osterhaus' division in the lead followed by Cruft with the *Ninth*, and Geary's division bring up the rear. Two regiments were left on the summit of Lookout Mountain with instructions to entrench and hold it at all cost.¹²⁵

The detachment from the *Ninth*, having returned from the race to the summit, waited with their brigade to move off the mountain. At about 11 a.m. the *Ninth* started their descent over a curving narrow road reaching the foot of the mountain about noon. They then marched on the road in the direction of Rossville by way of Chattanooga Creek, a distance of about 5 miles.

When the lead column reached the Creek, it was found that the Confederates had destroyed the bridge across it. Hooker's column stopped and orders were given to repair the bridge. There was only one problem; Hooker had not brought the engineers and building materials with him. With no materials at hand he sent scouting parties to fan out and bring in what was needed. The repair of the bridge took over three hours as Hooker's men stood at ease and waited.



With Sherman's attack stalled and Hooker delayed by the rebuilding of the bridge across Chattanooga Creek, Grant did not know what to do next. At after 3:00 p.m. with the day nearly gone, word came that Hooker had rebuilt the bridge and was ready to begin his offensive effort. With Sherman's situation so critical, Grant made a radical departure from his pre-announced

¹²⁵ The 8th Kentucky and the 96th Illinois were given orders to explore the battle-field, bury the dead, and collect and secure all abandoned arms and property.


plan. He would send Thomas' army to attack the center, not in support of Sherman as originally planned, but as an independent assault.⁸⁷⁶ Thomas' four divisions were to move forward, take the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge, and halt there to wait for further orders.

In front of Thomas' army the Confederates had fortified the ridge for three miles. There they stationed four divisions of about 16,000 men and nine batteries of artillery. In rifle-pits about 100 yards from the base of the ridge, Bragg had positioned half of Anderson's division and two brigades of Bate's division. In front of these pits the Confederates had cut down all the trees to open a field of fire from 300 to 500 yards wide. From the base of the ridge to the top was a steep ascent of some 1,500 feet covered with large rocks and fallen trees. About half way up the ridge a small line of works had been thrown up. On the crest of the ridge Bragg's men had constructed their heaviest breastworks, protected by sixty pieces of artillery.⁸⁷⁷ There was, however, a mistake by the engineer in placing the artillery. He had taken his instructions literally when told to put the final line on the highest ground. This line was along the topographic crest instead of the "military crest", or the highest place from which you can see and fire on an approaching enemy.⁸⁷⁸

Bragg, failing to see the mistake, considered that part of the ridge impregnable and an unlikely place for a frontal assault. If an attack on the ridge was to be made, he reasoned, it would come on the flanks but just in case of the implausible, Bragg issued orders that if the Federals advanced in force, the troops in the rifle-pits should hold their position until the enemy was within 200 yards, fire one volley and retire up the slope fighting as they climbed.⁸⁷⁹

Thomas was dubious about Grant's plans. It appeared to him that Grant was willing to sacrifice the Army of the Cumberland in an unrealistic effort to save his friend Sherman. Thomas was not aware, however, of the pinned-up emotions of his men: their hate for the Southerners, their embarrassment about being run off the field at Chickamauga, their hurt over the prevailing notion that Sherman's troops were better soldiers and more battle-hardened than they were, and that they were insulted by the way Hooker's Easterners treated them.⁸⁸⁰

Thomas' divisions lined up. Even orderlies, clerks and cooks rushed to find rifles to fall in line. Twenty-five thousand angry men stood in line in the late afternoon ready to cross the mile of mostly open ground to their redemption. Baird's division, having been sent back by Sherman, was on the left, Thomas J.



Wood's division next to him, then Phil Sheridan's division, and Richard W. Johnson's division on the far right. The long blue line stretched for over two miles with more men in line, shoulder to shoulder, than in Pickett's charge at Gettysburg.

Each brigade was in line with a double line of skirmishers ready to lead off. Their orders to stop after capturing the rifle-pits was misunderstood by most of the generals leading the attack, or if understood, most considered the order absurd. To William Carlin, brigade commander in Johnson's division, the attack was simple. He roared along his line of battle and shouted: "Boys, I don't want you to stop until we reach the top of that hill."⁸⁸¹

At 3:30 p.m. the six gun volley was given the signal that the assault should commence, and with it the long blue line moved forward. The charge that followed according to most who observed it was "a scene never to be forgotten--a panorama to stir the blood in wild tumult"; - - - "one of the grandest spectacles ever seen", and an experience "never to be encountered twice in a lifetime."⁸⁸² As the Federals moved forward, the Confederates' artillerymen on the crest of Missionary Ridge with their sixty guns came alive and a moment later the troops were deafened as the valley shook by the noise of hundreds of shells exploding. Most of the shells screamed over the heads of the advancing Union troops, while a few landed in their midst with the consequential results. The line never stopped or faltered in this hailstorm as they passed through

the woods. When the blue line reached the open field, they could see the rifle-pits and a spontaneous cheer swept along the line. The men began a running charge with bayonets raised, flags flying, and each yelling "Chickamauga! Chickamauga!" as if the yell alone would force the rebels from the rifle-pits.

When the Confederates in the pits saw the charge, they fired a volley and ran like hell scrambling up the hill as fast as their legs would carry them. A few stayed to fight and were quickly overrun by the Union skirmishers who got to the pits first. In about ten minutes the first regiments reached the base of the ridge where the two mile long blue line came to a stop. The second line stopped in the flats.

The Confederate artillery loaded canister and turned their guns on the rifle-pits. These pits were now proving to be death traps; they had to leave or be cut to pieces. The only place of safety was on the crest. First one soldier then another began going up the slope; then a platoon here and a company there. Color-bearers sprang to the front and as one fell, another bore the flag aloft and onward, followed by their comrades en-mass.¹²⁶ It was spontaneous, each soldier moving as his own courage and endurance dictated. As the line moved up, junior officers began to climb yelling out to their men: "follow me!"

Generals caught the fever and began sending their brigades up the ridge. Willich and Hazen had no intention of halting as their orders required; they went up the slope full tilt. All regular formations were soon lost as the men crawled together up the hill, some men using tree branches or bayonets to haul themselves up, each vying to be first.

Grant, back at Orchard Knob, seeing the blue line move up the slope yelled to Thomas: "who ordered those men up the ridge?" "I don't know", Thomas replied, "I did not." Then he addressed Gordon Granger, "Did you order them up, Granger?" "No", said Granger, "They started up without orders. When those fellows get started all hell can't stop them." Through his

¹²⁶ Seven of the color-bearers who scaled Missionary Ridge to plant their flags won the Congressional Medal of Honor, including General Douglas MacArthur father of the 24th Wisconsin.

binoculars Grant could see disaster in the offing. The ridge at that place was implausible and both he and Bragg knew it. Seeing the disaster before him he muttered "somebody would suffer if this does not turn out well."⁸⁸³

The blue line moving up the hill soon changed into a sea of blue, as it covered the entire slope topped with little points where regimental or national colors lead the way. Over and around rocks, under and through the fallen trees, the wave slowly moved to the top of the ridge while the rain of shot and shell fell upon them. As they moved up, the Confederate batteries could no longer lower their cannon tubes to engage the oncoming blue wave, so the cannoneers resorted to hurling lighted shell down the slope.⁸⁸⁴


At about 5:00 p.m. Hazen's brigade and Sheridan's division reached the top first and leaped over the Confederate log breastworks. Panic gripped the Southern soldiers and they turned and ran from the works by the score taunted by the cry "Chickamauga, Chickamauga!" This panic was not caused by fear, but by the overwhelming impression that resistance was useless.⁸⁸⁵ The rest of the blue line simultaneously carried the ridge in six places. In some places along the ridge the Confederates made a fight, but they were soon beaten back.

Bragg, who was never known for having much charisma, tried to rally the broken brigades from horse back holding a large flag. He ordered, and then begged the men to return to the line to no avail.⁸⁸⁶ Near his headquarters the panic-stricken Confederates broke in full retreat. Regiments were captured almost in their entirety. Battery after battery were captured with most of their artillery men, and those who stayed and fought were either shot or bayoneted at their guns. These guns were then turned and used against the retreating masses running to the rear.⁸⁸⁷ With Thomas' army having taken the impregnable center of Missionary Ridge, Bragg turned his horse rearward to join the retreating mass.



While Thomas was aligning his four divisions for the attack on Missionary Ridge, Hooker got across the bridge over Chattanooga Creek. The lead division marched through Rossville Gap without difficulty pushing aside a small unit guarding the supplies and wagons at Rossville. After capturing Rossville, Hooker determined to assault the ridge itself. His plan of attack was brilliant; Geary's division that had not yet reached Rossville would march northward along the western base of the ridge while Osterhaus' division would do the same on the eastern base of the ridge. To Cruft's division came an order from Major-General Butterfield, Hooker's chief of staff, "to occupy the ridge immediately and engage the enemy vigorously in case he should be met, pressing the line rapidly northward along the ridge until the enemy was encountered."⁸⁸⁸

At about 4:00 p.m. Cruft immediately turned his two brigades to move up the ridge, lead by the two brigade commanders along with a small cavalry escort. The ridge at the point of ascent was narrow on top preventing full brigade formation. When Cruft and Grose reached the top they were attacked by Confederate skirmishers advancing down the ridge. This



attack scattered a portion of the cavalry escort down through the ranks of the lead regiment, the *Ninth*.⁸⁸⁹ The *Ninth*, supported by the 59th Illinois, was ordered up on the double-quick. The 84th Illinois and 36th Indiana formed a second line, with the 75th Illinois and 24th Ohio forming the third line. By the time the rear lines were formed, Colonel Suman had thrown forward his first two companies as skirmishers and charged to the top of the ridge with the rest of the regiment following. As soon as the *Ninth* gained the top, it formed in line of battle as heavy fire was poured upon them. Without allowing his regiment to fire a shot, Colonel Suman ordered bayonets to be fixed and they charged the Alabamians at a dead run. "It was hard enough to

make the movement on that rough ground up hill, let alone make the movement on a run under fire", recalled Lieutenant Mosman of the 58th Illinois, which somehow got caught up with and fell in on the left of the *Ninth*.⁸⁹⁰ The sight of the oncoming men in blue caused the Confederate units to flee to the rear. As soon as the *Ninth* gained the desired point, Colonel Suman ordered a volley to be fired into the rebels' broken and fleeing ranks. In the first charge the *Ninth* captured some 50 prisoners, and killed and wounded a large number.⁸⁹¹

The fleeing Confederates rallied their broken ranks behind some breastworks 300 yards in front of the *Ninth* and opened fire upon them. These breastworks had been constructed by the *Ninth* on September 21st and were used the day after the battle of Chickamauga in the Federal retreat into Chattanooga. Colonel Suman, seeing the reserves come up over the hill and allowing time to reload, ordered a second charge on these breastworks. The regiment crossed the open ground in front of the fortifications and carried them by storm capturing some 200 prisoners. The Colonel, not wanting to stop the attack or break his line of battle, turned these prisoners over to one of General Woods' regiment on his immediate right.⁸⁹²

With the prisoners taken off their hands, the *Ninth* pushed forward some 200 yards to a second set of breastworks where the Confederates were making a stand. Here, after a short fire-fight, the *Ninth* captured 20 more prisoners and killed some 10 or 12 men wounding some 30 more. After taking the second breastworks the *Ninth* was ordered to halt until the reserves came up.⁸⁹³

When these troops arrived, the *Ninth* continued to push forward for about a mile driving the Confederates northward on the ridge. As they advanced, the sound of battle from the North, where Thomas' troops were attacking the center of Missionary Ridge, seemed to be approaching them. This sound turned out to be Carlin's brigade of Johnson's division. As Johnson moved South, he was driving the Confederates before him on the ridge. When the *Ninth* and Johnson's men were separated by only 800 or 900 yards, the Confederate forces caught between them threw down their arms and surrendered. Carlin's troops alone netted 27 officers and 679 men.⁸⁹⁴

Colonel Louis H. Waters of the 84th Illinois, seeing the *Ninth's* fight for Missionary Ridge, noted in his official report:

In the fight on Missionary Ridge my regiment was in the second line and immediately in the rear of the Ninth Indiana, but did not have an opportunity to participate, as the gallant Ninth monopolized the entire affair.⁸⁹⁵

When Carlin's troops met and joined the *Ninth*, the battle for the Confederate center and right came to an end as well as the carnage brought on by the *Bloody Ninth*.⁸⁹⁶ With night-fall the regiment went into camp on that part of Missionary Ridge they had captured.

In this afternoon's action, the *Ninth* lost 3 enlisted men killed, 5 wounded, and 1 officer wounded.⁸⁹⁷ One enlisted man would later die of his wounds; bring the total killed from the *Bloody Ninth* to four.⁸⁹⁸ Both Cruft and Grose in their official reports noted that Colonel Suman and his regiment, deserve, favorable mention for daring and gallant conduct on this occasion.⁸⁹⁹ The *Ninth* had now made a statement to their new commanders.



While the battle for Missionary Ridge was being waged in the center and on the right, Sherman on the left could make no further advances against Cheatham's and Cleburne's divisions. In the fast fading light of November 25th, Sherman made one last attack, but was stopped just 200 yards short of the objective and was forced back disorganized and exhausted. With that, the Union army was content to let the Confederates leave Tunnel Hill at their leisure; the fight for Missionary Ridge was over.

During the night the Confederate Army of the Tennessee moved south toward South Chickamauga Creek leaving Missionary Ridge and Chattanooga to the Federals. Bragg stayed there until midnight then ordered the retreat to continue through the night to Ringgold, Georgia,

a town ten miles south along the Western and Atlantic Railroad.

Grant now deemed that the relief of Knoxville was now more important than any further pursuit of Bragg. He placed Sherman in command of the Union endeavor towards Knoxville and gave him for that purpose Howards' and Granger's corps, along with Davis' division of the XIV Corps. Sherman would, of course, also take his own three divisions. Grant permitted Sherman to give his troops one day's rest before starting for Knoxville.



On November 30th, Grose's Brigade and the *Ninth* received orders directing them to move to the Chickamauga battle-field and bury the Union dead. The *Ninth* reached Reed's Bridge on Chickamauga Creek at nightfall and camped there. The next day it performed the gruesome duties required of them. The brigade buried about 400 bodies of the Union soldiers that had been the prey of animals for two and a half months. Their clothing had been stripped from the bodies and they lay in the field and woods where they had fallen. On the left, in the area where Longstreet had been in charge the dead were buried, but toward the center and right where Bishop Polk was in command, few of the Union dead were buried or covered at all. The heads and feet of those were frequently found separated and some distance from the bodies.⁹⁰⁰ The men could not help from crying, it was an awful sight, a scene of inhumanity the men of the *Ninth* hoped never to witness again.⁹⁰¹

With the ghastly task performed, the *Ninth* returned the next day to their camp at the summit of Raccoon mountain near Whiteside, Tennessee. There they would spend the winter.

During the Chattanooga campaign the *Ninth* lost 4 killed, 21 wounded, including one officer and 25 missing, although most returned to the regiment in the days that followed. Grose's brigade lost in the campaign 6 killed, 55 wounded, and 64 missing.⁹⁰²

The losses for the North out of the 56,359 effectives during the three day fight for

Chattanooga were 753 killed, 4,722 wounded and 349 missing for a total of 10% of the effectives force.⁹⁰³


The South had 64,165 effectives and lost far less in killed and wounded: 361 killed and 2,160 wounded. The Confederates, however, had 4,146 missing, most of them taken as prisoners. The total loss for the South was 14% of the effectives or 6,667.⁹⁰⁴ As to the South's losses, Grant insisted that Bragg was in error as he had sent 6,142 men to Union prison camps.⁹⁰⁵ His count is probably more reliable than that given by the Confederacy.

Chapter 11

VETERAN VOLUNTEERS

After the Battle for Chattanooga, the *Ninth* returned to its camp on top of Raccoon Mountain near Whiteside, Tennessee. General Charles Craft, still acting as brigade commander, was directed to take a position on the railroad between Whiteside and Bridgeport for the purpose of rebuilding the railroad line. The *Ninth* was temporarily placed in a pioneer detachment composed of units from both of Craft's brigades, and was employed in the construction of a double-track macadamized road over the nose of Lookout Mountain. This railroad was to serve as a route of communication between Lookout Valley and Chattanooga without dependence upon the pontoon bridges built during the Chattanooga action. Beyond this primary use, the railroad was essential to keep supplies coming into Chattanooga from Bridgeport, Nashville, Louisville and the North.⁹⁰⁶

The railroad building project included two long and high bridges, one over the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, and the other over Falling Water, near Whiteside. At this point in the war, building bridges had become somewhat standardized. The ordinary wooden bridges on a railroad were being reconstructed on a standard pattern of truss, of which the parts were interchangeable. Prepared



Bridge at Whitesides, Tennessee
December 1863.

interchangeable timbers were kept in stock at points in the rear, and brought forward when needed. By this means a bridge, which might have taken months to build before the war, could

be rebuilt within days. The *Ninth* was assigned the task of building the Whiteside Bridge, and spent most of the month of December, 1863 working on its construction and the road bed leading to and from the bridge.

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Following the battles for Chattanooga, General Braxton Bragg's Army of the Tennessee withdrew south about fifteen miles to Dalton, Georgia a station on the Western & Atlantic Railroad. Bragg wired Richmond on the night of November 29th: "We hope to maintain this position. Our inferiority in numbers, heavy loss in artillery, small-arms, organization, and morale, renders an earlier halt impossible; and should the enemy press on promptly we may have to cross Oostenaula." He added: "My first estimate of our disaster was not too large, and time only can restore order and morale."⁹⁰⁸ Bragg went on to add a request that he be relieved from command, and that an investigation be commenced into the causes of the defeat.⁹⁰⁹

This time Davis had his adjutant general reply to Bragg's reports with the following order: "Your dispatches of yesterday received. Your request to be relieved has been submitted to the President, who, upon your representation, directs me to notify you that you are relieved from command, which you will transfer to Lieutenant General Hardee, the officer next in rank and now present for duty."⁹¹⁰ Bragg waited for two days for the order to be rescinded, but when none came, he had no choice except to obey and he turned his duties over to Hardee and took his leave.¹²⁷

In the seventeen months that Bragg had commanded the Army of Tennessee, it had fought four great battles. In each, except one, Bragg's army ended up withdrawing. The Army had one great moment with the victory at Chickamauga, but Bragg squandered that victory with

¹²⁷ Bragg was soon recalled to Richmond as Davis' military advisor. He held several other posts during the remainder of the war, and went with Davis to Georgia where he was captured on May 9, 1865. One of the largest military bases in the United States is named in his honor, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

the defeat at Chattanooga.

With Bragg gone, within a few days Davis offered the permanent command of the Army of Tennessee to General William J. Hardee, but he turned down the offer. Davis was then forced to search for another officer with experience in army leadership who had popular support and who was available. There was only one man who met these criteria. Most reluctantly, Davis appointed Joseph E. Johnston as the army's new commander, even though he personally disliked him.⁹¹¹



Most of the enlisted men in the Union army had committed themselves to a three year term of service, as did the men of the *Ninth*. As 1864 approached the three year term of enlistment was rapidly coming to an end. Washington was not unaware of the calamity that would be caused by the loss of these troops. The problem was in persuading the veterans to volunteer for an additional term of three years or for the duration of the war. Most of the same motives still existed which had caused the typical soldier to volunteer in 1861, including love of country. But these motives were now accompanied by a stern knowledge of war, death, wounds, captivity, and incredible deprivation and hardship.⁹¹²

In early June 1863, the War Department devised a plan of offering various inducements to these veteran troops to keep them in the field for the duration.¹²⁸ The first plan gave as inducement one month's pay in advance, as well as a bounty of \$402.00 paid over time. In addition a red and blue "service chevrons" would be worn on their uniforms. As an additional incentive, the veteran recruits were promised a thirty days furlough after their original term of enlistment came to an end.

This plan utterly failed, as very few men rejoined the Union cause. In a letter to

¹²⁸ This plan was especially designed to secure the re-enlistment of nine months' men who entered the service under the call of August 4, 1862. It was hoped that the three year men would jump at the chance to re-enlist in order to secure the bounty and premium.

Washington, Governor Oliver P. Morton of Indiana offered the suggestion that the old regiments should be allowed to come home to recruit and re-organize as most of the Indiana regiments were now dangerously reduced in numbers. He reasoned that the influence of the old veterans upon their friends at home would enable the regiment to fill its depleted ranks. Morton's plan was rejected by Washington, so again in early October, 1862, undaunted by the rebuff, Morton revised his plan and sent it off to Washington:

I respectfully submit the following plan for filling up the old three (3) years regiments: A certain number of the old regiments, say one from each Congressional District, reduced the lowest in point of numbers, or oldest in organization, and three fourths of which will reenlist for three years, should be brought home to recruit--officers and men to be furloughed from such time as the Governors of the respective States may determine, for the purpose of recruiting for their respective regiments, the Governor to designate places of rendezvous. At the expiration of the terms of furlough, the regiments to be returned to the field, and a like number of old regiments, upon the same principle, be brought home and recruited, and so on. The men who reenlist to be mustered out as if their first terms of enlistment had expired for past service, and be paid the four hundred and two dollars (\$402.00) bounty awarded to veteran volunteers for future service. This will place the regiments organized in 1861, as regards bounty, on the same footing as those organized in 1862, and it is believed the plan will take so few men from any one corps as not materially to weaken it.⁹¹³

Again Morton's plan was shelved, but because of the low number of men in the Indiana regiments, the War Department issued an order in late October, 1863⁹¹⁴ that allowed one non-commissioned officer or private from each company to be sent home on recruiting service for his company. If the non-commissioned officer was able to recruit a number of men that would bring his company up to the minimum standard, he was promised a commission in that company.

After the Battles for Chattanooga, Colonel Suman, in compliance with that order, selected a sergeant from each company to return home to recruit.⁹¹⁵ These ten sergeants from the *Ninth* arrived home in early December and began their recruiting efforts, most, were unsuccessful. Four recruited none at all, while four others brought in only one recruit. The sergeant from Company A was able to deliver nine men, and the one from Company K was able

to recruit eleven. Neither received promotions to Second Lieutenant for their efforts. The rest of the Indiana regiments fared similarly to that of the *Ninth*, and only a few thousand new recruits came into the Union cause.

Morton's plan, as amended by Washington, helped to bring a few good men into the already existing regiments, but it did nothing about securing the reenlistment of the veterans needed to carry on the war effort. Washington's program in this area failed to provide those veterans with what they really wanted and needed most. The general terms of the reenlistment and the amount of bounty offered appeared satisfactory enough, but the provision of granting furloughs of thirty days "as soon after the expiration of their original term of enlistment as the exigencies of the service will permit", was unpalatable. The veterans had been in the army long enough to distrust the promise of a furlough at some unspecified time in the future. Most thought this promised furlough would come only at war's end. The men had not been home for two years, and what they wanted most was to go home now. To alleviate this distrust and to satisfy their wants, the War Department issued an order on November 21st, 1863 which authorized "a furlough of at least thirty days previous to the expiration of their original enlistment." The Generals of all armies were required to see that the furloughs were granted and to provide transportation to their homes at the expense of the Government.⁹¹⁶

To encourage reenlistment, Governor Morton dispatched special agents to confer with the officers and men in the field. These agents were instructed to bring such influence to bear on the commanding generals as would accomplish early furloughs for those regiments that were the first to reenlist. Regimental officers were encouraged to place pressure on their men and most, but not all, enthusiastically went among their soldiers to have them re-up. These officers were promised that if three-fourths of the men reenlisted, the regiment's future existence would be assured and they would remain in command.⁹¹⁷

These endeavors were well received by the enlisted men in the regiments, and for the

Ninth it only took a few days¹²⁹ for seventy-five percent of the men to reenlist in the Veterans Service.⁹¹⁸ Of the 22 officers and 271 enlisted men that comprised the *Ninth*,⁹¹⁹ 291 ultimately reenlisted.⁹²⁰

When it became apparent that the reenlistment strategy had worked, Governor Morton began to plan for the Indiana soldiers' return. Over twelve thousand would be granted furloughs for thirty days in the state, excluding the days spent in transit, and arrangements had to be made for their arrival. Most of these soldiers were in the south, under Grant and Sherman, and their return was planned by way of Jeffersonville, Indiana where a large hall was fitted for their temporary accommodation. Jeffersonville provided the men with a place to rest and recoup where it was warm, dry and well lit. Food and drink was ready and available at any time the men wanted to partake.

Indianapolis was the next step for the returning troops. They were met at the railroad depot by a messenger sent by the Governor, who conducted them to a spacious home or hall where comfortable quarters and a "good square meal" with plenty of refreshments awaited them. At these dinners, many of the regiments were greeted and welcomed by the Governor himself. His address usually included a short military history of the regiment including its campaigns, marches and engagements. After the speeches, music by a full band gave zest to the banquet. Frequently, the occasion was enlivened by patriotic and humorous songs presented by singing clubs and individuals. In addition, these reception dinners were always brightened by the presence of a delegation of ladies from Indianapolis, who were gratified to wait on the soldiers.

From this reception the men boarded trains and went to their homes. Through the Governor's efforts, the soldiers left Indianapolis with knowledge that the leaders of government and the people of Indiana really appreciated their efforts in putting down the rebellion. Most of

¹²⁹ On December 12, 1863 "The Ninth Regiment re-enlisted for three years. For purposes of the three-fourths requirement, the Ninth, as all other regiments, was credited with the number of men it had in the Department of the Army of the Cumberland, without distinction between effective and ineffective strength.

these soldiers would never forget the Governor's treatment; they would remain loyal to him and form the backbone of the Republican Party in Indiana for the next forty years.

The *Ninth*, being one of the oldest and the first to meet its seventy-five percent requirement, was one of the first regiments granted furlough. It left Whiteside, Tennessee in the last week of December, 1863 after waiting a few days for the paymaster to pay off the veterans.⁹²¹ They marched out of camp, off Raccoon Mountain to Shellmonud, Tennessee. From there they took the train north. On January 9, 1864 the *Ninth* arrived in Indianapolis. Governor Morton's reception was held in the afternoon of January 11th at Indianapolis' Masonic Hall, and as the *Ninth* entered, they were greeted with salvos of cheers. The Governor paid a high compliment to the *Ninth's* bravery on "many bloody fields" and their patriotism in being one of the first to re-enlist. Other speeches were given by Generals Mansfield, Nobel and Carrington, as well as Colonel Suman and Surgeon Sherman of the *Ninth*. That night the *Ninth* was quartered in the Senate Chamber at the Capital. The *Ninth* divided into companies the next day and moved off to their respective counties.⁹²² In each of the home county other formal gatherings greeted the men as they arrived. As an Indiana soldier remembered, "It was worth a lifetime of service to become the recipients of the loving welcome we received from mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, [and] sweethearts . . ." ⁹²³

During the thirty day furlough many of the officers and men did their best to recruit friends, family and neighbors into the ranks of the *Bloody Ninth*. One hundred twenty-five new recruits joined the regiment as a result of their efforts.⁹²⁴ In mid February, these new men, along with their veteran colleagues wearing their new red and blue "service chevrons", went into camp at the county fair grounds in Valparaiso, Indiana. There they spent a week in training and for the first time since leaving Hazen's brigade, began to drill. As Captain Amasa Johnson remembers the events of that week, he credits Colonel Suman for having the hardest task he had ever undertaken when he tried to hold these men at the fair grounds. "Colonel Suman had a wife, and could not fully realize the terrible hardship of staying in camp when there were so many

charming girls in Valparaiso bidding us welcome to their pleasant homes; no, I assure you when Colonel Suman left camp in the evening we didn't remain long but immediately started for the town where we spent our time much more pleasantly than in the old barracks at the Fair Ground."⁹²⁵

After a farewell party given by the citizens of Valparaiso, the men of the *Ninth* boarded a train at 10:00 p.m on February 22, 1864 for Indianapolis, arriving the next morning. The regiment would spend four days quartered at Camp Washington awaiting transportation to move back to the front.⁹²⁶ At noon on February 26th, the *Ninth* boarded the Madison, Indianapolis and Peru Railroad train for a short ride to Madison, Indiana; from there, it embarked on the "Bostona", a small steamboat that traveled down the Ohio River to Louisville, Kentucky. From there the regiment took the train to Nashville, arrived at Bowling Green, Kentucky at 6:00 in the morning and arrival at Nashville on February 28th at about 1:00 p.m.⁹²⁷ Only the veterans made the trip and not the 125 recruits, for they stayed in Indianapolis with Captain Leonidas A. Cole of Company "E" to be mustered into Federal service and paid their promised bounty.

On March 1st the regiment left Nashville by train, moved through Chattanooga and on to Cleveland, Tennessee, a small town twenty-eight miles further east of Chattanooga. On March 4th the *Ninth* found its brigade camped about four miles east of Cleveland, not far from the Chattanooga and Knoxville Railroad tracks. The *Ninth* with its brigade would spend the next month in Cleveland, the nearest Confederate a mere twenty-five miles south at Dalton, Georgia.⁹²⁸

When the *Ninth* went into camp, they saw the new star on their brigade commander's shoulder, for William Grose had been promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General on January 25, 1864 during their absence. This was not the only promotion, for a few days after the *Ninth* arrived back in camp, word came that General Grant had been promoted and ordered to Washington. Lincoln wanted to give Grant control over all the armies of the United States, reporting only to the President. With this in mind, Congress revived the grade of Lieutenant-

General.¹³⁰ On March 2nd Grant was given this rank by the President, and confirmed by the Senate in executive session. Two days later while in Nashville, Grant was ordered to report in person to the President in Washington, D.C.¹³¹



The year of 1863 was a year of great victories for the North at Gettysburg, Vicksburg and Chattanooga. In the West, the Confederate losses in men, material of war, and territory were immense. At the close of the year the central offensive line was resting upon the northern limits of Alabama, Georgia, and North Carolina.

It was evident that during the forthcoming year the Army of the Cumberland would again confront its old enemy, the Army of Tennessee. This Southern army was getting ready for a defensive fight they knew would be launched against them in the spring. They were well-positioned at Dalton, Georgia with a heavy detachment at Buzzard's Roost, and several strong outposts between Dalton and Atlanta. The Western and Atlantic Railroad ran north from Atlanta and went through this area of Georgia supplying the Confederate Army with the needs of war. During the long winter, those stationed along this railroad would build fortresses out of what Mother Nature had already amply provided them.⁹²⁹ It would now be along this railroad that the war for Southern independence would be won or lost.

¹³⁰ George Washington alone had previously been honored with the full title conferred upon General Grant. In 1798 the United States relations with France threatened war, and during this crisis Washington was made Lieutenant-General. The only other person to hold the rank was General Scott. He was given the rank after his unsuccessful campaign for the Presidency, however the grade of Lieutenant-General was conferred upon him by brevet.

¹³¹ At 1:00 p.m. on March 9, 1864, General Grant was received by the President in the cabinet room, and secured his commission. There was no celebration for the honor conferred. Only a few attended the meeting: the President, the cabinet, General Halleck (the retiring general-in-chief), General Rawlins (Grant's chief of staff), Colonel Comstock (Grant's chief engineer), the President's private secretary, and Owen Lovejoy of Illinois. The only other person forming a part of the group was Grant's fourteen year old son.

Chapter 12

ADVANCE ON ATLANTA

When Grant was ordered to Washington to take command, he took his friend William Tecumseh Sherman with him as far as Cincinnati. During this journey, the two generals consulted freely as to the plans for future campaigns. The consultation was continued in the parlor of the Burnet House at Cincinnati, where it was determined that the Northern Armies should make a simultaneous assault upon both Richmond and Atlanta. Sherman was appointed to Grant's former command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and General James B. McPherson was assigned to take over Sherman's old command of the Department and the Army of the Tennessee.

Sherman had not proven himself as a great general. He had failed at Shiloh, failed at Chickasaw Bluffs, and failed at Chattanooga. As far as generalship, George H. Thomas would have been a better choice; after all, he was the "Rock of Chickamauga" and his army saved Grant at Chattanooga. Sherman, however had two important qualities of which Grant could count: (1) he was Grant's friend, devoted to him, and there would be no disloyalty; and (2) he knew that Sherman would use his brilliant intellect, his best efforts, and all his energy to carry out Grant's orders.

Sherman's new command consisted of four departments, each having its own army. The Army of the Cumberland, stationed in an area around Chattanooga, was still commanded by Thomas and consisted of the IV, XIV and XX Corps, commanded respectively by Generals O.O. Howard, John M. Palmer, and Joseph Hooker. The IV Corps had three divisions under David Sloan Stanley, John Newton, and Thomas J. Wood. The *Ninth* was part of Stanley's division. Stanley was appointed to command the 1st division of the IV Corps on March 14, 1864¹³², and relieve its

¹³² David Sloan Stanley graduated ninth in his class of 1852 from West Point. He served on the frontier and in the Kansas border wars and did some Indian fighting. He was offered a colonelcy in the Confederate Army while stationed in Arkansas even though he was from Ohio. He refused the appointment and was named Captain of the 1st U.S. Cavalry. He fought at Forsyth, Dug Spring, and Wilson's Creek before being named Brigadier-General (USV). He was appointed commander of the 1st division Army of the Mississippi and led it at New Madrid, Island No. 10 and Fort Pillow. He was later appointed Chief of Cavalry of the Army of the Cumberland and fought at Stones River, Brandville, Snow Hill, Franklin and others. He took over command of the 1st Division, IV corps on November 21, 1863 and was reappointed its commander on March 14, 1864.⁸¹

temporary commander Charles Craft. Stanley had three brigades under him commanded by Charles Cruft, Walter C. Whittaker, and William Grose. The *Ninth* remained in Grose's brigade.

In order to allow the Northern army the ability to move south, the railroads had to be maintained in working order to move the supplies that an army on campaign needed for survival. With this in mind, Sherman made the training of rail repair crews an integral part of his preparations, and placed the railroad gangs on the same status as his combat troops.⁹³⁰ Their training was as rigorous as the drills required of soldiers.

Because Sherman's forces would be moving south further and further away from their base of supply, a limited means to provide supplies to each army unit was order. Sherman gave each army commander equal right to make requisition for stores and equipment, but in turn he cut the amount of equipment each unit could carry. To each regiment he allowed only one wagon and one ambulance, and to each company a pack-mule was assigned to carry the officer's mess-kit and personal baggage. A similar reduction was made for each brigade, division and corps headquarters. The army was stripped of unnecessary gear that made an officer's life a little more pleasant, and Sherman made no exception, even for himself.⁹³¹



The Confederate army facing Sherman during the early part of 1864 was a demoralized group of veteran soldiers where desertion was a common daily affair.¹³³ After Johnston's appointment, he made it a point to visit every camp and outpost. Unlike Bragg, he spoke cordially to the troops and officers alike and listened to their views. He granted them furloughs and gave deserters amnesty.⁹³² He worked tirelessly to re-cloth and refit his army, to increase their rations and to restore discipline. As he worked, the confidence and spirit of the army returned and for the first time since Albert Sidney Johnston, the army became devoted to its commander.

¹³³ General Thomas reports that they averaged thirty deserters per day, nearly all of whom desired to take the amnesty oath, and to comply with General Grant's orders in regard to deserters.

Johnston knew that his army was about half as large as that opposing him. His forces were concentrated at Dalton. This location was picked not because it offered great natural fortifications, but because it was merely the point at which the route from Missionary Ridge stopped. Johnston realized, however, that he was expected to hold Dalton and could not pull back; as such action would bring about Davis' wrath. Therefore, he spent the winter fortifying this and other positions further south which he knew would be used in the spring.

Additionally, Johnston realized that Sherman might send a force across the Tennessee River into Alabama, march against Rome, then move South to Kingston cutting off Dalton. If this happened, Johnston would have to abandon Dalton and move to interpose his army as a shield against Atlanta. He therefore made plans to leave Dalton on short notice if necessary, either by rail to Kingston or by marching his army to intercept an approach to his rear. This plan called for carefully entrenched lines, one succeeding the other, as he might be compelled to retire. His plan was for Sherman to attack these fortified positions and at the last moment, Johnston could withdraw to another fortified position. With this plan, one man in the line was worth three or four of the attackers.⁹³³ To carry out the plan, he improved the roads south from Dalton and assigned a separate route for each column in case of withdrawal. He provided each column with guides so that the whole army could move smoothly and quickly into prepared positions further south.⁹³⁴

In February, as Johnston was building his line of fortifications and refitting his army, Davis appointed his friend Braxton Bragg as his military adviser, and sent him to inspect his old command. After the inspection, Bragg advised Davis that Johnston's army was ready, willing and able for an offensive movement into Tennessee. Again, Davis recommended a forward movement. To this pressure, Johnston again pointed out that he had neither the men nor means of taking on Sherman's army so far from his base of supply. This reply only hardened Davis' view toward Johnston.

Fostering hard feelings or not, Johnston was able to increase the size and strength of his army by these delays. Returning deserters, a small number of reinforcements, and the return of the cavalry brought the size of his army to 63,777 with 144 guns. Of this number only 43,887 were

effectives.



From Chattanooga to Atlanta was nearly one hundred miles across a difficult country, but not so difficult as that over which Rosecrans had advanced from Murfreesboro to Chattanooga. The key to the topography of North Georgia was the Allegheny range of mountains that formed a line of ridges running northeast to southwest. The more eastern range of mountains continued further south, losing their character as ridges and changing into isolated mountains and high hills such as Kennesaw Mountain, Pine Hill and Lost Mountain, near Marietta, and Stone Mountain which stand out above the flat lands north east of Atlanta.

The Atlanta Campaign started when one of Thomas' cavalry units discovered Snake Creek Gap and found that it was unprotected. Thomas proposed to Sherman that his army use the gap to take Resaca and cut off Johnston from the south blocking both his line of retreat and supplies.⁹³⁵ Sherman liked Thomas' plan, but he would use McPherson's army (his old command) instead and just cut the rail-line forcing Johnston to retreat from Dalton where McPherson would attack his flank and Thomas his rear. This pincer movement would either destroy the Confederate army or force it away from its supply line.

To carry out Sherman's plan of attack, it was first necessary to carry Tunnel Hill something that Sherman could not do in the Battle of Chattooga, and then threaten a direct attack upon Johnston's main position at Dalton. This attack at Dalton would hide the flanking maneuver by McPherson through Snake Creek Gap. Sherman accordingly gave orders on May 7th for Thomas to move the XIV Corps directly upon Tunnel Hill, protected on the left by the IV Corps and on the right by Hooker's corps. While Thomas was on the move, McPherson was to advance through Snake Creek Gap.


As for the *Ninth*, it moved out of its winter camp at Blue Springs near Cleveland, Tennessee

on May 3rd, and marched to Red Clay on the Georgia line. The next day it moved on to Catoosa Springs, Georgia where it would camp until Sherman was ready to put his plan in motion.

Sherman's command on the night of May 6th was situated thus: on the right, at Lee and Gordon's Mill, lay McPherson's Army of the Tennessee; the Army of the Cumberland under Thomas held the center at and near Ringgold; and Schofield's Army of the Ohio was at the Georgia border just outside Cleveland.

On May 7th Sherman's army moved forward. The Confederates made a show of resistance at Tunnel Hill, but when Howard's corps with the *Ninth* came forward, these Southerners fled to Buzzard's Roost.⁹³⁶ McPherson moved south undetected by the Southern cavalry pickets.

On May 8th Sherman was notified of McPherson's progress so he ordered Thomas to attack Rocky Face Ridge. Howard's corps advanced along the face of the ridge to a point within a mile and a half of the Confederate signal station. The *Ninth* moved along the east side of the railroad using Dalton Road that lead through Buzzard Roost Gap. The Confederates had strongly fortified this pass and the high ridges on either side of the road making the gap impregnable to assaults. Grose's brigade, however, along with



the *Ninth* moved into the very "jaws of death" until it drew the fire from batteries and set the entire line of Confederate musketry supports ablaze.⁹³⁷ The *Ninth* was pushed back, but continued to make repeated assaults by way of heavy skirmish lines against the gap.⁹³⁸

On May 9th the diversion against Buzzard's Roost by Thomas's army continued, with the *Ninth* on the east side near the Dalton Road. As the attacks continued on Rocky Face Ridge, McPherson debouched from Snake Creek Gap in mid-morning toward Resaca, seven miles away.

By mid-afternoon McPherson had reached a hill overlooking Resaca, and found Resaca occupied by Cantey's brigade. If he had made an immediate attack, his success would have been certain, but he over-estimated the Confederate strength both in position and number. While he waited on the hill above Resaca deciding what to do next, three infantry divisions under General Hood arrived in town. McPherson's force, over 15,000 strong, was superior to that of the troops defending Resaca and an attack would probably have been successful. He chose only to skirmish with the Confederates until evening without carrying out his goal of cutting the railroad; he fell back to Snake Creek Gap. The decisive advantage gained over Johnston by McPherson's flank movement had been thrown away by his failure to attack.⁹³⁹ Sherman "somewhat disappointed as to the result" placed no blame on McPherson, and decided to march his entire army through Snake Creek Gap to Resaca in the hope of "interposing" it between Johnston and the Oostanaula River.⁹⁴⁰

On May 10th the attacks in front of Rocky Face Ridge continued, but as a ruse it served no purpose since Johnston knew McPherson was in Snake Creek Gap. Davis became concerned about the situation and sent Polk's Corps to support Johnston. The *Ninth* remained in camp during the day and in the evening, went on picket duty, in the pass with its brigade.⁹⁴¹

On May 11th Sherman ordered his army to follow McPherson's path into Snake Creek Gap, lead by Thomas followed by Schofield. He left the IV Corps with the *Ninth* along with a cavalry division to hold Johnston's attention at Dalton. During the day the *Ninth* remained on picket duty in the pass and that night it was assigned the task of fortifying its position.⁹⁴²

On the other side, Polk's advance division reached Resaca giving Johnston three corps, Hardee, Hood and Polk that brought the size of his army to about 75,000. In the afternoon Johnston sent Wheeler's cavalry to make a reconnaissance of the Union positions and although it was beaten back by the Federal cavalry, Johnston learned of Sherman's plan.

On May 12th the *Ninth* was still on the front line near Buzzard's Roost, by then known as "the terrible door of death"⁹⁴³ when they were attacked. After a "lively" fire-fight, the Confederates were pulled back, leaving the *Ninth* with one man killed and two wounded. After the fight the

Ninth was relieved of picket duty, but was again ordered to continue fortifying the brigade's position.⁹⁴⁴ Unknown to the *Ninth* or anyone in Howard's corps, late in the day Johnston ordered a withdrawal from Dalton. His prior preparations were so complete that during the night, Dalton was completely evacuated without confusion.⁹⁴⁵

On May 13th Johnston positioned his army to the west and north of Resaca in a horseshoe-shaped line, something like the Union position at Gettysburg, with his left at the Oostanaula River and his right extending northeast around Resaca to the Connasauga River.⁹⁴⁶ To offset this new position, Sherman positioned his army in a line opposite Johnston, with McPherson positioned on the river, Hooker on his left, then Palmer and Schofield where the line turned east to the railroad.

That morning Howard discovered that Johnston was gone from Dalton and sent his corps through the gap to take the town. The IV Corps was led by the *Ninth* on the Dalton road to the outskirts of the town when it came upon Johnston's rear guard and skirmishing commenced. The *Ninth* and the 36th Indiana drove this guard through Dalton killing several of the rebel calvary and took the town that had been so long the stronghold of the Army of Tennessee.⁹⁴⁷ The regiment continued the pursuit and at about noon, three miles south of Dalton, they came upon a rebel fortification on a high wooded hill. As they approached, the Southern gunners opened upon them with a battery of artillery. One officer of the *Ninth* reported that "the terrible musketry and artillery fire they poured into our ranks seemed as if they would sweep us from the face of the earth; never did we receive a more terrific storm of shell and canister."⁹⁴⁸ The brigades's artillery returned fire and a heavy duel commenced across a large open farm with a low valley in between. The men of the *Ninth* almost ceased firing to watch the artillery duel. "We feared the result as the rebels were entranced, but we saw one gun after another silenced or dismounted --- and felt like giving three cheers for our battery as it was the first real artillery fight of the campaign."⁹⁴⁹

As the Confederate guns became still, the *Ninth* and 36th Indiana supported on the right by the 84th Illinois charged across the valley under a heavy fire. With Nelson's flag leading the way the three regiments ascended the wooded hill and drove the rebels from their fortifications. In the fight,


only one man in the *Ninth* was wounded, but he would later die of his wounds.⁹⁵⁰ This was the last of the *Ninth's* fighting for the day, and it moved a few miles south entering Sugar Valley and camped with the its corps that night.

On May 14th Sherman, believing that Johnston was ready to withdraw, ignored Thomas' proposal for a strong flanking movement across the Oostanaula River, and ordered a three corps attack on the Confederate center. The ground over which the attack was made was very difficult and the troops were subjected to infiltrating artillery fire from both right and front. The Union troops were unable to get a foothold on the opposite bluffs and were repulsed with considerable loss.⁹⁵¹

At this point, Johnston chose to counter-attack by ordering Stevenson's and Stewart's divisions of Hood's Corps to


move against Howard's corps which had been left exposed. The object of this assault was to turn the Union left and cut Sherman off from his supply train in Snake Creek Gap. The *Ninth* was on the far north side of the Union line where the Confederates planned an assault. The terrain in front of the regiment was rough and hilly, too rugged for the artillery to move. The area was heavy woodland with thick underbrush interspersed with a few small farm fields.

The rebels attacked through this area, moving in heavy columns. They initially pushed Whittaker's brigade, and succeeded in driving them like "cattle." Cruft's brigade was then driven in the same manner, leaving Grose's brigade with the *Ninth* in their path. Grose quickly changed



positions facing the attackers and yelled to his men, "We shall not be driven back." It appeared to Colonel Suman and his men that they would be crushed by the overpowering rebel lines. The mass of gray pushed against the *Ninth's* barricades and were beaten back. Again and again the southerners attacked, and each time the *Ninth* and the rest of the brigade maintained a heavy fire from behind their barriers causing the rebels to fall back. The brigade's six gun battery, firing canister into the ranks of the attackers, assisted in keeping the Confederates from overrunning the fortifications.⁹⁵² As the Confederate line moved to one side past the *Ninth* and were about to capture the brigade's battery, the crash of musketry was heard stopping the Confederate advance. It was Williams' division from Hooker's corps, having been called from reserve, which came onto the field and drove back the attackers from the *Ninth's* front.⁹⁵³ In the fight, three men of the *Bloody Ninth* were killed and another four were wounded.⁹⁵⁴

On May 15th Sherman ordered Howard's and Hooker's corps to attack the Confederate right in an attempt to drive Johnston's army back against the Oostanaula River. The attack failed and that night Johnston evacuated Resaca leaving his dead and wounded in Union hands. The Confederates crossed the




Confederates crossed the Oostanaula River on the railroad bridge and a small trestle bridge built alongside. Completing the crossing, he burned both and marched Polk's and Hardee's corps to Calhoun. Hood crossed the Oostanaula River on a pontoon bridge built that night and took the road to Adairsville by Spring Place.⁹⁵⁵

On May 16th just as the sun was coming up, the fires from the burning bridges alerted

Sherman that Johnston had made his escape across the Oostanaula River. He ordered a pursuit but the passage over the river with such a large force encumbered with his long trains was slow.⁹⁵⁶ The *Ninth* followed the retreating Confederates for about ten miles and ran into part of Stewart's division which was acting as Johnston's rear-guard.⁹⁵⁷ In some sharp fighting the *Ninth* captured seventy-two men including two commissioned officers.⁹⁵⁸

On May 17th Johnston reached Adairsville. In looking over the maps he noted that the terrain between Kingston and Cassville was a high, gravelly plateau, becoming rough and broken in its southern part.⁹⁵⁹ He also noted that there was a road leading from Cassville to Kingston that was not on most of the maps. With that, he came up with a strategy to use this road to ambush part of Sherman's command. He would send Hardee's Corps and most of the cavalry with the entire baggage train due south on the main road that paralleled the railroad to Kingston. At the same time, he would send his other two corps with a bare minimum of ammunition, wagons, and ambulances to Cassville. He hoped that Sherman would also divide his army and follow each of the Southern detachments, thus making it easier to attack the smaller force. He instructed Hardee that upon reaching Kingston he should rush his forces on the road he had discovered to join Hood and Polk at Cassville. When his army was once again together they would attack the smaller Union force moving on Cassville. While Johnston was putting his plan together, the *Ninth* marched to within two miles of Adairsville on duty as train guards.

On May 18th Sherman found conflicting evidence at Adairsville. Therefore, he sent most of his army including the *Ninth* following Hardee to Kingston, while Hooker and Schofield's corps took the road to Cassville. Believing that Johnston's army would be concentrated at Kingston, he ordered that Hooker and Schofield upon reaching Cassville should move west toward Johnston's main force. By nightfall, Johnston's entire army was together again and in line of battle outside the town of Cassville where the trap was to be sprung.



During the day, the *Ninth* moved along the road to Kingston. When night came, they encamped about seven miles from Adairsville.⁹⁶⁰

On May 19th at dawn, Johnston rode with his corps commanders to point out where Hood would start his march to attack Hooker's flank. However a Union cavalry division that had been sent to raid the railroad south of Cassville discovered the trap and the confederate plan failed.

Thomas' army with Howard's corps in the lead and the *Ninth* in the advanced position pushed the Confederate rear guard through Kingston with heavy skirmishing as they moved forward. At Kingston, Thomas found that the Confederate army was not there as expected and so he moved east toward Cassville and established a line on a parallel ridge across from the Confederate position. "It looked as if we were to have a great battle; it was one of the grandest sights we saw during the war", reported a Captain in the *Ninth*.⁹⁶¹ Hooker's corps joined Thomas on the left and Jacob D.

Cox's¹³⁴ of Schofield's army on the right. Skirmishing continued into the night with artillery being used by both sides.

Johnson however, having studied the position and having told his troops that very morning that their days of retreating were over wanted very much to remain there and fight.⁹⁶² During the night he considered the situation and then ordered a retreat across the Etowah River.

On May 20th Johnston's army crossed the Etowah River and burned the railroad and wagon road bridges after them. His army entered into the vastness of the Allatoona range where good positions could be fortified for further defense. He followed the railroad to Allatoona Pass which provided a natural stronghold, one even stronger than the position they held at Dalton.

On May 21-22nd the *Ninth* rested and refit in camp at Cassville.⁹⁶³ When Sherman started the campaign, his troops carried only four days of pre-cooked rations. After they were gone, only small supplies reached them and most of the soldiers were living on hard tack and water. At the Etowah River, Sherman ordered a three-day rest to allow the supply wagons to arrive and for the railroad to be repaired as far as Kingston which he would fortify and make a supply depot.

Sherman's intelligence informed him that Johnston was now dug in around Allatoona and that he could not successfully attack such a stronghold. He planned to flank Allatoona, a maneuver that would take him away from the railroad and his supply line. He ordered twenty days of rations to be issued to each division, and a wagon train was developed to support his next move.

The land into which the Union Army was marching was dominated by the mountain ranges pointing to the southwest. The Allatoona Hills, Kennesaw Mountain, Pine, and Lost Mountains lay near the line of the railroad and necessarily formed the most important strategic points for both armies. For several miles west of the railroad the hills were high, and further west the hills diminished to form a rolling sandy region filled with streams containing sharp ravines. The entire

¹³⁴ Jacob Dalson Cox, a lawyer, was a State Senator from Ohio when the war broke out. He is reported as being a genius in almost everything he attempted. His two-volume *Military Reminiscences of the Civil War* was published in 1900. He is also the author of "Atlanta" and the "March to the Sea", Franklin and Nashville" in 1882 which are frequently cited in this work.⁸³

country between the Etowah River and the Chattahoochee River had a desolate appearance, with few openings and very few farms. The farms that could be found were small and poor. Other parts were covered with trees, thickets of the loblolly pine, and dense underbrush which troops would have difficulty penetrating. There was much loose, shifting soil on the hills, and many lagoons and small streams bordered with treacherous quicksand. In the area of march, Dallas was a village twenty-five miles south of Kingston and twenty miles west of Marietta.⁹⁶⁴

On May 23-24th leaving a garrison at Kingston, Sherman's army crossed the Etowah River a few miles south of Kingston. Satisfied that Johnston would attempt to hold Allatoona Pass, Sherman's plan was to bypass it and move to the right for Dallas. If he eluded Johnston's watchful eye and reached Dallas he would be closer to Atlanta than Johnston. This, he concluded, would force Johnston to abandon Allatoona and fall back to the Chattahoochee River only a few miles north of Atlanta.

The *Ninth* left Cassville at 1:30 p.m. on May 23rd, crossed the Etowah River to the right of the Atlanta road, and camped at Euharley for the night. The next day they moved out at 6:00 a.m. marching eight miles and camped for the night at Burnt Hickory, north of Huntsville.⁹⁶⁵

Johnston detected Sherman's entire plan from the start, and moved his army west concentrating them near Dallas where three roads intersected.

On May 25th all of Johnston's army was in the Dallas area posted near a Methodist chapel called New Hope Church. In front of the church was a wooded valley along the road, but with open fields a little further to the north along a stream that ran into Pumpkin Vine Creek.⁹⁶⁶

When Hooker approached New Hope Church he encountered the Confederate line and was ordered to dig in and hold. Sherman believing that Johnston was still at Allatoona Pass, and that only a few Confederates faced Hooker, ordered Hooker to press the attack. Hooker did as ordered and a severe battle began. Johnston later wrote, that "the canister shot of the sixteen Confederate field-pieces and the musketry of five thousand infantry at short range must have inflicted heavy loss upon General Hooker's corps, as is proved by the name "Hell Hole" which, General Sherman says,

was given to the place by the Federal soldiers."⁹⁶⁷ The Confederates fought off Hooker's attack and by nightfall it was still in a strong position to withstand any assault.

The *Ninth* moved from camp at about 6:00 a.m., marched about five miles, crossed Pumpkin Vine Creek, and fell in as reserves behind Hooker. There they spent the night under arms waiting to be called to the front line.

It rained all night and Sherman, without a tent, tried to sleep next to a log close to the *Ninth's* position. The next morning both he and Hooker were soaked to the bone and "about as sorry a looking Major-General" as the men of the *Ninth* ever saw. One of the officers of the regiment offered Hooker something to drink, but advised that it was only some rot-gut whiskey. Hooker told him he would like to see it, as he had never before seen the article. He took it and proclaimed that "it was the best whiskey he had ever tasted."⁹⁶⁸

On May 26th during the day the *Ninth* moved into position on the left of Hooker, and pressed close upon the Confederate line. They fortified their new position that was just four miles north of Dallas.⁹⁶⁹ Sherman was not convinced, however, that Johnston had his whole army before him and planned still another limited assault for the next day.

On May 27th the *Ninth's* old brigade commander William Hazen attacked what he thought was the Confederate flank near Pumpkin Vine Creek. As he moved forward, he soon realized that he was not attacking the end of the Confederate line as planned, but a well-placed division which presented a strong line of fire. It was the elite division of Patrick Cleburne. Hazen was repulsed as Johnston reported "with great slaughter." Hazen had over 1,000 casualties, nearly half of them killed.¹³⁵

While Hazen attacked, Stanley's division made a strong demonstration attempting to keep

¹³⁵ By this stage of the war both North and South had learned the lesson, excluding maybe Grant at Cold Harbor, that to attack a strongly fortified position was folly, and a waste of life without prospects of victory. What an attacking force wanted to do was to find their adversary in a weak position, or in the open, or to have an exposed flank. For this reason, Sherman used almost entirely the flanking movement in this campaign. The attack of Hooker at New Hope Church, and the one made by Hazen were both in column of brigades or demi-brigades. The result in both cases demonstrated that in a difficult and wooded country, and especially against entrenched lines, the column had little, if any advantage over a single line of equal front.⁸⁴

the Confederates occupied in their front, though no serious attack was made. During this demonstration the *Ninth* was engaged in heavy skirmishing that commenced early in the morning and continued throughout the day. As part of the regiment fought on the firing line, the other part threw up a line of breastworks. In the late afternoon the *Ninth* was moved to the left, and took position on the front line where again they built another line of works. During the day's fight the *Bloody Ninth* lost one man killed and one wounded. The regiment would spend the night behind their built fortification, under arms, wide awake, and ready for whatever might occur.

It should be noted that what Colonel Suman had started on the battlefield of Chickamauga, had now become common practice. The advance line on both sides entrenched themselves as soon as a position was assumed. The Confederates often noted: "Sherman's men marched with a rifle in one hand and a spade in the other."⁹⁷⁰ The method of making such quick entrenchment required that a skirmish line be kept in front, while the rest of the unit would stack arms a few yards in rear of the intended entrenchment. Entrenching tools were taken from the wagons that accompanied the ammunition train, or were carried by the troops, and each company would cover its own front. Trees were felled and trimmed, and logs, often two feet thick, were rolled in front of the line. The timber revetment was usually four feet high, and the earth thrown from the ditch in front varied in thickness according to the exposure. When likely to be subjected to artillery fire, it was from ten to thirteen feet thick at the base, and three feet or less on the top of the parapet. Logs resting on the top of the revetment at right angles kept in place a head-log that created a three inch wide horizontal loophole through which firing took place. Sharpened poles were then placed in front making an entanglement that would prevent or slow an oncoming attack. This type of entrenchment could be built in an hour from the time the unit stacked their arms.⁹⁷¹

On May 28th Johnston believed that McPherson's army was withdrawing and ordered a cavalry brigade to charge McPherson's position. Late in the afternoon, these dismounted troopers, moving through the dense woods and underbrush found that Johnston was wrong. They were hit with a storm of bullets, shell and canister which devastated the unmounted horsemen. "Fortunately,

our men had erected good breastworks, and gave the enemy a terrible and bloody repulse," said Sherman. The Confederates' loss in this attack more than Hazen had lost the day before; some estimate nearly 3,000 casualties.⁹⁷² Meanwhile, the *Ninth* stayed in the same position they had fortified the day before, and participated in slight sporadic firing.⁹⁷³

On May 29th the *Ninth* stayed in the same position. Late in the night they beat off a heavy attack on their position, and the Confederates were repulsed with some loss.⁹⁷⁴

On May 30-June 4th the *Ninth* and most of Sherman's army remained in the same positions, moving slightly left each day. The scene in their front continued to be the same with heavy skirmishing but no general engagements. Thomas' troops alone were expending 200,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition daily.⁹⁷⁵ During the four days of skirmishing, the *Ninth* suffered only a few wounded.⁹⁷⁶

Sherman was now in a stalemate with Johnston, for during the last ten days (May 25-June 4th), the Union position failed to advance. His army was running out of food and forage, so he determined that it would be necessary to leave Johnston in his entrenchments and move eastward to Ackworth and back to the railroad. He ordered his army to move slowly to the left. The roads leading back to Ackworth were now in his possession and Allatoona Pass was now occupied by his cavalry.

On June 4-9th Johnston, adapting his movements to those of Sherman, had transferred his whole army to a point on the railroad north of Marietta. On June 4th, the *Ninth* found that their front had been evacuated and in the early morning its skirmishers occupied the former Confederate works. A day later the *Ninth* plowed through the mud in the direction of the railroad, and encamped about three miles from Ackworth. On June 7th they policed the camp and arranged tents in their proper order, knowing that they would be spending the next few days resting and being refit.

While Sherman was busy refitting his army, Johnston was building a new line of fortification with Kennesaw Mountain on his right, Pine Mountain¹³⁶ in the center, and Lost Mountain on his left.

136 Pine Mountain is really a big hill, about 300 feet high.

These mountains interposed a natural barrier to a direct approach from the north, and Johnston did his best to make it impregnable to direct assault.

On June 10-14th Sherman put his army once again in motion. They marched south along the railroad to Big Shanty, a station on the railroad, the site of present-day Kennesaw. Here the Union found a triangular mountain fortress of nature's construction. "The scene," Sherman said, "was enchanting--too beautiful to be disturbed by the harsh clamors of war; but the Chattahoochee lay beyond, and I had to reach it." It was not just the mountains that stopped Sherman's army, but a ten-mile long Confederate line of fortifications. Seeing this defense line, he deployed his army parallel to it. During the next few days the *Ninth* fell into line with the rest of the army, even though drenching rains had turned the red clay into a blood-red sea of mud. It was like the Tullahoma Campaign all over again, for rains and storms had started on June 4th and continued daily making the roads impassable. Streams that were ordinarily dry in June were now formidable obstructions. The woods and fields were soaked, turning the whole country into a quagmire making any type of activity impossible. As for the combatants, most had never known what real hardship was before the rain started. For days upon days, they were wet to the skin with "not a dry article of clothing on us; each night our beds were the wet and muddy ground, without even fires, lest we should discover our position to the enemy."⁹⁷⁷ Further, deep in Georgia in the middle of summer, a cold wind blew from the east, quite unlike what the men of the *Ninth* had anticipated of the "sunny South." And then there were the bugs. Mosquitoes stung and thrived in the rain and wet. "The men's bodies are alive with creeping things."⁹⁷⁸ "Chigoes are big, and red as blood and crawl through any cloth and bite worse than fleas, and poison the flesh very badly," noted one soldier.⁹⁷⁹ The men of the *Ninth* near Pine Mountain suffered, scratched and skirmished each day as they moved around the mountain until the night of June 13th.

On June 14th Howard's corps was near the side of Pine Mountain when they were visited by Sherman. Looking on top of the hill he could see several Confederate ranking officers who were making no attempt to conceal themselves. "How saucy they are!" he said, "Make 'em take cover."⁹⁸⁰

The 5th Indiana Artillery, part of Grose's brigade, commanded by Captain Peter Simonson,¹³⁷ was to the right and in front of the *Ninth* when it opened fire on these men. The first shot caused them to scatter, and the second struck Bishop-General Polk in the left side and ripped through his chest.⁹⁸¹ With the Bishop dead, Major-General William Loring assumed acting command of Polk's Corps.¹³⁸

During the night Johnston ordered the Confederates off Pine Mountain, and Grose's brigade with the *Ninth* moved onto the mountain and pursued the withdrawing troops two miles where they established a new position that was again strongly fortified. There the *Ninth* camped for the night.⁹⁸²

On June 15-20th Johnston continued to withdraw from one strong position to another. Their line was growing stronger with each move because it was contracting. They abandoned Lost Mountain. On the 19th Johnston reached his strongest position of all, Kennesaw Mountain, a long two mile ridge contained three hills: Big Kennesaw on the northeast end, Little Kennesaw in the center and Pigeon Hill at the far southwest end. During these operations the weather, according to Sherman's report, "was villainously bad." Rain fell almost without pause for three weeks, making mud gullies of the narrow roads, and the fields and woods a vast red quagmire. This condition prevented a general movement, but slowly the Union lines moved closer and closer to their entrenched opponents.

For the *Ninth* this advance was no walk in the park. On June 15, 16 and 17th, they were in a constant fire-fight as Grose's brigade move slowly forward. For the first and last time during the war, a whiskey ration was issued to Howard's corps.⁹⁸³ To the men of the *Ninth*, wet, cold and covered with mud, it came as a welcome surprise. On June 19th the *Ninth*, leading Stanley's division proceeded about two miles when they came upon the rebel front on the east side of a large farm. The brigade formed for an attack with the *Ninth*, 36th Indiana, 18th and 84th Illinois in the front line.

¹³⁷ Three days later Simonson was killed by a Confederate sniper.

¹³⁸ A few days later A.P. Stewart was promoted to Major-General and given command over Bishop Polk's Old Corp.

When formed, they charged and drove the rebels from their position and into their fortifications on Kennesaw Mountain. During the charge the *Bloody Ninth* drove the Confederates two miles, and for their efforts had three men killed and eleven wounded.⁹⁸⁴ It was later reported that whiskey may have played a part in the death of several of these men.⁹⁸⁵ One man killed from the *Ninth* was the black servant of Colonel Suman who participated in the fight.¹³⁹ He brought in one prisoner before being killed.⁹⁸⁶ The Brigade's losses were severe, particularly in officers.⁹⁸⁷

On the 20th the rain continued and so did the fighting, with the Confederates trying to hold and the *Ninth* trying to drive them from a swamp in "no-mans" land between the main trenches. Early in the day Groses' Brigade succeeded, but were compelled to abandon the ground gained because of destructive fire from the Confederate artillery. During the evening the *Ninth*, relieved by the 59th Illinois, was moved across a creek to assist Whittaker's brigade that was under heavy attack. The Confederates had sent three brigades to retake the ground that they had lost during the day. In the attack, the 35th Indiana was driven from their position by superior numbers, and the Confederates thus gained a foothold in the Union line. In the dark, friend and foe were mixed. As Whittaker later reported: "It was a time of peril and great danger".⁹⁸⁸ He ordered his troops to attack and re-attack until the rebels were driven out. The fighting was hand to hand, and the bayonet played a deadly role. The counter-attacks caused the Confederates to retreat in wild disorder and with heavy loss. To Whittaker "it was the most fiercely and deadly contested battleground" he had seen. Whittaker had lost 273 killed, wounded, and missing. The *Bloody Ninth* again earned its sobriquet; it lost 13 killed, 27 wounded, including two officers.⁹⁸⁹ The Confederate losses were between 500 and 600 killed and over 1,000 wounded.⁹⁹⁰

On May 21st Hood was shifted to Hardee's left, while at the same time Sherman was enveloping Johnston's right flank south of Kennesaw. Heavy skirmishing continued along the line as the *Ninth* moved one mile to the right in support of the Third Brigade, while four regiments of

¹³⁹ The name of Colonel Suman's black servant does not appear in the official record, nor on the list of dead from the Ninth.

their brigade moved in the opposite direction to support the First Brigade.


May 22nd was another day of combat in the rain for the *Ninth*. They held the same position they had taken from the rebels the night before, and kept up a constant fire with the enemy. Casualties during the day were one man killed, one officer and two men wounded. Sherman became convinced that without dry ground he would never out-flank Johnston. He was afraid that being bogged down in a stalemate would enable Johnston to transfer troops east to Lee in Virginia who was being hard-pressed by Grant.

On June 23-26th Sherman wrote to Halleck: "The whole country is one vast fort, and Johnston must have fully 50 miles of connected trenches, with abates and finished batteries." Sherman was growing restless and impatient with delay. It had been a month since he had crossed Etowah River, and he hoped to be facing Atlanta by this time. He now determined to try a direct assault on Kennesaw. It was a bold and uncharacteristic thing for Sherman to do, for he had promised Halleck that he would "not run head on into fortifications."

The order was given on the 24th for Thomas and McPherson to look along the line for places that an attack might be successful. Both doubted that the assault could succeed, but both prepared to carry it out. They chose three places to attack, one on the North just south of Pigeon Hill, and two in the center near the *Ninth's* position.

While the generals were laying out the plans for the attack, skirmishing continued all along the line. The *Ninth* held its position with no fighting of importance, although Colonel Suman reported another one of his men had been killed.⁹⁹¹

On June 27th a roaring artillery bombardment against the places designated for attack opened the day. While artillery was softening up the Confederate fortifications, the three divisions aligned for their attempt to break open Johnston's stronghold and split his army in two parts. The landing of the shell and the aligning troops pin-pointed the place of attack, and Johnston rushed troops to those places. Newton's soldiers formed in front of the *Ninth*. Colonel Suman's men remained in their trenches on orders that "at the time of the general attack the skirmishers at the base of Kennesaw would take advantage of it to gain, if possible, the summit and hold it."⁹⁹²



As the cannonade stopped, Sherman's division attacked his appointed place and ran into a wall of fire. With a loss of less than 700 men, mostly pickets overrun in the initial rush, the Confederate position was maintained. In less than an hour the army was completely repulsed without even reaching the Confederate works.¹⁴⁰ The North had altogether more than 3,000 casualties.⁹⁹³ The soldiers of Sherman's army realized now, as never before, the futility of direct assaults upon entrenched lines already well prepared and well manned.⁹⁹⁴

Sherman gave the following explanation of his reasons for making this assault:

¹⁴⁰ General Harker before the attack was waiting with General Grose behind the Ninth's position. Grose advised him he had better lead on foot and not on horseback as he would be killed and his Brigade repulsed as he had to charge over open ground. Harker said, "I am a regular, and according to the army regulations I must be on horseback, and I would make the charge on horseback if I knew I would be killed. I ask my men to take their place and they have the same right to demand me to take mine." In the attack Harker, moving with his men, cheered them on; when they were forced to stop, he rallied them again and make a second vigorous effort, in which he fell mortally wounded.

Upon studying the ground, I had no alternative but to assault or turn the enemy's position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers. And I perceived that the enemy and our own officers had settled down into a conviction that I would not assault fortified lines. All looked to me to outflank. An army, to be efficient, must not settle down to one single mode of offense, but must be prepared to execute any plan that promises success. I wished, therefore, for the moral effect, to make a successful assault on the enemy behind his breastworks . . . Failure as it was, and for which I assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim that it produced good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly; and we also gained and held ground so close to the enemy's parapets that he could not show a head above them."⁹⁹⁵

On June 28-July 2nd things remained pretty much the same with heavy skirmishing along the line, but the rain had stopped and the roads, fields and woods began to dry. The *Ninth* was replaced along the front line and moved to the second line of entrenchments.⁹⁹⁶

On June 30th, an armistice was granted for burying the dead. "Not for any respect either army had for the dead, but to get rid of the sickening stench." All day, Confederate and Union burial details moved over the battlefield. "Long and deep trenches were dug, and hooks made from bayonets crooked for the purpose" were used to drag the dead to the trenches. "All the dead were dragged and thrown pell-mell into these trenches. Nothing was allowed to be taken off the dead, and finely dressed officers, with gold watch chains dangling over their vest were thrown in as well."⁹⁹⁷

For Sherman there were two alternatives left, another flanking maneuver or a siege. With the roads and fields drying, a flanking maneuver was determined to offer more success than a regular siege-style operation. On the night of July 2nd McPherson, in front of Kennesaw, was relieved by Garrard's cavalry, and thrown around the right of the army with instructions to advance to Nickajack Creek, and threaten Turner's Ferry and the railroad in Johnston's rear. Johnston had anticipated this movement and saw no way to counter it with his limited resources. He evacuated his fortifications on and around Kennesaw and withdrew southward through Marietta.


On July 3rd Union skirmishers on the top of Kennesaw Mountain were the first sight that

Sherman and the Northern army saw at daybreak. For the *Ninth* it meant an early pursuit of the retreating army. Grose's brigade led the advance and was the first to enter Marietta just as the Confederate cavalry was leaving.

As the *Ninth* approached Confederate entrenchment near Smyrna Camp Ground, five miles south of Marietta, they found that the Confederates were ready to make a stand then and there.¹⁴¹ The *Ninth* stopped short of the Confederate entrenchments and encamped for the night.⁹⁹⁸

On July 4th Sherman paid a visit to Howard. He could not at first believe that Johnston would make another stand north of the river. "Howard," Sherman said, "you are mistaken; there is no force in your front; they are laughing at you!" "Well, General," Howard replied, "let us see." Howard ordered Stanley "to double your skirmishers and press them." Stanley chose Grose's brigade with the *Ninth* to make the charge across a large cornfield in front of the Confederates at Smyrna. The brigade's lines sped forward, capturing the outlying pits and taking many prisoners; but a sheet of lead instantly came from the hidden works at the edge of the woods and several unseen batteries hurled their shot into the charging line forcing the brigade and the *Ninth* to retire.⁹⁹⁹ In making the

point to Sherman, the brigade lost 89 killed and wounded, and the *Ninth's* suffered one officer and nine men wounded.¹⁰⁰⁰ No one in the *Ninth* laughed when Sherman rode away remarking to Howard that his report had been correct after all. On July 5th with the Confederate left again being



¹⁴¹ The "Camp Grounds" are places where religious camp meetings were held from time to time, giving a name to the locality.⁸⁷

turned, Johnston evacuated the lines at Smyrna during the night and pulled back into works of great strength near the Chattahoochee River. The *Ninth* followed them closely to the river, where they again made a stand. The regiment took position on a hill overlooking the river and encamped for the night.

On July 6-11th the army continued to skirmish all along Johnston's new line. On the 7th Sherman withdrew Schofield's army and sent it across the Chattahoochee River at the mouth of Soap Creek. Johnston, seeing that he was again out-flanked and that Sherman was in his rear, withdrew his army the night of July 9th burning the railroad bridge behind him. Johnson then took up a position on Peachtree Creek just three miles from Atlanta. With this move Johnston abandoned all of Georgia between the Tennessee and the Chattahoochee Rivers. This withdrawal did not make President Davis happy. Citizens of Atlanta who were leaving town by the hundreds were equally displeased.

While all this was going on, the *Ninth* held their position on a hill overlooking the Confederate fortifications. There they would stay from July 6 through the 11th resting and watching the rebel activities. On the 11th they were ordered to march five miles up the river where they would cross the Chattahoochee River the next day.

On July 12-17th Johnston at Peachtree Creek started building a line of breastworks only a few miles from the enormous ones surrounding Atlanta. It was his plan to attack Sherman as he crossed Peachtree Creek, where he felt he held the edge, since both Peachtree Creek and the Chattanooga River would intercept any Union retreat. If he failed in this attack, he planned to fall back to the Atlanta entrenchments and to keep back the Union army until the arrival of the state troops which had been promised by Governor Brown at the end of the month. These entrenchments would be manned with the state militia giving him the opportunity to withdraw his main army and attack Sherman in flank whenever Sherman would approach Atlanta.

While Johnston was forming his plans Braxton Bragg, then President Davis' Chief of Staff, visited him, and reported back on July 15th that Johnston had no real plans to defend

Atlanta. Two days later Davis dashed off a telegram to Johnston informing him that since he had failed to stop the Union army's approach to the vicinity of Atlanta, and had expressed no confidence in his ability to defeat or repulse General Sherman, he should immediately turn over his command to General Hood. That afternoon Hood was notified that he would take command of the Army of Tennessee with the temporary rank of full general.¹⁰⁰¹

The *Ninth* crossed the Chattahoochee River on July 12th, marched down the left bank and encamped at Power's Ferry in front of the XXIII Corps. There they built a line of log fortifications and waited for further orders.

Chapter 13

THE CAPTURE OF ATLANTA

John B. Hood now had what he wanted; he was a full General in command of the largest army in the Confederate States. The task before him was to stop William T. Sherman's advance against Atlanta, to push him back across the Chattahoochee River, or to outright defeat him on the field of battle. This assignment was a task that would have discouraged the most skillful of generals, to defeat an army well supplied and twice its size. Hood however was the type of general that would send his troops and himself into situations where angels feared to tread. If Sherman could have made the appointment himself, he could not have picked a better man to help the Union cause.¹⁰⁰²


Hood's first job was to save Atlanta, the very heart of Dixie. To lose Atlanta was to lose the war and everyone knew it, North and South alike. Robert E. Lee was holding his own against Ulysses S. Grant's Army of the Potomac on the outskirts of Richmond, and if Hood could do the same at Atlanta, at least until the north's presidential elections in the fall, he would win the war for the South.



Atlanta was not an old city. Its founding was based on two events that occurred in the 1830s: (1) the final cession of lands in northern Georgia by the Creek and Cherokee peoples and (2) the extension of railroad lines into the state's interior. In 1837 surveyors for the Western and Atlantic Railroad selected the dusty crossroads between the towns of Decatur and Campbellton seven miles southeast of the Chattahoochee River as a southern terminus for their line. A small settlement, aptly named Terminus, arose at that location. While work was progressing on the Western and Atlantic, Terminus grew, changing its name to Marthasville in 1843 and again to Atlanta (in honor of the railroad) in 1845. Atlanta was incorporated as a city two years later. Two more railroads soon established connections with Atlanta. The extensive rail facilities

made Atlanta the center of a growing regional transportation network and hastened the city's development as a commercial center.

By 1861 Atlanta's population had grown to over 9,000. The city accommodated one of the two rolling mills in the Confederacy that produced rails for the over-burdened railroads. As the industrial giant of the Confederacy, Atlanta's machine shops, mills, and foundries supplied the war demands from Mississippi to the Carolinas. Its warehouses, bulging with materials of war, served as a distribution axis. From these warehouses trains left hourly going east, west and south to supply almost all of the Confederate armed forces, including Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of Tennessee.



To protect the largest supply depot in the Confederate States, the Chief of the Bureau of Engineers authorized the building of fortifications around Atlanta. The plan called for a cordon of enclosed works, two or three lines deep and ten to twelve miles in length to be built around the city. As planned, these lines were to be built an average of about one to three miles from the center of the city and were to be within supporting distance of each other. Rifle pits were to run the length and seventeen redoubts for artillery were planned to be distributed along the lines. The plan called for interior batteries to

be added later.¹⁰⁰³ To carry out the plan, large quantities of labor, mostly slaves, supplied by Georgia plantation owners, tools, wagons and construction materials were gathered in May, 1863. As work progressed, large quantities of private property, homes, buildings, crops and timber had to be destroyed in order to clear a field of fire 1,000 yards in front of each line. Behind this field of fire several lines of trenches were built with redoubts¹⁴² connected by curtains and infantry parapets. In front of the line a system of abatis¹⁴³ were added, and in many places three or four rows of these made the line impenetrable. Additionally, long lines of *Chevaux-de-frise*¹⁴⁴ were added.¹⁰⁰⁴ As it turned out, the line proved to be too strong to assault and too long to invest.¹⁴⁵



On July 18th, the day after Hood took command of the Army of Tennessee, Johnston met with the new commander and his chief lieutenants, Williams J. Hardee and Alexander P. Stewart who now with the rank of Lieutenant-General, headed Polk's former Corps. Johnston explained what he had planned for the defense of Atlanta. After hearing the plan, the three sent a request to President Davis asking that Johnston be retain until Johnston's plan could be put into action. Davis refused. Johnston, at Hood's request, continued to give orders until the afternoon of the 18th, placing his troops in the position that he had selected near Peachtree Creek. This done he boarded a train with his wife to Macon, satisfied that he had done his best. He left with the

¹⁴² A small separate work inside a fortification.

¹⁴³ Defensive obstacle formed by fallen trees whose butts are secured toward the place defended with sharpened branches directed outward against the enemy.

¹⁴⁴ A piece of timber from which sharp pointed spikes, spears or pointed poles projected outward five or six feet. Most of these had four rows of sharpened poles, each pole eight to twelve inches apart.

¹⁴⁵ Today only a small part of Atlanta's fortification remain. A small one hundred acre park called L.P. Grant Park carefully preserve what was once known as Fort Walker. L. P. Grant, a native of Maine, in whose name the park is know became chief engineer for the building of Atlanta's fortifications.

understanding that if Atlanta was to fall, it would not be his fault. Hardee sought to be relieved, owing to his dissatisfaction with Johnston's removal and the assignment of Hood to command. He withdrew his request at the personal request of the Confederate President.¹⁰⁰⁵

On July 19th a cavalry unit reported that James B. McPherson's Army of the Tennessee was moving on Decatur from the east in an effort to cut Atlanta's rail link with Richmond. Another report informed Hood that John M. Schofield's Army of the Ohio was moving toward Decatur from the north. With the knowledge that George Thomas' Army of the Cumberland was beginning to cross Peachtree Creek five miles north of the city, he realized that there now existed a gap between Thomas' left and Schofield's right. Hood decided to take advantage of this situation. Thomas also knew about this gap and as will be seen later, two divisions in the IV Corps including the *Ninth* had been sent east to form on the west side of Schofield in an effort to close this gap.

On July 20th Hood arranged his troops to make an attack on Thomas. This attack was supposed to drive Thomas back to the banks of the Chattahoochee River where they would be trapped and annihilated. Benjamin F. Cheatham, now in command of Hood's former corps, would move to the east and keep Schofield and McPherson from closing the gap and coming to Thomas' aid. Further, while the attack was in progress Joseph Wheeler's cavalry would keep Schofield and McPherson, who he believed was still to be east of Decatur, busy. The attack was planned to begin at 1:00 p.m.


Before the appointed hour Wheeler, who was attempting to hold back McPherson on the Atlanta road, called on Cheatham's division on his left for help as he had found McPherson much closer to Atlanta than he had anticipated. Cheatham moved his troops to support Wheeler causing the whole Confederate line to move east. This shaft in the line cause a delay in the attack by several hours.

The *Ninth* followed General David S. Stanley, as he took two divisions to fill the gap between Thomas and Schofield. The *Ninth* moved out at 7:00 a.m. and proceeded to cross the

south fork of Peachtree Creek. Here the bridge was found to have been burned and guarded by a strong Confederate skirmish line. The *Ninth* was in charge of building a new bridge while under fire which the regiment accomplished in short order. By 10:00 a.m., Stanley had his two divisions across and in heavy contact with Cheatham's troops. He was now only a mile west of Schofield, who was moving on a road toward Atlanta. Although the Union maps showed that Stanley's two divisions could fill the gap and still remain close to Newton, they were in fact two miles apart.

At 3:00 p.m. the main attack plain by Hood was made. The southern troops nearly broke through the Union positions, but lacking the numbers to take advantage of their gains, at about 6:00 p.m. were compelled to withdraw back to their line¹⁰⁰⁶

Thomas had 20,139 engaged and of these, 1,600 were killed or wounded. Hood had 18,832 men involved and 2,500 were killed and wounded. Hood left 600 dead on the field and as he withdrew, 246 of his soldiers remained with his adversary as prisoners.¹⁰⁰⁷ Hood's "First Sortie" ended in failure, but this fact did not discourage Hood for he was contemplating a new attack to be made on the east side of Atlanta that would do what the first sortie had failed to do: destroy Sherman's army.¹⁴⁶



¹⁴⁶ Sherman was unaware that a battle was taking place along Peachtree Creek until Thomas sent him a note, six hours after the battle, informing him as to the outcome. In fact, during the height of the action, Sherman ordered Thomas to move on Atlanta as he believed there were no Confederate troops in is area.

As the Ninth along with the rest of Stanley's corps advanced on a small road, the Confederates soon opened fire upon them with shells and canister. Stanley drove in the rebel's outposts, and came up in sight of well made and located entrenchments in front of which was the usual line of skirmishers.¹⁰⁰⁸ During the rest of the day severe skirmishes were fought along this line of fortifications. As the skirmishing continued the *Ninth* attacked the rifle-pits near the line, and after dark carried them. In the action forty-three Confederate pickets were captured by the *Ninth's* skirmish line, commanded by Lieutenant Robert F. Drullinger of "H" Company.¹⁰⁰⁹



On July 21st sharp skirmishing continued during the entire day all around the *Ninth's* position. Batteries were placed behind the *Ninth* and fired continuously at every point where they could produce any effect. It was a very hot day; in fact the intense heat was such that officers and men were prostrated by it, and sunstroke added considerably to the list of casualties.¹⁰¹⁰ In such heat there was only minor readjustment of the lines as neither side made any serious effort to advance.¹⁰¹¹


At Confederate headquarters Hood worked on his plan to attack the Union troops on the east side of the city. His plan was to have Hardee's Corps take a fifteen mile night hike to McPherson's rear and to attack him at dawn. While Hardee's Corps moved east the Confederates, from behind their lines of fortification south of Peachtree Creek, and in the area in front of the *Ninth*, pulled back to the main line of fortifications built to defend the city. The *Ninth* not knowing that the Confederates were pulling back, spent the night in front of these abandoned lines.¹⁰¹²

On July 22nd Sherman was informed that the Confederate works on Peachtree Creek were abandoned. He concluded that Hood had evacuated Atlanta and instructed Schofield to move in and occupy the City.

Colonel Suman, hearing that Atlanta was abandoned, sent a company commanded by Amasa Johnson to rush forward so the *Ninth* might claim to be the first Union troops into the city. This time the *Ninth* would not act as cautiously as it had done in the race up Lookout Mountain, only to come in second. Johnson personally lead the charge: "I came near with our advance, moving right into the rebel lines . . . and for some unaccountable reason the rebels did not fire on us, but allowed us to fall back in great haste to a safe distance, where we awaited the arrival of our brigade."¹⁰¹³ When the brigade arrived, the *Ninth* moved across some deserted Confederate trenches capturing 15 of those who were left behind. They then moved toward the city and came upon the Confederate main fortifications that Amasa Johnson's men had just left in such haste. These battlements were located just three miles north of the center of the city. As the *Ninth* re-approached, the confederates were not as considerate as they were the first time. The regiment took position and entrenched with heavy skirmishing that lasted the remainder of the day.¹⁰¹⁴

Like the *Ninth*, other Union troops moved closer to the city's fortifications. The new line formed by the Army of the Cumberland allowed the three divisions of Howard's corps to again reunite. Schofield, likewise, found the Confederates were well entrenched in his front covering the city from all points on the compass. With this news from his commanders, Sherman concluded that Hood planned to hold the city's fortifications.¹⁰¹⁵

The Confederate attacked on the east side of the city as Hood had planned, and ended at night fall. With the end of fighting, Hood's second sortie ended in failure as had the first. Although Hood would attribute the loss to Hardee for allegedly not carrying out his orders to strike the Union rear, he publicly was satisfied that he "demonstrated to the foe our determination to abandon no more territory without at least a meaningful effort to retain it."¹⁰¹⁶



This battle on the east side of the city became known as the "Battle of Atlanta", and was the largest engagement of Sherman's Atlanta campaign. The *Ninth* played no part in the battle as they continued to remain on the north side of the city. In the battle the Confederates had about 5,500 casualties¹⁴⁷ and Sherman's forces suffered 3,722, a large proportion of which were prisoners.¹⁰¹⁷

On July 23-26th the *Ninth*, in front of Atlanta, built more and better fortifications, one fortified trench in front of another.¹⁰¹⁸ There was little fighting that took place and it appeared that each army had settled in, each soldier glaring across the line at the other waiting for something to happen. The real action during these days in July was occurring at headquarters, and in the process the *Ninth* would lose their commanders from corps to brigade. With McPherson dead in the battle of Atlanta, a new permanent commander had to be named to the Army of the Tennessee, and the choice was up to Sherman. He recommended to the President Oliver O. Howard, commander of the IV Corps in which the *Ninth* was serving.¹⁰¹⁹

¹⁴⁷ Cox reported that of the Confederate, 1,000 dead were delivered to their flag of truce in front of one division of Blair's corps, 422 were buried in front of Dodge's corps, about 700 were buried in front of Logan's corps, and Blair estimated the number in front of his other division as many as those delivered under the flag, making a total of Confederate dead of 3,200. Reducing the numbers by half that were estimated, there would still be at least 2,500 killed.⁸⁹

The President followed Sherman's recommendation, and appointed Howard which infuriated Hooker. It was Howard who had commanded the XI Corps in the Battle of Chancellorsville. Hooker had blamed the XI Corps and its commander for the disaster and loss of the battle that ultimately cost Hooker the command of the Army of the Potomac. To appoint Howard over him seemed to be a double affront.¹⁰²⁰ Believing this to be a point of honor, Hooker asked to be relieved and left the XX Corps on July 28th, being replaced by Major-General H. W. Slocum.¹⁴⁸

To replace Howard as commander of the IV Corps, Major-General David S. Stanley, commander of its 1st Division was appointed. To take Stanley's place the *Ninth's* own brigade commander, William Grose was given temporary command, and John E. Bennett from the 75th Illinois took over the brigade. Grose commanded the division only a short time, for Nathan Kimball was appointed its permanent commander on August 13th, 1864. Kimball was no stranger to the men of the *Ninth*, for he had fought with them as Colonel of the 14th Indiana at Cheat Mountain and Greenbrier in West Virginia in 1861.



On July 22d while the Battle of Atlanta was taking place on the east side of the City, Kenner Garrard's cavalry was given the assignment of destroying the Georgia Railroad, running east to Augusta then to Charleston, and he did so at Covington, 42 miles east of Atlanta. There he destroyed six miles of track, rolling stock, army stores and other buildings.

This destruction left Atlanta with only a single uninterrupted railroad for receiving supplies: the Macon & Western Railroad. In order to cut this remaining road Sherman planned to shift Howard's Army of the Tennessee from the east side of Atlanta to a point on the railroad

¹⁴⁸ Fighting Joe Hooker (1814-1879) remained in the army, and was assigned to command the Northern Department until the end of the War. He remained in the regular army until he suffered a paralytic stroke in 1868 and retired as a Major-General.


south of the city. This maneuver was necessary since Sherman's army was too small, and the defenses around the city were too extensive to encircle it. It was hoped that with Hood inside the city Howard could relocate his infantry and move south toward the Macon Railroad to cut this last line of supply to Atlanta without being harassed by the Confederate army.

On July 27-28th Howard's army moved around in back of Thomas, and had moved to a position directly west of the City. On the evening of the 28th Howard's army was west of a small Methodist chapel known as Ezra Church. "General Hood will attack me here", Howard told Sherman who replied "I guess not--he will hardly try it again."¹⁰²¹

Howard followed his own instincts and began rapidly fortifying on good defensive ground by building breastworks of rails and logs. As they built, the Confederates began and keep up a constant artillery barrage on the digging troops.¹⁰²²

Howard's intuition was right for Hood attacked, but the southerners were hurled back by the withering fire from the troops entrenched behind their rail breastworks.¹⁰²³ Hood's third sortie had ended like the others with the appalling loss of over 3,000 dead and wounded. Howard had lost only 600.¹⁰²⁴ The casualties were not the only loss suffered that day according to Hardee, who afterwards declared: "No action of the campaign probably did so much to demoralize and dishearten the troops engaged as it."¹⁰²⁵

Hood had replaced Johnston because Johnston would not fight. A few more battles like the ones that Hood had just fought would have left Hood without an army. Three times Hood had sent his army against Sherman in the hopes of forcing the Union army to retreat. Each time they failed, and in the process lost about 11,000 men. No further attempt would be made by Hood to oppose Sherman's southward movement. As the Union army moved toward East Point the Confederates, without attacking, extended their entrenched line in the same direction protecting the railroad as they moved.



While the battle of Ezra Church was in progress, the *Ninth* remained in their fortified position, strengthening the line each day. Colonel Suman reported no fighting of importance in their front from July 28 through August 2nd.¹⁰²⁶

On July 29-August 8th the Army of Tennessee moved around the west side of Atlanta. The Army of the Ohio, with Schofield still in command, was transferred to Howard's right with Palmer's corps of the Army of the Cumberland being moved next to them. Palmer held a position below Utoy Creek while Schofield extended the line to near East Point. Here a question of authority arose between Schofield and Palmer. Palmer, believing he was senior in rank, refused to take orders from Schofield, and when ordered to do so soon submitted his resignation on August 6th. Jefferson C. Davis, the assassin of the *Ninth's* beloved General Nelson whose flag they carried, succeeded Palmer in command of the XIV Corps.¹⁰²⁷ This appointment was made by the President on the recommendation of both Sherman and Thomas. He was given the rank of Brevet Major-General.¹⁰²⁸

Sherman's probing actions with the Army of the Ohio compelled Hood to lengthen the line of defense. Every new trench found a fresh one opposite. The lines were near together. The firing from both lines continued both day and night resulting in many officers and men being slain and many more being wounded and sent back to the hospitals.¹⁰²⁹ While Schofield attempted to turn the Confederate flank to reach the Macon Road, Thomas' and Howard's armies pressed vigorously on Hood's right and center. For the next twenty-eight days Sherman's armies were occupied in making approaches, digging rifle-pits and erecting batteries while being subjected day and night to a galling fire of artillery and musketry.¹⁰³⁰ This pressure proved that the defenses around Atlanta had no weak points that Sherman could take advantage of by direct assault, even though the line was fifteen miles long. It was beginning to be evident that in order to reach the Macon Railroad, the whole of Sherman's army would have to be transferred to the west and south of Atlanta.



It was surprising that with the Union army only a few miles from the center of Atlanta and the whole Confederate Army of Tennessee in the city, only a few shells were fired into the city, the first falling on the corner of Ellis and Ivy Streets on July 20th. Most of the civilians considered the sporadic shelling a nuisance rather than a serious danger and went about their daily affairs with little precaution; but nonetheless, the wise stayed away from the railroads, tall chimneys and church spires which were prime targets. During this light shelling most of the residents built dugouts in their yards, similar to tornado cellars that were built in the midwest. This sporadic shelling was about to change, for Sherman wanted to "make the inside of Atlanta too hot to be endured."¹⁰³¹

On August 9-25th after Hood had shown no inclination either to abandon Atlanta or come out and fight, Sherman ordered his 4-1/2 inch rifled siege guns and fifty field pieces of artillery to fire on the city. He now planned to take the city by bombardment. These guns, all employed from commanding ground, rained shells and solid shot day and night, creating within the city the nearest thing to hell on earth. Hood protested to Sherman claiming that the city was full of noncombatants who had not been able to, or would not, leave the city. He called the shelling barbarous and an act unwarranted by civilized warfare. Sherman replied that the object of war was to desolate and devastate the enemy's country. He considered Atlanta far from a peaceful community filled by noncombatants. After all, it was the Confederate's chief military depots and military manufactories center.¹⁰³²

The shelling did considerable damage to buildings in the northern part of town, and killed and injured a hundred or so civilians including women and children. The bombardment accomplished no military impact for Hood continued to receive supplies and there appeared to be no shortage of food or munitions in the besieged city. What the bombardment did was to force the civilians to leave the city. "Everybody seems to be hurrying off, especially the women.


Wagons loaded with household furniture and everything else that can be packed upon them crowd every street, and women old and young and children innumerable are hurrying to and fro. Every train of cars is loaded to its utmost capacity."¹⁰³³

As for the *Ninth*, with the exception of August 20th, frequent skirmishing and changes of lines and positions were the nature of their activity during this period of time. On the 20th, however, the *Ninth* was ordered to the left about three miles from camp and found the Confederates moving out from their fortifications. The regiment, just as dawn was breaking, engaged this force, and a severe fire-fight started lasting nearly two hours. In the end, the Confederates were pushed back for one-half mile to their former fortifications. The *Bloody Ninth's* casualties were two enlisted men of Company B killed and one officer, Major Carter, wounded. All remained quiet thereafter until the morning of August 25th.



On August 25-30th the Union army was once again on the move. Sherman's limited movement south by the armies of the Ohio and the Tennessee during the last twenty-eight days and the all-out bombardment of Atlanta had failed to take the city. This failure only proved that he would need to move his whole army southwest in a flanking movement to cut Hood's last line of communications. On August 25th Sherman ordered his army to pull out of their entrenchments and make a wide arcing movement around Atlanta to the west and south toward a position on the Macon Road near Jonesboro. Through the night of the 25th all the corps were on the move south with the exception of Slocum's XX Corps (formerly Hooker's) which had been ordered to move back to the Chattahoochee River at Bolton to cover and protect the railroad, the bridges, and ferries in his rear.

The *Ninth* was on the move with the rest of the army, having first been given fifteen days' rations. On August 25th they marched to the right, seven miles south across Proctor's Creek, and rested until daylight of August 26th when, starting at 8:00 a.m., they moved with the IV Corps seven miles south across Utoy Creek and camped for the night. On August 27th they marched four miles south to Camp Creek. On August 28th they marched three miles southeast to Red Oak Station, striking the West Point Railroad twelve miles southwest of Atlanta. During the remainder of the day the *Ninth*



spent their time in the destruction of the West Point Railroad. On the 29th the *Ninth* rested and fortified the area around Red Oak Station, only to move the next day five miles to Shoal Creek.¹⁰³⁴

On August 30th Hood received confirmation that Howard's Army of the Tennessee was moving on Jonesboro. To counter this move, he ordered Hardee to march both his and Lee's Corps to that town and in the morning attack Howard and push Howard into the Flint River. After Hardee accomplished this, Lee was to return to Atlanta where he would join Stewart in an attack on the rest of the Union army while Hardee would attack from the south. Hood did not seem to know or understand the extent of Sherman's maneuvers, and supposed that Hardee would encounter a force inferior to his own. In Hood's strategy, he again desired not just to stop Sherman's flanking movement, but to annihilate him, a task far too big for his dwindling army. When these Confederate troops reached the entrenched line they were stopped dead. This uncoordinated attack lasted two hours and was repulsed, leaving Hardee with 2,200 casualties, 1,400 of them in Lee's Corps. The Confederate army had suffered so severely in the battle at Peachtree Creek, in the "Battle for Atlanta" and at Ezra Church that the southern soldier was

losing his stomach for assaulting entrenchments. It was this lack of zeal that prevented a worse slaughter as many Confederate units refused to engage the entrenched Union line once they came under fire. The value of these entrenchments was shown again as Union suffered only 172 casualties.¹⁰³⁵

While this battle was taking place Stanley's corps, with the *Ninth*, Schofield's army, and a portion of Davis' corps, reached the Macon & Western Railroad just below Rough and Ready and began its destruction. The tracks were heaved up in sections the length of a regiment. The rails were then separated, rail by rail, and placed over bonfires that were made from the ties. These red hot rails were then carried to trees or telegraph poles, wrapped around and left to cool." To keep the railroad from quickly being repaired, the road bed was often booby-trapped with live shells that would explode when tampered with by railroad gangs.¹⁰³⁶

On September 1st Sherman saw a splendid opportunity to destroy Hardee's command, so he order three corps to attack by moving down the railroad, destroying the track as they went, until they reached the Jonesboro area where they would find Hardee. About 4 P.M. Davis, not waiting for the rest of the troops to arrive, assaulted a weak place in the Confederate line sweeping all before him, and capturing 600 officers and men of an Arkansas brigade of Cleburne's Division. This was the first and only successful frontal assault of the entire campaign.

Repeated orders from Thomas were sent to hurry Stanley. When Stanley failed to arrive to assist Davis, Thomas galloped up the railroad to find Stanley and get him moving to join the other corps. But due to the difficult nature of the country, Stanley could not deploy his corps before night fall which rendered farther operations impossible.¹⁰³⁷

The *Ninth* moved with Stanley's corps and spent most of the day in the destruction of the railroad as they moved toward Jonesboro. In the early afternoon Stanley ordered Grose to send out a party and capture a few prisoners to determine the true situation of the surrounding area. As usual, Grose sent the *Ninth* out as skirmishers and after feeling for the enemy they found that

a strong force had just left the area leaving a weak skirmish line in their place. Some time went by, and Stanley approached Grose murmuring, "General Grose I am sorry your *Ninth* has captured no prisoners today." "Well," said Grose "the skirmishers are not all in yet, wait and see." With that they looked off to the southeast to see the *Ninth* returning with a couple of "Johnnies." Stanley look at Grose, smiled and retorted, "Well, the *Ninth* has again redeemed her reputation."¹⁰³⁸

The *Ninth* got to the Jonesboro area at about 4:00 p.m. and moved through a dense woods filled with thick bramble and underbrush over which a man could hardly walk. As the regiment struggled along, the Confederates with a strong skirmish line and artillery played havoc on their progress. Upon emerging from the woods, the *Ninth* came in contact with the rebels positioned behind barricades. By the time the *Ninth* got their line straightened up and the Confederate's skirmishers driven back, night had come. In the dark the *Ninth* moved forward under a heavy fire of canister from the rebel guns to within 300 yards of their barricaded lines when they were ordered to halt for the night.¹⁰³⁹ During the engagement the *Bloody Ninth* had eight men wounded, one would later die of his wounds.¹⁰⁴⁰

Late that night Hardee withdrew his forces from their trenches and moved south down the railroad toward Lovejoy's Station where they again formed an entrenched line of battle. As he left Jonesboro, he sent a courier to Atlanta advising Hood that the town had fallen and with it the Macon Railroad. When Hood received Hardee's message he knew that the ghost was up for Atlanta and he ordered his army to evacuate the city by moving south to reunite with Hardee. By midnight only a few cavalry units remained in the city. These troops were used to burn the city's industry, including its rolling mills and eighty-one box cars of ammunition. The explosion caused by these burning box cars was heard at Jonesboro, and was the first indication of the total abandonment of Atlanta. In the early hours of September 2nd, as this Federal unit approached the city, they were met by the mayor who handed its commander a note that read: "Sir: The fortune of war has placed Atlanta in your hands. As mayor of the city I asked protection to

noncombatants and private property."¹⁴⁹ A few hours later Slocum occupied the city with seven brigades.¹⁰⁴¹

On September 2nd the *Ninth* moved into Hardee's vacated works, issued rations, and were given orders to march in pursuit of the retreating Confederates on the road toward Lovejoy's Station. At about 2:00 p.m. the regiment came upon the rebel rifle-pits about 500 yards in advance of their main line of heavy trenches. They assaulted and carried the pits, taking most of the men as prisoners. The *Ninth's* brigade sent skirmishers out beyond these pits toward the main works, but were driven back by Confederate artillery using canister, with the loss of one enlisted man killed.¹⁰⁴² The *Ninth* maintained their position on the lines in the captured rifle-pits and fortified the site during the night.

On September 3rd Sherman received word that Slocum had occupied Atlanta the day before. That night Sherman wired the War Department: "Atlanta is ours, and fairly won." With that, Sherman announced the conclusion of the campaign, and gave orders for his armies to return to Atlanta to rest and recuperate until Hood made another move or some new plan on the Union's part could be developed. It was two days later that the *Ninth* received word that the campaign was over and with the rest of the Union army withdrew to Atlanta.¹⁰⁴³ On September 8th the *Ninth* marched through the devastated city and encamped two miles east of town. They would rest there and "prepare for a fine winter's campaign."¹⁰⁴⁴

¹⁴⁹ Through the night of September 1st and the morning of September 2nd throngs of deserters, stragglers, abandoned slaves, and desperate refugees filled the streets, looting empty stores and homes. Residents huddled in their homes, expecting to see their city pillaged either by the mob or by the Union army.



The casualty figures in the Atlanta campaign are difficult to calculate, but the Union probably lost in the region of 30,000 men out of the 100,000 that served: 4,423 killed, 22,822 wounded and 4,442 captured or missing. The Confederate suffered about the same number of casualties out of the 75,000 plus men that participated in the campaign: 3,044 killed, 18,952 wounded and 12,983 captured or missing.¹⁰⁴⁵ Hood's various sorties had added 20,000 casualties of that number in the seven weeks he commanded the Army of Tennessee. Sherman lost in that same seven weeks fewer than 15,000¹⁰⁴⁶.

In the Atlanta campaign the *Ninth* again suffered the greatest number of casualties in its brigade with 17 killed and 95 wounded including eight officers. Seventeen more men would die as a result of the wounds.¹⁵⁰



The fall of Atlanta probably saved the country. With the success Lincoln's prospects of reelection improved as the people regained their belief that a total unconditional victory in the war was at hand. For the first time since the first Battle of Bull Run, both Democrats and Republicans concluded that the rebellion would be put down, the Union would be restored, and slavery, the evil that had caused the war, would be totally eradicated. With the fall of Atlanta, both the Democratic platform calling for peace at any price and McClellan's candidacy were ruined. With the fall of Atlanta the South's final plan for victory "by not losing" had come to an end. The outcome of the war was a certainty.

¹⁵⁰The Army of the Cumberland reported the expenditure of 86,611 rounds of artillery ammunition and 11,815,299 rounds of infantry ammunition used during the Campaign.

Chapter 14

A PRELUDE TO INVASION.

On the outskirts of Atlanta the men of the *Ninth* rested, were recloth and rearmed. Their wounded, even those slightly wounded, were granted furlough and sent home. As it turned out, being sent home when wounded was not for military necessity, but for political urgency. In Indiana, the summer of 1864 was one of despondency after the terrible slaughter under Grant in the Wilderness in May. The Republicans appeared to be in trouble, particularly since the Indiana Democrats were much more moderate than those who would ultimately nominate General George B. McClellan for President. Morton thought that returning soldiers would support the war and vote Republican.

In Sherman's mind, military considerations outweighed the political and consequently, few soldiers in the field were furloughed. Secretary of War Stanton intervened and issued an order to the Surgeon General to furlough the sick and wounded so that they might travel and return to Indiana. Transportation both ways was to be paid by the government. Special agents of Morton were sent to the camps to gather up as many wounded as possible.¹⁰⁴⁷ So it was that the *Ninth's* wounded were permitted to leave for home.¹⁵¹

The loss of these troops were more than made up by men entering the ranks of the *Ninth* brought about by the draft. It was the July 18, 1864 call by Lincoln for 500,000 men that brought about the draft in Indiana. The Indiana quota could not be met with volunteers as it always had been in the past, and so it was that in September, 263 recruits came to the *Ninth* with 98 more in October and 61 more in November. The new soldiers, almost all not wanting to be in the military, were divided among the various companies most going to Companies "A", "B" and "F". The *Ninth* would receive 640 new soldiers from September 1864 through February 1865 as

¹⁵¹ Morton's effort to bring home soldiers to vote proved unnecessary. The Republican ticket won by a margin of 20,000. It regained control of the General Assembly and won eight of the eleven Congressional seats. In November, Lincoln won by the same percentage margin.⁹²

a result of the 1864 draft.



The *Ninth* remained in camp about two miles East of Atlanta and remained there for about a month. The Army of the Cumberland likewise remained quietly in camp around the City of Atlanta. During this period, many changes occurred in the composition of the Union armies largely as a result of the expiration of the three year term of service for those who chose not to become veterans. Many regiments left Federal service, and fragments of others had to be regrouped. The Union force was reduced by nearly one-third during September.¹⁰⁴⁸ The timing was perfect for such reorganization since a general armistice existed between Sherman and Hood for the purpose of exchanging prisoners.

With regard to the *Ninth*, General David S. Stanley would remain in command of the IV Corps, and as of September 28th, Walter C. Whitaker was in charge of the 1st Division. General William Grose who had commanded the *Ninth's* brigade for the last year was transferred to the 2nd brigade of the 1st division and was replaced by John E. Bennett who had commanded the brigade briefly during the Atlanta campaign. In addition to the *Ninth*, the Brigade was now made up of the 75th, 80th and 84th Illinois, 30th and 36th Indiana and the 77th Pennsylvania.¹⁰⁴⁹

Even without more troops, Hood planned for a move northward, and he requested Davis to transfer the 30,000 prisoners in Andersonville to keep them beyond reach of Sherman's army which would allow him to shift his base from Lovejoy's Station. Davis consented, and the transfer of inmates from Andersonville to stockades in Florida started in early September, 1864.

While the transfer of the prisoners was proceeding, Hood received a conditional approval of his plan to attack Sherman line of communications. He moved his army from Lovejoy's Station westward toward the Chattahoochee River, taking position covering the West Point railroad near Palmetto Station. Hood threw a pontoon bridge across the Chattahoochee River and sent cavalry detachments to the west in the direction of Carrollton and Powder Springs.¹⁰⁵⁰

Hardee, the senior corps commander, requested transfer away from Hood. Hood consented to the transfer; in fact, Hood wanted him gone, for he placed the blame for his recent defeats squarely on Hardee's shoulders. Davis granted the request and Hood replaced Hardee with B.F. Cheatham, his senior division commander.

Sherman was now planning a march through Georgia to the Atlantic Ocean. While guarding the railroad to Chattanooga, he planned to move upon Savannah if he could get Washington's approval. He knew that Grant would never approve of such a grand plan so long as Hood remained in his front. It was certain that Hood and the Confederate cavalry would swarm about his army if he advanced far from Atlanta eastward or southward.

Hood was developing his own plan, and it became public as a result of a speech made by President Davis who traveled from Richmond about three weeks after the fall of Atlanta to confer with Hood. In Augusta, Davis promised, Hood would move north and retake Tennessee where he expected 20,000 to 30,000 recruits would join "our standard and so strengthened, we must push the enemy back to the banks of the Ohio and thus give the peace party of the North an accretion no puny editorial can give."¹⁰⁵¹

When Sherman heard about Davis' speech, he sent General George Thomas to Nashville to organize the new troops expected to arrive and to make preliminary preparations to meet Hood if he should move that way. The rest of the army would wait to see if Hood would indeed move north.



During the armistice, and as a prelude to his advance north, Hood sent Nathan Bedford Forrest with a cavalry force of 7,000 men into Middle Tennessee. Additionally, he removed the rails from the Augusta and Macon Railroad for forty miles out from Atlanta, and used them to repair the Atlanta-Montgomery Railroad so he could be resupplied. On September 18th, he

moved his army to the vicinity of Palmetto, Georgia with his left touching the Chattahoochee River, and established a supply depot at Blue Mountain.

Having accumulated provisions for his march, Hood began to cross the river on a pontoon bridge on September 29th at a place about twenty-four miles south of Atlanta. His plan was to cut Sherman's line of communications, and if followed by Sherman, retire westward. He hoped to lead Sherman away from Atlanta and transfer the seat of war again to the valley of the Tennessee River.

Once across the river, Hood marched west a short distance to enable him to move north in safety without detection by Sherman's cavalry. His army had about 36,000 men of which one fourth was cavalry including Wheeler's command. Sherman waited in Atlanta to see where Hood would move, either through Alabama to Tennessee or through northern Georgia. By October 2nd Sherman knew Hood's course, and planned to move at once to interpose his army between Hood and his pontoon bridge cutting him off from his supplies.


By October 3rd Hood's army reached Lost Mountain, with his cavalry on his front and right. On the same day Sherman issued orders for the IV Corps to march. The *Ninth* moved out from Atlanta that night with ten days of rations and with the rest of the corps camped near Smyrna Camp Ground, south of Marietta. The next day Sherman would send the rest of his army after the IV Corps.¹⁰⁵²

On October 4th as the Union army marched after Hood, his whereabouts became uncertain so Sherman sent reconnaissance units to find him. Sherman makes note of one such unit: "Colonel Suman, with the *Ninth* Indiana Infantry sent on reconnaissance near and to the right of Lost Mountain. . . Colonel Suman's regiment, *Ninth* Indiana, returned. They reached the summit of Lost Mountain," from where one could see "the camp-fires of three rebel corps, one at Mount Hope Church, one at Dallas, and one south of Dallas."¹⁰⁵³

Later on the 5th, at about 10:00 a.m., Sherman reached the top of Kennesaw Mountain where he could see the Confederate main body encamped to the west around Lost Mountain, and

gun smoke coming from Allatoona Pass twelve air miles to the north.¹⁰⁵⁴ He signaled the fort at Allatoona to hold out as help was on the way. Sherman hoped that if the fort could be held, Hood's whole army might be caught between him and the Etowah River.¹⁰⁵⁵

Coming to aid the fort at Allatoona was General Corse with a brigade. He reached Allatoona increasing the number of the garrison to 1,944 men. He arrived just in time to meet the attack made that morning by French's division. The Confederates attacked repeatedly in a desperate



contested. In the end the Union fort held, costing the rebels nearly 2,000 casualties.¹⁰⁵⁶

After Hood's failure at Allatoona, he moved his army northwestwardly across the Coosa. Sherman followed; the *Ninth* marched by the railroad through Allatoona Pass on October 8th, and reached Kingston on the 10th. Hood had made a feint on Rome, and then crossed the river about 11 miles below that place. The *Ninth*, along with the entire IV Corps, marched to Rome arriving on October 12, 1864.

Howard's army was ordered to Snake Creek Gap, where the Confederates were found occupying the former Federal defenses. Howard tried to hold Hood until Stanley, with the Fourth Corps, could come up on his rear at Villanow. When Stanley arrived with the *Ninth* on October 16th Hood was gone. It appeared that Hood did not intend to fight as he was content with being chased. Covering his rear with Wheeler's cavalry, Hood fell back to Gadsden,

Alabama. Sherman followed as far as Gaylesville where the IV Corps and the *Ninth* went into camp. Here there was a pause on the part of both armies.¹⁰⁵⁷ The marching that the *Ninth* performed in pursuing Hood was severe. They marched up and down and around mountains, over and through rivers, in good and in bad weather. During this long march not a gun was fired by the *Ninth* at the enemy.¹⁰⁵⁸

In summary, Sherman had chased Hood for over a hundred miles and had yielded nothing for he still held Atlanta. The entire railroad line from Chattanooga to Atlanta was still in his hands except for the momentary break at Dalton. Hood's incursion was nothing more than a giant raid. Hood's action signaled that he had no serious plans for staying very long in any one place.¹⁰⁵⁹

Hood realized that he might be trapped between Sherman's army and Thomas who was waiting for him on the North side of the Tennessee River. To prevent this trap he moved South by way of Summerville toward Gadsden, Alabama.

On October 21st Hood met at Gadsden with Beauregard who had formally assumed command of the new Military Division of the West. At this meeting, Hood presented his detailed plan for an incursion into Tennessee. His plan was to cross the Tennessee River at Guntersville which would place him on line to attack Sherman's supply depots at Stevenson-Bridgeport. He then would move promptly on Nashville, smashing Thomas' scattered detachments before he reached that city. In the process he would resupply his army from captured Union stores, and move on through Kentucky to the Ohio River where he would threaten Cincinnati. Because of the 20,000 to 30,000 recruits he expected to gain along the way, he theorized that if Sherman followed he would be strong enough to defeat him.¹⁰⁶⁰

The next day Hood put his plan into operation and marched west to make his crossing of the Tennessee River at Guntersville. On October 26th, he found the crossing to well guarded, and moved further west to Decatur. On the day Hood bypassed Guntersville, Sherman became satisfied that Hood was moving westward and away from his supply line. With Grant's approval

of Sherman's proposed march to the sea, Sherman detached the IV Corps with the *Ninth* to Chattanooga, and four days later did the same to the XXIII Corps. Sherman felt that these forces would enable Thomas to defend the railroad through Tennessee to Chattanooga, including Nashville and Decatur and give him an army with which he could successfully cope with Hood should he attempt to cross the Tennessee River northward.¹⁰⁶¹

Chapter 15

THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN

By the end of October, 1864 General John B. Hood's Army of Tennessee had been driven out of Georgia by General William T. Sherman's combined armies of the Ohio, the Cumberland and the Tennessee. To finish off Hood, Sherman gave General George Thomas full power over all the troops that Sherman would not take with him on his march to the sea. He gave Thomas the troops in all the garrisons in Tennessee including Chattanooga, Bridgeport, Stevenson, Huntsville, Decatur, Murfreesboro and Nashville which numbered about 25,000 men.¹⁵² To provide Thomas a backbone for his army, Sherman transferred him two veteran corps. The first was David S. Stanley's IV Corps of 12,331 men. Sherman left Stanley behind because of a "spat with Sherman over the Jonesboro affair."¹⁵³ The other corps was John M. Schofield's XXIII Corps of 10,620 men. Schofield was chosen to be left at home because Sherman felt he was "slow and leaves too much to others."¹⁰⁶² Brevet Major-General James Wilson had also arrived from the Army of the Potomac to take command of the cavalry. Wilson thought that he might be able, in a week or two, to mount 5,500 men.¹⁵⁴ Additionally, new regiments of recruits from the 1864 draft were continually arriving at Nashville, and these were ordered to be integrated into the veteran corps of Stanley and Schofield. Since the garrisons of Nashville, Decatur, and Chattanooga had to remain, Thomas had available for battle about 28,500 men.

To give Thomas a final advantage over Hood in manpower, Sherman ordered transferred from Rosecrans' department two divisions under the command of A.J. Smith, totaling about

¹⁵² There were also detachments in block-houses on the railroads; but it was not considered safe to withdraw these troops from either of the two railroads leading from Nashville to the Tennessee River.

¹⁵³ Stanley was blamed by Sherman for Hood's escape from Atlanta on September 1, 1864 by being "slow to come up." When Stanley tried to explain his movement that day, Sherman used him as a scapegoat and was never forgiven.

¹⁵⁴ James H. Wilson was one of the youngest major generals in the Union army. His promotion to command was due to his close friend, Ulysses S. Grant. Between January and December 1863 Wilson, at 26, had been jumped from a regular-army lieutenant to a brigadier general of volunteer. Nine months later he was promoted to brevet major general.

9,300 men. These divisions were in the western part of Missouri near the Kansas border and were ordered on October 29th to move at once to Nashville. It was hoped that they would be able to move by boat down the Missouri River, but the river was too low to navigate and the troops had to move overland to St. Louis.¹⁰⁶³ With these troops, it was believed that Thomas would have a force sufficient to attend to Hood. Sherman thought it most likely that these troops would not see combat anyway as Hood, learning of his march eastward through Georgia, would follow him and leave Tennessee alone. In any event, he had no uneasiness in taking the bulk of his army with him on his march and leaving Thomas with his left-overs.

Thomas was not as confident about his new army's ability to fight off Hood as was Sherman. He thought it would be better to send Wilson's cavalry through Georgia, and fight Hood with the whole of Sherman's army. Sherman's arguments finally convinced Thomas that he could take care of Tennessee while Sherman marched to the sea.¹⁰⁶⁴ This conviction was based upon the hope that Smith's forces would arrive quickly from Missouri, his cavalry would be speedily remounted, and the reinforcements from the North would also arrive swiftly¹⁰⁶⁵.

There was only one change of command that affected the *Ninth*. John E. Bennett was replaced by Lewis H. Waters as brigade commander. General David S. Stanley remained in command of the IV Corps and Walter C. Whittaker keep command of the 1st Division. The 3d brigade of the 1st division still kept the same regiments: the *Ninth*, 30th and 36th Indiana, 75th, 80th and 84th Illinois, and the 77th Pennsylvania.¹⁰⁶⁶ The brigade totaled 2,277 men and officers.¹⁰⁶⁷



During the evening of October 26, 1864 the IV Corps with the *Ninth* started their march for Chattanooga to join Thomas' command. The *Ninth*, by a rapid march, reached Rossville, four miles from Chattanooga on the afternoon of the 29th. Here it encamped and during the night

orders were received directing the regiment to proceed by railway to Athens, Alabama. Early the next morning the *Ninth* moved into Chattanooga to take the railroad to Athens. The regiment with the First Division embarked on the morning of November 1st, and reached Athens early in the afternoon. The *Ninth* was now back in Athens where they had celebrated the National birthday in 1862. The town had not changed much since they were last there. The instruction from Thomas was to concentrate the IV corps at Athens with an indication that it would move on to Pulaski, Tennessee later.¹⁰⁶⁸ While Stanley's corps was moving into Athens, Thomas ordered Schofield's corps to Nashville.



On the South side of the Tennessee River, the Army of Tennessee remained under the command of John B. Hood. Hood's army still had three corps, the largest of about 15,200 men was commanded by Benjamin F. Cheatham. The other two corps were almost equal in size and numbered about 12,500 men, still commanded by S.D. Lee and Alexander P. Stewart. Joseph Wheeler remained in command of Hood's cavalry, but on October 22nd was assigned the task of harassing Sherman's march to the sea. Nathan Bedford Forrest with a cavalry force of 9,200 men was ordered to take Wheeler's place as Hood's eyes and ears. Hood had in his army 38,117 infantry, 3,068 artillery and 12,753 Cavalry troopers for a total of 53,938.¹⁰⁶⁹

On October 26th a portion of Hood's infantry appeared at Decatur on the south side of the river and made a feeble attack upon the garrison. This attack was ordered by Hood as a diversion to provide safe passage for the remainder of his army around Decatur, and he moved further west to Tuscumbia, Alabama.¹⁰⁷⁰ This, indeed, was a good spot to effectuate a crossing as the rest of the river, from Muscle Shoals above and Colbert Shoals below, was guarded by Union gun-boats. It was the same place that the *Ninth* had crossed the Tennessee River back in June, 1862 when making their summer march from Corinth toward Chattanooga under Don

Carlos Buell's command. From Tuscumbia the Confederates used a combination pontoon/trestle bridge to cross the Tennessee River. On the last day of October, 1864 Hood took and occupied the town of Florence on the river's northern bank.

Having been away from his line of supply for thirty days, Hood's army had depleted its food and forage. To enable him to resupply his army at Tuscumbia and Florence, he had ordered the Mobile and Ohio Railroad repaired and trains were soon running as far north as Corinth and then east to Cherokee Station. When Thomas learned that Hood was at Tuscumbia with some units across the Tennessee River at Florence, he sent orders for Stanley to move the IV Corps from Athens north to Pulaski, a town eighty miles south of Nashville and forty-four miles north of Decatur. The *Ninth* remained at Athens waiting for rations until November 2nd when it marched at daylight toward Pulaski arriving there on November 3rd. Stanley took command of all troops in the area and started an elaborate system of field-fortifications, a portion of which was assigned to each division.¹⁰⁷¹


On November 4th Thomas sent Schofield who had just arrived at Nashville with the XXIII Corps, to Johnsonville to investigate and report back. Schofield reached Johnsonville that same night to discover that Forrest had already retreated. Schofield left a small unit to guard the town and moved on to Pulaski with part of the XXIII Corps. He arrived there on November 15th, just as Stanley was finishing his fortifications. Although Stanley was the senior major-general by date of rank, Schofield was given overall command based on his position as a department commander. At Pulaski, Schofield had the IV Corps including the *Ninth*, Jacob D. Cox's division of the XXIII Corps, and John Hatch's Cavalry which was on patrol near Florence.¹⁰⁷²

By November 22nd it became clear to the Union command that Hood desired to push his army up between Nashville and Schofield's command at Pulaski. Such a move would have isolated and cut off Schofield from any help from Nashville, so under these circumstances, Schofield concluded that he must move north out of Pulaski towards Columbia, Tennessee on the Duck River.

Thomas had hoped for more time so that he could concentrate all of his forces to give battle south of the Duck River, but this was impossible. Smith had not arrived yet; new regiments had not come into Nashville as fast as old ones had been discharged upon expiration of their term of service, and the dismounted cavalry had made little headway in securing horses and arms.¹⁰⁷³

On November 23rd orders were issued for the troops in Pulaski to pull up stakes and be ready to march by noon. The *Ninth*, with the rest of their brigade, would act as rear guard with special orders to march at mid-night after destroying any commissary stores and ammunition that could not be transported to Columbia. The *Ninth*, followed by the 84th Illinois, filed out of Pulaski under the light of burning and exploding munitions and marched towards Columbia passing the railroad bridge at Reynolds Stations where they had spent several weeks in July 1862 guarding the place from Morgan's raiders. The regiment marched all the next day in the snow, sleet and rain and arrived in Columbia, dog tired at 7:00 p.m.¹⁰⁷⁴

Upon arrival, sleep was not afforded the weary men of the *Ninth*, for they were required to help in the building of strong entrenchments. The brigade's position was on the left end of the union line that covered the south approach to the town, not far from the Duck River. The river at the town made a horse-shoe bend to the south, and the land on the north bank of the bend was low and completely commanded by that on the south. The line of Union entrenchments



provided a strong position against a frontal attack, but it had the great disadvantage of a river in

its rear. To protect his rear, Schofield ordered Cox to move two brigades to the north side of the river and take position covering the pontoon bridge, needed if the army had to retreat north. With his troops in position, Schofield hoped to delay Hood's advance until the two divisions under A.J. Smith might arrive from Missouri. Smith, however, was not expected for four or five more days.¹⁰⁷⁵

No sooner had the *Ninth* completed their line of entrenchments when a move was ordered. Schofield determined that the XXIII Corps, occupying the right of the Union position, would be unable to maintain its position against a concentrated assault. Therefore, it was decided to construct a much shorter interior line of works north and west of the town. The *Ninth* would spend all the 24th and 25th with spade in hand helping to build this interior line. By the dawn of the 26th this line, too, was ready for the Rebel onslaught.¹⁰⁷⁶

While Schofield was preparing at Columbia, Hood was having difficulty moving his army north. He could not make more than ten miles a day due to the miserable weather that engulfed the area. His forces finally reached Columbia on the morning of November 26th, and made a strong assault on the Union picket and pressed the line at several places. Hood could find no weakness in the sturdy entrenchments and not wanting an all-out attack against such a stronghold, decided to use a plan from Sherman's bag of tricks. He would flank Schofield with most of his army cutting off any retreat that the Union forces might try. Hood's plan was simple: he would leave two infantry divisions of S. D. Lee's Corps at Columbia to keep the Union forces occupied, while the rest of his army would make a flank movement east along the south side of the river, cross the river by pontoon bridge, and march on Spring Hill, some 13 miles to the north. Believing that something might be amiss, Schofield determined to transfer his army and place the Duck River between him and the rebel force. This movement was made in the hope that he could hold the line at the Duck River until reinforcements could arrive from Nashville. Reinforcements would not arrive quickly, however, for Thomas had received only 20,000 recruits and he had sent 15,000 veterans north, either on final discharge or to vote. Smith had

not arrived, and only 1,000 cavalry had found horses.¹⁰⁷⁷

On Sunday the 27th at 7:00 p.m., the Union infantry started crossing the river, and when all were across they burn all the bridges. The *Ninth* crossed at about 8:00 p.m. and went into camp one mile north of the river. The next day the regiment began constructing a line of works on the high ground along the Franklin road. At this time Walter C. Whittaker was replaced by Natham Kimball as the *Ninth's* divisional commander. Whittaker returned to command the 2nd brigade, freeing up William Grose to return as the *Ninth's* brigade commander.¹⁰⁷⁸

Schofield thought that Hood, on crossing the river, would not move to Spring Hill, but instead turn back west, rejoin Lee's Corps, and attack him at Columbia. Schofield sent Stanley with Wagner's division, the IV Corps' artillery, and the army supply wagons to Spring Hill. He also sent an infantry brigade on reconnaissance east, toward the place Hood was making his crossing, with instructions to report frequently during the day as to what they observed. Late in the afternoon he received reports from his reconnaissance that Hood was not moving back toward Columbia, but was moving northward toward Spring Hill. With that information, it finally dawned upon him that he was about to be isolated. He ordered his forces to withdraw toward Franklin at nightfall via Spring Hill.

About 3:00 p.m. Hood looked out onto the Columbia-Franklin Pike and saw Stanley's long wagon-train heading to Spring Hill. He called Cheatham and Cleburne to his side, and order an attack. As Cleburne's men moved forward, they came upon a well- fortified line that contained all of the IV's Corps' artillery that Stanley had hastily positioned to cover his eastern flank. The Federal cannons began firing percussion shells, spherical case, and canister into the Confederate ranks resulting in an almost immediate stop to the attack. Cleburne regrouped, and as he was ready to renew his assault, Cheatham ordered a halt so more troops could be brought into action. By 5:30 p.m. the butternut clad infantrymen of Cleburne and Brown were formed in the half light of dusk and ready to overwhelm Stanley's hastily formed line. Brown was to lead the attack, and the sound of Brown's small arms would be the signal for Cleburne and the

other troops to move forward from all points on the battle line. Time passed and no sound came from Brown. As it turned out, Brown's line was outflanked and he would not move until Cheatham was informed of the situation. To Brown, attacking with an exposed flank would be "inevitable disaster."

By 11:00 p.m. all the Confederate troops had pulled back from their line on the turnpike and went into camp outside of Spring Hill not far from the Franklin road. Although the Union troops were badly outnumbered, pushed back, and nearly overrun in Cleburne's first attack, due to an overreaction of Cheatham, Stanley had been able to keep the road open for the withdrawal of the main body of Schofield's army from Columbia.



Back in Columbia, it was not until after dark that the Union troops started to move north toward Spring Hill. The *Ninth* was assigned to cover the retreat. The head of the Union forces arrived at Spring Hill about midnight, passed rapidly and silently through the village, and took position about a mile north of town to protect the trains coming out of Spring Hill towards Franklin. As rapidly as possible the trains and artillery were drawn out and pushed toward Franklin intermixed with the troops. It was necessary to move the troops rapidly and silently through Spring Hill to avoid a night attack from Cheatham's and Stewart's Corps which lay encamped only 800 yards off the road.

Around 11:00 p.m. Hood was awakened and informed that union troops were passing on the Franklin road. Hood's senses, dimmed with the drug laudanum, remarked that the men should be allowed to rest, for they would find the enemy in the morning. Later still, Hood was awakened and this time he ordered Cheatham to send a division to block the road. Cheatham selected Johnson's division of Lee's Corps to stop the movement. At about 2:00 a.m. Johnson scouted the road and found the road empty and everything quiet. He then returned to camp.¹⁰⁷⁹


If Johnson had come to the road a half hour earlier, he would have found the *Ninth* bringing up the rear of the Union retreat. They had been up for nearly 24 hours, and had marched in the dark for the last twelve miles fearful that any sound would bring on a disastrous attack. The veterans were tired, but the new recruits were dangerously exhausted. These new men, not yet hardened to the rigors of soldiering, had to be pulled and pushed along by the veterans. Most of the recruits dropped their personal belongings, some abandoning everything as they staggered north. It was not until 1:30 a.m. that the *Ninth* entered Spring Hill.

The *Ninth* with the rest of the Northern army were apprehensive about the next twelve miles from Spring Hill to Franklin, Tennessee. The march would have to be made in the dark, slowed by wagons with no place for cover in case of attack. To make things worse, the enemy was only a few hundred yards away. The men themselves were tired, the night was cold, the ground was wet, and during the short rest at Spring Hill, they stood in line shivering from both the cold and the fear. Just as they were about to leave Spring Hill, word came that the road to Franklin had been blocked a few miles out at Thompson's Station. It was William H. Jackson's Division of Forrest's Corps that had attacked the head of the wagon train. At least Forrest would do his best to stop the Union retreat while Hood and the rest of the Confederate army enjoyed a good night's sleep.

After setting ablaze thirty-nine wagons, Union infantry compelled Forrest's men to pull back. To prevent further attacks, Stanley ordered Kimball's division, along with the *Ninth* and Wood's division, to protect the main segments of the wagon train. To move quickly, the infantry columns were doubled up shortening the cavalcade by half, although it was still seven miles long.



Franklin, Tennessee was a small town of about 900 residents on the southwest bank of the Harpeth River. One road bridge crossed the river at the Nashville Pike and there was one ford that led east to Murfreesboro. Additionally, there was a railroad bridge for the Central Alabama Railroad on the east side of town, not far from the Nashville Pike. The Columbia (Spring Hill) Pike entered the town on the south side near the F. B. Carter homestead. The land further south was open and flat with only a few hills protruding above the farmland. When the Union Army




reached Franklin just before daylight on November 30, 1864, they found that the wagon bridge had been destroyed across the Harpeth River, and the fords were in poor condition. They also found that the railroad bridge was partially destroyed and it too could not be used to make a crossing. Schofield ordered the wagon bridge rebuilt and directed that the railroad bridge be planked using whatever wood that could be found, including wood from homes and out buildings in the area. While this construction was proceeding, the troops arriving would have to dig in and wait. Schofield anticipated that a defensive line would only be needed until the bridges were ready for use and he could then proceed with his retreat to Nashville. General George Thomas in Nashville disagreed with Schofield's scheme. He ordered Schofield to hold the Confederate

army on the south side of the Harpeth River for three days to allow A. J. Smith's corps time to arrive in Nashville. Schofield, however, had no intention of following that order. By some miracle he had escaped from Spring Hill with his army intact, and he was in no mood to let it be destroyed waiting for Smith. It was his plan to get the wagons across the river during the day and then move his army that night across and on to Nashville.



The XXIII Corps was the first to arrive at Franklin. Looking back to the south, the way they had come, there were cleared fields which spread for nearly two miles to Winstead Hill. At the south edge of town there were old entrenchments leading off to the east and west starting at the Fountain B. Carter farmstead. These entrenchments would be the start of the defensive line.

After a short rest, the men of the XXIII Corps begin to expand and improve these deteriorated entrenchments that had been constructed the year before. Starting at the road and moving east to the Harpeth River this line of trenches covered a third of a mile and were fashioned of earth and logs with a ditch in front and rear. At several places along this line artillery was placed inside the line and somewhat higher than the infantry parapets. At the Columbia Turnpike a gap, wide enough for a double line of wagons to pass was left in the entrenchments. To cover this open gap a second line of trenches were built 200 feet to the rear.



It was about 10:00 a.m. when the *Ninth* arrived in Franklin. The regiment, along with the rest of Kimball's division, was positioned to the right of the XXIII Corps resting on the river.¹⁰⁸⁰ After arriving in the town the *Ninth*, dead tired and hungry, drew rations, made coffee and rested for an hour. Grose's brigade took their position facing southwest on the right of the Centerville road. By 1:00 p.m. the 84th Indiana, 30th Indiana, 75th Illinois were placed in the front line from left to right with the *Ninth* placed a short distance back of the main line, next to a ravine. The rest of the regiments in the brigade were placed in a second rear line to cover a ravine that separated the *Ninth* from the 75th Illinois.¹⁰⁸¹ After forming the line, every soldier vigorously went to work making barricades and preparing for a reception that all knew was coming. This was accomplished by having the 77th Pennsylvania form a skirmish line a half a mile in front of the brigade to provide warning of any approach while the rest of the soldiers stacked arms and each company constructed a line of barricades covering its own front. Entrenchments were started with earth thrown from ditches on both sides of the line making a mound three feet high and four feet wide.¹⁰⁸² Any trees that could be found in the area, mostly apple, were cut and trimmed, and logs and fence rails were rolled in front of the line. The *Ninth's* position was forty yards to the right of the 75th Illinois with a small ravine and stream of water running between the two regiments. Next to the *Ninth* on the left was the 21st Illinois of Kirby's brigade. Whittaker's brigade formed the end of the Union line at the river.¹⁰⁸³

After the trench was built Colonel Suman ordered some of his men to cut down a small peach orchard that was growing behind the *Ninth's* position and they piled branches in front of the line to act as an abatis.¹⁰⁸⁴ While the orchard was being cut, Colonel Suman sent the rest of his men into the corn field that fronted his position to trample the corn stalks flat to prevent any cover to an advancing line.¹⁰⁸⁵ When that was completed, the men of the *Ninth* took their position on the line and dropped off to sleep.



When Hood awoke the next morning he learned about Schofield's escape from Spring Hill. He was beside himself with fury for missing the best opportunity he ever had to defeat at least part of the Union Army. Hood called a meeting of his leading generals and expressed his anger about the situation. More than anyone, Hood blamed Frank Cheatham who in turn passed blame onto Brown and Cleburne, neither of whom were present to defend themselves. Hood decided that it was Cheatham's corps that was responsible and that their men should be punished. Within two hours after daylight, Hood had commenced the pursuit with great vigor. When Hood arrived near Franklin, he looked across the open fields and saw that the Union army was entrenched and waiting for his arrival. At 2:30 p.m. he called a council of war and announced that the army would make a frontal assault on the fortified Union line. The Confederate commanders looked out toward Franklin, and could scarcely believe their ears. Attack headlong and without artillery support, against a foe entrenched on chosen ground and backed by more than sixty pieces of artillery! This had to be a mistake! Forrest objected vigorously. Forrest, from his knowledge of the immediate area, knew that there was a gap which would have allowed the army to bypass the Franklin Road to Nashville and get behind Schofield's line of retreat. He urged Hood in no uncertain words to take that route.

Hood disregarded Forrest's advice and was determined to make a direct attack on the Federal entrenchments. No flank movement, he believed, would prevent Schofield from reaching Nashville. Cheatham joined in the objection saying that the attack across two miles of open field against what appeared to be impregnable fortifications was courting disaster. The others agreed, but Hood had his mind made up; he would attack. It was Hood's plan that Stewart's and Cheatham's corps would commence the attack without waiting for Lee and most of the Confederate artillery. Stewart would advance on the right, while Cheatham's Corps would attack up the middle on the Columbia Turnpike. Hood was still seething about the failure of

Cheatham's Corps at Spring Hill and by specific design, it would be his corps that paid the price today. Particularly, Cleburne and Brown had to be taught a lesson for Spring Hill and their attack at Franklin would serve that purpose. Bate's division would be formed in echelon, move past the Bostick house, and strike the Union line near the Carter's Creek pike where the *Ninth* was positioned.¹⁰⁸⁶




About 3:00 p.m. word came from Wagner's brigades that the Confederate army was forming at the foot of the hills in heavy force. It was a grand sight, for very few battlefields in the western theater were so open and free from trees and obstruction. Most battlefields were wooded giving cover to the attacking force and requiring close-cover combat, but not here at Franklin.

Schofield looked over the field and saw the Confederates forming in double and triple lines of brigades, with artillery in the intervals between the columns.¹⁵⁵ Here, along a mile and a half of front, the imposing array of more than 20,000 butternut-clad soldiers could be seen advancing at quick step with the artillery in the intervals galloping forward, unlimbering and firing as soon as they were within range.¹⁰⁸⁷ It was a sight that those watching on that clear warm Indian Summer afternoon would never forget; the long gray and brown line moving forward, bayonets gleaming in the setting sun, hundreds of battle flags flying, regimental commanders riding in front of and between the lines, and bands playing Dixie and other tones of glory. It was a magnificent spectacle while at the same time, a terrifying sight for the veteran troops that awaited them. Most of the Federal soldiers couldn't believe their eyes. It was like a human tidal wave rolling toward them.¹⁰⁸⁸

¹⁵⁵ There were two six-gun artillery batteries with the attacking army, the rest was with S. D. Lee's Corps enroute from Spring Hill.

At 4:10 p.m. this line approached Wagner's brigades that remained out front and to the amazement of the rest of the Union forces, they opened fire on the advancing Confederates. For a moment, Cleburne's and Brown's divisions stopped their onward rush, only to resume again and in short order flanked both brigades. When they fell back it was at a full run streaming to the rear in a disorganized crowd, each soldier racing to be the first to reach the



trenches and safety. Orders were sent down the line to hold fire in the center until Wagner's men were recovered. On both flanks, artillery opened on the advancing Confederate troops at 300 yards with percussion shells, soon followed by grape and canister. At 100 yards, a sheet of flame from the flanks let loose as the first volley of Federal musketry brought down large numbers of advancing troops.

In the center, the mass of retreating Union soldiers reached the line shielding both Brown's and Cleburne's men who came on yelling like fury and shooting anything in blue. Those in the trenches, perplexed by the men trampling over them, were carried away by the surging mob, and swept back from the first line of works leaving a gap on both sides of the road. Through this gap Cleburne's and Brown's men rushed, over the entrenchments and around shouting and bayoneting anything that moved. Cheatham's Corps had gained an advantage; three or four hundred yards of Federal line had been broken in the center. Twelve regiments in

Wagner's division, three in Cox's, and two other regiments in reserve had been routed. Two batteries of four guns each had been captured. Victory for the first time seemed almost within Hood's grasp.¹⁰⁸⁹

Stanley, who had spent the morning ill, arrived on horseback just in time to see the break through. He moved with the men waving his hat and urged the men to charge. In the process he was struck in the neck by a bullet that sliced diagonally across the base of his neck and exited near the spine. Stanley keep going, yelling orders until he ran into Cox who insisted that he seek medical attention.¹⁵⁶ Cox continued toward the fire zone.

As the blue line pushed and fought their way forward, the Confederates moved back from the second line of trenches to the main line. The Union men were able to close the gap, recover the lost batteries, and capture about 400 prisoners.¹⁰⁹⁰ For a short time the two sides were shooting as fast as humanly possible across the garden, the Union troops firing from the second line and the rebels returning the fire from the main line. From time to time there were efforts by the Confederates, now intermixed regiments, to charge across the smoke filled area and retake the second line of trenches which were in some places only twenty-five yards away. So vigorous and fierce were these assaults that the Confederates reached the exterior slope of the second line several times. Only after savage hand-to-hand encounters were the rebels repulsed. In all, there were thirteen charges, and each was met with a hail of fire resulting in the rebels falling back with great loss.¹⁰⁹¹ Between the assaults, the Confederates, covered by the undulations of the ground, pressed sharp-shooters close to the works and kept up a galling fire.¹⁰⁹² As darkness set in, a stalemate had been reached with the Confederates holding the main line of trenches, and the Union holding the second. Between the lines of trenches mounds of dead and wounded lay in the no man's zone.




¹⁵⁶ David S. Stanley was given the Medal of Honor in 1893 for his actions at Franklin.

Earlier in the attack, down by the cotton gin on the east side of the battlefield where the railroad crossed the Harpeth River, the Union troops were attacked by A.P. Stewart's Corps of 10,000, Cheatham's Corps of 4,000 lead by Cleburne, and 1,300 dismounted cavalry of Abraham Buford's command. The Union entrenchments at this point in the line were guarded by thick thorn-bearing hedges of Osage orange used as abates that made an impassable thorny palisade. As the Confederates moved forward Major-General Patrick Cleburne was killed.

A few of the Southern regiments¹⁵⁷ made it across the Union entrenchments forcing back the Ohio regiments, but their stay was short lived as reinforcements arrived and drove them to the far side of the entrenchment. Only a few feet of dirt separated the two sides.¹⁰⁹³

On the west side of the battlefield near the Carter's Creek Road the action started later than it did in the center. The men of the *Ninth* watched the Confederate line move toward them, while at the same time watched the fighting to the left. They saw that the center had been pierced, and an "ugly gap in lines seemed to be widening each second." The Confederates were now nearer to the bridges than was the *Ninth* and it appeared that the regiment would be cut off from any escape.¹⁰⁹⁴



West of the road, it was near dark when skirmishing commenced between the 77th

¹⁵⁷ The 29th and 33d Alabama.

Pennsylvania of Grose's Brigade and the Florida regiments of Bates' Division. The 77th had remained in front of the entrenchments as pickets with four companies spread out in a line about 600 yards long. The remainder of the regiment was divided into two parts and posted in reserve 200 yards from each end of the line. Bullock's brigade appeared and as they advanced on the 77th, a hot fire-fire commenced momentarily slowing the Confederate movement in the center. Within a few minutes the 77th was nearly encircled on the right while the left fell back upon the reserves. As Bullock's Florida regiments formed in two lines, came on yelling and firing the 77th fell back to the ravine in front of the *Ninth*. Nearly out of ammunition they moved to the rear and went into reserve.¹⁰⁹⁵

Having driven in the pickets, the Confederates advanced steadily in good order and with great determination until their front line came within 250 yards of the Union line. Seeing the situation, Colonel Suman jumped on top of the breastworks with his back toward the advancing line and walked back and forth yelling to his men to hold their fire until "you can see the whites of their eyes." As he spoke, a shell exploded nearby caused him to duck that brought about a loud laughter and a blushing Colonel.¹⁰⁹⁶

This attack on Grose's position never had much of a chance to do much damage because of the Pennsylvania battery along the road, the strong abates of felled apple and peach trees fronting the road, and the strong entrenchments constructed by Grose's men.¹⁰⁹⁷ The thrust of this attack fell upon the three regiments between the road and the ravine where the *Ninth* was stationed. As the gray-brown line moved forward, the Union troops opened upon them with one gigantic volley fired by all the front line troops simultaneously. The destruction to the Floridians was terrible, yet they pressed forward to within 100 yards of the entrenchments. Again and again the guns of Grose's men rang forth fire and death causing Bullock's front line to melt and fall away. With the first line gone, his second line broke and fell back in confusion.¹⁰⁹⁸

The *Ninth* was positioned on the far side of the ravine. This ravine prevented a direct movement upon them by the Floridians, and only a skirmish line showed itself to their front.

One volley, an oblique fire toward the line that was moving against the 75th Illinois was all the fighting that the *Ninth* accomplished during the battle of Franklin.¹⁰⁹⁹ The *Ninth* suffered no casualties, and probably inflicted none.

Bates reported that in the attack his division suffered 47 killed, 253 wounded, and 19 missing. Among them was one regimental commander killed, one badly wounded, and one wounded three times before leaving the field.¹¹⁰⁰ In contrast, Grose's brigade suffered only two officers wounded, three enlisted men killed, twenty-two wounded, and ten missing for a total of thirty-seven. Of these, nineteen came from the 77th Pennsylvania.¹¹⁰¹



As total darkness set over the battlefield, Hood's frontal assaults had been decisively repulsed, including Forrest's cavalry attack north of the Harpeth River. The troops on both sides were worn down from the day's blood bath, but not John Bell Hood. He had not yet given up the fight; to him the night was his, and he ordered another attack on the Federal line by his only reserves. After only a few minutes the Confederates leaving 587 casualties on the field. By 10:00 p.m. the firing had slowed and by 11:00 p.m. the whole front was quiet.¹¹⁰²

As the fighting stopped a Union reconnaissance patrol was sent out on the Columbia Turnpike to see the effect of the battle. "I never saw the dead lay near so thick. I saw them upon each other, dead and ghastly in the powder-dimmed star-light" came the report.¹¹⁰³ Across the front perhaps 5,000 dead and wounded lay strewn in grotesque arias.

After dark the men of the *Ninth* lay snuggled in their trench listening to the singing of the bullets passing over them from the left.¹¹⁰⁴ At about 9:30 p.m. they received word that they would be evacuating the trenches during the night and moving on to Nashville. It was to be a withdrawal like the one they made from Spring Hill, a move that would have to be made in the dark, and in silence to keep the Confederates unaware of them leaving. Just as the *Ninth* was

prepared to pull out, a fire broke out in Franklin lighting up the sky. No move could be made under these circumstances, and so the regiment waited until the flames died down. At midnight the regiment drew away from the works, crossed the river, and began the march for Nashville.¹¹⁰⁵ By 2:00 a.m. Schofield's entire army was across the river leaving their dead on the field and those too wounded to move to the mercy of the enemy. As the last Union soldier crossed the river, the bridges were set afire by the rear guard.



The annals of war may long be searched for a parallel to the desperate charge of the Army of Tennessee at Franklin, a charge which has been called 'the greatest drama in American history.'¹¹⁰⁶

The best known charge made by any army during the Civil War was made under the direction of Longstreet at Gettysburg, known as "Picket's Charge."¹⁵⁸ The charge was made following a 159 gun, two hour artillery bombardment of the Union line. That charge had 15,000 Confederate infantry, ten brigades and attacked across a half mile of open field against a Federal force which waited behind improvised breastworks along a stone wall. The charge made at Franklin was much larger and covered much more ground than that at Gettysburg. There was no artillery bombardment to soften up the Union line; there were 22,000 infantry, twenty brigades involved, just over one hundred regiments, and they had to move over two miles of open ground against well prepared entrenchments held by veteran troops. In Picket's Charge there were 6,500 total Confederate casualties, 500 less than at Franklin.

Several days after the battle Hood sent word of the battle to Richmond:

¹⁵⁸ Although the charge has been called "Pickett's Charge," George Pickett's troops did not constitute the major portion of the total attacking force and he was only responsible for forming the brigades before the attack. He did not lead nor participate in the attack itself.

About 4 p. m. November 30 we attacked the enemy at Franklin, and drove them from their center line of temporary works into the inner line, which they evacuated during the night, leaving their dead and wounded in our possession, and retired to Nashville, closely followed by our cavalry. We captured 7 stand of colors and about 1,000 prisoners. Our troops fought with great gallantry."¹¹⁰⁷

A subsequent telegram from General Hood noted that the loss of officers was excessively large in proportion to the loss of men. Hood, however, never revealed his combat losses. Only because Union forces counted the Confederate grave sites and disabled and wounded soldiers still in Franklin after reoccupation, can an estimate of Southern losses be given. Of 22,000 Confederate infantrymen engaged, approximately 1,750 were killed, 4,550 wounded of which 3,800 were so disabled they were to be placed in hospitals, and 702 taken prisoner, nearly a one-third loss ration.¹⁵⁹ To put the battle in perspective, in just a few hours Hood lost more men killed at Franklin than the Union did in any of the more noted battles including Chancellorville, Fredericksburg or First and Second Manassas, the Battle of Seven Days, the two day Battle of Chickamauga, or either side in the two day Battle of Shiloh, or the two day Battle of Stones River. In addition he suffered more deaths and casualties than the total on both sides in the three days at Chattanooga.¹¹⁰⁸ The losses would have been greater had it not been that the still air kept the smoke of the battle from drifting away. The gun-smoke settled on the field in a thick cloud, obscuring the vision of the Union troops from seeing the second and third line of charging Confederates.¹¹⁰⁹

On the Federal side there were reported 189 killed, 1,033 wounded and 1,104 missing for a total of 2,326. Most of the two thousand casualties were in Wagner's division with 1,241, over half of these missing or captured.¹¹¹⁰

With the dawn of the next day the gruesome evidence of the day's battle became evident. There were about 6,000 wounded soldiers lying about needing attention. Every large building

¹⁵⁹ Hood later wrote that ten days after the battle he had an effective strength of 18,342 infantry, 2,405 artillery and 2,306 in cavalry for a total of 23,342. At Florence he had a effective force of 30,600 and therefore he had suffered from all causes including Columbia, Spring Hill and Franklin 7,547.

in Franklin from the new Court House to the Female Institute was turned into a hospital. As to the 2,600 corpses strewn over the battlefield, the arduous task of burying them fell upon the victors of the field. Almost all of the Confederate bodies were buried in long two foot deep trenches. The Union bodies were left in the trenches with the dirt pulled down around them from the earthworks. Almost all remained unidentified.¹¹¹¹



The Battle of Franklin is the most unappreciated and one of the least known battles fought in American history. Because the South remained in control of the field, the northern press gave the battle only brief coverage as other events in the war quickly became more significant including the siege of Nashville and Sherman's march to the sea. Morale was already so low in the South that another full report of shocking and appalling losses could not be tolerated. For this reason the press in the South gave the battle little or incomplete coverage. Although the "Franklin Charge" was more spectacular in almost all regards than any other charge made during the war, it will be "Picket's Charge" that will always be better known, not only because it was in the east where the press followed everything much more closely, but because it became the turning point in the Civil War. The Battle of Franklin will only be remembered by the purest of Civil War historians.

Chapter 16

THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.


After the battle of Franklin, the *Ninth* moved north at the end of Schofield's army, not so much marching but staggering along the eighteen mile stretch between Franklin and Nashville. The men had not slept more than a few minutes in the last three days, had marched under constant fear of being attacked, and had engaged in one of the bloodiest battles fought during the war. Some of the men fell sleep as they walked along, only to be picked up and helped by those able to move on their own. The *Ninth's* divisional commander, David S. Stanley, suffering from a neck wound, noted that his troops "were more exhausted physically than I have ever seen them on any other occasion."¹¹¹² By 9:00 a.m. the *Ninth* had reached Brentwood, nine miles south of Nashville, where the regiment was halted for an hour to allow the men to cook breakfast. Many, too tired to eat, slept and were difficult to arouse when the march continued. The *Ninth* arrived in Nashville dog-tired at about 1:00 p.m. on December 1, 1864.¹¹¹³

Into town, past the on looking ranks of George H. Thomas' garrison soldiers marched the *Ninth* along with the rest of the veterans of Franklin, their captured battle flags at the head of each regiment. Seven hundred Confederate prisoners including 113 officers taken at Franklin followed as prizes of their triumph.¹¹¹⁴

After the *Ninth* arrived, they were allowed an opportunity for a few hours rest and some hot food before being moved into camp not far from the Franklin pike. Their temporary position was just inside the entrenchments that had been completed by the troops who had occupied the city since it was first taken after the fall of Fort Donelson in 1862. Their stay in camp behind these entrenchments would be short lived, for the next day the *Ninth* was assigned a new position on the line west of the Franklin pike, not far from Acklen place. The rigors of hard labor in constructing new entrenchments to defend the city would be their fate for the next three days.¹¹¹⁵

The City of Nashville had no natural geographic attributes that could be made available

for defense. Good roads led to the city from all sides, and through the city ran the Cumberland River, navigable by the Union gun-boats. The southern approaches were covered by Forts Negley, Morton, Casino, Houston, and Gillem. Some of these had been constructed in the latter part of 1862 when the city was threatened by a portion of Braxton Bragg's army. The forts were situated on commanding hills connected by entrenchments that ran along a range of hills in the shape of a semicircle covering the entire southern approach to the city.



Behind the fortifications Thomas had amassed a force superior to General Hood's in infantry and artillery. General A. J. Smith's three divisions of 12,926 men had finally arrived from Missouri after many unforeseen delays. James B. Steedman brought 5,200 men consisting of a division of Sherman's men, who had arrived too late to make the march with Sherman, and two brigades of black troops from Chattanooga. It would be the black soldiers' first opportunity in the western theater to fight by brigade, and the first to be committed offensively since the bloody repulse at Port Hudson, nearly twenty months before.¹¹¹⁶ At Nashville Thomas had 6,000 infantry and artillery, 3,000 cavalymen, mostly dismounted, and all secondary military elements. With the IV Corps of 15,100 and the XXIII Corps of 10,277, Thomas had over 52,000 men in Nashville. Other Union forces in Tennessee, including a new cavalry force that was in the process of organization at Edgefield, the troops at Chattanooga, Murfreesboro and

Stevenson, brought Thomas' command to 67,100.¹¹¹⁷

Most of these troops began constructing the new line of entrenchments. In doing so, various houses and buildings outside the line of works had to be demolished to clear a zone of fire.¹¹¹⁸ Smith's troops, all tough veterans of fights along the Mississippi River, were placed on the right of the line. The IV Corps, including the *Ninth*, was positioned in the center while Schofield's XXIII Corps was placed on the left. Next to Schofield was placed the Provisional Detachment brought in by Steedman.

When James H. Wilson arrived, his cavalry was sent over the river to Edgefield, Tennessee on the north bank. His troopers appeared to be in a wretched state, needing clothing, equipment, better arms, and especially horses. This caused grave concern on Thomas' part for he believed that Wilson's men numbered only about one-fourth the number of Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalymen.¹¹¹⁹ Thomas was grossly mistaken in this belief, for Forrest's actual strength was less than 6,000 and he too was deficient in horses and supplies.¹¹²⁰ Nevertheless, Thomas' future plans would be based on this false assumption.

David S. Stanley,¹⁶⁰ still recovering from his neck wound, turned over command of the IV Corps to Brigadier-General Thomas J. Wood¹⁶¹ and left for home. In the days to come it would be this corps, laden with combat-tested experienced infantry, in which Thomas would place his greatest trust. Nathan Kimball's division of the IV Corps still consisted of William Grose's, with the *Ninth*, Walter Whitaker's and Isaac M. Kirby's brigades. Grose's brigade was

¹⁶⁰ Stanley would return to command the IV Corp on January 31, 1865. He would remain its commander until August 1, 1865. After the war he returned to the Regular Army and was appointed Brigadier-General in 1884 and retired in 1892. A year later he was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during the Battle of Franklin. He died in 1902.⁹⁸

¹⁶¹ Thomas John Wood was a graduate from West Point in 1845, and roommate of Grant. He was part of Taylor's staff during the Mexican War. Later he was sent to the frontier and participated in Indian fighting in the Kansas border disturbances. As part of the Regular Army he acted as mustering officer for Indiana until October 1861 when he was named Brigadier-General U.S.V. He was a brigade commander, and fought at Shiloh, a Division commander during the siege of Corinth, Perryville and Stones River where he was wounded. He led a division during the Tullahoma campaign and at Chickamauga. In that battle he pulled his division out of line in accordance with orders, but in so doing left a gap through which rushed Hood and the Confederate army. He continued as a divisional commander at Missionary Ridge, Knoxville, and during the Atlanta campaign. He was again wounded at Lovejoy.⁹⁹

assigned the position on the line just west of the Granny-White pike, the remainder of the division formed both to the east and west of Grose.



As the *Ninth* was arriving in Nashville on December 1, 1864, John Bell Hood was leaving Franklin with a demoralized army. A third of his fighting force had already been either killed or wounded in this incursion into Tennessee. Without clearing his advance with his superior, General Pierre G. Beauregard, Hood marched on to Nashville. It was only Hood's aggressive nature that caused this move rather than a move south to safety, or to a less defended area of Tennessee.

When all his troops arrived, Hood had to make a choice between three highly unpromising alternatives. The first, to launch an immediate all-out assault on the Union line. This alternative was rejected as Hood did not want another Franklin. The second was to move past Nashville, cross the Cumberland River and march to the Ohio River. This would place Thomas' larger army in his rear, with the Union sending reinforcements from all parts of the North. It would be an invitation to disaster. His third choice was to stay at Nashville, entrench his army and await the inevitable attack. He chose to stay and hope for a Franklin in reverse that might afford an opportunity to follow up and enter the city on the heels of the retreating Union army.¹¹²¹

Hood's force entered the town on the high ground about a mile south of the Federal new line. The entrenchments ran for a mile and three-quarters in an east-west direction, started in the east near the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, crossed a high hill (Rains Hill), and extended


to the Hillsboro Turnpike where it turned south for three-quarters of a mile along a stone wall fronting the east side of the road.

Hood's problems increased when he decided to stay at Nashville. He lacked sufficient soldiers to adequately man the trenches, let alone provide any reserves. He also lacked sufficient artillery ammunition to harass or damage the Union lines, so he ordered the artillery not to fire unless attacked.¹¹²² His most

significant problem was his plan of operation. It was Hood's strategy, a gamble at best, that Thomas should attack him. He hoped that his heavily prepared lines could be held keeping the Union forces trapped around Nashville. A tactical victory would presumably follow.¹¹²³



Ulysses S. Grant, still not on friendly terms with Thomas, sent two telegrams to him on December 2nd urging him to leave the defenses of Nashville and attack Hood at once.¹¹²⁴ Thomas, however, was not ready to take the offensive as his cavalry had not yet been mounted and armed, and he wanted to wait a few more days. Grant waited patiently for three days then wired Thomas: "Time strengthens him [Hood], in all probability, as much as it does you." Grant ordered Thomas to attack.¹¹²⁵ Thomas replied: "As soon as I can get up a respectable force of cavalry I will march against



Hood."¹¹²⁶ But Grant couldn't perceive that Thomas wasn't ready. What Grant didn't know was that Hood had wrecked the Confederate Army at Franklin and could not attack the strong fortifications around Nashville, nor pull out and move north beyond the Cumberland River.

While the telegrams flew back and forth, the *Ninth* continued to work on their part of the entrenchments. On December 3rd the *Ninth* was ordered into battle line awaiting the result of a Confederate demonstration that was taking place in their front. As the men stood in line waiting for the rebels to come from the cover of woods, Colonel Suman yelled out: "Sergeants hold your fire and if any of these new men or any man start to run to the rear shoot them." The new recruits looked at each other and asked the veterans "Will they really do that?" "You bet they will" was the reply. No one found out if Colonel Suman's order would be followed as there was no attack that day. It turned out that Hood was just forcing his way into position to entrench.¹¹²⁷

During the next two days all was quiet along the line, expect for the usual picket-firing. Early on the morning of December 6th the *Ninth* received information that Hood was calling for volunteers to assault the Federal works in front of Grose's brigade. Increased vigilance was ordered in the brigade, and dispositions were made to meet the attack, but none came.¹¹²⁸

By December 7th, Grant was thinking of relieving Thomas and replacing him with Schofield, leaving Thomas subordinate to Schofield. Halleck wired to Grant: "If you wish General Thomas relieved from [command], give the order. No one here will, I think, interfere. The responsibility, however, will be yours as no one here, so far as I am informed, wishes General Thomas removed."¹¹²⁹ Two days later Grant did just that, and Halleck issued the order:

The President orders: I. That Major General J.M. Schofield assume command of all troops in the Departments of the Cumberland, the Ohio, and the Tennessee. II. That Major General George H. Thomas report to General Schofield for duty and turn over to him all orders and dispatches received by him, as specified above.¹¹³⁰

On December 8th the relatively good weather around Nashville turned bad, a freezing storm of snow and sleet covered the ground with a sheet of ice. By December 9th two or three inches of ice covered everything, and Nashville was brought to a halt. By December 10th the

thermometer dropped to ten degrees below zero. When the report went to Washington and then to Grant in Virginia that Thomas couldn't move because of an ice storm, Grant suspended the order relieving Thomas from command, with a warning: "I hope most sincerely that there will be no necessity of repeating the order, and that the facts will show that you have been right all the time."¹¹³¹

As the sleet and snow was falling on December 8th, a small detachment of rebels drove in the *Ninth's* pickets and occupied their out-works. Their stay, however, was short lived for the *Ninth's* skirmishers charged these rebels and retook and held their rifle-pits. From December 9th through the 14th the *Ninth* continued to strengthen their works with no further action occurring in their front.¹¹³²

During this time, Colonel Suman allowed some of his men to leave the trenches and enter town. Nashville was a great city for a soldier to visit; it was filled like a horn of plenty. There were all types of stores, large quantities of clothing and food, fresh vegetables and everything that a cold soldier might want could be obtained there. Soldiers also enjoyed the prostitutes, for Nashville was known for the many prostitutes who had arrived during the war.

The ice prevented any aggressive movement by Thomas. To reach Hood's line the Union army would have to advance over ice covered hills and hollows. Almost all of Thomas' generals felt the absolute necessity of waiting for the ice to thaw. In a council of war even Schofield agreed that it was "not now practicable to move." Those in Washington did not fully appreciate the problem. To them it was just another excuse like Thomas' previous wish for more time. But while Thomas was waiting for the ice to thaw, Schofield was sending telegrams to Washington stating that Thomas was too slow in his movements. Schofield wanted command of the Army at Nashville, and he thought by complaining about his commander he might get it.¹⁶² Thomas was

¹⁶² One of Thomas' staff picked up at the telegraph office the original of a recent message from Schofield to Grant: "Many officers here are of the opinion that General Thomas is certainly slow in his movements." Grant would later write in 1881: "I think I can say with great positiveness there was never any dispatch from you to me, or from you to any one in Washington, disparaging General Thomas' movements at Nashville." No telegram was ever found.¹⁰⁰

informed regarding Schofield's betrayal and remained wary of him thereafter.¹¹³³

Even without Schofield's note, Grant was still suspicious of Thomas' lack of movement. By December 13th Grant ordered General John A. Logan to Nashville for the purpose of superseding Thomas as Commander of the Department and Army of Cumberland. This order was conditional and would only go into effect if Thomas had not attacked by the time Logan got to Nashville. Grant may have had second thoughts about having Logan replace Thomas. Logan was not a West Point Graduate, and such an order might cause problems with the army's professionals. Grant determined that personal supervision was required. On the afternoon of December 14th Grant left Virginia and journeyed by steamboat to Washington for the purpose of moving on to Nashville. When he got to Washington, Grant issued an order relieving Thomas of command for the second and last time. The telegraph wires to Nashville were down, however, and this order was delayed.¹¹³⁴ By the time the wires were repaired there would be no need to send the order.



The severity of the weather began to ease on December 14th, and that afternoon, Thomas called his corps commanders together to announce his plan of battle, and give them instructions with regard to the specific action of their respective commands for an attack the next morning. Thomas' plan of battle was very simple, involving the turning of the Confederate's left flank by a sudden and irresistible blow to be struck with the bulk of his army, and to be pressed until Hood's army was destroyed or dispersed in utter rout. The pivot point of the attack was just to the left of the *Ninth's* position.

The morning of December 15th was in every way favorable to the immediate execution of Thomas' plans. The sheet of ice which had covered the ground for nearly a week had thawed and a heavy mist completely covered the valley masking the preparations for battle.¹¹³⁵ Thomas left

his headquarters early that morning, looked around and told his staff: "Well boys, we're going to settle this business now. It's about the right time to stop fooling."

Before the sun had risen, Steedman had his troops moving down the Murfreesboro pike on the east side of town. As the sun rose, the fog continued to cover the Union troops as they aligned for battle. Steedman's instructions were to make a demonstration that would precede the main attack. Steedman's troops attacked, fell back, reformed and attacked again. This continued for nearly two hours. The intensity of the attack, and the rapid fire of both artillery and small arms succeeded in diverting the rebel's attention from the center and left, leaving the way open for Wilson, Smith, Wood, and Schofield to move against Hood's main entrenchments at the Hillsboro pike.¹¹³⁶ On the opposite side of town Smith's men attacked the detached works and forts that Hood had built in front of his lines.¹¹³⁷


Hood had spent most of the morning at his headquarters doing paper work, when at about 10:00 he learned of a simultaneous Union advance on both the eastern and western flanks. His corps commanders reported that they believed these to be only reconnaissance raids. When Hood arrived at Stewart's position near the Hillsboro pike, he could see the heavy columns of troops advancing against his outposts. Instantly he knew that this was more than a demonstration or raid; the attack he had wanted was on in earnest.¹¹³⁸



As Smith's corps moved out of their entrenchments at 6:00 a.m., Wood determined that movement by his IV Corp was impracticable because of the thick fog that blanketed the area where his troops were to move. By 8:00 a.m. the fog began to rise, and the troops silently and rapidly commenced the move into their assigned positions. The order of battle was by divisions in echelon formation.¹¹³⁹ Grose's brigade had been ordered by Kimball to move from its position in front of Nashville to the right of the Hillsboro pike, and was placed in the front line

immediately in front of the ninety-degree angle in Hood's line. Six of Grose's seven regiments moved to this new position at about 8:00 a.m., leaving the 77th Pennsylvania as pickets near the Franklin pike. The effective force of the brigade was 2,190. Grose formed his line with the *Ninth*, 80th and 84th Illinois in the front line and the 77th Illinois, 30th and 84th Indiana in the second line. The 77th Pennsylvania, when relieved from picket, formed the reserve.

When the *Ninth* was positioned, Colonel Suman sent Company "I" forward as pickets and they were soon joined in a hot fire-fight with the pickets of



Loring's division. Joined by other

pickets from other regiments, Company "I" slowly drove the Confederate pickets back to their main line. In the chase, several men of the *Ninth* were seriously wounded.¹¹⁴⁰ Throughout the morning an occasional shot was fired by the Confederate artillery bursting over the men of the *Ninth* adding interest to the scene and showing that Loring's men were ready, willing and able to take on the long blue line.¹¹⁴¹

The first obstacle in the way of the attack was Montgomery Hill. This Hill was an irregularly cone-shaped eminence, which raised some 150 feet above the general level of the country. The ascent to its summit throughout most of its circumference was quite abrupt, and its sides were covered with trees. The ascent on the left and rear of the hill was more gradual than

the portion which was directly in front of the Union entrenchments. The Confederates had encircled the hill just below its crest with a strong line of entrenchments, and covered the approach with an abatis and rows of sharpened stakes firmly planted in the ground. The hill was Hood's most advanced position, and was not more than 800 yards from the Union lines.

As the Union troops advanced, Wood ordered Kimball's division forward to attack east of the Hillsboro pike. Kimball's attack was across a muddy, 200 yard-wide cornfield at the heavily entrenched line in front defended by Loring's three brigades.¹¹⁴² The *Ninth* moved forward in the line of men all wearing their sky-blue overcoats, crossed the little stream in their front, and advanced 300 or 400 yards when it was ordered to halt and to remain quiet for a while. A misting rain had set in, and the firing all along the line had become heavy and general with the crash of musketry and the roar of artillery deafening. Colonel Sumner chose a position behind a ridge that afforded protection from the artillery fire that had rained down upon the advancing line from atop a hill in the center of the Confederate line.¹¹⁴³

Groce had positioned himself behind the *Ninth* and was joined by Wood and Kimball. Grose suggested to Kimball that if the ridge in front of Kirby's brigade could be carried, his brigade could advance over the valley, ascend the hill at Hood's ninety-degree angle and take the artillery that had been dealing roughly with the Union troops.¹¹⁴⁴ Both Kimball and Wood agreed with Grose's idea as both realized that if it could be accomplished, the Confederate center would be broken. Wood, glancing at the *Ninth* as it crouched on the muddy ground in the drizzling rain, said loud enough to be heard by the men: "And we'll whip them, sure as hell."¹¹⁴⁵

Wood ordered up two batteries and placed them to bring converging fire on the crest of the hill. After a half hour of bombardment he ordered Kimball to assault the hill with his entire division.¹¹⁴⁶ When the order to advance came, the *Ninth* moved down the slope of the hill behind which they had just sought protection, ran through a garden and yard, past a house, and through corn fields with its stocks still standing. The *Ninth* reformed and closed its ranks as it moved across the bullet-swept corn field, until it came to a small ridge, behind which Colonel

Suman ordered the men to lie down, since the artillery fire had began taking a toll on his regiment. This rest was short lived as Colonel Suman observed that the right of the regiment was exposed, he ordered the regiment to move at a dead run forward through a second corn field in order to take shelter in a sunken road behind a stone fence which afforded some protection from the artillery fire. This run of nearly half a mile, in plain view of the Confederate line and under artillery fire, was so quick that it was accomplished with small loss to the regiment.¹¹⁴⁷

While the *Ninth* lay in this sunken road, a battery was positioned in the corn field a few hundred feet behind them. With short-cut fuses the artillery sent bursting shells into the rebel skirmishers followed by a withering volley of musketry from the *Ninth*. Within a few moments several men of the *Ninth* were struck by pieces of a shell from friendly fire that had burst seconds too soon. Several more were slightly wounded by splinters from the wooden casing on the shells. Observing this, the captain of the battery asked Colonel Suman to make a gap in the line to prevent further injury. Colonel Suman ordered the three right companies of the regiment (A, F and D) to move to the right, opening an interval of 200 yards between these companies and the balance of the regiment. While safely behind the stone fence the regiment watched the brigade's skirmishers gradually crawling up the hill. After lying nearly an hour behind the fence, at approximately 4:00 p.m. the *Ninth* was ordered to charge the works on the hill. The *Bloody Ninth* sprang out of the sunken road and advanced rapidly and steadily over an open field. With Nelson's flag in the lead, they moved under a galling fire up the hill, nearly 200 yards, just to the left of the angle, and within sixty or seventy paces of the Confederate line. At that point, Colonel Suman observed that the men were very fatigued and were impeded by their knapsacks, so he ordered them unsung. With this done, they "center-dressed on the colors" and with a wild yell, the regiment spring forward over the short intervening space so quickly that many of the rebels could not get away from their works before the *Ninth* was upon them.¹¹⁴⁸

The *Ninth* was the first to arrive at the Confederate trenches. Having arrived, there was no time for congratulations as Colonel Suman, seeing the rebels fleeing from their line, scarcely

took time to reform when he ordered the regiment to follow in hot pursuit. This rapid advance lasted for about half a mile, when the regiment was halted. The sun had set and darkness was slowly taking hold of the area. Colonel Suman could see that it was useless to make further pursuit, as the rebels were running so quickly that the *Ninth* could not overtake them before they would be engulfed in total darkness. After a short rest to catch their breath the regiment rejoined the brigade.

While the troops of the IV Corps were being reformed, Wood received an order from Thomas to move toward the Franklin pike, some two and a half miles away and drive the rebels from these works. At about 5:00 p.m. as darkness set in, the whole corps formed in two lines and covered by a cloud of skirmishers, pushed rapidly toward the Franklin pike. After crossing the Granny-White pike and arriving within about three-quarters of a mile of the Franklin pike, the darkness became so dense that it was necessary to halt the corps for the night. At about 7:00 p.m. the *Ninth* threw up some works at the front lines and rested for the night. The result of the day's operations for the IV Corps was the capture of 10 pieces of artillery, 5 caissons, several stands of colors, a considerable number of small-arms, and some 500 prisoners.¹¹⁴⁹

The fight that started in the fog on December 15th had lasted the whole day, but the losses for the Federals were astonishingly light. Wood reported only 350 casualties, Smith about the same, and Schofield reported only 150 casualties. All totaled, sixteen pieces of artillery, 40 wagons and 1,200 prisoners had been taken.¹¹⁵⁰

As it turned out, Thomas' plan of attack was masterly; it was coordinated with a weighted superiority in numbers at the best point to over-run the opposition. Hood, on the other hand, had several defects that he could not overcome. First, his entrenchments were too long to defend with the troops available, and he lacked reserves to call upon. Second, his cavalry was absent, as he had sent Forrest's three divisions of cavalry and one of infantry away when it should have been available for the battle to protect his open flank. Third, and most important, he did not have sufficient troops to take on Thomas' army at Nashville and should not have been there in

the first place.¹¹⁵¹

At 9 P.M. Thomas telegraphed Washington:

I attacked the enemy's left this morning and drove it from the river, below the city, very nearly to the Franklin pike, a distance about eight miles. . . The troops behaved splendidly, all taking their share in assaulting and carrying the enemy's breast-works. I shall attack the enemy again tomorrow if he stands to fight, and if he retreats during the night I will pursue him, throwing a heavy cavalry force in his rear to destroy his trains, if possible.¹¹⁵²

Grant wired back:

I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from Van Duzer, detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go no farther. Push the enemy now, and give him no rest until he is entirely destroyed. Your army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break up Hood's army and render it useless for future operations. Do not stop for trains or supplies, but take them from the country, as the enemy have done. Much is now expected.¹¹⁵³



During the night new orders arrived for the IV Corps directing it "to advance at daylight the following morning and if the Confederate army was still in front to attack it. If the Confederates had retreated, to pursue them until found." For a proper understanding of December 16th activities, a brief description of the topography of the adjacent country is necessary. The basin in which the city of Nashville is situated was enclosed on the southwest, south, and southeast by the Brentwood Hills. The Franklin pike ran nearly due south from Nashville. The Brentwood Hills consisted of two ranges of hills; one range to the west of the Franklin pike ran from northwest to southeast. The other range to the east of the Franklin pike ran from northeast to southwest. The two ranges united at a gap, about nine miles from Nashville. The Franklin pike passed through this gap and ran through the little hamlet of Brentwood. The most northern point of each range of hills was about five miles from Nashville.

Hood had not withdrawn or given up the fight as the Union generals first thought. During

the night, he withdrew his right and center to form an entrenched line covering both the Granny-White and Franklin Pikes, about four miles north of Brentwood. The whole line, about three miles long, had been hastily but strongly entrenched with abates thrown up in front. This line rested upon two high hills, one at each end of the line. The center through which the upper branches of Brown's Creek ran was lower. Since the left was still Hood's weak point, he ordered the whole of Cheatham's Corps transferred from right to left, leaving Stewart in the center and Lee on the right. Hood's center was weaker than either flank. On top of Shy's hill Bates' division was positioned where the line made a right angle. Bates complained that this angle in the line made his position vulnerable, but Hood's engineers had established it and it was too late to change.

Hood knew the odds he faced and was quite aware of what might happen. Accordingly, he ordered all wagons to move at first light to Franklin with warning notes to all corps commanders specifying that "should any disaster happen to us today", Lee would hold fast on the Franklin Pike, until Stewart had moved down it, and Cheatham would take the Granny-White Pike back to Franklin.¹¹⁵⁴

Believing that they would have to pursue Hood's retreating army, the Union forces followed Thomas' plan of pursuit given the night before. The army formed with the IV corps moving south, just east of the Franklin Pike toward Overton's Hill. Wood deployed Elliott's division across the road facing southward, Beatty's on the left, and Kimball's in reserve behind Elliott. The corps, with banners waving and bayonets glistening in the hazy morning sunlight, moved forward for three-fourths of mile. Then, for the second time, it met a strong line of Confederate skirmishers behind barricades. The main line was now plainly in view just a half mile beyond.


As the *Ninth* moved forward over the scrub land, a fox startled from his hiding place dashed into the line of cheering men. After some scurrying about, the bewildered animal was captured, muzzled and made to ride atop one of the knapsacks. The fox was not the only one running between the ranks. Newsboys from Nashville hurried among the soldiers selling newspapers about the great battle of the day before.¹¹⁵⁵ Grose's brigade rushed forward and came within range of the Confederate works just to the right of the Franklin Pike. The 75th Illinois, 84th Indiana, and 77th Pennsylvania in the front line, the 84th Illinois and *Ninth* in the second line and the 80th Illinois and 30th Indiana in the third line.¹¹⁵⁶ The Regiment received hot fire for several minutes until it was ordered to lay flat on the ground. The left of the regiment was sheltered by rising ground, but the right companies were exposed on open ground, just in the rear of a little stream.

Within minutes, a rail fence was torn down and used as a slight barricade in front of the exposed companies. The men lay in the mud for hours while bullets and shells fell among them. Several received wounds from bursting shells.¹¹⁵⁷

The other corps formed in accordance with Thomas' plan, the Union line ran from flank to flank, nowhere reaching beyond the Confederate line except for cavalry operations.

Skirmishing started in earnest all along the front, and various points were reconnoitered to determine if there were any weak points in Hood's line. All the batteries of the IV Corps were brought to the front, and placed in positions for short range firing on the rebel works with orders to keep up a steady fire as there was an unlimited supply of ammunition available. The confederates replied spiritedly with musketry and artillery.

By mid-afternoon after a thorough and close reconnaissance of Overton Hill, Wood



determined to make an attack. It was evident that the assault would be very difficult and, if successful, would probably be attended with heavy loss. Any preparatory movements by Wood's troops could not be concealed from the Confederates due to the extreme proximity to their entrenchments and thus, they were made under the fire of his artillery.

While this was taking place the *Ninth*, along with the rest of Grose's brigade, remained behind the temporary works, waiting for orders to advance up the hill. The ground in front of Grose's brigade was open farmland with a ravine running obliquely across the front to the left. It was this ravine that Grose's regiments would need to cross before they could reach the hill and the rebel lines beyond.¹¹⁵⁸

A concentrated artillery fire upon Overton Hill preceded the assault that Wood ordered at about 3:00 p.m. When the attack began, Confederate troops were hurried from the Confederate left and center to meet the attack. Nearing the entrenchments, the Federal troops rushed forward. Some gained the parapet, but they were received with such hot fire by S. D. Lee's soldiers that they could not endure and were pushed back to the safety of their own trenches.¹¹⁵⁹ The attack had lasted less than an hour and the result was reported by General Thomas:

The assault was made and received by the enemy with tremendous fire of grape and canister and musketry. Our men moved steadily onward up the hill until near the crest, when the reserve of the enemy rose and poured into the assaulting column a most destructive fire, causing the men first to waver and then to fall back, leaving their dead and wounded, black and white indiscriminately mingled, lying amid the abates, the gallant Colonel Post among the wounded.¹¹⁶⁰

Hood had a momentary alleviation following his partial success against the attack on Overton Hill. This joyful feeling, however, was soon turned to utter disbelief and disappointment. On the west side of the line and at about 4:00 p.m. in a cold rain, John McArthur's infantry division of Smith's corps began moving up Shy's Hill "carrying all before them, irreparably breaking Hood's lines in a dozen places, and capturing all his artillery and

thousands of prisoners."¹¹⁶¹

Something happened at Shy's Hill which all Generals dream about. Virtually, every Union soldier on the battle field could see Shy's Hill being captured. Wood saw it and ordered another attack on Overton Hill. This attack was taken up from right to left all along the Union line. Grose's brigade with all his regiments including the *Ninth* moved in conjunction with the lines on their right. With loud shouts they streamed across the ravine and open cornfield. Bullets from a few Confederate skirmishers sliced through the cornstalks like the sound of hail, and the ground was so muddy that the charging men often sank to their ankles.¹¹⁶²

The *Ninth* was in the second line to move up the hill. When it reached some temporary works that had been built by the rebels, captured moments before by the first line, it halted long enough to receive a withering volley from the Confederate main works. When the smoke cleared, much of the first line was broken in places. Some of the men were running to the right, while others were gathering in groups and laying down seemingly hesitating whether to reform and advance or wait for help from the rear lines. "Go in *Ninth*" were the shrill words of Grose, and Colonel Suman on his black charger steered the regiment up the wet, spongy ground toward the Confederate works. The *Bloody Ninth* stopped for a brief moment at a line of sharpened stakes that were planted at an angle of about sixty degrees which formed a barrier to the advance. One or two men would grab the upper end of the stake, push and pull and uproot it. Several stakes were removed, thus a gap was formed through which squads and companies rushed. When the Confederates realized they were about to be taken, they struck their guns against the works and trees to break them and began to run for the tall trees in their rear.¹¹⁶³

As it turned out, the Federal soldiers were not the only ones who saw Shy's Hill being captured. The rebels saw it and what followed was a domino effect all along the Confederate line. The troops who were not under tremendous pressure farther to the east began retreating and the Confederate lines were soon carried.¹¹⁶⁴ The entire western and center segments of Hood's army were gone. Bates' division, French's two brigades, Walthall's and Loring's divisions and

the remnant of Cheatham's Corps all had been routed, including Lee's Corps which just minutes before had pushed back the Union troops from Overton Hill.¹¹⁶⁵

The *Ninth*, having swept the Confederate entrenchments in their front, was reforming in rear of the captured works when Grose rode in front of them and ordered an advance at once. Dashing forward at the lead of the Union troops as skirmishers, the *Ninth* pushed the running Confederates further into the Brentwood hills. The rest of the IV Corps pursued rapidly for several miles capturing prisoners until darkness kindly enveloped the Confederate retreat. As night set in, a large group of retreating Confederates faced about and showed sufficient fight that the *Ninth* stopped and reformed, but darkness prevented any further action that day.¹¹⁶⁶ In a drenching rain the *Ninth* went into camp eight miles from Nashville in the mountain pass just outside Brentwood.¹¹⁶⁷

The two day battle of Nashville was over. Hood had suffered the consequences of his mismanagement of the Army of Tennessee. His dead and wounded were left upon the field, the exact number unknown, but probably not more than 1,500. He had lost 4,462 men taken as prisoners, of them 287 officers of all grades, including three generals: Edward Johnson, H. R. Jackson, and T. B. Smith. Hundreds of others deserted for home. Fifty-three guns were taken and thousands of small arms. Thomas reported a loss of 387 killed, 2,562 wounded, and only 112 missing. The *Ninth* lost in the two day battle one officer and seventeen men wounded, none killed and none missing.¹¹⁶⁸



At 12:30 a.m. on December 17th Thomas ordered that the pursuit should continue and instructed Wood to move his corps as early as practicable down the Franklin pike after the remains of Hood's army. At 6:00 a.m. Grose got orders that his brigade would lead the pursuit with the *Ninth* leading the brigade. Colonel Suman's orders were to move as rapidly as possible and if the Confederates should be overtaken, to press them vigorously.¹¹⁶⁹

The night of the 17th had been rainy and the morning broke dark and cloudy. It was nearly 8:00 a.m. before the whole of the IV Corps was underway, following the *Ninth* down the Franklin Pike. The road, having been used by three armies within the last month, was in poor condition and it took longer to reach Franklin than expected. Along the roadway bore the unmistakable evidence of the route that had taken place. The road was strewn with small arms, bayonets, cartridge boxes, blankets, other material and accouterments. It was not until after 1:00 p.m. when the *Ninth* reached town.¹¹⁷⁰

Wilson's calvary had arrived about two hours before the *Ninth*, but not in time to save the bridges over the Big Harpeth River. Wilson's men were able to ford the river, but the rains of the previous night and that morning had swollen the river making it impossible for infantry to cross without a bridge. One had to be built and Colonel Suman, with his pre-war experience as a builder, volunteered. By 2:00 p.m. with only a few tools and scant materials, the *Ninth* began the task.


After spending six hours in the freezing waters of the river, Colonel Suman reported at 8:00 p.m. that it was impossible to rebuild the bridge due to the rapid rise in the water, the swiftness of the current, and the amount of driftwood that was coming down the stream. One of the bents that he had installed during the day had just collapsed by the current, and he still had one bent yet to install.¹¹⁷¹ Wood ordered the corps into camp on the north side of the Harpeth River and allowed the *Ninth* to suspend work for the night if Colonel Suman believed the bridge

could not be built.¹¹⁷² With the odds against him, Colonel Suman ordered the work on the bridge to continue throughout the night. It was a cold soggy night that the men spent in and next to the river working by torch light and bonfire. By 7:30 a.m. on December 18th Wood reported to Thomas that the bridge Colonel Suman had been building was just finished.¹¹⁷³

The Corps crossed the Harpeth River early on the 18th using Colonel Suman's bridge, and pressed forward for eighteen miles through Spring Hill before night fall put an end to the day's work. Again, the weather was inclement and the roads were very muddy and burdensome. Near night-fall the *Ninth* went into camp about a mile in advance of the corp's calvary screen, and for the first time in twenty-four hours got some sleep.

While the *Ninth* slept Hood gave the order to withdraw south of the Tennessee River due to "the condition of the army."¹¹⁷⁴ In order

for Hood's army to escape cross the Tennessee, Thomas' pursuing cavalry and infantry would have to be slowed. Hood assigned Forrest this task. Forrest knew that he could not keep the Union army off Hood's back without strong infantry support. He was assigned four brigades from Stewart's corps, three for Cheatham's and one from Lee's. This rear guard was made up of 1,600 infantry, and most having seen only limited combat were in better fighting condition than the majority of Hood's army. Forrest also



requested Edward Walthall to command these troops while he took charge of the cavalry contingent.¹¹⁷⁵

During the night the rain poured in torrents, and the morning brought no improvement in

the weather. By 8:00 a.m. on December 19th the IV Corps was again on the road in the pouring rain that inundated the area rendering all movements off the road impossible. After moving just three and a half miles, the *Ninth* was stopped at Rutherford's Creek. The creek was usually fordable, but due to the heavy rains of the past twenty-four hours, it had become enlarged to such an extent that it was impossible to cross without bridges.

On the other side of the creek, Forrest's cavalymen joined Cheatham's troops and they held the high ground behind earthworks. When Kimball's division appeared they opened fire from these works with a four gun battery. In addition to the earthworks, the Confederates had lined the high bank with sharp shooters, preventing any effort to build a bridge at the turnpike crossing. Forrest saw to it that the Federals would make little progress in crossing Rutherford Creek.

To clear the rebels from the opposite bank it was necessary to get troops over the creek. Grose was ordered downstream and again Colonel Suman was expected to build a bridge, but the creek was too swift and deep. Grose ordered two rafts built, but these were swamped in the swift current killing two men.¹¹⁷⁶

During the early forenoon of December 20th the rain stopped, but the temperature turned very cold. After getting some men across the river Colonel Suman, was able to start construction of a foot bridge that the infantry could use to cross. By 11:30 a.m. Colonel Suman's foot bridge was completed and Kimball's division was again on the move. By 12:45 p.m. they were back on the turnpike and marching south toward Columbia, following Forrest's men who had been recalled by Hood late on the 19th. At about midnight Forrest crossed the pontoon bridge over the Duck River and the bridge was dismantled leaving a very wide water barrier between him and Thomas' army.

After a three-mile march on the 20th the *Ninth* came to the northern bank of the Duck River. The river was extremely enlarged, too deep and swift to build a bridge across. It was necessary to wait for the pontoon train to arrive.

On Wednesday, the 21st, the *Ninth* awoke with about two inches of snow covering the ground. They would spend the day quietly in camp along with the rest of the corps, waiting for the pontoon train to arrive. The day was bitterly cold, keeping most of the men wrapped in their blankets inside their tents.¹⁶³ During the night, between midnight and daylight, the pontoon train arrived.

At 5:00 a.m. on the 22nd work began on the pontoon bridge in fifteen-degree temperature. Two hours later the construction crew started receiving fire from Forrest's Cavalrymen on the opposite shore. By 6:30 p.m. a sufficient number of pontoons were put across the river to allow the infantry of the IV Corps to cross. The *Ninth* went into camp just across the river about a mile from Columbia next to the Pulaski Pike.

On Christmas Eve the *Ninth* waited in camp for Wilson's cavalry to pass and get in front of them. By noon the road was free of the cavalry, and the corps was put in motion. It was a long cold march in temperatures that hovered in the teens. The march lasted sixteen miles over ice and snow covered roads. By nightfall the *Ninth* went into camp two miles south of Lynnville.¹¹⁷⁷ There was no rest on Christmas, as the IV Corps arose early and followed closely on the heels of the cavalry for another sixteen miles. The *Ninth* passed through Pulaski late in the day and encamped for the night six miles south of the town. The *Ninth* had used the last of their rations during the day's march. Late that night word came that supplies had arrived in Pulaski, and that they should wait the next day until resupplied.¹¹⁷⁸

The *Ninth* waited in the cold rain for food and supplies to arrive. They were utterly exhausted and filthy. Most hadn't changed clothes in weeks, and many were sick, some too sick to move. Late in the day each man of the *Ninth* was given three days' rations with orders that he should make it last for five days. It was 5:00 p.m. by the time all the brigades were supplied and it was too late to take up the pursuit.

¹⁶³ While at Columbia, Wood ordered 15,000 pairs of shoes and socks. The wet weather and rough roads had chewed up so many shoes that Wood said many of his troops would be disabled "in a very few days."

On December 27th the corps was on the march at 5:30 a.m. with Grose's brigade in the lead. After a march of about seven miles they reached Lamb's Ferry where the Lexington and Florence roads separated. There they went into Camp for the night. The next day the *Ninth* started out at about 10:00 a.m., but the roads were so bad it was determined to march through the thick undergrowth of woods and bushes on either side. Through the barren and desolate country the corps moved for eleven miles. As the troops went into camp, word came that none of the corps' trains could move during the day as they were stuck fast in the mud. Later Wilson sent a note that Hood had indeed crossed the Tennessee River and taken up his pontoon bridge.

As it turned out Hood, by a gleam of good luck, crossed the Tennessee River on a pontoon bridge made up of eighty boats that had been floated down from Decatur. These pontoons by some blunder had been left by Granger when he evacuated that post in early November.¹¹⁷⁹ By late morning of December 28th the Army of Tennessee had withdrawn never to invade again.

On the 29th, out of food and forage, the corps remained quiet in camp, awaiting orders from General Thomas. Late that night orders were received calling an end to the pursuit and directing the IV Corps into winter quarters at Athens.¹¹⁸⁰ Smith's corps was ordered to Eastport, Mississippi; Schofield's Corps was sent to Dalton, Georgia, while Wilson's cavalry was sent to Eastport and Huntsville.¹¹⁸¹

On the 30th Thomas announced in orders the conclusion of the campaign, and congratulated his army upon its eminent success. In the campaign Hood lost by capture 13,189 men, including seven generals, sixteen colonels, and nearly 1,000 other officers. Over 2,000 men had come to the federal lines by formal desertion. The total loss in killed, wounded and missing amounted to 23,500, nearly two-thirds of his fighting strength of about 38,000. He also lost 72 pieces of serviceable artillery, seventy stands of colors, and immense quantities of small arms, wagons, pontoons, and other materials.¹¹⁸² Thomas' loss was less than 6,000.

On the 31st the *Ninth* marched to Elk River, a distance of fifteen miles. This river, like

almost all the rivers the regiment was forced to cross, was too swollen to ford. Colonel Suman was again called upon by Wood to build a bridge across this wide estuary. The bridge was difficult to build as the river was over 300 feet wide, very deep and very swift. There were no boats to aid in the construction and very few tools could be found to work with, including axes, a few saws, and two or three axes, but no nails or spikes. New Year's day would be spent by the men of the *Ninth* as laborers in the cold water of Elk River. During the next two days Colonel Suman would build a substantial trestle bridge, 309 feet long. On January 3, 1865 the IV Corps, with all its artillery and wagons, safely passed over Colonel Suman's bridge and moved on to Athens, Alabama.

Chapter 17

TENNESSEE TO TEXAS

With a wrecked army and nearly two-thirds of his fighting force lost in the incursion into Tennessee, John Bell Hood crossed the Tennessee River at Bainbridge starting on December 26, 1864.¹¹⁸³ Once reaching the south shore, the march continued to and past Tusculum from where they had started only thirty-seven days before. The defeated and greatly demoralized army moved to Iuka, then to Burnsville and on to Corinth. Finding no provisions, the army turned south on January 3, 1865 to Tupelo, Mississippi, about 50 miles south of Corinth. It was not until January 12th that the final elements of Hood's troops reached Tupelo. The army's effective force numbered no more than 15,000 men, and of these fewer than half had shoes or blankets. It was a "disorganized mob" and in no shape to carry on the war effort. Hood's army was near collapse, out of food, clothing, shoes, and horses; everything including hope.¹¹⁸⁴

Hood knew that with the disaster at Franklin and the defeat at Nashville his army career was in jeopardy. He hoped by using the right ploy he might keep his command. For this he pulled a page from Braxton Bragg's tactics: "To avoid being fired, resign in the hopes that they will insist on keeping you." Like Bragg, the strategy failed and Hood was relieved of command on January 17th and replaced by Richard Taylor on January 23rd.¹⁶⁴ Forrest was put in charge of the Department of Mississippi, East Louisiana, and West Tennessee, and detached from the Army of Tennessee. By January 19th, at Jefferson Davis' request, S. D. Lee's Corps, the army's largest with about 5,000 men and best fit for movement, was sent to Augusta, Georgia to aid Williams J. Hardee in his fight against William T. Sherman. On January 20th Benjamin F. Cheatham's Corps followed. The grand Army of Tennessee was reduced to only one small skeleton corps, "Polk's old corps" numbering now only a few thousand men.¹¹⁸⁵

¹⁶⁴Richard Taylor was the son of Zachary Taylor and former brother-in-law to Jefferson Davis.



When word reached Washington that George Thomas was sending his army into winter quarters to "recuperate for the spring campaign", Grant countermanded the order. "I have no idea of keeping idle troops in any place", Grant wired to Washington. A message was sent to Thomas: "General Grant does not intend that your army shall go into winter quarters. It must be ready for active operations in the field." With the new directive, Thomas ordered the IV Corp to move to Huntsville, Alabama instead of Athens.¹¹⁸⁶

The *Ninth* had just arrived at Athens on January 3, 1865 and went into camp when word came that they were not going into winter quarters as expected, but were moving the next day further east to Huntsville. At night fall on January 4, 1865, the First Division along with the *Ninth* went into camp about one mile east of Huntsville.¹¹⁸⁷

Sherman wanted Thomas' army to move into Alabama and do to that state what he had done to Georgia during his march, but Grant had other ideas. Not liking Thomas very much, Grant would strip him of his troops and leave him to garrison Tennessee and northern Alabama. This was an unrewarding assignment, and unlikely to require any fighting.




The *Ninth* went into camp on the Big Cove road about one mile east of Huntsville, along with the rest of the First Division. Although the orders from Grant specified that no troops would go into winter quarters, most of the men in the IV Corps treated their new camp as if they would be there for a long time. The men built frontier style huts. The base was formed of logs about three feet high on the two sides, with the front and back about five feet high that allowed a slanted roof to be made. The roof was made by superimposing wedge or shelter tents on log cross members. On one end they built a fire place using sticks daubed with clay.

During January and February the *Ninth* stayed in camp, except for picket duty. Much of the remaining time was spent drilling the new men who had come to the regiment as a result of the 1864 draft. During this period, company and regimental drills, inspections, and weekly reviews regularly took place. Many of the wounded and almost all of those who had gotten sick during the pursuit of Hood from Nashville returned to the regiment. By the beginning of March, 1865 the condition of the regiment was much improved and returned to peak fighting condition.

The *Ninth's* command structure remained the same. David Stanley, who had given up command of the IV Corps because of the neck wound he received at Franklin, reassumed command on January, 31, 1865. Thomas J. Wood, who had temporarily headed the corps, returned to his post as division commander. On March 12th, William Grose was assigned to Thomas' headquarters and Louis H. Waters took over temporary command of the Third Brigade.



In early March it became apparent that Robert E. Lee's forces at Petersburg were about ready to retreat from their entrenchments that had provided protection to Richmond for ten months. His line of retreat was uncertain, but it was probable that he might try to move into east Tennessee and take Knoxville as a new base of operations. East Tennessee was saturated with Confederate guerrilla bands, most no larger than a few hundred men,



but they could pave the way for Lee's forces moving into East Tennessee.

The *Ninth* remained in cantonments at Huntsville until orders were received from Thomas on March 12th directing it along with two divisions of the IV Corps to move by railroad to Bull's Gap. The *Ninth* boarded the trains at Huntsville and traveled through Chattanooga to Knoxville. Five miles beyond Knoxville the *Ninth* disembarked and went into camp at Strawberry Plains, Tennessee. From that point on they would help in the rebuilding of the railroad by unloading the rail cars of all the cross-ties and bridge timbers to make repairs. With the cars unloaded, the construction corps would take the material and make the necessary repairs. When not moving railroad materials, the *Ninth* would protect the construction corps from the bands of guerrillas that roamed the area.

By March 27th the *Ninth* had moved along the railroad to Bull's gap, and began working on the 900 foot railroad bridge across Lick Creek. On April 10, as the *Ninth* moved along the railroad east of Lick Creek, word arrived by telegram that Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia had surrendered to Grant. For the next eight days the *Ninth* continued to work on the railroad.

On April 19th the *Ninth* was marched to Bull's Gap and embarked for Nashville. This train trip was quite different than the one they had made weeks earlier to Strawberry Plains. There was no rush this time, and only one brigade at a time was moved. The railroad cars were not jammed packed and there was a lot of space to move about. All the artillery, the transportation, and the pontoon train was moved to Knoxville by road. The ambulance train continued by road all the way to Chattanooga where it was then transported to Nashville by train. The *Ninth* arrived at Nashville on April 20th, 1865. The regiment, along with the First Division, went into camp on the Charlotte Pike on the west side of Nashville about five miles from town.¹¹⁸⁸



The surrender of the remaining Confederate military units east of the Mississippi River followed the surrender of Robert E. Lee. It would not be until the Confederate troops west of the Mississippi River under the command of Kirby Smith surrendered on May 26th that the Civil War would come to an end. With the loss of the Confederate military, the governments of the Confederate states collapsed, leaving the Southern States in chaos. The only organized force capable of filling this void, at least in the short run, was the Union armies.

An overall reorganization of the command structure for the army was necessary to change it into an army of occupation. Its purpose, instead of conquest, was to provide law, order and security to the Southern States, as well as to impose Congress's retribution on the rebels who had brought on and fostered the war. On May 17th, only seven days after the capture of President Davis, Major-General Philip H. Sheridan was given command of all territory west of the Mississippi River and south of the Arkansas River.¹¹⁸⁹ Sheridan needed troops to fill his army of occupation, and two days after being appointed to govern the area that included Texas, Grant ordered Thomas to make the IV Corps subject to Sheridan orders. It was clear from that date forward the *Ninth* would be leaving Tennessee and moving to Texas.

On June 5th, 1865 the IV Corps was reduced in size to those who were not entitled to immediate discharge. This force was to be reorganized and sent by the most practicable route to New Orleans, Louisiana, with expectation that they would move to Texas.¹¹⁹⁰

Those men who came into the regiment before October 1864 as a result of the 1864 draft, were the only ones eligible for discharge from the *Ninth*. Most of the men, including those who rejoined as veterans and those who came in as recruits, would be part of the new corps sent to Texas. Approximately 370 officers and enlisted men of the *Ninth* would make the trip.

The reorganization of the IV Corps was announced on June 7th, keeping Stanley in command of the corps, with three divisions in each corps but only two brigades in each division,

not three as before the reorganization. The *Ninth* would remain in the 1st Division with Brevet Major-General Kimball still commanding. It would be in the second brigade with Colonel I. C. B. Suman of the *Ninth* as brigade commander. Lieutenant Colonel William P. Lasselle would take over temporary command of the *Ninth*.¹⁶⁵ The second brigade had the following regiments attached to it: the *Ninth*, 30th and 35th Indiana, 21st and 38th Illinois, and a detachment of the 36th Indiana.¹¹⁹¹

General William Grose was relieved of his duties from the IV Corps on June 9th,¹⁶⁶ and while the regiment was waiting to leave Nashville, Suman read his farewell address to the men of the regiment:

SOLDIERS OF THE THIRD BRIGADE:

The object for which we have been associated together having been accomplished, we are now about to separate and most of us join our families and friends at home, while some of you continue for further duty. You have acted well your part, faithfully and bravely, in the great struggle of your country for the maintenance of right and justice over wrong and oppression. You will feel better that you have done your part for your country than to have stood an idle spectator. Since we are compelled to separate, I feel thankful that I leave you in the enjoyment of an enviable reputation, a reputation of which your friends can boast and you feel proud. Your toils, hardships, and perils will be attended with perpetuation of the National Government, with a greater power and glory than ever before. Treasure up for our fallen heroes and comrades a remembrance of heroes of their age, in a great and good cause. Take home and into the future with you the heartfelt gratitude for his lot having been cast with such gallant soldiers and kindhearted gentlemen. God bless you. Good-by.¹¹⁹²

The *Ninth* left Nashville for New Orleans on June 16th, after waiting for more than a week to be paid. They went by train to Johnsonville, Tennessee and then by steam-boat the rest

¹⁶⁵ Governor Morton never appointed a new permanent commander of the Ninth after Suman was appointed brigade commander on June 7, 1865.

¹⁶⁶ William Grose continued in the Army until December, 1865 and acted as president of important court-martials in Nashville until his resignation. He was brevetted Major-General on August 13, 1865. He returned to his law practice and entered public life in Indiana. He served several terms in the Indiana Senate. He wrote in 1891 The Story of the Marches, Battles and Incidents of the 36th Regiment, Indiana Volunteer Army. He died at his home in New Castle, Indiana on July 30, 1900 at the age of 87.¹⁰⁵

of the way via the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers. When they arrived in New Orleans about 30 deserted the regiment. All of these were from the 1864 draft. They believed that they should have been discharged with the rest of the draftees while back in Nashville.¹¹⁹³

On July 7th the *Ninth* took a steam ship from New Orleans to Indianola, Texas with the rest of the brigade. They traveled by rail to Victoria, Texas where Camp Stanley was established. Shortly thereafter the *Ninth* marched northwest 160 miles to San Antonio. The next move was northeast 40 miles to New Braunfels, Texas where they went into camp for the duration of their stay in the Lone Star state.

On July 28, 1865 Suman received a note from headquarters: "You are hereby informed the President of the United States has appointed you, for gallant and meritorious service during the war, a Brigadier General of volunteers by brevet to date back to March 13, 1865."¹¹⁹⁴ In almost all regards the brevet rank was an honorary title given during war. The rank did not have the authority or pay of the full rank, but had all the outward trappings of the rank, including the right to wear the insignia of the rank. Looking at the uniformed officer, one could not tell the difference between a brevetted or a full brigadier-general. Suman turned down the rank, or at least refused to wear the uniform, shoulder straps or epaulettes of a general giving the reason that he "did not enter his country's service for the sake of honors, but in her defense."¹¹⁹⁵

In mid September, 1865 the *Ninth* back-tracked through Texas to Camp Stanley. On September 28th they were mustered out of Federal service and embarked for Indianapolis on September 30, 1865 for payment and final discharge.¹⁶⁷ It was not until October 17, 1865 that the *Ninth* returned to Indianapolis. The regiment was received by Governor Morton and his staff at a stand set up at the State House Park at 11:00 a.m. There after speeches by the Governor, Generals Milroy and Suman the regiment was mustered out of state service, their battle flags

¹⁶⁷ On July 28, 1865 Suman was offered and turned down a commission as a Second Lieutenant in the Thirty-eight Infantry, regular army. On being mustered out, he returned to Porter County, Indiana purchased a farm, and engaged in agricultural pursuits until April, 1881. He became Postmaster in Valparaiso from 1881 to 1885. In 1891 he was elected mayor of Valparaiso, and served one term. He died on August 7, 1911 at the age of 80.

turned over to state authorities, and the men given their final pay. That night after this ceremony a dinner was held in their honor at the Indiana Soldiers' Home. The next day the soldiers of the *Indiana Ninth Regiment Veterans Voluntary Infantry* returned to their homes having played their part in putting down the rebellion.¹¹⁹⁶

Chapter 18

EPILOGUE

The *Ninth* existed for 1,617 days and during that period they fought in thirty-one engagements in five different states. They marched and traveled by rail or boat over 17,000 miles, including the trip down the Mississippi River to Texas and return. They crossed the state of Tennessee twelve times, five of which they marched on foot. They crossed the state of Kentucky eight times, twice on foot.

In summary, they were first organized in the three month service at Indianapolis, Indiana, April 22-27, 1861. They were ordered to Grafton, Virginia on May 29, 1861 and attached to Kelly's Command. They fought at Philippi on June 3. They were later attached to Morris' Indiana Brigade and fought in the West Virginia Campaign, including Laurel Hill on July 7 and 8, Bealington on July 10, and Carrick's Ford on July 12 through 14. They led the pursuit of Garnett's forces from July 14 through 17. They returned to Indianapolis, Indiana and were mustered out of Federal and State service on August 2, 1861.

For the three year service most of the men from the three month service rejoined at LaPorte, Indiana on September 5, 1861. They were again sent to Virginia and ordered to Cheat Mountain on September 10. They were attached to the Cheat Mountain District until February, 1862. They were then sent to Nashville, Tennessee and joined the 19th Brigade (Hazen), 4th Division (Nelson), Army of the Ohio until September, 1862, and then the 19th Brigade (Hazen), 4th Division (Nelson), 2nd Corps, Army of the Ohio until November, 1862. In an army's reorganization, they were assigned to 2nd Brigade (Hazen), 2nd Division, Left Wing, 14th Army Corps, Army of the Cumberland until January, 1863. In a second army's re-organization, they were assigned to the 2nd Brigade (Hazen), 2nd Division, 21st Army Corps, Army of the Cumberland to October, 1863. They transferred to 3rd Brigade (Grose), 1st Division, 4th Army Corps, Army of the Cumberland at Colonel Suman's request and remained there until June, 1865. Finally they were assigned to the 2nd Brigade (Suman), 1st Division, 4th Army Corps,

Department of Texas and remained there until they were mustered out of Federal service in September, 1865.

	Org. No.	Recruits	Total	Off. Kill	Men Kill	Died	Deserted
Regiment	67		21	1	1	3	7 ¹⁶⁸
Company A	98	75	176	1	12	18	15
Company B	98	71	172	1	10	12	6
Company C	98	75	176	--	16	21	5
Company D	98	79	180	--	10	26	4
Company E	98	76	177	1	14	19	15
Company F	98	75	176	1	8	31	8
Company G	98	78	179	--	15	34	9
Company H	98	78	179	1	15	14	13
Company I	98	61	162	4	7	15	32
Company K	98	67	169	1	12	29	11
Total	1047	747	1,794	11	120	222 ¹⁶⁹	125

In his final report, the Adjutant General of Indiana listed forty-seven original commissioned officers in the *Ninth*; however the actual number was only thirty-seven. According to William F. Fox in his book on regimental losses in the war, there were only 1,750 men who served in the three years service in the *Ninth*.¹¹⁹⁷ The Adjutant General, however, listed the number who served as 2,141, but he counted those who rejoined as veterans twice. The total number of men who served in the regiment in both the three month service and the

¹⁶⁸ The recruits did not show up for duty and thus were not assigned a Company.

¹⁶⁹ Included in this figure are 14 that died in Confederate prisons camps.

three year service was 2,175.¹¹⁹⁸

Of the deserters, sixty-three belonged to the original regiment. The other sixty-two were recruits, most of whom came into the regiment as a result of the 1864 draft. A large portion of the desertions occurred after the close of the war, and was caused by the regiment being kept in the service long after the war ended when most of the men believed they were entitled to be discharged.¹¹⁹⁹

There were one hundred sixty-one officers who served in the *Ninth* and the Governor promoted one hundred twenty-two.

	Three Month Service	Three Year Service
Colonels	1	4
Lieutenant Colonels	1	4
Majors	1	5
Adjutants	1	6
Quartermasters	1	4
Chaplains	--	3
Surgeons	1	2
Assistant Surgeons	1	8
Captains	12	31
1st Lieutenants	12	48
2d Lieutenants	13	46
Total Commissions	44	164
Original Commissions	37	39
Promotions	7	122

As to the loses within the officer corps, eleven were killed in battle and two died of disease. It should be noted that no line officers died from disease during the entire term of service.

	Killed or Died of Wounds	Died from Disease
Adjutant	1	
Assistant Surgeon		1
Quartermaster		1
Captains	4	
1st Lieutenants	3	
2d Lieutenants	3	
Total	11	

During the war, the *Ninth* (three year service) served at Cheat Mountain, Virginia until January 9, 1862 with actions at Greenbrier River October 3 and 4, 1861; expedition to Camp Baldwin on December 11 through 13; and the Battle of Buffalo Mountain, Virginia on December 12, 1861. They were encamped at Allegheny Mountain and moved to Fetterman, Virginia on January 9, 1862 where they remained until February 19, 1862.

They were ordered to Louisville, Kentucky on February 19 and moved on to Nashville, Tennessee. They marched to Savannah, Tennessee on March 18 through April 6 and fought in the Battle of Shiloh on April 6 and 7, 1862. They then advanced on and took part in the siege of Corinth, Mississippi on April 29 through May 30, 1862, taking the town of Corinth on May 30. Thereafter, they took part in the pursuit of the Confederate army to Booneville, Mississippi from May 31 through June 12, 1862.

The *Ninth* marched across the top of Mississippi to Iuka, and across Alabama to

Tuscumbia, Florence and Athens during June 12 through July 8. They stayed in Athens, Alabama until July 17 when they were transferred to Reynolds Station, and thereafter to Murfreesboro, Tennessee. On August 17 they marched to Louisville, Kentucky in pursuit of Bragg. They participated in the pursuit of Bragg from Louisville to Loudon, Kentucky during the month of October, 1862. They were at the Battle of Perryville on October 8, but did not fire a shot. They led the pursuit of Bragg from Perryville to Danville on October 11. They followed Bragg through Wild Cat Mountain near Crab Orchard; Big Rockcastle River and near Mt. Vernon on October 16; Wild Cat on October 17; and Rockcastle River and Nelson's Cross Roads on October 18. They moved on to Pittman's Forks giving up the pursuit of Bragg on October 20 and marched to Nashville, Tennessee arriving on November 5 where they stayed until December 26, 1862.

They next advanced on Murfreesboro on December 26, marching through Lavergne and Stewart's Creek on December 27. The regiment fought in the Battle of Stones River on December 30-31, 1862, and January 1-3, 1863. After the battle, they remained in camp at Murfreesboro and Readyville, Tennessee until June, 1863 with a minor fight at Woodbury, Tennessee on April 2, 1863.

They participated in the Tullahoma Campaign from June 23 to July 7, 1863, marched to Manchester, and made the passage through the Cumberland Mountains and crossed the Tennessee River to Chickamauga, Georgia during August 16 through September 22. They fought in the Battle of Chickamauga on September 19 and 20. They participated in the reopening of the Tennessee River on October 26 through 29, and fought in the Battle of Lookout Mountain on November 23 and 24, and Missionary Ridge on November 25. They fought at Ringgold Gap and Taylor's Ridge on November 27, and went into camp at Whitesides, Alabama thereafter.

The regiment returned to Indiana for veteran's re-organization in early 1864 and returned to the front in March, 1864 at Cleveland, Tennessee. They would remain there until May, 1864

when they started the Atlanta Campaign on May 1. They fought at Tunnell Hill May 6 and 7, and Rocky Faced Ridge and Dalton on May 8 through 13. They skirmished at Buzzard's Roost Gap on May 8 and 9, and again near Dalton on May 13. They fought in the Battle of Resaca on May 14 and 15, and moved on to Kingston on May 18 and Cassville on May 19. They participated in operations near Pumpkin Vine Creek, and fought in the Battles around Dallas, New Hope Church and Allatoona Hills on May 25 through June 5, 1864.

They fought at Marietta and against Kennesaw Mountain on June 10 through July 2, as well as Pine Hill on June 11 through 14. They fought at Lost Mountain on June 15 through 17, and again during the assault on Kennesaw on June 27. They fought at Smyrna Camp Ground on July 4, 1864.

The regiment crossed the Chattahoochee River during July and fought near Peach Tree Creek during July 19 through 20. They participated in the siege of Atlanta from July 22 through August 25, and the flank movement on Jonesboro on August 25 through 30. They fought in the Battles at Jonesboro on August 31 and September 1, and Lovejoy Station on September 2, 1864.

After Atlanta they participated in operations against Hood in North Georgia and North Alabama from September 29 through November 3, skirmished at Columbia, Tennessee, and fought at the Battle of Franklin on November 30, as well as the Battle of Nashville on December 15 and 16, 1864.

They led the pursuit of Hood to the Tennessee River from December 17 through 28, and went into camp at Huntsville, Alabama where they stayed until March, 1865. They moved into East Tennessee from March 15 through April 19, and were transferred to Nashville until June, 1865.

Finally, they were ordered to New Orleans, Louisiana on June 16, and then to Indianola, Texas on July 7. They remained at San Antonio and at New Braunfels, Texas until they were mustered out of service on September 28, 1865.

During these marches and battles the *Bloody Ninth* suffered the following losses:

	Killed	Wounded
Green Brier Valley, Va.	3	6
Buffalo Mountain, Va.	12	13
Shiloh, TN	32	153
Pursuit of Bragg, Ky.		8
Stones River, TN	20	87
Chickamauga, GA	21	91
Lookout Mountain, TN	2	15
Missionary Ridge, TN	4	8
Buzzard's Roost, GA	1	--
Rocky Face Ridge, GA	2	--
Resaca, GA	3	--
Dallas, GA	4	--
Kennesaw Mountain, GA	13	--
Peach Tree Creek, GA	6	--
Before Atlanta, GA	3	--
Jonesboro, GA	1	--
Lovejoy's Station, Ga	1	95 ¹⁷⁰
Columbia/ Franklin, TN	2	11
Nashville, TN	1	18
Total	131 ¹²⁰⁰	499 ¹²⁰¹

One hundred seventeen of those killed and those who died from wounds belonged to the original regiment. Fourteen of those who were killed came to the regiment as recruits.

In his 1889 book on regimental losses in the Civil War, William Fox listed three hundred

¹⁷⁰ Colonel Suman in his official report listed 95 wounded in the Atlanta Campaign.

regiments that bore the brunt of the war and suffered the heaviest losses in battle. Indiana had thirteen such regiments, including the *Ninth*. Of those regiments the *Ninth* had the second largest enrollment, but ranked only eleventh in men killed; 70 less than the regiment that ranked first.¹²⁰² Of those Indiana regiments found in Fox's three hundred, the *Ninth* probably was the least known and publicized. Its commanders neither sought nor received adulation for their achievements from the press as was noted in the flag ceremony at Chattanooga by General Crittenden on October 10, 1863.

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¹¹⁹⁴ Cole, L.A., Whitehall, and Alex L., eds. Ninth Indiana Veteran Infantry Association. Indianapolis: Watseka Republican Book Print, 1884-1904, Fourteenth Reunion, General Isaac C. Suman, p. 65; Goodspeed and Blanchard, Counties of Porter and Lake, Indiana Historical and Biographical, (1882) p. 273, ¹¹⁹⁴.

¹¹⁹⁵. Id.

¹¹⁹⁶ State of Indiana. The Indiana Battle Flag Commission. Indiana Battle Flags. Chors. David I. McCormick and Wilson M.C. Indianapolis: Indiana Battle Flag Commission, 1929, p. 65.

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¹¹⁹⁷ Fox, William F. Regimental Losses in the American Civil War, p. 341.

¹¹⁹⁸ Cole, L.A., Whitehall, and Alex L., eds. Ninth Indiana Veteran Infantry Association. Indianapolis: Watseka Republican Book Print, 1884-1904, Fourth Reunion, Statistical Summary of the *Ninth* Regiment Indiana Veteran Volunteer Infantry, p. 73.

¹¹⁹⁹ Cole, L.A., Whitehall, and Alex L., eds. Ninth Indiana Veteran Infantry Association. Indianapolis: Watseka Republican Book Print, 1884-1904, Fourth Reunion, Statistical Summary of the *Ninth* Regiment Indiana Veteran Volunteer Infantry, p. 73.

¹²⁰⁰ Fox, William F. Regimental Losses in the American Civil War, p. 341.

¹²⁰¹ Fox, William F. Regimental Losses in the American Civil War, p. 341; Cole, L.A., Whitehall, and Alex L., eds. Ninth Indiana Veteran Infantry Association. Indianapolis: Watseka Republican Book Print, 1884-1904, Fourth Reunion, Statistical Summary of the *Ninth* Regiment Indiana Veteran Volunteer Infantry, p. 73.

¹²⁰² Fox, William F. Regimental Losses in the American Civil War, p. 341.