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GLOBAL SECURITY, THE NUMBER ONE DILEMMA OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY: THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES

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ABSTRACT

This paper is an attempt to deconstruct the concept of security which has been by tradition exclusively confined to the military realm. We make evident that security takes into consideration a number of fields and that its major concern is the human person. In addressing security in this work, we do not only refer to the security of states – the concept of national security –, but also to that of individuals – human security –. Governments should integrate in their security agendas not only their own security, but also the security of their nationals. Accordingly, this implies that they should protect their citizens against any threat to human life. In other words, governments or the people they rule do not merely face military threats from other states; they are as well endangered by other threats to their security, these threats are debated in this research paper. We do not mean that military issues are not to be conceptualized within security frameworks, but we do contend that they are not the unique issues to be securitized. Indeed, this paper displays that other issues should be securitized.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ABMs	Anti-ballistic missiles
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CNS	Convention on Nuclear Safety
COPs	Conference of the Parties
DoD	Department of Defense
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross domestic product
GNP	Gross national product
HDI	Human development index
HEU	Highly enriched uranium
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IEL	International environmental law
IR	International Relations
LAS	League of Arab States
LDCs	Less developed countries
LEU	Low-enriched uranium
MAD	Mutual assured destruction
MEAs	Multilateral environmental agreements
NAS	National Academy of Sciences
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGAs	Nongovernmental advocates
NNWS	Nonnuclear-weapon states
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty on Nuclear Disarmament
NWS	Nuclear-weapon states
OAS	Organization of American States
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
POPs	Persistent organic pollutants
R&D	Research and development
SLBMs	Submarine-launched ballistic missiles
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNEP	United Nations Environment Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WBW	World beyond War
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction
WW I	World War I
WW II	World War II

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INTRODUCTION

Global security is a major of international relations which in fact draws attention to lecturers, strategists and a number of security planners. The inquiries that are conducted are not negligible. In other words, the issue of global security is taken seriously amid the global political elite and security experts. The issue represents a significant aspect of research amid prominent university professors. It is also a permanent focus of regional organizations – ECCAS, ECOWAS, AU, EU, LAS, NATO, OAS etc. –, non-governmental organizations like Amnesty International, the Red Cross and many others, and international governmental organizations such as the UN. For instance, it can be argued that political non-state violence is a problem we should take seriously as it seems that we witness its progression at the local, national and international levels.

The theme of our research has not been chosen randomly considering its importance in view of the progress the world community has made so far in the purpose of managing global security issues – aggression of military groups from non-state actors, peace, environmental change, population pressures, nuclear terrorism, nuclear security, conflicts...–. Indeed, one of our main concerns is to highlight what has been implemented by the world community to address these problems. Some advancement was made possible thanks to a certain number of measures taken by the world community. We consider that a basic definition of global security should be provided in this introduction, in an attempt to give our readers a more comprehensive view of what we are intending to demonstrate in this paper.

Global security is the process that consists of preventing the break-out of military conflicts – with preventive diplomacy –, the mitigation of non-state military violence; it is focused on environmental degradation, arms control issues etc. in order to safeguard global peace and human security. Global security is put in place through diplomatic resolutions, peaceful settlements of armed conflicts, or by sending peacekeeping forces to areas stifled with military conflicts, or even by protecting people against environmental threats. Global security has also something to do with the respect of human rights everywhere in the world and as well the promotion and proliferation of democracy as a political system that guarantees the individual rights of people.

Another aspect of global security is the global-regional security mechanism between the UN Security Council and regional and sub-regional organizations.

We find appropriate to provide a characterization of security in this introduction. According to Bosold and Werthes (2005), there are two possible ways to define security, in this case, human security – a concept first developed by the UNDP Human Development Report in 1994 –. Human security can be regarded as a safety from physical violence and obedience to the law in accordance with fundamental human rights, most importantly, the right to life (Bosold and Werthes, 2005). The writers asserted that this approach has been at the core of international processes of negotiation, as it was the case with the discussions on small weapons trade and trafficking or the Ottawa Treaty – the highly successful 1977 Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines –. In this perspective, they argued that the understanding of this perception of security is that order, peace and economic development have no chance to originate from failed states or developing countries with no previous stable environment wherein the disarmament of illegitimate fighters has been made possible, this means an environment wherein political stability can be encouraged or even reestablished as a precondition for development revenue (Bosold and Werthes, 2005).

The second approach of human security is that the issue of security ranges from the degradation of the environment, satisfaction of fundamental human wants like health care and food, to economic security, mostly to have basic income (Bosold and Werthes, 2005). The writers underlined that this second analysis of security is at the core of the findings and works of the UNDP's 1994 Report of human security in the sense that security in this standpoint cannot be achieved by making some issues such as arms control a priority, but by broadening the framework of security in taking into consideration the effect of seven factors which obviously impact the lives of people on a regular basis. These seven factors include: *economic security, environmental security, health security, food security, community security, political security and physical security* (Bosold and Werthes, 2005).

Heinrich Böll Foundation Regional Office for East Africa (HBFROEA, 2006) brought about another dimension to security. HBFROEA (2006) explained that after the 9/11 attacks in the United States and the consequent “war on terror”, the debate of international security has been focused on the traditional perception of security. The Bush administration has directed its security policy on the return of the utilization of force – as demonstrated in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and preemption as its response to terrorism – (HBFROEA, 2006). In this standpoint, security is primarily to give priority to military intervention and nonmilitary measures are not envisaged in considering security

planning. Traditionally, the issue of security has been regarded as strictly concerned with the threat or utilization of violence, and preemptive responses are considered as essential to provide security (HBFROEA, 2006).

The traditional concepts of security are limited. In other words, traditional, that is, military-directed approaches to security are not always appropriate to the international challenges to come (HBFROEA, 2006). The writers underlined the following reasons to explain as to why this conceptualization of security has to be reconsidered:

- Weapons do not automatically bring security. This is true for confrontational states armed with weaponries of such destructive power that no defense is possible. It is true in civil wars, where the informal accessibility of weapons empowers the merciless but offers little defense for noncombatants;

And it was true on 9/11, when a determined group of terrorists hit with impunity against the world's most militarily powerful nation. Proliferation of weapons and military expertise is being recognized as a growing concern for international security;

- Factual security in a globalizing world cannot be provided on a purely national basis (or even on the basis of partial alliances). A polygonal and even comprehensive approach is needed to deal efficiently with a multitude of transboundary challenges;

- The traditional emphasis on state (or regime) security is inappropriate and needs to include protection and well-being of the state's population. If people and communities are insecure, state security itself can be extremely jeopardized. Security without justice will not produce a stable peace. Democratic governance and a vibrant civil society may eventually be more important for security than an army;

- Non-military dimensions have an important impact on security and stability. Nations around the world, but particularly the weakest countries and communities, face a multitude of pressures. They face an incapacitating combination of rising race for resources, severe environmental degradation, the reappearance of infectious diseases, poverty and growing wealth discrepancies, demographic pressures, and unemployment and income insecurity.

The major security challenges of today cannot be addressed with traditional military-focused security policies (HBFROEA, 2006).

We have considered that some approaches to security in this introduction are of tremendous criticality. We have first seen the concept of human security defined in the UNDP's 1994 Report of Human Security that was the first comprehensive approach to the concept of human security. We have therefore understood that many issues are concerned with security; the environment for instance is a concern of security. The Report helped see that every single threat to human life is a problem of security. Another aspect we have regarded here is the traditional understanding of security. In effect, we have seen that security was first-hand centered on military means as essential to its provision. As a result, the Bush administration opted for a preemptive approach for the retaliation to the 9/11 attacks.

The problem with preemption as it was the case with the Bush administration's war on terror is that it proved to be significantly unproductive in some cases. The aim was to fight against the axis of evil, but the terror did not stop. This definitional approach to security has also revealed that not every security issues can be resolved with military means. For this reason, governments have to include the safety and well-being of their populations as part of their security agendas. In this respect, they have to protect their populations against environmental degradation, poverty, and illnesses. From this standpoint, it can be argued that military troops can do nothing about the Ebola outbreak!

Another aspect is that we investigate the challenges global security symbolizes for the world community. In fact, we cannot solve a global problem if the world community is not involved. This is why it is necessary here to bring about some modest definition to the notion of world community. The world community is the set of states that do not compete in their mutual relations; they work together and cooperate in domains as diverse as trade, migrant crisis, military, diplomacy, terrorism, climate change, conflict resolutions... Of course, the world community is different from the international society; the latter is the set of countries that compete in their mutual relations. In an international society the more you have power, the more you are likely to reach your goals. As a result, power plays a strategic role in an international society. In addition, the world community refers to all the countries of the world put together, most of which belong to the UN or not. It is the responsibility of the world community to deal with global security issues.

Elements of Procedures

In this part, we would like to deal with the different approaches that withstand our research. In fact, our dissertation is sustained by a theoretical approach. We develop two different approaches to give this work its comprehensive academic dimension. Therefore, we have opted for an historical approach and postmodernism in a sense that they both deal with power and the historical development of real world problems. We identify their similarities. Then we show how important they are to our research paper. We will finally find that our thesis has a social and political dimension. Let us start with the postmodern approach. One of the most prominent scholars of the postmodern theory is Jean François Lyotard – a French philosopher and literary theorist, well-known for the analysis of the impact of postmodernity on the human condition –.

We will first examine an article by Lyotard, entitled “Postmodernism-Conceptual Postmodernism and Postmodernist Theory”. The writer argued that the most important determinate of postmodernism is a world of multicentering, as the emergence of many centers and claims upon one or another centrality, including previously marginalized groups. He contended that variety of interests and ways of viewing the world allows the previously marginalized groups to make claims about justice and upon a position of centrality.

In view of Lyotard’s terms, we can observe that minorities or marginalized groups have claims upon a position of centrality. What is glaring here is that our research paper is about power. In his statements the author showed that the world cannot remain the same, the world can no more be a world of centrality, where decision-makers (politicians) are the only individuals who decide about people’s destiny. The world is no more modern, but postmodern. The world is the world of many centers, which he termed “multicentering”. With the 20th century, the configuration of the world has changed with the multiplicity of international actors. While the traditional actors of IR are states, things have shifted by the end of WW II. In effect, other actors come on stage. We witness the creation of the UN, the establishment of its specialized agencies: the UNDP, WHO, UNHCR; we have the creation of the EU, AU, OAS, ASEAN etc.

We witness the coming of other actors, which are non-governmental organizations, international corporations, civil society etc. With postmodernism we understand that all these entities own power. We come to the realization that the nation-state is no longer the only unit that owns power with such a multiplicity of actors, hence

the multicentering the writer referred to. And more significantly, there is no more a unique super power (the United States) but a multiplicity of global powers.

Lyotard (1979) indicated that the ruling class is and will continue to be the class of decision-makers. Even now it is no longer composed of the traditional political class, but of a composite layer of corporate leaders, high-level administrators, and the heads of the major professional, labor, political, and religious organizations. What is new in all of this is that the old poles of attraction represented by nation-states, parties, professions, institutions, and historical traditions are losing their attraction (Lyotard, 1979). As above-mentioned, this extract showcases the reality about the multiplicity of actors in IR and that states have to adapt to that new context of international affairs.

What about the historical approach? Our point is that the historical approach or the historical method is research that consists of gathering data through historical events. In the approach, we concentrate our analysis on historical facts that we have to analyze. In addition, in an historical approach the analysis of facts play a major role. But an historical approach of course is not only to deal with historical facts; it also has something to do with current events that are going on in our society. From an online dictionary retrieved from www.dictionary.com/historical-method, we have found out that an historical approach is “the process of establishing general facts and principles through attention to chronology and to the evolution or historical course of what is being studied.” Another definition is “a technique of presenting information (as in teaching or criticism) in which a topic is considered in terms of its earliest phases and followed in an historical course through its subsequent evolution and development” (www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/historical-method).

When examining both definitions, it is not difficult to understand that if we have chosen an historical approach for our research it is because our theme deals with issues that have a certain development across the time. Indeed, we have to start from where and how non-state military forces started for example; how the issue of international security is being addressed. The historical method will actually help us scrutinize historical facts associated with global security. What are the similarities within both approaches? We have seen that the first approach deals with power and that the second is about the use of information from a chronological (historical) order so as to provide some analyzes or interpretations. The similarities lie in the fact that the issues that are discussed in our research are about power throughout the past and the present time. These approaches are essentially relevant to our investigation because we are

proceeding exactly as the approaches suggest, that is, we are showing that the question of power is obvious in our paper and which historical events can evidence it.

To assert that our work has a political and social dimension means that we cannot deal with international security without the involvement of world political leaders because they symbolize solutions to political problems. That is why in this thesis we deal with the challenges global security represents for the world community since it is these political elites that in effect characterize that community. It subsequently requires political commitment to address dossiers associated with global security. Our paper has a great social dimension in so much as when referring to global security we refer to the security of people. When it comes to the victims of suicide bombers or bomb attacks, we deal with the lives of people.

The Purpose of Our Study

With the theme we develop in our work, we examine some issues that are entrenched in global security in order to highlight the role of the world community in addressing them effectively. This investigation is not only a contribution to the scientific community, but also to the general public as it displays the reality that is currently witnessed in international affairs. With regard to the time location of our study, we have opted for a period ranging from the 1970s to the present. This means that we deal with our theme within and after the Cold War. As for the geographical location of our study, we are concentrating our research on the United States and its relationships with the rest of the world.

The Review of the Literature

The world community has made decisions that prevent the proliferation of WMD and worked towards the dismantlement of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. A study has been carried out in the United States, through the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (DOD CTR) programs. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS, 2009), with the book Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Reduction Threat is considered here as it displays the concrete measures that had already been taken to ensure global security and peace and to guarantee the capability of the world community to safeguard threat reduction.

NAS (2009) holds that the DOD CTR program was a program primarily approved and sustained by funds allocated to the Department of Defense by the Congress, which initially authorized \$ 400 million under the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 in

Public Law 102-228. The law takes into account three (3) primary program goals: (1) assist the former Soviet states to destroy nuclear, chemical and other weapons; (2) transport, store, disable and safeguard weapons in association with their destruction; and (3) create verifiable safeguard against the proliferation of such weapons. Of course DOD CTR programs met the reluctance of the US Congress that considered spending too much money and time to what it thought to be “soft” activities in contrast with the “hard”, more concrete activities, those related to programs of dismantlement and destruction of WMD, (NAS, 2009).

Despite these impediments across the years, from the beginning of the DOD CTR programs to the year 2009, the United States and the Newly Independent States (NIS) – the countries formed on the basis of the former Soviet Republic, and does not include the Baltic States – have neutralized 7,504 strategic nuclear warheads, demolished 742 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), removed 496 ICBM silos, destroyed 143 ICBM mobile launchers, eliminated 633 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), demolished 476 SLBM launchers, destroyed 31 nuclear submarines and started biological surveillance efforts in several NIS states (NAS, 2009).

NAS (2009) also reports that other measures were taken during the Kananaskis G8 Summit among which was the *Creation of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction*, held in 2002 in Canada. These are the significant measures taken during the G8 GP (Global Partnership) Summit: to prevent “terrorists, or those who harbor them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles and related equipment and technology.” The G8 GP was a retaliation to the 9/11 attacks. Can we state that these measures yet undertaken by the world community are enough to guarantee global security in combating non-state violence? We admit that these are noble measures but more actions might have needed to be taken in order to safeguard world peace which is actually imperiled. Beforehand, we have to identify how we can consider terrorism. Sloan (2000) believed that it is worth pointing out the following question: is terrorism a criminal act or an act of war? He stated that the way we fight it depends heavily on how the answer to this question is addressed. The writer underlined that in the 1990s terrorism was still perceived as a form of violence that only occurred to other people in other regions of the world. However, that perception would change with basically two factual events: the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York on February 26, 1993 and the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. The

World Trade Center blast was the first massive terrorist attack on the US soil (Sloan, 2000).

Per se Sloan (2000) considered terrorism as a form of criminality, an aspect of intense political competition and manifestation of the changing nature of conflict. Then he supported that concrete military actions have to be undertaken as a direct response to the problem. But for US politicians and the military in general, terrorism is not thought to be a form of warfare that demands action by the military services. According to the writer, the reason for an absence of a counterterrorism doctrine is that military services are reluctant to recognize that terrorism is a new type of conflict that needs a military doctrine to fight it. Unfortunately military action is only undertaken after a bomb attack or a suicide bomber has hit as a way to retaliate (Sloan, 2000).

When considering the approach developed in the report of the National Academy of Sciences, we note that good measures have been assumed in order to prevent terrorists from getting technology, WMD, nuclear arsenals, ballistic missiles etc. Yet, these countermeasures are limited if they only take actions associated with prevention. Visibly, prevention is a good thing, but still more action is to be taken. Sloan has a point there because he helped see that in addition to prevention, other measures may be considered: an offensive approach against terrorists which is manifested by military actions against them. The common point with these authors is that they all advocate global security measures to combat both domestic and international terrorism. Terrorism is not the only threat to global security; of course there are many others.

Although terrorism embodies a serious threat for both national and global security, we also have other threats such as population pressures, migration, environmental degradation, water shortage, climate change etc. The increase of the world population in some regions is a danger for sustainability because the environment they live in might not be able to support their daily needs for food (as a result of desertification, soil erosion, deforestation) with poor agriculture, water supply etc., the absence of such commodities might cause populations to migrate from one place to another. Michael and Savana (2001) held that the beginning of the twenty-first century has come with specific security challenges. Many of them will not provide any easy response to solve them. One of these new challenges will concern population pressures and the related mess up problems of immigration, refugees and conflict. The distribution of the world population is disproportionate and has negative impacts over the globe since it constitutes the

commencement of a new era of important change in demography (Michael and Savana, 2001).

When dealing with population pressures we refer to the total number of people in the world at a given time; despite the increase of the world population, what has to be taken into account is the distribution of the total number of people in the world (Michael and Savana, 2001). The writers explained that while it is admitted that traditionally the migration of people between states has a basic impact on international politics, local population pressures are often responsible for such situations as inadequate economic opportunities, which cause people to migrate most of the time (Michael and Savana, 2001).

The authors considered some figures to examine the enlargement of the world population in displaying how risky it might be for global security. For example, the world population reached its one billion mark in 1830. From that year it took merely 100 years to have another billion mark (1930). By 1960, only 30 years later, the world reached the 3 billion mark. We made the 4 billion mark in 1975, and in 1987 we topped the 5 billion mark. As early as the 2000s, the world population stabilized at 5.6 billion with a global rate of 1.56 percent (Michael and Savana, 2001). In the 2000s, 4.3 billion of the 5.6 billion of the world population (78 percent) lived in developing regions. With the expansion in population growth raises the demands on the environment in many respects. Firstly, an important number of people provoke more demands on the environment for food supply, energy and other raw materials. Secondly, the escalation of economic activity as a consequence of more people producing outputs that touches soil erosion, deforestation, air and water pollution and other environmental factors (Michael and Savana, 2001). As more people place greater demands on and having impact on their local environment and that environment becoming less able to support these people, it is logical that the direct outcome is the migration of people from one region to another. Obviously migration is the result of population pressures, although not the only causes of migration as people use to migrate by themselves (Michael and Savana, 2001).

Through the writers' analysis we understand that there is an obvious link between population growth, migration and refugees. The authors also underlined that the dangerous growth of the global population can provoke serious problems to the lives of people on the planet. Population growth can be a source of tensions as the authors held it. The immediate outcome may be food scarcity (agricultural crisis) as the demands for

food would arise and as well the scarcity of water and raw materials. This can provoke conflicts as states might fight for natural resources. The world community cannot neglect this aspect of security. What we would like to underscore here is that when we debate issues of global security in this research paper, such things as natural resources (renewable and nonrenewable resources), and food security are included in global security issues.

Apparently, global security has not only to do with the military, terrorism, armed conflicts management, but also the above-mentioned problems. An appealing issue of global security has been of course climate change. The issue of climate change is to be regarded with attention as the way we manage this challenge of human life will jeopardize or not future generations. Indeed, climate change is considered to be one of the most important challenges facing the world today. The problem of climate change is associated with sustainable development, which takes into consideration the well-being of future generations.

The Problem Statement

Can non-state military forces be regarded as new actors of international law as we take into account the mounting of terrorism?

What factors are accountable for non-state military forces around the world?

How and what can the world community do to possibly find a solution to the issue?

Is the possession of nuclear weapons by states a way to deter their enemies from attacking them or to compel them to act accordingly?

Is a complete nuclear disarmament likely to take place from the traditional NPT nuclear-weapon states when considering that issue-specific possessors of nuclear weapons outside the NPT are not willing to disarm for the reason that they use their nuclear weapons as a deterrent against regional and existential threats?

Is there a possible solution to the non-viability issue – socioeconomic, military and political viabilities –?

Persistent organic pollutants (POPs) are threatening human security, is there a way to annihilate them from our environment and avoid health degradation? Is it possible to analyze peace quantitatively or rather, qualitatively?

Hypotheses

We have two hypotheses. The first one is that the world community cannot overcome domestic and global military threats from non-state actors. In other words, we contend that it is impossible to defeat political non-state violence since when dealing with non-state violence we are not engaged in a conventional warfare where the enemy is identified. In non-state military violence the enemy is likely to be confused with a civilian.

The second hypothesis is that the world community cannot achieve global peace with the mounting of military threats from non-state actors and the threat of nuclear terrorism, the proliferation of conflicts on the planets – mostly intrastate conflicts –, the ongoing environmental degradation and population pressures, water problems and hunger. Peace cannot be achieved in such a hostile global environment if we acknowledge that peace is not the mere absence of warfare but the absence of any forms of violence.

In this doctoral dissertation, our work is sectioned into 5 parts. Indeed, we deal with (I) Armament and Disarmament, (II) Environmental Security, (III) Security Threats to States and Regional Security, (IV) Military Strategies and Terrorism, and (V) Peace and Conflict Resolution.

PART I: ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT

Partial Introduction

Abstract:

“There would be neither winners nor losers in a global nuclear conflict: world civilization would inevitably perish. It is a suicide, rather than a war in the conventional sense of the word. But military technology has developed to such an extent that even a non-nuclear war would now be comparable with a nuclear war in its destructive effect. For the first time in history, basing international politics on moral and ethical norms that are common to all humankind, as well as humanizing interstate relations, has become a vital requirement. From the security point of view the arms race has become an absurdity because its very logic leads to the destabilization of international relations and eventually to a nuclear conflict. Diverting huge resources from other priorities, the arms race is lowering the level of security, impairing it. It is in itself an enemy of peace. The USSR and the USA could come up with large joint programs, pooling our resources and our scientific and intellectual potentials in order to solve the most diverse problems for the benefit of humankind. So, adversaries must become partners and start looking jointly for a way to achieve universal security.”

Mikhail Gorbachev's *1988 New Political Thinking speech*, quoted in the book of Ó Tuathail et al. (1998, p.98).

A new understanding of the concept of security has been developing in the 21st century (Nanda, 2009). The need to redefine the traditional concept of security was eloquently developed in 2003 by the Commission on Human Security, in their report *Human Security Now* (Nanda, 2009). The Commission co-chaired by Sadako Ogato, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and Amartya Sen, Nobel laureate in economics, was launched by the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the 2000 Millennium Summit and was recognized as the initiative of the Japanese government. The new concept of security was different from the traditional one in that it aimed at assuring the security of people. According to Nanda (2000, p.335) the Commission indicated the following:

“The security debate has changed dramatically since the inception of state security advocated in the 17th century. According to that traditional idea, the state would monopolize the rights and means to protect its citizens. But in the 21st century, both the challenges to security and its protectors have become more complex. The state remains the fundamental purveyor. Yet it often fails to fulfill its security obligations—and at times has even become a source of threat to its own people. That is why attention must now shift from the security of the state to the security of the people—to human security.”

The Commission's emphasis is on the enablement of people, which can help get them ready against severe present and future threats, both societal and natural. The Commission sustains that the traditional view of state security has expanded in the 21st century to also encompass human security (Nanda, 2009). The emphasis on human security is to make sure that sufficient attention is directed to address the real causes of insecurity from several individuals around the world who suffer. Nuclear weapons represent a serious cause of people's insecurity, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – chemical, biological and nuclear – are apparently among the main dangers to state security (Nanda, 2009). The writer informs that the High-Level Panel of the UN Secretary-General in 2004 which was established to analyze new global security threats enlisted six groups of threats to global security, which encompassed WMD.

Nanda (2009, p.336) states that in June 2007, former US Senator and co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Reduction Initiative, Sam Nunn speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations mentioned the major threats we currently face from nuclear weapons:

"Catastrophic terrorism, a rise in the number of nuclear weapons states, increasing danger of mistaken, accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch"2 5 He referred to the January 2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed piece he had published along with two former Secretaries of State, Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, and former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, in which they had called upon the United States to provide leadership to prevent nuclear weapons' "proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world."

In the same way President Kennedy had declared in his 1961 speech to the United Nations General Assembly: "Every man, woman, and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or by miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us." (Nanda, 2009, p.336).

M. ElBaradei, former Director General of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), (ElBaradei, 2005) made clear that security strategies were for various centuries limited to frontiers: strategic placement of cities and boundaries to take advantage of natural barriers; defenses that were based on trenches, walls and armadas; and the utilization of ethnic, religious or other groupings to distinguish friend from enemy. In the 20th century the arrival of submarines, airplanes and ballistic missiles started to challenge

this approach to security by making capable the remote delivery of destruction on scale up to that time not imagined (ElBaradei, 2005).

At the same time, the author informed that the change that has tremendously modified the global security landscape is indeed globalization. The international community has become mutually dependent with the continuous movement of people, ideas and goods. Several aspects of contemporary life – the global marketplace, communication and, most recently, the rise of global terrorism – obviously show that our understanding of and approaches to national and global security must be reevaluated, in taking into account new realities (ElBaradei, 2005).

On the importance of nuclear security, Amano (2005) asserted that since the 9/11 attacks of 2001, the global community has reexamined and supported measures against terrorism in wide-ranging areas with a sense of urgency. However, non-state military forces are increasing their capacities in conducting activities such as crossing boundaries, acquiring funds and weapons, campaigns of propaganda, and the utilization of technology and advanced science. Amano (2005) insisted that strengthened security measures have particular significance in the fight against terrorism. If nuclear terrorism ever occurs, it could provoke inestimable damage and psychological effect on our entire society. For this reason he argued that we should take all the necessary measures as extensively as possible so as to protect society from nuclear terrorism (Amano, 2005).

The questions of armament and disarmament have started to become a concern from the beginning of the 20th century, but most significantly after World War II (WW II). Accordingly, this happened with the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States using the atomic bomb over Japan in August 1945 where 300,000 people died. That experience brought the world to consider that we were entering a new era, that of the WMD. An important aspect to be regarded is the radioactivity of the atomic bomb that lasted over 30 years in Japan. When the Soviet Union also possessed the atomic bomb, we had witnessed what was called arms race between the two superpowers during the Cold War.

This made the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States even more possible and dangerous, because such confrontation could eventually have ended in a nuclear war knowing that the military arsenals of both powers could by themselves destroy human civilization. Notwithstanding, what made the military conflict impossible is what was known as the mutual assured destruction (MAD) if a war ever waged between

the two. Now before we continue, it is necessary to define the words armament and disarmament.

From a dictionary retrieved from <https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/armament> we have found a remarkable definition of armament. According to that dictionary, the word armament is meant to describe heavy duty artillery and the equipment that is related to it, such as fighter jets, tanks, bombs and assault rifles. The dictionary explains that in the 17th century, armament was mainly used to refer to naval equipment for war, and stands for the Latin word *armare*, meaning to arm or to provide with weapons. As for disarmament, the Collins English Dictionary, on its 12th Edition 2014 defines it as follows:

1. The reduction of offensive or defensive fighting capability, as by a nation.
2. The act of disarming or state of being disarmed.

The Random House Kernerman Webster's College Dictionary, 2010, defines disarmament as:

1. The act or instance of disarming.
2. The reduction or limitation of the size, equipment, armament of the armed forces of a country.

The above definitions of disarmament are retrieved from the free online dictionary on the link <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/disarmament>. We wanted to approach some definitions to armament and disarmament before advancing in this section. Yet, as for disarmament, we would like to make clear that dealing with disarmament in this paper has nothing to do with disarming rebels after a civil war or conflict but is concerned with states' military arsenals, whether conventional or nuclear. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 1982), the permanent increase of military expenditure is the main indicator of the increasing use of resources in the world for military ends. In the course of the 1970s, expenditures in the military sector remained increasingly high. By 1979, military spending had extended to some \$480,800 million. As stated by SIPRI (1982), in 1980 that figure went above \$500,000 million. As a matter of fact, these figures represent nearly a four-time increase in military budget since 1948. Everything showed that these figures would keep increasing steadily. In this respect, the 1970s UN "Decade for Disarmament" had proved to be a widespread failure (SIPRI, 1982).

As we consider these data by SIPRI, this brings us to question the reasons for this increase in military budgets by states. The reasons may be rooted in the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, two giant nuclear powers on the one

hand, and other emerging nuclear states on the other. As we see it, this increase in military spending is due to investing money in military research and development (R&D) technology. The aim of states was to acquire the most advanced military technology possible. Another reason was to acquire military superiority. Some states like Pakistan, as we shall see in this section started to develop their nuclear program in the 1970s as a deterrent against India. In effect, India's conventional arsenal is highly superior to that of Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan developed its nuclear program to deter its neighbor India from trying to attack it or attempt any reunification or invasion.

Watkinson (1999) indicated that over the period of the Cold War, both the United States and Russia discussed a series of arms control agreements to minimize the direct risks of their possible nuclear confrontation. In addition to that initiative, they participated in the building of other agreements associating other countries, with a much greater involvement, with the purpose to curb the production of nuclear arsenals in other countries. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968 is a perfect illustration in this respect.

It can be argued that these multilateral nuclear talks about nonnuclear proliferation and arms control proved to be successful, in so much as no mistaken, accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear weaponries had ever occurred (Watkinson, 1999). In other words, we have never witnessed any escalation to a nuclear war between countries. The nuclear weapons of the United States and Russia finally shrank even if the quantity of their arsenals were still importantly high, 30,000 and 40,000 respectively. Besides, with the termination of the Cold War, the nuclear arms of both countries have substantially diminished, as 1500-2000 nuclear warheads were being dismantled each year on each side (Watkinson, 1999).

As we deal with disarmament in this doctoral dissertation, can we consider this voluntary bilateral nuclear disarmament from the United States and Russia as long-lasting such as to guarantee world peace and avoid a possible escalation to a nuclear confrontation? Therefore, it can be contended that much needs to be done in the long road to nuclear disarmament. In effect, the United States and Russia are not the unique nuclear weapon states (NWS); we have other NWS like the United Kingdom, France, China, the aforementioned Pakistan, and India.

The problem today is that we have the so-called rogue states such as Pakistan, North Korea and Iran which possess nuclear arsenals although the latter was requested to stop its nuclear program in exchange for repealing the economic sanctions that the

main actors of the world community made it undergo. The year 2015 was a historic year in this regard when Iran, the United States and the European Union negotiated an agreement whose provisions stipulated that Iran should stop immediately its nuclear program and in exchange of economic advantages and the repealing of the economic embargo. It can be argued that disarmament is essential to ensure world peace for the reasons of stability and damage limitation. But the issue becomes complicated when it comes to nuclear disarmament given that the possession of nuclear arsenals is important to deter aggression from states or non-state military forces.

In this section, we mainly discuss two major points subdivided into two chapters: (I) Armament and Disarmament in the 20th and 21st centuries and (II) Nuclear Security.

CHAPTER 1: ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT IN THE 20TH AND 21ST CENTURIES

Symons (2005) contended that the dawn of the nuclear era has brought with it a new power, terrifying in its capacity to wipe out; awesome in its potential for good, a great contrast that confronts the world today. On the one hand, nuclear power represents a significant climate friendly source of energy. Furthermore, its applications go far beyond civil nuclear power – the preservation of food and the prevention of diseases are being revolutionized by nuclear technology – and in effect, nuclear power will practically be certainly essential if we must continue our adventure of exploration beyond our solar system (Symons, 2005).

On the other hand, if we have to continue to reap the welfares of the atom, we should take into consideration its associated threats, and prevent a technology with the power for so much good from falling into the hands of those that would utilize it to harm and exterminate life. Nuclear security therefore plays a critical role in this effort. The NPT has been a momentous and to many, a surprising success in impeding nuclear proliferation and making available a secure framework for the peaceful transfer of nuclear technology (Symons, 2005).

Together with the NPT, the IAEA has played an important role in encouraging and contributing to nuclear security and safety, championing the peaceful utilization of nuclear technology and science and promoting and enforcing safeguards that protect nuclear devices and impede its diversion to destructive usages (Symons, 2005). Together the operations of the IAEA and the NPT face significant challenges. But this is not a reason to get discouraged, rather there should be more global efforts to make the system work better in the future. Symons (2005) went on to argue about the current challenges of nuclear security in asserting that the end of the Cold War brought about new hope, but as well new challenges. The threat to international security has changed and therefore we should as well change the way we address it. The most persistent image of the Cold War was an iron curtain consisting of a hard impassable boundary wrought in the container of two opposing ideologies (Symons, 2005).

Today's boundary more strictly represents the habitat of mountain tunnels wherein some terrorists have decided to take a refuge. Likewise, the nuclear landscape no longer

rests on a balance of poles – two superpowers –, but on a balance of wills (Symons, 2005). People disposed to take their own lives as they destroy others are not dissuaded by conventional logic – those with limited or no material assets, who often view their own annihilation as a prize, cannot be deterred by deterrents, whether they be nuclear or conventional –. The danger of a dirty bomb in the hands of a non-state actor, with the guaranteeing panic, chaos and trouble it would provoke, is a specter not easy to contemplate, (Symons, 2005).

1.1 World Military Expenditure and Nuclear Armament

SIPRI (1982) pointed out that in the 1970s the world military expenditure was rushing and the United States five-year program (1980-1985) for military expenditure predicted a 4% annual growth. During the period, the total supplementary expenditure in the military would be \$80,000 million. It was estimated that the Soviet Union military expenditure had increased at a percentage of 3 to 5% a year during the 1970s. This estimate was responsible for the NATO increase of its military budget (SIPRI, 1982).

The following diagrams indicate the development of world military spending from 1949 to 1979, SIPRI (1982, p. 16).




FIG. 1. World military expenditure, 1949-79 (constant 1978 prices and exchange rates).




FIG. 2. Distribution of world military expenditure, 1965 and 1979.

SIPRI (1982) postulated that world military expenditure was generally witnessing a rapid growth rate over the decade 1970-1979. In this respect, there have been states whose military spending had increased significantly. This can be exemplified by the members' states of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) which spent an important portion of their high revenue on weapons. In the same decade, their investment rate in the military as a group of states underwent a 15% increase annually. Another place with a high military expenditure was southern Africa, with South Africa and the neighboring states, with a total military expenditure of 16% annually. In southern America, the military expenditure had reached about 5% annually, in the entire continent (SIPRI, 1982).

As for nuclear armament, SIPRI (1982) reported that in 1945 two atomic bombs with a total explosive power of about 30,000 tons of high explosive were released in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and destroyed both cities, eliminating 300,000 people. From that time, the nuclear arsenals of the world have reached the equivalent of more than a million Hiroshima or Nagasaki bomb attacks. According to SIPRI (1982) the world's nuclear arsenals at the time had more than 60,000 nuclear weapons, which correspond to about four tons of explosive per person. So if they ever used even a small proportion of these arms, this would be a widespread catastrophe over the planet (SIPRI, 1982).

Equally important, deterrence has been the common approach of the super powers based on MAD; however the temptation to attack first was growing increasingly and the danger of nuclear confrontation by miscalculating, madness or accident would increase accordingly (SIPRI, 1982). Nuclear warfighting was being made obtainable, but the propensity for their deployment and strategies for nuclear armament were rationalized. The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), which establishes equal limits on the total number of strategic delivery systems between the Soviet Union and the United States, did not affect the planned deployment of nuclear weapons by these powers (SIPRI, 1982).

In effect, above the line set for the number of weapons, each side has the right to determine the structure of its strategic nuclear arsenal. The weapon developed in the United States at the time is the MX missile system, with an associated mobile building scheme to moderate vulnerability. The MX would carry 10 warheads, the maximum number authorized by the SALT II treaty. While the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBMs) did not have the required combination of accuracy and explosive to destroy

targets such as missile silos, the U.S. was designing a new type of SLBMs, the Trident II, which would possibly have a final capability to destroy the planned targets (SIPRI, 1982). However, the URSS as the U.S. was also developing a nuclear arsenal as a response to the US development of MX missile systems. Among the strategic weapons developed by the USSR, we had a series of multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) able to destroy a high rate of US MX missile systems. Obviously, the arms race between the super powers was more likely to continue (SIPRI, 1982).

In accordance with SIPRI, it is obvious that disarmament was a great challenge for both the United States and the Soviet Union in a sense that none of them was willing to stop developing strategic weapons. The good news is that the MAD guaranteed that a nuclear war between the U.S. and USSR would be even more destructive not only for both sides but also for the rest of the world. Consequently, a nuclear war can have no winner, because the destruction is assured for both parties, it even guarantees the wiping out of mankind. We can talk about winners in a conventional warfare; unfortunately the current trends of the global military arsenals reveal that even a conventional war can also be very destructive.

1.2 Early Approaches to Disarmament and Humanitarian Law of War

According to Brooks (1982), in the decades after WW II, it was believed that limitation of advancement in weapons' development was impossible because of the difficulties relative to the verification of those limitations, particularly in the R&D stage. And so, talks on arms control had the tendency to focus on agreements for numerical limitations to the deployment of a category of weapons whose verification could be made possible with realistic confidence through unilateral intelligence means.

The Partial Test Ban (PTB) was an attempt to the limitation of technological advancement in so much as it was expected thanks to the prohibition of atmospheric tests, to prevent the development of nuclear arsenals and to make all testing of weapons very expensive in order to slow down that development considerably (Brooks, 1982). The PTB has not been that successful. Its main advantage was to reduce atmospheric pollution; nevertheless, conducting tests underground made them less visible to the public and therefore reduced the pressure of public opinion (Brooks, 1982).

Dynamics of the Arms Race

The United Nations Groups of Consultant Experts (UNGCE, 1982) contended that the arms race was progressively being an international phenomenon and, albeit its intensity differed obviously between regions and some nations, no major region has escaped it. The competition of arms race between the most powerful military states was especially associated to the ultimate diversion of incomes, the highest potential dangers and represented the main chief reason of the global armament race. It is for this purpose that this competition was actually life-threatening than we can imagine if we take into consideration the huge size and the rapid development of their artilleries, given that the competition takes place in the qualitative level, not in the quantitative one, each innovation in weapons being more sophisticated and more damaging than the previous arsenals (UNGCE, 1982).

As far as military technology is concerned, UNGCE (1982) claimed that the most significant and remarkable facet of the arms race in the 1960s was the invention and the complete deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and the associated deployment of communication systems and satellite surveillance. At the end of the 1960s, there was a generalized anxiety about a new era of arms race that would eventually end with the invention of the ABMs and countermeasures in increasing the number of launchers, especially by amplifying the number of warheads per launcher in order to saturate ABM systems.

UNGCE (1982) indicated that the proliferation of nuclear weapons kept moving rapidly across the years. China and France possessed nuclear technology competency in the 1960s. In 1975, 19 countries acquired nuclear weapons capability, and another 10 countries had acquired them in the 1980s. With regard to developed and developing countries, designing a nuclear weapons program is no longer submitted to technological and economic barriers (UNGCE, 1982).

An important aspect to underline according to Ignatieff (1982) is the verification issue. In effect, when NWS negotiate an agreement on the limitation on certain arms development or test ban, the question is how the verification of the implementation of such agreement can enter in force with the guarantee of no violation. The writer underlined that sensitive seismological instrument, as well satellite surveillance, obviously provide accurate means of verification. Another aspect as for Brooks (1982) is

that the development of satellite surveillance reduced the possibility that whether the U.S. or the Soviets could secretly set up strategic weapons. Satellites equipped with infra-red detection - satellite reconnaissance - guaranteed instantaneous warning of a missile attack launched from any one place of the world, which as well prevented possible effective anticipatory attacks from each side (Brooks, 1982).

Policies on Nuclear Disarmament

Deterrence

Watkinson (1999) quoted the Committee on International Security and Arms Control, arguing that to understand the history of policies concerned with nuclear weapons and to address the challenges of designing new policies for the future demand and understanding of diverse definition and applicability of “deterrence”. The author described deterrence or to deter as deriving from the Latin *deterre*, meaning to frighten from. Therefore the author provided the following definition of deterrence: “to discourage from some action by making the consequences seem frightening.” Nuclear deterrence is normally employed not only to discourage nuclear attacks, but also attacks with conventional weaponry, attacks with bioweapons and chemical weapons (Watkinson, 1999).

The possession of nuclear weapons has basically three goals: (1) deterrence of intended nuclear attack; (2) deterrence of most important conventional war; and (3) compensation for possible inadequacies in nonnuclear forces, including deterrence or response to attacks with chemical or biological weapons (Watkinson, 1999).

Watkinson (1999) contended that neither China nor Russia would currently consider reducing their nuclear weapons, while they would like the United States to do it. Russia and China are presently modernizing their nuclear arsenals and nobody can imagine what sort of power their arsenals will possess in the future. Accordingly, the author believed that it would be wiser for the United States to keep up a strong military deterrent. An example can be provided, when the Iraqi government in the Gulf War attributed their decision not to use bioweapons and chemical agents against the United States for the reason that they knew they could undergo a nuclear counter-attack by the USA (Watkinson, 1999).

When considering the author’s views, it seems to us that possessing nuclear technology if not nuclear weapons is overwhelmingly crucial in this new context of

international affairs. The acquisition of nuclear arsenals seems to be significantly important for the reasons of deterrence because a state can decide to attack another state when it knows that it cannot fear any threatening reprisals. Today possessing nuclear weapons constitutes a certain guarantee of security not to attack but to retaliate. Arguably, conventional weapons are good but not enough to ensure complete protection if an attack is carried out. However, it is not documented that a NWS ever used preemptive measures against a NNWS. In other words, a nuclear war has never been waged; this is why it is in the interest of states to make efforts to avoid such a disaster because as Gorbachev said in 1988, a nuclear war would have no winner, nor loser, it will have as only outcome the total destruction of mankind.

In the meantime, states with nuclear arsenals know that it would be a mistake to eliminate all their nuclear weapons. The point at this stage is to have a dominant nuclear deterrent to discourage other states to attack them as in the above mentioned case of the United States. For example, North Korea has a nuclear arsenal but is aware that if it ever launches a nuclear warhead to the United States, it will undergo a tremendous military response from America. In addition, deterrence is a good strategy to ensure that a nuclear war is unlikely to take place.

Simpson (2013) argues about the challenges that are brought to deterrence. In effect, further challenges to the legacy of deterrence are evidenced by the amounting non-NPT parties that are self-declared nuclear power states, or those that are supposed to be going towards that direction (Simpson, 2013). In this respect, 3 states, North Korea, India and Pakistan have made tests on nuclear weapons and are supposed to be possessing operational capabilities. The problem is that in some decades, there might be as many countries with nuclear technology outside the NPT as there are inside it. In this direction, we have countries with nuclear capabilities which are not parties to the NPT, and have never been parties to any international legal agreement on disarmament (Simpson, 2013). One thing is certain, the non-NPT countries believe that possessing these nuclear arsenals guarantee their protection regardless of being vulnerable to a first nuclear attack by another state (Simpson, 2013).

The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco

According to Goldblat (1982), the treaty proscribes the use, manufacture, testing, acquisition or production by any means, as well as the installation, receipt, storage, deployment of any kind of possession of nuclear weapons in Latin America. The treaty

had been in force from the beginning of the 1980s and its main intent was to prohibit the rise of nuclear-weapon powers in Latin America. That objective had been reached albeit the treaty has been in force for nearly the majority of the states of that region. Undeniably, in 1977, that is to say a decade after signing the treaty, several countries were not still members of the treaty (Goldblat, 1982).

The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Goldblat (1982) postulated that the treaty precludes the transfer by nuclear-weapon states (NWS) to any receiver whatever of nuclear arsenals or other nuclear warhead devices or control over them. The NPT also precludes the receipt by nonnuclear-weapon States (NNWS) from any transferor of whatever, as well as the making or other acquisition by those states of nuclear arsenals or warheads. In addition to that, the NWS are formally prohibited to assist, induce or encourage any NNWS to make or acquire nuclear devices (Goldblat, 1982). The necessity to prevent a widespread of WMD came out when the United States and the Soviets realized that the acquisition of such weapons by many other countries would escalate the threat of global security. The problem with the treaty is that it prohibits the possession of nuclear weapons to the majority of the states in the world while at the same time it tolerates the retention of such weapons by a few groups of states. To this end, controversies had risen as to why all parties do not enjoy the same balance of rights and obligations under international agreements. To cope with that controversy, NWS had decided to facilitate the transfer of materials, equipment, scientific and technological information, for the nonviolent uses of nuclear energy, with some attention for the needs of the developing world (Goldblat, 1982).

In the same way, Simpson (2013) argues that traditionally, we have had a historical agreement on disarmament that had the goal to avoid the possession of nuclear weapons by nontraditional NWS. The initiative was an idea of the United States and the Soviet Union at that time. It is in that perspective that the author reminds us that the cornerstone in disarmament policy is the Agreement resulting from the negotiations co-chaired by the United States and Russia held in July 1968, which is a Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, most known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), (Simpson, 2013).

Rinn (2013) exposes that the NPT, which was opened for signature in 1968 entered into force in 1970, has the pretentiousness to curb the proliferation of nuclear

weapons. 190 states ratified the NPT, rendering it the most adhered-to arms control treaty of all times. It recognizes five nuclear states, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France and China, and puts all other countries in the category of NNWS for the purpose of the treaty. Only four states are not party to the NPT: North Korea which the majority of states recognized to have quitted in 2003, Pakistan, Israel and India which never adhered (Rinn, 2013).

Rinn (2013) posits that the precise hierarchy of NPT is sometimes discussed, but is safe to affirm that three of the treaty's main objectives are (1) to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons, (2) to declare that the responsible utilization of nuclear energy is permitted, and (3) to commit to a purpose of nuclear disarmament. The nonproliferation obligations of the NPT are specified in Articles I and II and as aforementioned demand that NWS shall not transfer or provide any aid in the development of nuclear weapons to any NNWS, and NNWS shall not receive any such weapons or seek development assistance. Then Article III demands that all parties to the NPT accept appropriate safeguards discussed with the IAEA to have an eye on the fulfillment of obligations under the treaty. Article IV declares that all parties have the inalienable right to peaceful nuclear energy, in conformity with the nonproliferation obligations of the NPT (Rinn, 2013).

Article VI is the disarmament provision, as quoted by the author: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Rinn (2013) points out that every five years since 1975, parties to the NPT have arranged to meet in order to "review the operation of [the] Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized." (NPT, supra note 6, art. VIII. 3.). Since 1995, private disarmament supporters and NGOs have spoken with an even more powerful voice at these conferences. Review conferences on the NPT approximately last a month and include discussions on what can be achieved to promote the NPT's goals for nonproliferation, peaceful nuclear energy, disarmament and other questions for example, how to react to withdrawals (Rinn, 2013).

The NPT after 1995 and the 2010 NPT Review Conference

Rinn (2013) informs that in 1995, parties to the NPT met as demanded by Article X of the treaty and agreed to extend the treaty for an indefinite period. Contrary to this

agreement, the majority of nongovernmental advocates (NGAs) appeared to have favored a long-term, but bounded extension of the NPT, such as by 25 years, in order to retain leverage over NWS. In effect, the belief was that if NWS wanted the extension of the NPT again, they might have to pay a price in terms of some important new commitment on disarmament. It is true that these NGAs did not see their preferences realized considering the extension of the NPT; in the meantime the conference did consecrate the start of the NGA disarmament support and continues to be the case today (Rinn, 2013).

Simpson (2013) indicates that the 1995 Review and Extension Conference updated the NPT in a number of ways. France and China attended for the first time, therefore putting all the recognized NWS inside the structure of the Treaty. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, the coming of the Russian Federation as its inheritor of its nuclear arsenal and America's large possessions of large numbers of warheads made possible both countries to embrace a more positive position on nuclear disarmament. Most of the reductions of nuclear arsenals took place under STARTI, and some by similar one-sided actions (Simpson, 2013). The NPT review process signed in 1995 put NWS under constant and continuous pressure to make evident they were willing to disarm their nuclear arsenals. Disarmament debates concentrated mostly on the evaluation of progress on the way to particular disarmament phases and actions approved by agreement at review conferences (Simpson, 2013).

At the review conference of 2000, NGAs kept arguing a moral imperative for nuclear disarmament and reinforced their determinations to build support for a nuclear-weapons convention (Rinn, 2013). In this perspective, the mayor of Nagasaki described the horrors undergone by Japanese victims of the nuclear strikes of WW II. He gave warnings about the threats of human extermination and advocated a convention on nuclear weapons. In the same way, Rinn (2013) quotes Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, an advocate of disarmament who also contended at the conference that a significant commitment to the disarmament provision of the NPT would only be demonstrated if NWS first and foremost immediately started multilateral talks leading to total nuclear disarmament. The conference is notably known to have produced the famous "13 Steps" toward nuclear disarmament, which encompassed an accord to achieve the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban, an agreement to start talks on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and reduction of the roles for nuclear weapons in the defense strategies of states.

The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy provides us with the final document (13 Steps) of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, also known as the Nuclear Disarmament Plan of Action (Thirteen Steps). The conference agrees on the following practical steps for the progressive and systematic efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”:

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without conditions and without delay and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
2. A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.
3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a program of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.
4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament is urged to agree on a program of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.
5. The principal of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.
6. An unequivocal undertaking by the NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States Parties are committed under Article VI.
7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons in accordance with its provisions.
8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all.
10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon states to place as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material remains permanently outside of military programs.
11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.
13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assistance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of nuclear-weapon-free world.

In contrast to the review conference of 2000, Rinn (2013) reports that NGAs almost globally saw the NPT review conference of 2005 as an awful failure. The majority of those nongovernmental advocates blamed the United States, contending that this country would not accept any promotion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, that it refused to build upon or even recognized the 13 Steps agreed to in 2000, and that the USA simply viewed no importance in multilateral diplomacy. At the same time, it is also documented that Egypt, Iran and the Non-Aligned Movement complicated negotiations by taking extreme positions and failing to offer constructive leadership (Rinn, 2013). In the 2005 review conference, NGAs kept promoting a convention on nuclear weapons within a specified time frame and supporting the moral imperative for nuclear disarmament (Rinn, 2013). The number one argument in terms of disarmament advocacy was the belief by some NGAs that the 13 Steps agreed to at the review conference of 2000 were so closely associated to the central meaning of Article VI that they constituted legal requirements for compliance under the NPT (Rinn, 2013).

The 2010 review conference probably showed the most forceful support yet for a convention on nuclear-weapons (Rinn, 2013). In effect, almost every NGA presentation to the conference had as main focus the necessity to start talks on a convention about nuclear weapons. For instance, the author quotes Nobel Peace Prize winner Jody

Williams whose presentation headline was titled "A Nuclear Weapons Convention: The True Path to Nuclear Non-Proliferation," although she admitted in her presentation that talks on such a convention could be long and the actual disarmament process prolonged. It is important to note that NGAs do not focus only on disarmament, but also on ideas on how to address nonproliferation challenges, and manage other timely questions such as withdrawal from the NPT (Rinn, 2013).

In the meantime, it is important to recognize that the major emphasis of NGAs at review conferences has been focused on issues related to disarmament. Rinn (2013) argues that the nature of NGA engagement on nuclear disarmament has been principally normative, suggesting what NWS must do. He goes on to assert that even the 13 Steps agreed to at the review conference of 2000, which are called practical steps, are mainly normative in nature. For this reason, Rinn (2013) advocates the urgency of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to be brought into force. He supports as well the necessity to start talks on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. At the same time, the writer affirms that there is nothing abnormal with the urgency of these disarmament measures or any others; however there has been very little debate on how these "practical steps" must be accomplished in practice. Equally important, there are challenging political and often technical difficulties that must be considered and overcome to take serious steps toward disarmament (Rinn, 2013).

As for Simpson (2013), the 2010 NPT review conference was necessary to take place given that countries like Iran and North Korea challenged the Treaty by developing their nuclear arsenals. In order to make the NPT not to lose its credibility, a positive outcome to the 2010 review conference was crucial in order to support collective belief in the significance of the NPT and avoid the treaty structure to degrade. In this end, the Obama administration attended the conference by taking a much more positive position on nuclear disarmament than former administrations. The Obama administration, as a result, launched a worldwide initiative to deal with the physical protection of nuclear devices (Simpson, 2013).

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention

Goldblat (1982) reported that the convention precludes the stockpiling, development, production or possession by other means, or maintenance of biological agents or toxins, in quantity or of types that has no excuse for peaceful purposes, as well as equipment, weapons or means of delivery prepared to use such agents or toxins in

armed conflict or for hostile purposes. Due to their unpredictability and uncontrollability, biological weapons (BWs) have always been neglected. Meanwhile, the prohibition of biological weapons at the Biological Weapon Convention intended to eliminate the possibility that scientific development modify the conditions of stockpiling, production and use of such weapon arsenals and could make them interesting for armament (Goldblat, 1982).

The Humanitarian Law of War

Goldblat (1982) explained that throughout history efforts to minimize brutality in times of war have always been attempted. Most important was the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1968, which disposed that the unique legitimate objective that nations pursue in warfighting is to weaken the enemy military forces, and that the use of arms which uselessly exacerbates the suffering of disabled men, or make their death unavoidable, would be contrary to the laws of humankind.

It is in that standpoint that the Second Hague Conference, that took place in 1907 adopted a Convention on Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, Convention IV, which stated that the right of parties to a conflict to adopt ways of injuring the enemy is not unlimited, and precluded the use of arms, projectiles, or material whose aim was to provoke needless suffering. The first Hague Conference, that took place in 1899, precluded the employment of dum-dum bullets, which expanded or flattened rapidly in the human body and caused more serious wounds than the other bullets could at that time (Goldblat, 1982).

Goldblat (1982) sustained that the two Hague conferences attempted to codify the international law of war on a global scale and they were responsible for the advances in the establishment of procedures and institutions for resolving international conflicts. The author showed that after the atrocities of WW II, it led to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide – the one called Genocide Convention – which declares genocide, defined as the commission of acts whose aim is the destruction, in whole or in part, of a national, racial, ethnical or religious group, as such, to be a crime to be prohibited and reprimanded. Goldblat (1982) claimed that additional rules were established at a conference that took place in Geneva in 1949 and encompassed the following four conventions: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed

Forces at Sea; Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War ; and Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. These Geneva Conventions had the very purpose to design a code of conduct in conflicts of the traditional genre, that is to say those waged between states and between regular armed forces (Goldblat, 1982). The author stated that in order to reinforce norms of international laws of war, a diplomatic conference on the reaffirmation and development of international law was held in Geneva in 1974.

The end of the fourth session of the conference in 1977 resulted with the adoption of two protocols: Protocol I, concerning the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts; and Protocol II, concerning the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts. Both protocols were signed up on December 12, 1977. Protocol I reaffirms and enlarges the customary norms about the protection of civilians. Protocol II is in accordance with Article 3, which appears in all the four Conventions of Geneva of 1949, and which concerns warfare not having a worldwide character. Above all, the protocol recommends the good treatment of all the individuals implicated in such conflicts, care for those who are wounded and sick and shipwrecked, as well as protection of civilian population against the threats coming from military operations. To conclude this part, the author affirms that both protocols represent a great step towards the development of the humanitarian law of war, albeit some of its dispositions lack clarity and some definitions are vague (Goldblat, 1982).

1.3 Practical Obstacles to Nuclear Disarmament

Nuclear-Weapon States Security Concerns

Nanda (2009) argues that there are NWS which rely upon nuclear weapons for security. In effect, according to him none of the NWS is disposed to surrender its nuclear weapons. This can be exemplified by the traditional policy of the U.S. as obviously shown by its 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), nuclear weapons have been at the core of the United States strategic planning. The U.S. is ready to launch nuclear weapons on NNWS and Syria, Iran, North Korea and Iraq are explicitly mentioned. It has even informed about the eventuality to design new nuclear weapons (Nanda, 2009).

The writer reports that in its working paper it submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference of the Parties, the U.S. mentioned numerous complexities as the NPT parties debate on issues of demilitarization. It encouraged the parties to discuss how to establish a global framework wherein it would become probable

to reach the objective of nuclear demilitarization. It insisted that mitigating international tensions and reinforcing trust between states would be a precondition to achieving the goal (Nanda, 2009).

Nanda (2009, p. 344) contends that China vowed its posture in its working paper it submitted to the Preparatory Committee, stating the following:

“Nuclear disarmament should be a just and reasonable process of gradual reduction towards a downward balance. States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special responsibility for nuclear disarmament and should take the lead in drastically reducing their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible and legally binding way, so as to create conditions for the realization of the final nuclear disarmament in a comprehensive and thorough manner.”

The author underscores that in order to promote nuclear disarmament, mitigate the threat of nuclear war and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy, China recommended the following measures:

- (a) Abandoning the policies of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons and lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons;
- (b) Honoring their commitment not to target their nuclear weapons against any countries, nor to list any countries as targets of nuclear strikes;
- (c) Undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances; to refrain unconditionally from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against NNWS or nuclear-weapon-free zones; and to conclude relevant international legal instruments thereupon;
- (d) Supporting efforts of relevant countries and regions to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and other WMD-free zones in accordance with regional conditions on a basis of voluntary consultation and agreement;
- (e) Not developing easy-to-use low-yield nuclear weapons;
- (f) Withdrawing and repatriating all nuclear weapons deployed outside their own territories;
- (g) Abandoning "nuclear umbrella" and "nuclear sharing" policies and practices;
- (h) Taking all necessary steps to avoid accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear weapons.

Nanda (2009) informs that in its working paper submitted to the Preparatory Committee, the UK mentioned its absolute commitment to the values and practice of

multilateral nuclear demilitarization. Nanda (2009, p.345) brings about its statement about its nuclear deterrent:

“At the end of last year we published a White Paper explaining the decision of the United Kingdom Government to maintain a nuclear deterrent. In March, the United Kingdom Parliament voted to support this decision. The United Kingdom has decided to begin the concept and design work required to make possible a replacement for our current submarine fleet; and it decided to participate in a program to extend the life of the Trident D 5 missile system. Russia is similarly dedicated to participate in a program to extend the life of the Trident D 5 missile system.”

Russia is similarly dedicated to nuclear weapons playing a key role in its military planning, as evidenced in its 2000 study, The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation by Daniel Summer. China keeps modernizing its nuclear weapons; meanwhile the UK and France have not provided any indication as to whether they might agree with the elimination of nuclear weapons (Nanda, 2009). India, a non-party to the NPT and currently a NWS, has in its February 2007 working paper submitted to the Conference on Disarmament, encouraged the global community to strengthen talks in order to reach an agreement that reinforces the capacity of the global community to initiate tangible steps towards the achievement of the goal of nuclear demilitarization (Nanda, 2009).

India also recommended particular steps, including the mitigation of the salience of nuclear weapons in security planning; measures by NWS to mitigate nuclear threat, including de-alerting of nuclear weapons; an international consensus on no-first-use of nuclear weapons; talks of a global, binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against NNWS; talks on a convention on the total ban of the use of threat to use nuclear weapons; and talks of a nuclear weapons convention banning the production, development, stockpiling and utilization of nuclear weapons and on their abolition, conducting to the global, nondiscriminatory and verifiable destruction of nuclear weapons with a definite time frame (Nanda, 2009).

As already mentioned in the partial introduction of this section, there is no useful utility of nuclear weapons as instruments of war, even though numerous nations still regard them as an essential deterrent against any aggression by other states. It is in that perspective that the writer sustains that such dependence on deterrence involves grave dangers and risks. There is no unanimity that the deterrent qualities of nuclear weapons during the Cold War preserved peace. Equally important, misperceptions or

miscalculations can surely take us to deadly nuclear holocausts. NNWS regard it as hypocrisy and a double standard on the part of NWS inasmuch as they have not demonstrated any motivation or intention to implement in good faith the commitment they took on under article VI of the NPT (Nanda, 2009).

Former Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei has boldly indicated the following: "The very existence of nuclear weapons gives rise to the pursuit of them. They are seen as a source of global influence, and are valued for their perceived deterrent effect. And as long as some countries possess them (or are protected by them in alliance) and others do not, this asymmetry breeds chronic global insecurity." (Nanda, 2009). From that viewpoint, the author contends that NNWS associate the current situation to *nuclear apartheid*. As a result, many of them are willing to join the nuclear prestige, having as direct outcome that the goal of non-proliferation remains utopian as long as NWS are not willing to commit themselves to achieving nuclear demilitarization.

Nanda (2009) sustains that during the 1990s noteworthy progress was made possible in arms control agreements under the leadership of the U.S. and Russia. A number of initiatives have been taken on and numerous significant agreements have been discussed with the goal of building confidence and mitigating nuclear militarization. Despite these efforts by the global community, the threat of nuclear weapons continues to menace both global and national security. The possible if not the only significant response to this problem will be a convention on nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia as the major NWS must take the lead so as to make nuclear weapons history (Nanda, 2009).

Regarding the data Nanda provided, we postulate that nuclear disarmament seems to be illusory because obviously a number of NWS are unwilling to disarm for whatever reason. They pretend to advocate a nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime while they do not want to disarm; they should show the good example in good faith if not NNWS are right to think that nuclear disarmament is hypocrisy. In that venture the major nuclear powers must take the lead for nuclear disarmament – the United States and Russia –. NWS with the support of the IAEA and Security Council sanctions are quick to impose sanctions on NNWS which want or have intentions to develop nuclear programs, but still modernize their nuclear arsenals.

In this case, it is actually discriminatory as the NNWS called it “nuclear apartheid” because it seems that nuclear weapons or nuclear armament or technologies is the

apanage of these states which impose sanctions on others which attempt to acquire that technology. Our point is not to proliferate nuclear weapons, but to indiscriminate their possession if the so-called world political actors are not willing to disarm but still want other states not to acquire nuclear weapons. From that perspective, disarmament is mostly utopian as we shall see later in the subsequent lines because a number of states rely on nuclear weapons as supposedly powerful deterrent against any aggressor. This of course does not mean we have to be pessimistic. With good faith, and with the good will of traditional NWS parties to the NPT and with the collaboration of the now NWS outside the NPT, nuclear disarmament might become a reality someday.

In a recent past, the IAEA has inspected incidents of noncompliance with the NPT in North Korea, Iran, Libya and Syria. However, despite the Additional Protocol and other post-Cold War measures with the intent to reinforce its nonproliferation efforts, it is only in Libya that the agency successfully dismantled an undeclared nuclear program, and as in Iraq, that accomplishment was made possible uniquely thanks to independent Western coercive action (Weitz, 2011). Even though it entered into a safeguard consensus with the IAEA in 1980, the Libyan government afterwards pursued covert uranium enrichment and plutonium separation programs so as to produce fissile material appropriate to manufacture nuclear weapons. Despite its failure to identify Libya's secret program in the first glance, it played a significant role in checking Libya's consequent dismantlement of its illegal nuclear program (Weitz, 2011).

The author sustains after the subsequent 9/11 attacks in the U.S. and the robust Western military response against international non-state military forces and their supporters, Libya sought to improve its relations with Western authorities hoping to end the sanctions imposed during prior decades following proofs that it had sponsored terrorism. The Libyan government, inter alia recognized to be responsible for the 1988 blasting of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Afterwards, in December 2003, Muammar Qaddafi, the Libyan leader renounced the WMD programs of his country and called international assessors to come to Libya to confirm the compliance of his country with its new commitment. Then the United States, the United Kingdom and the IAEA, together with other international organizations took on a major work to help Libya destroy its nuclear weapons and other programs of WMD, as well its long-range ballistic missiles. The writer goes on to indicate that the main contribution of the agency to this effort was to verify the exactness of Libya's new commitment of its past nuclear activities. In July 2006, the US National Nuclear Security Administration and the IAEA finalized the

removal of all highly enriched uranium from Libya (Weitz, 2011). The writer asserts that the case of Libya demonstrates that collective pressure and sanctions can contribute to persuade a state that violates its NPT commitments to alter its policies in order to come into compliance. Regrettably, the Libyan illustration has been a rare achievement and because of the subsequent fate of Qaddafi, is less probable to be repeated.

When its early secret nuclear program was identified, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) threatened to leave the NPT. In its reaction, the U.S. mediated and negotiated the 1994 Agreed Framework (Weitz, 2011). Under this agreement, Pyongyang promised to terminate its nuclear program, which was based on the diversion of plutonium from its main reactors at its Yongbyon nuclear facility, in return for political and economic concessions, together with ameliorated relations with the United States and the building of light-water nuclear power reactors which were deemed less vulnerable for diversion to nuclear weapon usage. However, the Agreed Framework died when North Korea, mentioning the failure of the other parties to provide it with satisfactory energy supply, at the same time recognized the American government claims that it was developing a covert uranium enrichment program. Equally important, Pyongyang subsequently deported its IAEA monitors on December 27th and declared its withdrawal from the NPT on January 10th, 2003 (Weitz, 2011).

Consequently, the IAEA reacted to that unprecedented event by referring the case of North Korea to the UN Security Council for action. Chinese veto prevented the Security Council from implementing coercive actions against North Korea at that time. In its place, China, South Korea, Japan, Russia, North Korea and the United States initiated the Six Party Talks on North Korea denuclearization (Weitz, 2011). The four interrelated goals of the negotiations are destroying nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula; normalizing relations between North Korea and all other parties; securing the economic development and regional integration of North Korea; and achieving a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula and in the broader East Asian region (Weitz, 2011). The parties have concluded numerous agreements but the same have witnessed failures at the very moment of their implementation. External events, particularly the Iraq War and most importantly North Korea's contested dynastic succession in 2011, have frequently disturbed possible accords (Weitz, 2011). Arguably, the new North Korean regime will never relinquish its nuclear weapons, principally after recent events in Libya have demonstrated that countries without WMD are vulnerable to Western attacks (Weitz, 2011). According to the author, the IAEA has far played a minimal role in the process of

North Korean denuclearization, which has been conducted first through direct talks between China, the U.S. and North Korea. The agency has been ready to help verify an accord, but has no independent means to secure one.

The IAEA's efforts about Iran have suffered from insufficient authority in the face of political defiance by the offending state (Weitz, 2011). The author informs that the government of Iran insists on its *inalienable* right (the expression comes from article IV of the NPT) to manufacture all instruments of the nuclear full cycle, with the capability to enrich uranium, which could bring about the basis to manufacture nuclear weapons. Weitz (2011) indicates that even though Iranian authorities insist that their nuclear program has completely peaceful goals, security experts believe that Teheran is in search of the capability to design nuclear weapons. Iranian officials did not pay attention to the protests of the IAEA and a number of Security Council sanctions in its determined quest of nuclear technology. Experts wonder why Teheran would endure such difficulties merely to boost the capabilities of its civil energy.

As stated by the IAEA, Teheran's nuclear program continues to progress albeit international sanctions, cyber-attacks, and other obstacles. Iran continue to enrich growing quantities of low-enriched uranium (LEU) at its Natanz fuel-enrichment plant and to build a IR-40 heavy water nuclear research reactors at Arak ignoring a number of Security Council resolutions instructing it to stop such activities. Iran has already manufactured enough LEU, about four thousand kilograms, to make a nuclear weapon or two if the LEU were additionally enriched to weapon grade (Weitz, 2011). The writer sustains that in spite of Security Council resolutions demanding Iran to provide the IAEA with the information verifying the absolutely peaceful nature of its nuclear program, Teheran has overlooked IAEA's requests to clarify information stating the Iran's previously conducted studies on how to make a nuclear warhead and a re-entry vehicle able to be launched on a long-range ballistic missile. Iranian officials have frequently refused agency demands for access to important data, sites and individuals capable to clarify these activities. If Iranians had to make a nuclear weapon, they will do it not at Natanz, Bushehr or other declared facilities under IAEA's supervision. As an alternative, they will build and design an atomic bomb at some clandestine facility, such as the one exposed at Qom, the isolated and profoundly buried enrichment complex that is hidden from foreign surveillance satellites and possible air strikes (Weitz, 2011).

In September 2007, Israeli warplanes stroke a suspected nuclear site at al-Kibar in northeast Syria, Weitz (2011). The IAEA had completely missed Syria's secret nuclear

program. It was aware that the Syrian authorities had unsuccessfully sought to acquire nuclear reactors from Russia, Argentina and other states. At the same time, experts of nuclear nonproliferation at the IAEA and elsewhere are convinced that Damascus lacked enough technical resources to develop a program of nuclear weapons. North Korea assistance probably aided Syria to overcome these impediments (Weitz, 2011).

Weitz (2011) reports that as any NNWS, Syrian officials have to inform the agency about any nuclear activities and apply safeguards to any nuclear reactors active in its territory, whether they work under military or civilian control. The Syrian government declared one small research reactor located near Damascus to the agency, and has authorized recurring IAEA inspections of its operations. A few times after the Israeli strikes, the agency delivered a statement confirming that the agency “has no information about any covert nuclear facility in Syria.” Syrian authorities have refused to answer several questions about the affair or authorize the IAEA to pursue extensive on-site research at the wiped-out site or at many other locations suspected of protecting covert nuclear activities. The Syrian’s incapacity to conclude an Additional Protocol with the IAEA has signified that the agency has lacked adequate powers to deal with Syria’s undeclared nuclear program, whose existence it only lately recognized (Weitz, 2011). In early 2011, the American Institute for Science and International Security released satellite photos detecting new Syrian nuclear sites unidentified to the agency. These revelations once again illustrate that Syrian nuclear program has made more advancement than originally believed.

Israel, India and Pakistan have declined to join the NPT or surrender their nuclear weapons, even if they have placed only some of their nonmilitary nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Indian authorities pretend that the NPT is discriminatory for the reason that it authorizes some nations to keep nuclear weapons while refusing other states the same opportunity. Indian authorities state that they would only give support to a global agreement that denies any state the ownership of nuclear weapons. Pakistani authorities refuse to join the NPT except if it distinguishes Pakistan as NWS or unless India joins too (Weitz, 2011).

Pakistan is taking on a complete program to enlarge the quantity and improve the superiority of its nuclear weapons (Weitz, 2011). Pakistan is augmenting the capacity to develop fissile material – enriched uranium and plutonium separated from utilized reactor fuel – for nuclear weapons (Weitz, 2011). There have been preoccupations as to whether the IAEA technical support programs in Pakistan have essentially helped its nuclear

programs. To illustrate this fact, the author argues that for two decades, Pakistan has received millions of dollars of the IAEA aid for control systems and working upgrades for its safeguarded reactors at the same time as it was operating and building reactors of the same design outside safeguards for its military program. There are still persistent fears that non-state military groups supported by sympathizers within Pakistan’s nuclear weapons complex, might gain control of some Pakistan’s weapons or numerous nuclear materials and technologies. Besides, the world has yet to recuperate from the damage inflicted by A. Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, who created the most extensive black market in nuclear materials and technologies ever identified. Because of the tensions between Pakistan and India, a nuclear war between these two NWS remains an eventuality, particularly as long as some Pakistanis support non-state military force strikes against India as a means, as Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, to compensate for India’s superior conventional military power (Weitz, 2011).

Rinn (2013) contends that there are several issues that influence the decision of a state to develop nuclear weapons, but generally speaking, today there are basically two types of nuclear-weapon states: global political actors and issue-specific possessors, that is to say, the five NPT NWS and those owning nuclear weapons and which are not parties to the treaty. Table 1 puts these five states in the category of global political actors, but truly speaking, China Russia and the USA are crucial NPT states for nuclear disarmament. He goes on to assert that the observed effects of nuclear disarmament on the global political influence of these states considerably have an impact on their disarmament calculation. In the meantime, advocates of nuclear disarmament should also take into consideration the necessity to address the challenges posed by non-NPT NWS, acknowledging that disarmament for these countries is essentially regarded through the sense of region-specific issues. The impediments to disarmament posed by these two types of states are to some extent diverse (Rinn, 2013).

Table 1: Categories of Nuclear-Weapon States	
NPT Nuclear-Weapon States (World-Political Actors)	Non-NPT Nuclear-Weapon States (Issue-Specific Possessors)
China France Russia United Kingdom United States	India Pakistan North Korea (withdrew in 2003) Israel

Debatably, the number one disarmament-related security concern for NPT nuclear-weapon states involves the conventional imbalance of force between the United States on the one hand, and China and Russia, on the other (Rinn, 2013). In effect, if all countries were totally to wipe out their nuclear arsenals tomorrow, perhaps no state would strategically benefit more than the United States owing to its dominant conventional capabilities (Rinn, 2013). In contrast, China and Russia would find their military deterrence and power-projection capabilities comparatively reduced. The USA, China, and Russia obviously understand that the NPT itself recognizes that nuclear disarmament is naturally associated with conventional military capabilities. As an illustration, the author reports that the United States in the 2010 NPT review conference admitted that its security perceptions authorized additional nuclear reductions in part due to its unchallenged conventional military capabilities (Rinn, 2013).

Conversely, China in several official working papers and statements at NPT meetings has pointed out that it does not have the intention to take any additional steps in nuclear disarmament, nor even make any nuclear diminishments, until diminishments from the United States average parity with the nuclear capabilities of China (Rinn, 2013). The author asserts that China is uncertain if US and Russian nuclear disarmament is ready to take place in a way that would relieve the security concerns of China in such a way that it would feel safe without a minor nuclear deterrent. And Russia made clear that there is a limit to how far it is disposed to curb its nuclear arsenal whereas the USA maintains conventional superiority. In this perspective, Rinn (2013) points out that the fact that Article VI references the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament, and general and total disarmament shows a linkage between nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament. The same article alone suggests some linkages between nuclear disarmament and conventional weapons, but the preamble is also telling:

“Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. . .”

As stated by the author, this preamble clearly suggests that NPT negotiators understood there to be some linkage between nuclear disarmament and conventional weapons. The exact linkage between nuclear and general and total disarmament will certainly continue to be discussed, but no matter the legal relationship between nuclear

disarmament and conventional weapons, the political reality is that Russia and China take the linkage seriously (Rinn, 2013). Additional support for nuclear disarmament should take into consideration this political reality and help the United States, Russia and China think about solutions to address the lack of confidence stemming from the imbalance of conventional force (Rinn, 2013).

We consider that nuclear disarmament is critical if we would like to live in a peaceful world. Part of the debate is at the level of what is left if all the traditional NPT NWS were to disarm. Obviously, if such a scenario was to take place, the United States would remain the number one military power in the world due to its unchallenged conventional military superiority. This is a problem for Russia and China, two states which feel insecure if they ever carry out additional disarmament of their nuclear arsenals. The debate also goes as mentioned by Rinn, to whether these states should initiate conventional disarmament referring to Article VI of the NPT when dealing with general and complete disarmament.

The inquietude of Russia and China is that if they were to disarm the United States should continue its disarmament at the conventional level. The issue of disarmament is very complex because we have states advocating nuclear disarmament and making pressure on other states not to carry out any nuclear programs, and yet are not disposed to disarm completely because a category of them is fearful of the American superiority on the conventional military capability. In this perspective, it can be argued that disarmament is of course possible because of the so many advancements and efforts witnessed in the past from NWS, however it seems that complete disarmament is impossible and the following lines will increasingly illustrate as to why it is so.

Issue-specific possessors, on the other hand, are less worried about global force projection and rather regard their nuclear weapons more as a deterrent against specific, regional and existential threats (Rinn, 2013). Despite moral agreement and formal multilateral processes for nuclear disarmament, these countries are unwilling to take serious disarmament measures except if their perceived regional security threats are resolved. India is perhaps the issue-specific state most comparable to the NPT NWS in a sense that its program in part was in all probability developed for political reasons, although it is sustained as a deterrent against immediate threats (Rinn, 2013).

The conventional reason is that India initially started a nuclear program in retaliation to China, and today it as well sees its program as a deterrent against Pakistan. However, Rinn (2013) contends that the security threat from China in the beginning of

the 1960s was not clearly defined, and the fact that India refused to deploy nuclear weapons for the subsequent thirty years shows that its nuclear program was not solely a result of security fears. In its place, India developed its nuclear program at least mainly out of a need to be viewed as a global political actor, and for the scientific reputation that goes with this kind of technology. Currently, India is perhaps the most vocal supporter of nuclear disarmament among the NWS, but still conditions its personal disarmament on the disarmament of China and Pakistan. India, similar to Russia and China apropos the United States, would like to make sure that its conventional armament would be enough to dissuade China (Rinn, 2013).

Pakistan is a more typical example of an issue-specific possessor, with its nuclear program closely linked to security concerns vis-à-vis India. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto started a nuclear program after the loss of East Pakistan to India in 1971. In reality, Pakistan's nuclear program is concentrating almost exclusively at dissuading aggression from India and is essential due to the superior conventional military capability of India (Rinn, 2013). In effect, even if Pakistan has promised not to use nuclear weapons against any NNWS, it has not ruled out the first attacks against India. In the absence of political reconciliation between Pakistan and India, it is not easy to see how South Asia could get rid of nuclear weapons, even if the NPT NWS were to implement total disarmament (Rinn, 2013).

Rinn (2013) contends that Israel has never admitted that it possesses nuclear weapons; at the same time it is easy to understand the reason for the development of its nuclear program. It is documented that Israel started considering a nuclear-weapons program by 1949. In the wake of WW II, the early director of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, Ernst David Bergmann supported the development of a nuclear program to make sure that Israel shall never again be led as lambs to the slaughter. Equally important, Israel has been surrounded by countries often very hostile to its existence. Considering the nearly constant tension between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the history of regional wars, with the Six-Day War and Yon Kippur War, and the small size of Israel, it is not difficult to understand the appeal of nuclear-weapons programs by Israeli decision-makers. Another reason for Israel's posture is the more recent threats from Iran that could be accountable for the conviction of Israel's statecrafts that nuclear weapons are essential dissuasion against possible existential dangers. If there is no regional peace between Israel and at least its Arab neighbors, there is more possibility for Israel's officials and elites to continue to view advantages to a nuclear deterrent (Rinn, 2013).

In the case of North Korea, like other NWS, there is rational wisdom for a nuclear deterrent that is directed on a history of regional security menaces, especially post-WW II, Cold War dynamics and the Korean War, which still is not exactly over and is the reason for the roughly 35, 000 US military staff that stay in South Korea (Rinn, 2013). In the meantime, North Korea has utilized in recent times its nuclear program as a bargaining instrument in negotiating for foreign aid to support its isolated and weak economy. In order to examine the posture of North Korea on nuclear disarmament vis-à-vis its bargaining attitude, let us have a look on the following passage by Rinn (2013, p.982-983):

“This motivation creates complicated problems for working toward nuclear disarmament: on the one hand, it facilitates negotiations on nuclear disarmament, especially when North Korea's economy is in particularly dire need and the United States and others are willing to talk; on the other hand, there are strong disincentives for actual disarmament or even steps that cannot easily be undone. Perhaps one bit of encouraging news about North Korea is that today it is not locked in the same kind of intractable regional security dilemma like India, Pakistan, and Israel, which alleviates some of the collective action problems associated with nuclear disarmament in those cases. However, it is hard to see how actual disarmament will occur on the Korean Peninsula without significant political changes in Pyongyang that guide a very different kind of economy and relationship with the world.”

Rinn (2013) sustains that it should be evident that supporters of nuclear disarmament should not uniquely think about the traditional great powers owning nuclear weapons, but also about the continuing regional conflicts that support interest in weapons programs in non-NPT countries. Although the NPT process made significant progress on phases toward nuclear disarmament, the possession of nuclear weapons by some nations outside the NPT complicates what almost was reachable. The automatic consequence is that the NPT NWS will not collectively be willing to disarm as long as other NWS still exist (Rinn, 2013).

Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Security Concerns

Rinn (2013) affirms that the disarmament security concerns related to non-nuclear-weapon states is subdivided into two key categories: (1) how to guarantee access to civil nuclear technology without weapons proliferation concerns, and (2) how to safely handle military alliances built on comprehensive nuclear deterrence. The first category touches developing states, whereas the second mainly affects developed allies of the United States. In the first decade of the 21st century, developing countries have shown interest

in nuclear energy. Rinn (2013, p.983) explains that a 2010 report of the IAEA tries to provide the explanations behind such unexpected interest: "In the context of growing energy demands to fuel economic growth and development, climate change concerns, and volatile fossil fuel prices, as well as improved safety and performance records, some 65 countries are expressing interest in, considering, or actively planning for nuclear power." As the report shows, there are good environmental and economic reasons as to why states would like to pursue nuclear energy. However, the author points out that there are also concerns about proliferation, and these concerns will only diminish as current NWS complete their disarmament.

EI Baradei (2003) contended that the countries that usually had produced the world's fuel for nuclear reactors had strong protection and accounting measures in place, put their facilities at the disposal of the IAEA for it to regulate them, and fulfilled robust export controls, all in an effort to control the spread of sensitive dual-utilization of nuclear technology, especially technology which might be utilized for both military and civil ends. In the meantime, he indicated that controlling access to this technology has come to be more and more difficult as the economic and technological obstacles to developing it have diminished with time. It is no longer documented that only extremely skillful, industrial and wealthy countries can design nuclear technology. This new reality to easily have access to nuclear technology raises concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, for the reason that the technology is dual use (EI Baradei, 2003).

Rinn (2013) admits that apparently, some developing states will have no evil intention, but some may, and the very fact that the nuclear science might be unchecked in so various nations raises the probability that several states might become virtual NWS. Virtual nuclear weapon capability refers to having the capacity to make nuclear weapons within a very short time frame, based on existing fissile material stocks and technical capability (Rinn, 2013).

It is not every state that is disposed however to sacrifice personal development of nuclear technology for nonviolent purposes, nor could states be obligated to do so under the NPT (Rinn, 2013). Most importantly, some developing states such as Iran are already developing innovative nuclear technologies with serious potential of weapons. Rinn (2013) goes on to argue that due to these challenges, the IAEA in addition to providing substitutes to personal nuclear technology development, should have the instruments to convincingly monitor nuclear activities inside states, and by its own faux pas, it has failed to keep up across the years. It is true that the IAEA has completed a credible job of

checking states declared nuclear materials and facilities, but as it was obviously made clear in the beginning of the 1990s in Iraq and in recent times in Iran, it has failed to discover and monitor undeclared nuclear materials and facilities, (Rinn, 2013).

Rinn (2013, p.985) supports that there have been several proposals to ensure how the IAEA's verification authorities must be strengthened, but perhaps the best placed institution to provide proposals about its functioning is the IAEA itself, as he quotes Yukia Amano, the current IAEA's Director General:

“Yukia Amano, the Director General of the IAEA has consistently stated that in order for the IAEA to give credible assurances that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in a state. Additional Protocols must be brought into force in every state. Additional Protocols to a state's standard safeguard agreement, among other things, typically give the IAEA expanded authority: to conduct inspections of all parts of a state's nuclear-fuel cycle, to conduct short-notice inspections of all buildings at a nuclear site, and to collect environmental samples beyond declared nuclear locations in order to investigate the presence of any undeclared nuclear activity.”

Such measures go well above the standard safeguard agreements, which are directed to a country's, declared nuclear materials and facilities Rinn (2013). In the absence of operational measures to verify the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, there is more chance for nuclear disarmament to remain a dream. The writer goes on to contend that no present NWS will feel secure if it implements disarmament, nor would national politics allow disarmament, if there were not sufficient confidence that other states were not covertly developing nuclear programs or virtual nuclear deterrents.

While the debate continues mainly on developing states, there is another concern that deserves attention, that is, security concerns about developed states which do not own nuclear technology Rinn (2013). Stability has been reached in numerous parts of the world, and perhaps various states have opted to forego indigenous development of nuclear weapons, as a result of alliance structures that provided a comprehensive nuclear deterrence. The most patent example of this situation is East Asia. Australia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan which possibly opted to sacrifice nuclear weapons for the reason that the United States was disposed to threaten their rivals with nuclear weapons (Rinn, 2013).

The author claims that disarmament that occurs rapidly or in the absence of adequate consideration of existing military alliance structures directed to comprehensive nuclear deterrence would expose immense imbalances of conventional military forces, as it is the case between China and Japan. The unexpected feeling of insecurity that would

come out so easily could end in a new regional nuclear arms race, together with tremendous increase of conventional military forces. According to Rinn (2013), this argument displays the fact that it is not uniquely developing nations which must be taken into account when thinking about the implications of nuclear disarmament with regard to NNWS. Advocates for nuclear disarmament who dream of a world free of nuclear weapons should consider these extended deterrence linkages and the stability they have provided until now (Rinn, 2013).

We have just seen that the issue of nuclear disarmament is so complex and is not only confined to the traditional NWS, nor to the issue-specific possessors, but nuclear disarmament has also something to do with NNWS. We have seen that we have two categories of NNWS, developing and developed countries. It seems that developing countries have been very cooperative in allowing the IAEA to work in their jurisdictions. It is also documented that nuclear technology can be used for peaceful ends. The problem is that it is not every developing country that is willing to sacrifice its personal development of nuclear weapons program.

As mentioned above, the past decade has seen a sudden interest for nuclear technology. The IAEA's report has postulated that it is mainly due to the economic advantages that come with the use of nuclear technology. The argument is that nuclear technology can be utilized for civil and military ends. The risks in this case are the proliferation of virtual NWS as aforementioned by Rinn. This is obviously the major security concern with NNWS. The other security concern with NNWS is about developed countries which have not developed nuclear capabilities due to military alliance structures aimed to serve as a comprehensive deterrent against their enemies.

Nuclear Disarmament Verification

Verification of nuclear disarmament is very controversial and problematic at the same time (Rinn, 2013). Indeed, verification means to see if NWS implement the different measures agreed on nuclear disarmament agreements, for example the NPT. In this standpoint, the NPT officially binds NWS to "not in any way . . . assist, encourage, or induce any NNWS to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices." This aspect of the NPT is not in our sense difficult to comply, but things get complicated when it is to verify if each individual NWS implement the reduction regime agenda. It is admitted that the IAEA has been the number one institution which tries to implement

verification of nuclear-weapons reduction. But as above-mentioned, the IAEA needs more power or authority to work at the different nuclear sites of NWS. The reality is that the IAEA is not given full access to these sites. For this reason, this institution needs to be empowered with a verification power not only for the verification of nuclear disarmament regime, but also be active in the question of nuclear-weapons proliferation (Rinn, 2013).

Rinn (2013) posits that at present levels of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament verification barely seems to matter. Assuredly, the United States and Russia will want to safeguard for political and confidence-building reasons that the other part abides by its agreements under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which would bring the number of each state's deployed nuclear missiles to 1, 550. Yet, at these levels, strict verification of every single missile does not matter much from a security viewpoint Rinn (2013). On the other hand, as states reduce further the number of their nuclear weapons, the question of verification comes to be progressively important.

A credible regime of verification is a precondition for nuclear disarmament, but this view according to the author is regularly neglected. The challenges of verifying nuclear disarmament is extremely complicated. The most basic barriers or ways of credible disarmament to verification are national security, legal, technical and political issues. Apparently, any regime of disarmament verification would necessitate specialists to get access to sensitive national nuclear sites and inspect sensitive nuclear technologies and materials. Various states may have different ideas concerning what sorts of information are too confidential and sensitive to allow international experts or monitors to inspect directly (Rinn, 2013).

Although approved definitions of "sensitive materials" could be agreed to among NWS, arguably the same line might not be appropriate for the public (Rinn, 2013). Then an additional problem is to find a level of transparency that would permit the public to have trust in the reported findings of international inspectors. Rinn (2013) goes on to assert that the basic challenge of disarmament verification will be to reach agreement on the level of intrusiveness necessary to provide credible guarantees of compliance with nuclear obligations. Equally important, no regime of verification, even the most intrusive can be perfect. From that view point, the author asserts that there is continuously a level of uncertainty.

We consider that the problem of verification is not that in a technical point of view, it cannot be undertaken; the problem is that states will put a number of measures to

hamper verification, for example national security and political reasons. This makes difficult the job of international monitors of nuclear disarmament who simply find legal barriers that cannot allow them to work with certain amount of autonomy. This is because of intrusiveness and classified technologies and materials that are too sensitive to reveal or put in the hands of international inspectors.

And even when states collaborate, they want sensitive materials to be covert, nuclear experts can work but not divulgate information that is too sensitive. We would like to highlight that it is not because disarmament has significant barriers that we have to give up the goal of nuclear disarmament. Governments have simply to work together in the purpose to find ways to facilitate the work of international inspectors for nuclear disarmament verification. Inspections therefore, in order to curb the uncertainty of states must prevent nuclear-weapons proliferation, ensure nuclear disarmament and simultaneously protect state secretes.

Here is the summary of this part, Rinn (2013, p.989).

Table 2: Summary of Significant Impediments to Complete Nuclear Disarmament

Concerns Related to Nuclear-Weapon States	Concerns Related to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States	Disarmament Verification
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conventional force imbalances between China, Russia and the United States • Nuclear capabilities of states outside the NPT and associated regional conflicts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developing "proliferation-safe" civil nuclear technology • Enforcing NPT nonproliferation provisions • Effects on extended deterrence, especially for allies of the United States 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inspections that prevent proliferation and protect state secretes • Living with uncertainty

After this first chapter, we are now going to address the second one about nuclear security. In it, we debate weapons of mass destruction and international law, nuclear terrorism, intergovernmental cooperation and catastrophe, and Japan's Self Defense.

CHAPTER 2: NUCLEAR SECURITY

Taniguchi (2005) contended that the protection of society against acts of nuclear terrorism is a new scale challenge currently facing the global community. Ameliorating nuclear security is subsequently a common objective of the global community, together with the IAEA. The events of 9/11 in the USA established a new scale, sophistication, dedication and organization of non-state forces and prompted the world community to reexamine the threat terrorism represents, including the threat of civilian nuclear programs. This reexamination has underlined the consciousness of a much broader danger picture. The readiness of non-state actors to risk their own lives in trying to cause destruction and death must be seriously considered. Whereas the threat linked to the potential development of nuclear weapons is the most overwhelming, the ways through which radioactive material may be spread for the goal of provoking harm to people, property and the environment should be strategically reassessed (Taniguchi, 2005).

Taniguchi (2005) posited that the definition of nuclear security by the IAEA as "the means and ways of preventing, detecting, and responding to sabotage, theft and unauthorized access to or illegal transfer of nuclear material and other radioactive substances, as well as their associated facilities" underlines a comprehensive strategic approach to nuclear security. Some updates of this definition have taken into consideration connections and interactions between nuclear security, safety and safeguards. From this viewpoint, the 2004 IAEA General Conference, well-known in the resolution on radiological and nuclear security, per se acknowledges that reinforcing the safety of radioactive sources contributes to the enhancement of the security of such sources. The conference also noted that safeguards agreements and subsequent protocols, as well as countries' system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, help prevent illegal trafficking by discouraging and identifying diversion of nuclear material (Taniguchi, 2005).

The author went on to assert that contemporary society, whether in developing or developed world depends on the accessibility of nuclear energy and on the quotidian utilization of radioactive material in agriculture, medicine, industry and research. Before the 9/11 attacks these operations were largely covered by safety rules concerning health and the environment. After the 9/11 strikes it is evident that these operations as well demand security. For the continual and expanded utilization of nuclear energy and

radioactive material, nuclear security is crucial and an indispensable precondition for sustainable and successful development (Taniguchi, 2005).

Taniguchi (2005) considered that the termination of the Cold War was marked by a change from a bipolar configuration of global security into a more difficult and unpredictable structure of international affairs. This also brought about new challenges of security, that is to say, an augmented probability for low density for subnational, national or regional conflicts with new and more spread threats originating from a larger number of actors, together with non-state military forces and criminals. The amount of cases of illegal trafficking in nuclear material recorded since the 1990s raised preoccupation about the global physical protection regime and prompted an effort to develop our capacity for detection, prevention, and response concerning acts of terrorism, as well as to enforce the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Taniguchi, 2005).

The writer informed that at the wake of the attacks of September 11, the IAEA identified four categories of threats to nuclear security:

- a) Theft of nuclear weapon;
- b) Construction of a crude nuclear explosive device utilizing stolen nuclear material;
- c) Malicious utilization of nuclear and other radioactive material, including radiological dispersed devices;
- d) An attack or sabotage of nuclear installation or transported material.

Taniguchi (2005) argued that the possible targets of such acts comprise nuclear power plants, fuel cycle facilities, research reactors, laboratories and storage sites as well as places around the world where these chemicals are utilized in a wide range of nonnuclear applications. To impede these events from occurring, governments should have a comprehensive approach to nuclear security, rooted in globally accepted instruments and which is applied in the entire world and in global partnership. If a nuclear terrorist attack were to happen, we would all suffer indirectly or directly as passengers of the same boat (Taniguchi, 2005).

Nanda (2009) sustains that the termination of the Cold War did not eliminate the threat nuclear weapons represent to human life. The threat of unintentional nuclear launching cannot be minimized, and we cannot be certain that non-state military forces will not acquire nuclear weapons or will not utilize them if they ever possess them. The role of international law is to make available a framework for nuclear disarmament regulation, a prerequisite for the security of civilization (Nanda, 2009).

Nanda (2009) informs that President Obama termed the future of nuclear weapons in the 21st century an issue that is “fundamental to the security of our nations and to the peace of the world”, in his remarks at Prague, Czech Republic, on April 2009. Labeling nuclear weapons the “most dangerous legacy” of the Cold War, President Obama insisted on the immeasurable consequences of nuclear weapons detonation in any major town “for our global safety, our security, our society, our economy, to our ultimate survival,” stating “clearly and with conviction the U.S. commitment to seek the security and peace of the a world free of nuclear weapons” (Nanda, 2009). The president believed that as the unique NWS to have hit with nuclear weapons, the U.S. has a moral responsibility to act (Nanda, 2009).

Some days prior to this speech at Prague, President Obama and President Dimitri Medvedev of the Russian Federation had talks about nuclear arms reduction and control issues and delivered the following joint declaration (Nanda, 2009, p. 332):

“As leaders of the largest nuclear weapons state, we agree to work together to fulfill our obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and demonstrate leadership in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world. We committed our two countries to achieving a nuclear free world, while recognizing that this long-term goal will require a new emphasis on arms control and conflict resolution measures, and their full implementation by all concerned nations. We agreed to pursue new and verifiable reductions in our strategic offensive arsenals in a step-by-step process, beginning by replacing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with a new, equally- binding treaty. We are instructing our negotiators to start talks immediately on this new treaty and to report on results achieved in working out the new agreement by July.”

As a result of these talks the issue of nuclear disarmament came to the forefront of the international agenda.

Drell et al. (2012) argue that the times we live in are perilous for a number of reasons. The major of them is the existence of an international nuclear enterprise constituted of weapons that can be responsible for damage of unthinkable proportions and power plants at which accidents can have serious, essentially unpredictable outcomes for human security. For all of its promise and its utility, the nuclear enterprise is exceptional in the atrociousness of the massive quantities of disastrous energy that can be discharged through heat, explosion and radiation. The greatest preoccupations with nuclear security and safety are in states relatively new to the nuclear energy, and the possible loss of control to criminal gangs and terrorist groups of the fissile material that

exists in such abundance around the globe (Drell et al., 2012). The writers go on to argue that in numerous states, confidence in the civil production of nuclear energy was seriously undermined with the disaster of the Fukushima nuclear reactor power plant. And in the military, the deterrence doctrine that primarily depends on nuclear weapons is declining as well because of the growing power of non-state military forces such as Al-Qaeda and other terrorist associates which look for destruction for destruction (Drell et al., 2012).

2.1 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and International Law

It is apparent that there is no absence of awareness regarding the destruction and death nuclear power can inflict (Nanda, 2009). The human desolation accompanying the releasing of atomic bombs over Nagasaki and Hiroshima in early August 1945 is brightly apprehended in the explanations of dreadful, frightening scenes witnessed by rescue and medical workers (Nanda, 2009). This was the commencement of the nuclear age. Nanda (2009, p. 333) quotes Nagasaki's Mayor who gave a description of the bomb's effects on his city:

“Nagasaki became a city of death where not even the sounds of insects could be heard. After a while, countless men, women and children began to gather for a drink of water at the banks of nearby Urakami River, their hair and clothing scorched and their burnt skin hanging off in sheets like rags. Begging for help, they died one after another in the water or in heaps on the banks. Then radiation began to take its toll, killing people like a scourge of death expanding in concentric circles from the hypocenter. Four months after the atomic bombing, 74,000 were dead and 75,000 had suffered injuries, that is, two-third[s] of the city population had fallen victim to this calamity that came upon Nagasaki like a preview of the Apocalypse.”

Nanda (2009, p.333) quotes former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan who reminded humanity of the devastation of Nagasaki and Hiroshima and presaged that a nuclear weapon explosion in any town of the world would create chaos as:

“Tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of people would perish in an instant, and many more would die from exposure to radiation. The global impact would also be grave Hard-won freedoms and human rights could be compromised And world financial markets, trade and transportation could be hard hit, with major economic consequences. This could drive millions of people in poor countries into deeper deprivation and suffering.”

The author reports that a number of security specialists have contended that nuclear weapons have negligible effectiveness as tools of war and that their ongoing

ownership has non-positive effect on the maintenance of regional and international security. To evidence his argument, Nanda (2009, p. 334) takes the article of Robert S. McNamara, former Secretary of Defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, “The Folly of U.S. and NATO Nuclear Weapons Policies”, from the journal *Foreign Affairs* in 2005. McNamara stated that America cannot avoid serious and unacceptable risk of nuclear war until it recognizes and until it bases all its military strategies, defense budgets, weapons deployment, and arms negotiations on that recognition – that nuclear weapons serve no military purpose at all.” In the same article he debated what he labelled the “unacceptable risk” of inadvertent or accidental utilization of nuclear weapons due to miscalculation or misjudgment in times of crisis. He argued:

“Senior Russian military officials have stated that, due to lack of resources, the Russian nuclear arsenal is increasingly at risk of accidents, theft, and serious malfunction in its command and control systems. As for the risk of inadvertent use of the weapons in a crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated that the United States and the Soviet Union—and indeed the rest of the world—came within a hair's breadth of a nuclear disaster in October 1962 as a result of misinformation and misjudgment.”

Adapted from Nanda (2009; p.334), with reference to the above quoted article by McNamara.

The writer by quoting McNamara has a point there. In effect, it appears that in strategic military planning offensive nuclear weapons are needless, they only represent a danger both for the owners and the potential targets. In the case of the owners we can have accidental launches of nuclear weapons which represent a severe threat as we shall see later in this section. The plain and latest illustration is the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan in March 2011, which was unintentional because caused by a combination of an earthquake and a tsunami. In this latter case, there was not a nuclear explosion as in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but guess what would have happened if that accident produced an explosion. This simple example shows that owners of nuclear weapons themselves are not secure. Of course, Fukushima followed a civil, not a military nuclear program, even in this case, governments have to think twice before they decide to launch nuclear programs be them for civil or military purposes. We shall further comment the case of Fukushima.

Fidler (2003) stated that the threat perceived from WMD has constituted the major priority issues on foreign policy and national security programs. This can be exemplified with the Bush Jr. Administration's national security and homeland security strategies

which were overwhelmingly influenced by the WMD threat. The importance of the WMD threat raises concerns about the role of international law regarding them in this new military environment. As far as traditional international legal approaches to WMD are concerned, Fidler (2003) explained that WMD in general include nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, with radiological weapons sometimes comprised in that category. Although current approaches to international law generally stick to this traditional definition of WMD, there is no normative definition of WMD. The reason for it is that states have traditionally employed international law to deal with each group of armament within the WMD rubric (Fidler, 2003).

The author points out that the most legal approaches to the WMD have been the implementation and negotiation of arms control treaties. This international legal activity on WMD had some fundamental objectives: (1) to deter the use of WMD by states for example, nuclear arms control treaties between the U.S. and the Soviets; (2) to preclude the emplacement and testing of WMD in some locations, for instance, treaties impeding WMD in orbit or on the sea-bed or ocean floor and (3) to produce WMD disarmament, e.g. treaties preventing the development and use of chemical and biological weapons (Fidler, 2003).

Fidler (2003) claimed that in the post-Cold War period, technological and political development posed 3 challenges to the WMD that made the historical reliance on arms control agreements questionable. Firstly, in the 1990s, preoccupation rose about WMD proliferation by states and terrorists, showing that the world faced a growing interest in WMD by non-states actors and states.

This motivation to possess WMD made the conventional arms control treaties even more inconsistent in addressing this kind of proliferation. Secondly, specialists contend that the previous problems that were manifest to develop WMD were being limited for non-states actors and states. Innovation in biotechnology and genetic engineering for example made a revolution in the development of biological weapons. This technological context made the verification efforts in arms control more difficult for all 3 WMD categories (Fidler, 2003).

Thirdly, the technological and political development we have just described above obliged governments to challenge the weaknesses that their citizens faced from terrorism implying WMD. What Aum Shinriyko committed with the so-called chemical terrorism in Japan in 1995, encouraged governments to make efforts in improving national security for cataclysmic terrorism (Fidler, 2003). The 9/11 attacks provoked efforts in the United

States and other nations to upgrade national security. The reason for it is that the arms control methodology to WMD did not take into consideration the vulnerability that countries faced in their homeland security after the Cold War period (Fidler, 2003). Arms control of course is still important, but the new international environment is undergoing diversity in the way states and international decision-making bodies use international law in association with the WMD risk (Fidler, 2003).

Fidler (2003) contended that in accordance with the proliferation of WMD by states and non-states actors, there have been new international normative efforts and suggestions in the purpose to strengthen deterrence against WMD production and use. These consist of: (1) UN Security Council action against Iraq concerning its alleged WMD programs; (2) US efforts to extend the right of anticipatory self-defense to justify military action in "pre-emptive self-defense" against a hostile regime armed with or pursuing WMD; (3) criminalizing WMD terrorism in treaty law; and (4) proposals to make the development, retention, acquisition, or transfer of biological and chemical weapons a crime under international law. Global cooperation and legal framework has as well started to deal with the mounting technological likelihood of the development of WMD (Fidler, 2003).

Global efforts to upgrade domestic control and regulate access and transfer of WMD constituents have begun for instance with the G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and is considered as a contribution to worldwide activity designed for the protection of WMD constituents from malevolent seizure (Fidler, 2003). The challenge of national preparation is also becoming the issue of global diplomatic and legal activities. NATO, the World Health Organization (WHO), World Customs Organization (WCO), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) have undertaken specific multilateral initiatives in the strengthening of national preparation against WMD terrorism, (Fidler, 2003).

These findings by the author are actually telling because they display the fact that things have changed with regard to the WMD threat. The author has begun to provide a definition of WMD; he has given a traditional definition of WMD that encompasses nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and sometimes radiological weapons. He obviously showed how international law has worked to address the problem of WMD. Traditionally, the attempts to address WMD have been arms control treaties between the United States and the Soviets because they were afraid that nuclear technology

becomes available to many states. However, the post-Cold War period has revealed vulnerability on states with regard to the threat WMD represent.

It is understandable that with technological advancement, acquiring WMD, especially the revolution in biotechnology and genetic engineering made the development of WMD easier than ever before. It can therefore be argued that arms control treaties somewhat appeared to be obsolete. The writer has taken the case of chemical terrorism with the attack Japanese terrorist group Aum Shinriyoko committed in Japan in 1995. Faced with that new environment of WMD accessibility to states and non-states actors, international law had to take action. This included criminalizing the possession of WMD, or their use. We can understand that non-states actors 'possession of WMD is a serious security threat in a sense that they can jeopardize the security of states, this is where the problematic of WMD stands.

2.2 Nuclear Terrorism: Fighting and Identifying the Threat

Is radiation always dangerous? How do we protect ourselves? Can terrorist groups release a Chernobyl on American soil? Could nuclear waste dumps or power plants be turned into nuclear bombs? Could non-state military forces design a dirty bomb able to widespread pollution and death provoked by radiation? Could they take a U.S. weapon and discharge it? (Cravens, 2002). These questions are the concerns of the author that she tried to provide answers to by addressing the issues of radiation, nuclear reactors and weapons facilities. She postulated that nine national laboratories of the Energy Department have started an advanced assessment of counterterrorism, as well as reviewing the weakness of American materials and sites.

Radiation

Radiation materials have unstable atoms called radionuclides, which emit extra energy as radiation, invisible but identifiable by instrument (Cravens, 2002). Certain atoms lose their energy quickly; others are dangerous for thousands even millions of years (Cravens, 2002). She went on to contend that some forms of radiation are more dangerous to human security, depending on the kind of particle emitted. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), made of consultants and scientists from 21 states, provides complete reviews on effects and sources of radiation as the scientist basis for estimating health risk (Cravens, 2002). The writer informed that UNSCEAR's reports are globally regarded as reliable and objective.

It listed annual average exposures worldwide per person. Cravens (2002, p. 41) quoted their report:

“Natural background radiation: 240 millirem worldwide, (300 millirem in the United States). The earth's core is a natural reactor; and all life evolved within a cloud of radiation stronger than background radiation is today. Cosmic rays, sunlight, rocks, soil, radon, water, and even the human body are radioactive-blood and bones contain radionuclides. Exposure is higher in certain locations and occupations than in others (airline flight personnel receive greater than average lifetime doses of cosmic radiation).

Coal combustion: 2 millirem. Every year in the United States alone, coal-fired plants, which provide about half of the nation's electricity, expel, along with toxic chemicals and greenhouse gases, 100 times the radioactivity of nuclear plants: hundreds of tons of uranium and thorium, daughter products like radium and radon, and hundreds of pounds of uranium-235. Coal pollutants are estimated to cause about 15,000 premature deaths annually in the United States.

Nuclear power: 0.02 millirem (0.05 in the United States). The Environmental Protection Agency, whose standards are the world's strictest, limits exposure from a given site to 15 millirem a year-far lower than average background radiation. For radiation to begin to damage DNA enough to produce noticeable health effects, exposure must dramatically increase to about 20 rem, or 20,000 millirem. Above 100 rem, or 100,000 millirem, diseases manifest. If exposure is not too intense or prolonged, cells can usually repair themselves.”

The horrific and avoidable reactor explosion at Chernobyl was responsible for suffering and fatalities among the local population but augmented the overall background radiation level by a factor of solely 0.00083 millirem worldwide (Cravens, 2002). According to the UNSCEAR, pollution greater than background radiation was limited to 20 square miles around the power plant. The most intense casualties took place among firemen and Chernobyl plant workers, two of whom breathed their last from boiling. Other 134 suffered severe radiation sickness. Twenty-eight of these victims passed away three months later, thirteen succumbed. The rest survived (Cravens, 2002).

Among the populations in neighboring communities, UNSCEAR discovered 1, 800 cases of thyroid cancer, mostly in children, and predicted more would be witnessed. Thyroid cancer could have been prevented, but, had the entire civilians nearby Chernobyl been immediately given potassium iodide, which halts the uptake by the thyroid of radio-iodine, a radionuclide developed by reactors (Cravens, 2002). The author indicated that fourteen years after the incident, no other evidence of a serious health impact attributable to exposure to radiation had been found. She informed that UNSCEAR report stated: "There is no scientific evidence of increases in overall cancer

incidence or mortality or in non-malignant disorders that could be related to radiation exposure. The risk of leukemia, one of the main concerns owing to its short latency time, does not appear to be high, not among the recovery operation workers. Although those most highly exposed individuals are at an increased risk of radiation-associated effects, the great majority of the populations are not likely to experience serious health consequences from radiation from the Chernobyl accident."

What the UNSCEAR discovered is that "the accident had a large negative psychological impact on thousands of people." She went on to assert that improved management of the emergency, together with adequate dissemination of the realities of the Chernobyl accident, possibly could have mitigated much of this mental trauma. For this reason, in December 2001 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) informed that it would require states with populations nearby the 10-mile emergency planning area of a nuclear power plant to think about integrating potassium iodide (KI) as a preemptive measure for the protection of the general public in the improbable event of a serious accident. This measure would complement sheltering and withdrawal or evacuation, the traditional measures; nine states had then asked for tablets (Cravens, 2002).

Nuclear Reactors and Weapons Facilities

Could any of the 103 nuclear reactors of the United States be transformed into a bomb? No, because the law of physics impedes it. In a nuclear weapon, radioactive atoms are sufficiently and densely squeezed inside a small chamber to initiate an immediate explosive chain reaction. A reactor is far too huge to provide the heat and density essential to provoke a nuclear explosion (Cravens, 2002). Could terrorist groups transform any of the US reactors into a Chernobyl? The author's answer was again no, in asserting that it is extremely improbable for the reasons that US reactors have a totally different plan. All reactors demand a medium around the fuel rods to delay the neutrons given off by the controlled chain reaction that finally provides heat to make condensation to turn turbines which produce electricity (Cravens, 2002).

In the U.S. the medium is water, which as well acts as a coolant. In the case of Chernobyl, it was graphite. Water is not inflammable, but graphite (pure carbon) is burnable at high temperatures. Very bad management, violation of basic safety measures, thoughtless mistakes and poor engineering at Chernobyl provoked the core to melt down through many floors. As a result, explosion including hydrogen and condensation blew off the roof – there was no containment structure – and burned the

graphite. The majority of the radioactive core discharged out (Cravens, 2002). In reaction to the Chernobyl accident, the NRC initiated additional safeguard measures at all power plants, together with improvements in equipment monitoring, personnel training, and emergency responsiveness. American nuclear power plants, which are at the same time subject to federal and international regulation, are aimed to resist serious events and are among the securest and most impenetrable structures of the world (Cravens, 2002). Another question, the author asked is, “what if non-state military forces opened a reactor?” According to the writer, an attempt to melt down the core would initiate several safeguards, plus alternative means of producing coolant as well as removal of the fuel rods from the chain reaction process. She went on to inform that military reactors used for the production of weapons have all been closed for years and are set apart on isolated reservations hundreds of miles square. Any discharge of radioactivity would stay on site.

Could non-state military forces steal a weapon facility of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium? The exercises have shown that the necessity for extreme safeguard and independent surveillance of security forces as well as of the network utilized transport weapons materials (Cravens, 2002). Since the 9/11 attacks at 10 a.m., these sites have been placed on maximum surveillance. Precautions at some nuclear weapons facilities abroad are undoubtedly weaker than in the United States, and international non-state actors would seem more probable to rush to these installations before ever attempt to challenge the United States (Cravens, 2002). Terrorist groups with enough know-how and resources could theoretically make a nuclear weapon but solely with huge impediments (Cravens, 2002).

Cravens (2002) posited that starting a chain reaction is not something easy to achieve, given that HEU – very difficult to obtain – would have to be properly contained to make an explosion possible. Terrorist forces robbing a US nuclear weapon could not discharge it in the absence of detailed information of undisclosed procedures. For instance, nuclear weapons that have been released by accident from airplanes or involved in aircraft crashes have not detonated. The explanation: these devices are intended to explode solely when properly discharged (Cravens, 2002). She argued that more should be done to secure US nuclear facilities. Safeguards should be upgraded, giving high priority to human engineering. Cleaner, safer and more effective reactor designs exist now and must replace obsolete ones. Without wasting time, nuclear waste

should be transferred to long-lasting depositories. Eventually, all nuclear weapons facilities would be actually more secure if transferred underground (Cravens, 2002).

EIBaradei (2005) supported that the security of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated technologies has won unprecedented importance in the last few years. The IAEA had been active in the field of nuclear security for various years, but the events of the 9/11 fostered the fast and dramatic reexamination of the threats of terrorism in all its forms, whether focused on the security of industrial complexes, urban centers, air and rail travel or operations concerning nuclear and radiological material. Terrorist strikes from that time in the Russian Federation, Indonesia, Spain and elsewhere did not stop to keep these preoccupations in the front position of our common consciousness. It has become obvious that our work to strengthen nuclear security is both urgent and vital, as we should not expect a devastating nuclear security event to occur for us to provide the necessary security advancements (EIBaradei, 2005).

EIBaradei (2005) admitted that although the likelihood of a nuclear explosive device being acquired and utilized by non-state forces is relatively negligible, it cannot be overlooked, and the outcomes would be destructive. Conversely, a dirty bomb would probably have less effect in terms of human casualties or victims, but the relative availability of radiological sources makes it more probable that such an event could happen. The author stated that some specialists share the concern of the Director General of the United Kingdom Security Service, who affirmed in August 2003 that "It will only be a matter of time before a crude version of a [chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear] attacks is targeted to a major western city." Until 2005, the own database of IAEA on illegal trafficking has documented since 1993 over 650 confirmed incidents of trafficking in nuclear or other radioactive material. In 2004 alone about 100 such incidents happened, eleven of which involved nuclear material.

It is true that most trafficking incidents do not implicate nuclear material, and whereas the majority of the radioactive material involved has limited radioactive concern, the amount of incidents reveals that the measures to secure and to control nuclear and other radioactive material necessitate an improvement (EIBaradei, 2005). In the meantime that credible and effective approaches to nuclear security are necessary not only to detect and respond to illegal trafficking but as well to protect nuclear power plants, research reactors, accelerators and the ensemble of nuclear and other radioactive material that sustain these other nuclear applications. To optimize the efficiency of these efforts, it is critical to prioritize, that is, to focus on these facilities and

activities where the risk is greatest, and to maintain equilibrium between security needs and the many advantages of the peaceful applications of nuclear technology. The author informed that several governments have already implemented the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which per se, calls every country to enhance and maintain operational border controls and law enforcement efforts to identify and fight illegal trafficking, and to abstain from giving any form of assistance to terrorists that try to design, obtain, utilize or transfer nuclear, biological or chemical weapons or their delivery systems.

Obviously, from the author's analysis there is inquietude concerning nuclear terrorism. This means that the likelihood for non-state actors to acquire biological or chemical or even nuclear weapons is no more limited as it was the case some years ago. The fact that terrorist organizations attempt to acquire nuclear or radioactive material through stealing or sabotage or illicit trafficking is a proof that we have to take terrorists seriously. To date, it is not documented that a nuclear terrorist attack has ever occurred, but terrorists might not be willing to stop the search of their major acquisition: nuclear material. If they were to acquire such material, we consider that they could make a nuclear bomb as many scientists regrettably have turned their back to the benefits of science and decided to devote their genius to the cause of non-state actors.

From that point of view, it can be argued that the problem is no more if terrorists can manufacture a nuclear bomb, of course they can, but to deprive them of having access to any sort of nuclear or radioactive material, considering the view of the author. For this reason, the IAEA has identified four security risks aforementioned in the introduction of this section: the theft of a nuclear weapon; the acquisition of nuclear material for the construction of nuclear explosive devices; the malicious use of radioactive sources including in so-called dirty bombs; and the radioactive hazards caused by an attack on, or sabotage of a facility or transport vehicle. We can see that the IAEA did a remarkable job in not only identifying these nuclear security threats but also in categorizing them.

Symons (2005) explained that there should be a dual push from the global community, primarily to act decisively and swiftly to prevent WMD from falling in the possession of non-state military forces, secondly, to hold a long and comprehensive reaching campaign against the reasons for non-state violence, be they hunger, hatred, poverty or politics. He went on to say that as the first element of this strategy, nuclear security embodies our war zone of defense, but also our most probable susceptibility to

attack. The number of nuclear and radiological sources is huge, and the challenge in securing them difficult. When only one such source could be the cause of a cataclysmic attack, the task seems awesome; at the same time we should not give up. Governments should promptly act and in unison if they are to minimize the immediate threat, (Symons, 2005).

It is evident that the problem of nuclear terrorism, as we take into account Symons' viewpoint, is not to be addressed individually. States must work together in order to combat nuclear terrorism, a catastrophe to avoid. As mentioned before, if a nuclear attack were undertaken by terrorists, we will all suffer its impact no matter where we are located. The job of the international community is to jointly unite efforts to prevent terrorists from owning WMD; whether they be chemical, biological and radiological or nuclear weapons. Because of the number of these weapons, the task to protect them from falling into the hands of terrorists is even more difficult. Nuclear terrorism is a picture so devastating as in this case we no longer talk about the destruction of some buildings, airports or whatsoever; it is about the destruction of entire cities as experienced by the atomic bomb in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, claiming 300, 000 lives. Until now, we have never witnessed again such an event, but this is precisely what can occur if non-state military forces come to possess nuclear weapons or other WMD.

Sagan (2005) claimed that the problem of nuclear terrorism has a long history, and regrettably will also be with us for a long period of time in the future. Indeed, the threat of non-state military forces acquiring and utilizing nuclear weapons or radiological devices existed before Osama bin Laden created Al-Qaeda and will continue to last even if Al-Qaeda is considerably weakened or wiped out in the future. In 1998, Osama bin Laden stated that it was "a religious duty" for the members of Al-Qaeda to acquire nuclear weapons. Proof that he has initiated more than one failed attempt to get nuclear weapons and material was found in Afghanistan after the war, and documents explaining how to design nuclear weapons and outlining how to make crude nuclear device were discovered in a Kabul home of a senior Al-Qaida official. However, the author argued that bin Laden's nuclear ambitions did not vanish when he disappeared from the caves in Tora Bora (Sagan, 2005).

In May 2003, a Saudi cleric, Sheik Nasir Bin Hamid al-Fahd delivered a fatwa (an Islamic decree) legitimizing the utilization of nuclear weapons against the United States, pretending that Islam recognized no limits on the utilization of such indiscriminate weapons in what he perceived as a "defense war" against "the crusaders" (Sagan, 2005).

Another evidence of Al-Qaida trying to possess nuclear weapons happened in January 2005, when two suspected members of Al-Qaeda were arrested in Mainz, Germany, and were charged with trying to buy HEU in Luxembourg. It is improbable that this unsuccessful attempt to get nuclear weapons for Al-Qaida will be the last one (Sagan, 2005).

In the meantime, Sagan (2005) noted that other kinds of terrorist organizations sought-after nuclear weapons or material in the past and are expected to do so in the future. The Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese millenarian terrorist group, attempted to obtain nuclear weapons, but had to be limited to biological and chemical weapons when its nuclear ambitions were dissatisfied. The Bader-Meinhoff gang sought to steal nuclear weapons from an American military base in Western Europe at the end of the 1970s. In the United States, activists of radical Christian organizations – such as the Covenant, Arm and the Sword – and neo-Nazi groups – such as the National Alliance and the Aryan Nation – have supported mass killing of their supposed enemies and they were caught with biological and chemical agents (Sagan, 2005).

Eventually, there has been a general tendency in the strategies of various terrorist groups towards creating mass and indiscriminate civilian victims in lieu of more targeted attacks on military staff or political leaders (Sagan, 2005). All these factors show that we must expect a continual terrorist interest in the acquisition of WMD, together with nuclear material and weapons in the future regardless of the existence of Al-Qaida or what occurs to its network. Sagan (2005) went on to contend that there is a natural, but regrettable, trend in all elite security organizations to regard non-state actors as *outsiders*, foreign enemies looking for ways to harm our society. Yet, incidents of insider theft, sabotage or terrorist support have been experienced in the security establishment of almost all NWS and several countries with sensitive nuclear material. Although such insider incidents are rare, however they are not non-existent (Sagan, 2005).

The author stated that sabotage incidents by discontented employees were reported at some American nuclear facilities in the beginning of the 1990s, and concerns about recruitment of nuclear security guards by radical Rocky Mountain militia organizations began later in the decade. Various reported incidents of nuclear theft have been ascribed to insiders within the Russian nuclear establishment since the end of the Cold War. The apprehension of two scientists from the Pakistani nuclear program for their linkages to Al-Qaeda in the autumn of 2001 is evidence of the existence of insider threats in elite security organizations in South Asia. Sagan (2005) contended that it is highly improbable

that any state is completely exempt from this security risk. The insider threat problem is a complex issue to deal with inside nuclear security organizations which are so proud of their high level of professionalism and loyalty. The threat of nuclear terrorism requires a real comprehensive cooperative response. Governments should learn from their own successes and failures, but also those of other countries. We are all hostages to each other's in this field, and accordingly a failure by one is a failure for all (Sagan, 2005).

Brooks (2005) asserted that today the danger of nuclear terrorism is at the core of the American and global security agenda. Such was not always the case. It is only after the 9/11 attacks and subsequent strikes around the globe that the global community came together to challenge the specter of non-state military forces armed with WMD. We can all be proud in the significant advancement made possible by the work and steps undertaken to address nuclear terrorism in the subsequent years following the 9/11 strikes. Progress is in process to develop the security of nuclear and radioactive material, to bring up-to-date anti-terror norms and controls over nuclear technologies (Brooks, 2005).

In the meantime, as impressive as these advancements may be, more still needs to be done in the purpose of keeping nuclear and radiological weapons out of the hands of terrorist organizations and the states that sponsor them (Brooks, 2005). A significant step forward would be to move towards an integrated strategy that joins more conventional antinuclear-terror – for example securing nuclear and radioactive assets against sabotage and stealing – with efforts to reinforce the core of the NPT regime – i.e. physical protection, safeguards, export controls and reinforced treaty regimes – to hamper terrorist acquirement of the technologies of WMD. Brooks (2005) claimed that to prevent nuclear terrorism and traditional NPT programs form two halves of the same walnut, we cannot treat them separately.

Cooperation between the United States and Russia on Preventing Terrorism

Brooks (2009) informs that the U.S. and Russia have confidence that nuclear materials and weapons in each state are secure against theft from either terrorist attacks or insider threats. They regularly exchange best practices about nuclear weapons and nuclear safety and have found a mechanism to share data on security that builds additional confidence at the same time not revealing specific data that would provoke either state preoccupation. Both nations make constant investments essential to ensure

long-term maintenance of weapons security and material. Through applicable and well-designed measures of transparencies, they show to the global community that their weapons are secure and safe, therefore taking the lead as an example to other NWS (Brooks, 2009).

Russia and the United States vigorously engage other NWS to encourage them to ensure that the security of nuclear materials and where applicable, nuclear weapons in these states are comparable to the strong security in the U.S. and Russia (Brooks, 2009). The writer goes on to report that as part of this endeavor, they work together to give technical security enhancements and the sharing of best practices to all countries, working through the IAEA where possible. They also work hard together to give assistance to countries in the operational implementation of both UNSCR 1540 and the Additional Protocol. Additionally, Russia and the United States have worked (and keep working) to destroy the non-military usage of HEU, particularly in research reactors, to complete the return of all American and Russian-origin HEU from research reactors in third countries, and to destroy stocks of such material in all NNWS. To provide leadership in this respect, both states adapt all of their own research reactors to utilize uniquely LEU, (Brooks, 2009).

Brooks (2009) states that while acknowledging the real limits of nuclear forensics, they believe this system to help detect the causes of nuclear material taken from terrorists and smugglers as well as the source of any device truly exploded. Both the U.S. and Russia make plain that if a country helps non-state military forces acquire a nuclear weapon or fissile materials to build an improvised nuclear weapon and terrorists consequently explode such a device, they will have a high probability of locating where the material was acquired. Both Russia and the United States make plain that terrorist usage of nuclear weapons or improvised nuclear materials at anyone place in the planet will inspire international condemnation (Brooks, 2009). Each state regards nuclear terrorism within their respective state as justifying a military coercive response against the provider of the weapon or material in compliance with the inherent right of self-defense mentioned in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This cooperation in nuclear weapons and attribution attempt is part of an ongoing effort in organizing and taking the world community under the framework of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. This great joint US-Russian work has kept growing and is the number one means for the prevention of nuclear and radiological terrorism (Brooks, 2009).

International Law and Nuclear Terrorism

High-rank officials, especially those in the intelligence community in the U.S. are in need to find a new and creative solution for contending the mounting threat of nuclear terrorism (Smith, 2012). For years, America has been deeply implicated in the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons through traditional international law. The writer however points out that the NPT, the cornerstone of all disarmament agreements, does not include a practical method of preventing the threat of nuclear terrorism. As a whole, the agreement does not deal itself with conflicts against non-state military forces like Al-Qaeda. Equally important, these non-state actors do not sign nonproliferation or disarmament agreements, nor do they abide by the ambitious terms contained in them. Only sovereign nations are capable to abide by the imposition of agreement terms. And Smith (2012, p. 705) asks the following question: “even if the United States were able to bring al-Qaeda to the bargaining table, how would diplomats negotiate with a loosely affiliated group of terrorists bent on catastrophic attack and infliction of maximum casualties?” According to the writer, the answer is evident, they would not.

To debate the outcome of international law on the threat of nuclear terrorism, it is mandatory to first address two distinct but interconnected theories to intelligence collection (Smith, 2012). For nuclear fissile materials to fall in the hands of non-state military organizations, the material needed to make a nuclear weapon should normally flow from a country already possessing the needed components (Smith, 2012). Of course, this is fiction for the time being, insofar as there are presently no terrorist groups able to enrich uranium or to complete extremely complex ensemble of steps essential to make a working nuclear weapon. Consequently, the intelligence collection should approach this situation from two separate standpoints. The first perspective gives precedence to nuclear activities of states, both for their own sake as elements in regional stability and as potential roots of material to non-state military forces. And so, agreements regulating the acceptable relocation of nuclear weapons may improve these collection activities by restricting the possible continuum of state activities that intelligent experts would be required to collect against (Smith, 2012).

But, Smith (2012) sustains that the second approach includes intelligence collection focus on the actual terrorist organization itself as well as investigate the actions and intentions of the group. During this kind of collection activity, hard work is not enhanced by limitations on state actors; rather, intelligence collection purely centers its attention on

an affiliated group of terrorist suspects whose actions are constrained by terms in an agreement or international treaty. Another point the author makes is that international agreements are incapable of forcing states which do not consent to their terms. States not parties to the NPT which have ever since designed nuclear weapons are not constrained by international law from relocating these weapons to a terrorist group or to other non-signatory countries (Smith, 2012).

Another important point the author brings about is that international agreements do not take into consideration the prospect of stolen or misplaced nuclear materials that are subsequent to the collapse of a NWS. Most importantly, international agreements do little to mitigate the attitude of a terrorist group that is already possessing nuclear material and has the capabilities to bring in such material into the U.S. In view of that, the author asserts that all these mentioned factors jeopardize international law as the cornerstone responsible for contributing to the prohibition of nuclear militarization. Notwithstanding the latest American military success of targeting Osama bin Laden, the U.S. still has to consider significant threats from Al-Qaeda and other various terrorist organizations. It is true that these organizations do not enjoy the status of an independent sovereign state, but a nuclear strike by such groups targeted at a key American city would unquestionably be as cataclysmic as a strike initiated by a state on the same city (Smith, 2012).

Nuclear weapons are unselective by nature, and no other device can be compared to the destructive power of a nuclear weapon (Smith, 2012). Although all WMD have the power to cause important casualties, only nuclear weapons can also wipe out physical infrastructures and buildings on a large scale. Not considering whether terrorist groups are capable to successfully discharge an intact nuclear weapon or a crudely unpremeditated nuclear device, the impact on the U.S., and of course the world would be irreparable (Smith, 2012). He informs that a number of security experts have debated the destruction a nuclear weapon can provoke. Smith (2012, p. 707) provides a scenario of a nuclear attack:

“If al-Qaeda was to rent a van to carry [a] ten-kiloton Russian weapon into the heart of Times Square and detonate it adjacent to the Morgan Stanley headquarters at 1585 Broadway, Times Square would vanish in the twinkling of an eye. The blast would generate temperatures reaching into the tens of millions of degrees Fahrenheit. The resulting fireball and blast wave would destroy instantaneously the theater district, the New York Times building, Grand Central Terminal, and every other structure within a third of a mile of the point of detonation. The ensuing firestorm would engulf Rockefeller Center, Carnegie Hall, the Empire State Building, and Madison

The ensuing firestorm would engulf Rockefeller Center, Carnegie Hall, the Empire State Building, and Madison Square Garden leaving a landscape resembling the World Trade Center site.”

This great picture here insists on the necessity for a practical defense strategy to protect America from terrorist strikes (Smith, 2012). In an instant, the vast majority of the population of New York City would be destroyed. In light of this frightening image, government officials must make use of all assets available to them in order to halt such a plot before it happens. Although the ambitious terms of agreements directed to nuclear disarmament are still of great importance in limiting state action, the impact these agreements such as the NPT have on the possibility of nuclear terrorism is unclear (Smith, 2012).

2.3 Between Intergovernmental Cooperation and Catastrophe

Nunn (2005) postulated that no matter where people call their place, the central organizing security principal of the 21st century must be the prevention of the spread or utilization of nuclear weapons or other WMD. The IAEA is front and at the core in this quest. Its mission, its authority and its resources should be reinforced. We are in race between cooperation and catastrophe. If we have a nuclear disaster, the world will demand immediate action. Why expect it to occur and act a day after? We should take action now, (Nunn, 2005).

Sagan (2005) indicated that all governments are hostages to each other’s nuclear physical security measures today. The stealing of a single nuclear weapon or a significant quantity of nuclear material in any state represents a danger for all nations (Sagan, 2005). Governments in each state consequently have a legitimate interest in gaining reassurance that others are keeping up effective physical security. Furthermore, a global multiplier concept of defense is obviously essential to Increase efforts to mandate advanced domestic controls (Sagan, 2005). Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are the primary line of defense in that if fewer states have nuclear weapons and those that have them reduce the size of their arsenals, the protection of existing weapons turns out to be more manageable (Sagan, 2005).

The protection of nuclear weapons and material at the sites of their storage, in transport or other facilities is the next line of defense. Then is the imperative improvement of export control capacity and border monitoring programs to identify trafficking of nuclear material in transit. And lastly, homeland security efforts are the final

line of defense, in detection, identification, warning and mitigation programs. In the absence of cooperation from other states' intelligence and nuclear security organizations, none of these lines of defense can be achieved (Sagan, 2005).

G8 Global Partnership

Oakden (2005) sustained that in June 2002 the leaders of the G8 states, meeting in Kananaskis, in Canada, against the background of the strikes of the 9/11, 2001, committed themselves to preventing terrorists or those who sponsor them from acquiring or designing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, missiles, and related material, equipment and technology. They announced a series of non-proliferation principles, and an initiative to implement, especially a new global partnership against the spread of WMD, under which they undertook to implement a specific program of cooperation, primarily in the Russian Federation, to deal with non-proliferation, disarmament, counterterrorism and nuclear safety. The number one concern that they acknowledged were and are to destroy chemical weapons, the dismantlement of neutralized nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile material and to find jobs for former nuclear weapons scientists (Oakden, 2005).

The author informed that six principles underlying the Global Partnership approach remain as valid now as then, and include the following:

- To promote the adoption, universalization, full implementation and where necessary, strengthening of the multilateral treaty regime on non-proliferation, and reinforced the institutions designed to implement these different instruments;
- To develop and maintain effective measures to account for and secure nuclear material, both while it is being produced, in use and while it is being transported;
- To develop and maintain effective physical protection for facilities housing CBRN materials;
- To develop and maintain effective border controls, law enforcement efforts and international cooperation to identify and prohibit illegal trafficking in CBRN materials;
- To develop and maintain effective national export and trans-shipment controls, whether the items in question are or are not on the multilateral export control lists;
- To adopt and reinforce efforts to handle and dispose of stocks of fissile material no longer necessary for defense purposes, to eliminate all chemical weapons and to minimize holdings of dangerous biological pathogens and toxins, based on the

recognition that the threat of terrorist acquisition is reduced as the overall quantity of such items is reduced.

Regarding the dismantlement issue, Oakden (2005) mentioned that of sub-marine dismantlement in the north-western Russian Federation. Out of the 250 nuclear submarines built under the Soviet Union, 193 have been now taken out of service; these comprise 117 from the Northern Fleet in the north-western Russian Federation, of which 57 are not yet dismantled. More than half of the remaining submarines still have spent nuclear fuel on board, which clearly represents a key security and environmental threat. The disintegration of the Soviet Union left in its wake nuclear and other radioactive material spread across the Russian Federation and other former Soviet Union (FSU) states (Sagan, 2005).

Therefore, it is important to implement a program to guarantee that sensitive materials are protected to international standards from stealing to sabotage. Programs are in progress to augment nuclear protection through the help of technical improvements, training, and transfer of expertise and equipment, and to upgrade nuclear material accountancy, to minimize the risks that nuclear material could be lost or otherwise without being detected (Oakden, 2005). Another work of the Global Partnership is directed towards helping to eliminate in the shortest practicable time, the Russian Federation's declared stockpile of contemporary chemical warfare agents, contained in over four million artillery, rocket and air developed munitions (Sagan, 2005). As a state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Russian Federation needed to terminate the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile by 2012. To meet this objective, it has sought considerable international help in order to build the facilities essential for the destruction program (Oakden, 2005).

The last issue Oakden (2005) argued about is the redirection of former weapons scientists. He indicated that some 35, 000 jobs would be lost from the reorganization of the nuclear weapons complex in the Russian Federation by 2010, as the Russian Government implements restructuring plans for its ten closed nuclear cities. A parallel process was probable to take place in several of the nuclear research institutes in the newly independent republics. A program was in progress to facilitate lasting alternative employment opportunities in the civil sector for these previous nuclear weapons scientists, engineers and technicians, and to support the long term economic sustainability of the closed nuclear cities. The creation of centers of science and technology in the Russian Federation and Ukraine is an illustration of how work on this

area is being addressed forward. The best hope of fighting the terrorist risk is through collaboration and cooperation (Oakden, 2005).

Abolishing Nuclear Weapons

The disastrous effects of Nagasaki and Hiroshima bombings conducted to only one coherent resolution – to destroy them (Nanda, 2009). The decision to eliminate them started with the very first resolution that the United Nations General Assembly adopted in London in January 1946, labelled "Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy" (Nanda, 2009). The Resolution charged the Commission among other things, to make particular propositions for the destruction from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other key weapons adaptable to mass killing. The General Assembly has reiterated this goal in a number of successive resolutions. Then the author goes on to explain that the 63rd Session of the General Assembly on December 2, 2008 adopted another Resolution called "Nuclear Disarmament", which acknowledges in its paragraph I that "the time is now opportune for all the nuclear-weapon States to take effective disarmament measures to achieve the total elimination of these weapons at the earliest possible time."

Nanda (2009) contends that among other recommendations for member-states, the Resolution encourages NWS to immediately halt the qualitative development, production, improvement and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems, and among other things, to immediately de-alert and disable their nuclear weapons. The resolution inter alia, urges NWS to agree on a globally and legally binding agreement on a joint responsibility not to be the first to strike with nuclear weapons, and for all NWS to give security assurances of non-utilization and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against NNWS (Nanda, 2009). Finally, the Resolution advocates the Conference on Disarmament to create an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the beginning of 2009 and to start negotiating on a phased program of nuclear disarmament conducting to the entire destruction of nuclear weapons with a particular framework of time, and for talks on a demonstrable treaty abolishing the development of fissile material for nuclear weapons (Nanda, 2009).

In the preamble of another Resolution adopted the same day, the General Assembly reiterated the commitment of the global community to the objective of the entire destruction of nuclear weapons and the creation of a world without nuclear weapons (Nanda, 2009). The General Assembly was convinced that "the continuing existence of

nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all life on Earth, and recognizing that the only defense against a nuclear catastrophe is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the certainty that they will never be produced again.” (Nanda, 2009, p.338).

It should also be noted that it was in 1978 at the First Session of the General Assembly entirely dedicated to disarmament that all member-states self-confessed by consensus the goal of nuclear disarmament (Nanda, 2009). They as well gave it their major priority, and decided on particular steps to reach that goal. Twenty-two years later, once again the UN called for the destruction of nuclear weapons in its 2000 Millennium Declaration (Nanda, 2009). The subsequent 1979 Conference on Disarmament established by the United Nations succeeded the Geneva-based Committee on Disarmament. Among other attempts to the United Nations toward nuclear demilitarization, the advocates of nuclear disarmament (AND) include NNWS and non-state actors – security experts, scientists, decision-makers, politicians and civilian activists –.

Nanda (2009) states that among the NGAs, we have a number of elected representatives and civil society groups which have been aggressively implicated in issues of nuclear disarmament. These comprise the Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Mayors for Peace, a global body which is holding a campaign to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2020, and the Middle Power Initiative, which works primarily with middle-power governments on issues of nuclear disarmament. Among prominent reports by civil society are a 1997 report delivered by the Henry L. Stimson Center’s 1997 Project on Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction, titled *An American Legacy, Building a Nuclear Weapon-Free World*, and 1997 report issued by the National Academies of Sciences (NAS), titled *The Future of Nuclear Weapon Policy* (Nanda, 2009).

With regard to the many NGOs aggressively implicated in working toward nuclear disarmament issues, Nanda (2009) indicates that we have Soka Gakkai International (SGI) and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. The president of SGI, Daisaku Ikeda has called upon the establishment of a United Nations Decade of Action by the World’s People for Nuclear Abolition and for the early convening of a World Summit for Nuclear Abolition. He considers such steps at the same time as supporting and reflecting an emerging global consensus for disarmament. Nanda (2009, p. 342) quotes him when he says: "Crying out in opposition to war and nuclear weapons is neither emotionalism nor

self-pity. It is the highest expression of human reason based on an unflinching perception of the dignity of life.” The writer then reports that the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is basically engaged toward working for a nuclear weapons free world.

An influential expert on armament looking for the elimination of nuclear weapons, Ambassador Max M. Kampelman, held a speech to the Conference on the Implications of the Reykjavik Summit on its 20th Anniversary in October 2006. In his discourse, he said: “There is today no alternative if we wish to secure the safety of our nation and of our families other than the elimination of all nuclear weapons globally along with all other weapons of mass destruction, including biological and chemical weapons.” (Nanda, 2009). Nanda (2009, p. 343) quotes the end of his address:

“It is essential that we lead the world into developing a decisive move from the "is"—a world with a risk of increasing catastrophe—and work toward achieving peace and stability, the 'ought.' It was President John Kennedy who said, ' . . . the world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.' It was President Ronald Reagan who called for the abolition of 'all nuclear weapons,' which he considered to be 'totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing . . . destructive of life on earth and civilization.”

The IAEA’s Role and the Safety Issue: the Case of the Fukushima’s Accident in 2011

The accident at a Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant that happened on March 11th 2011 has once again underlined both the importance and the incomplete capabilities of the IAEA. It would cost billions of dollars to stabilize the plant, close it down, neutralize its six reactors, and reduce the radioactive contamination (Weitz, 2011). In the case of Fukushima, the IAEA made initial comments that were sometimes vague and contradictory for the reason that while the agency received various data from a number of official Japanese sources, these information were wrongly filtered through the government Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, the IAEA unhelpfully merely reprinted the official statements of the Japanese government, which at the beginning talked down the disaster on its website. Altogether, American regulators were officially warning of much darker scenarios. Compelled by the media Yukiya Amano, IAEA Director General, had to go to Japan so as to persuade the government to provide him urgently with more information. The author explains that according to Amano’s view, the IAEA must be authorized to provide its own analysis of the possible outcome of such an incident.

Subsequently, there was a meeting of the states parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) in April 2011, an officially binding international accord for the promotion of nuclear safety, had already initiated global consultations with regard to the Japanese nuclear accident (Weitz, 2011). The convention which was approved in 1994 after the disintegration of the USSR repealed the Soviet veto to a convention on nuclear safety, but the same lacks a proper sanctions and inspections regime. It is true that the convention does force members to submit reports as regards the safety of their nuclear installations for review by their peers at meetings that take place every three years. However, the peer reviews, most of the time made secretly – which would allow for independent assessments – seem not to have worked well in the Fukushima case. The three reactors of the Fukushima nuclear plant were built decades before the CNS, even though convention reviews meetings might have provoked upgrades of some reactor systems. Despite peer pressures, the CNS does not impose sanctions for faulty reactors or their host countries. Moreover, the review meeting does not impose safety inspections on-site. Most importantly, there is no way to require the states parties to shut insecure nuclear facilities or impede them from constructing them (Weitz, 2011).

The writer argues that regarding how disasters on the scale of Chernobyl and Fukushima can inflict transnational, even international damage to animal and plant life, international trade, human health, and the environment, some specialists have advocated the establishment of IAEA mandatory nuclear safety requirements that would encompass obligatory inspections. Others have called for establishing a totally new global safety body. The latter would be excessively difficult, costly and time-consuming, even if additional bilateral, regional and limited multilateral initiatives can prove useful, such as those launched by Japan and the G-8 in 2011. Propositions to establish ASIATOM designed after EURATOM and to create nuclear safety equipment sharing activities and international registers of nuclear safety must be paid attention to (Weitz, 2011).

Even so, the Fukushima accident obviously shows that both the IAEA's role in nuclear safety and its standards of safety are in need of reinforcement. General safety obligations in the CNS and other legal tools must be made more clear and compulsory (Weitz, 2011). The author points out that states that receive technical help from the IAEA, must join the CNS. He goes on to indicate that the nuclear energy community must as well extend security and safety measures to account for the eventuality of several simultaneous nuclear accidents impacting nuclear reactors, both natural as with the case

of the earthquake-tsunami combination responsible for the Fukushima accident, and with a thoughtful manmade component, such as a terrorist attack that exploits an earthquake or a combined cyber and physical attack on one several nuclear reactors. The agency as well necessitates a dedicated group of nuclear specialists that it can mobilize and send in emergencies to provide on-site analysis to supplement that of the state's authorities. The ongoing extension of global utilization of nuclear energy will impose an extension of the IAEA's staff and the increase of its funding so as to ensure that it can handle its existing and new responsibilities (Weitz, 2011).

Weitz (2011) informs that in theory, that is, on paper, the IAEA has more power to limit nuclear spread than it does for the promotion of nuclear safety. In practice, the major barrier against the proliferation of nuclear armament is called the United States and other powerful military powers. South Korea, Japan, and other American allies thought about, but then opted against, pursuing nuclear weapons programs when Washington proposed them extended security guarantees at the same time threatening to withdraw them if the shielded countries looked for national nuclear deterrents. Meanwhile, American, British, Israeli and other military actions destroyed the nuclear weapons programs of Iraq and Syria before they achieved completion and helped wipe out the nuclear weapons aspirations of Libya. South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina and other nations opted against looking for nuclear weapons, but for reasons having nothing to do with the IAEA. It is only the absence of robust military action against Iran and North Korea that authorizes these nations to continue nuclear weapons capabilities irrespective of the IAEA's actions (Weitz, 2011).

When the author advocates a strong military action against North Korea we do not think that he carefully paid attention to this country's military capabilities. Pyongyang is a NWS outside the NPT, and uses its nuclear power as a deterrent against any regional existential threats and even against the United States itself. We consider that a collective military action would not be wise and might subsequently take us to a nuclear war beginning in Asia. We have faith in that the best alternative would be diplomatic bargaining with Pyongyang, making pressure on its economy, economic sanctions, to opt for nonmilitary options. Let us illustrate how this tactic paid out with Iran in 2015.

The global community did not use a collective military force as they did in Libya, they negotiated with Teheran. By lifting economic sanctions on Iran and giving it economic advantages and privileges to trade with the West, the United States and the European Union negotiated a historical agreement that forced Iran to halt its nuclear

program. This was made possible thanks to high level diplomacy on the part of John Kerry, former US Secretary of State and the European Union leaders. This case shows that the military option against a country developing nuclear weapons capability is not always productive, but that diplomatic bargaining works.

The case of Libya is different, as aforementioned, that state when late Colonel Qaddafi accepted to implement a disarmament program in his country in exchange for lifting the economic sanctions his country had been undergoing since the 1990s, the consequence is that when there was an international military coalition against him, he could not do anything because Libya had no nuclear deterrent or other WMD. The global community did not attack Qaddafi before the year 2003, that is, when he still had his WMD arsenals, his fate undoubtedly discouraged states like North Korea to disarm. In effect, according to Pyongyang, countries that do not possess nuclear weapons are vulnerable to western attacks.

It was with good faith that the Libyan leader invited the global community, the IAEA, the United States, the United Kingdom to help him dismantle his nuclear program, including long-range ballistic missiles. The 2011 attacks by NATO, France, and the entire global community after Security Council Resolution 1973 will for sure make Issue-specific possessors of nuclear weapons not to be willing to disarm because of their national security. What we would like to point out is that because of that action, disarmament agreements are less likely to be reached as the Libyan case brings about a lack of confidence on the part of states. All things considered, a military option against a state possessing nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles should never be undertaken; in this case we disagree with Weitz.

Drell et al. (2012) argue that the nuclear enterprise was made known to the world by the destructive power of the two bombs discharged on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Contemporary nuclear weapons are far more destructive and potent than these first bombs, which displayed their own threats. Primary researches were dependent on a program of atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. In the subsequent years of WW II, the effect and quantity of radioactive consequences in the atmosphere produced by above-ground nuclear detonations was not completely evaluated (Drell et al., 2012). In that period, the former Soviet Union and the United States conducted several hundred of tests in the atmosphere that provoked fallout (Drell et al., 2012).

From this we can notice that the different nuclear tests from the United States and the Soviets contributed to the contamination of the atmosphere, with radiation and we

have already seen the danger of radiation in the case of the Chernobyl power plant accident. We have seen that radiation provoked thyroid cancer in the communities surrounding Chernobyl. From that perspective, we comprehend that atmospheric nuclear tests are very damaging to human life because as we shall see in the next section – Environmental Security –, pollution has no frontier, especially air and water pollution. Fortunately, improvement was made in 1963 with the talks and ratification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) prohibiting all nuclear explosive atmospheric tests – initially by the USA, the Soviets and the UK – (Drell et al., 2012).

A serious supervisory weak point still exists in several places in this time, as demonstrated by the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe. However, with the effective safety record of the American nuclear weapons program, domestic fear concerning nuclear weapons regressed to some extent (Drell et al., 2012). In the meantime, the writers indicate that public opinion about nuclear weapons showed recognition of their major role in making possible a more constant nuclear deterrent posture in the conflict with the former Soviet Union. Twenty-six years after the disaster of the nuclear reactor at Chernobyl in Soviet-age Ukraine, the nuclear enterprise has reinforced its safety practices. Over the past years, increasing preoccupations about energy independence and global warming have in fact reinforced support for nuclear energy in the U.S. and numerous states in the world. Yet in spite of these tendencies, the civilian nuclear enterprise is fragile (Drell et al., 2012).

In the Fukushima accident, opinion polls obviously showed the public's profound fears of the unseen power of nuclear radiation, displayed by public opposition to the building of new nuclear power plants having proximity with local communities. It is not uniquely a question of getting better information to the public but of really teaching the public regarding the real nature of nuclear radiation and its threats. Of course, the direct task of the nuclear power plant component is to achieve the greatest potential safety record. The major goal could not be clearer: no more Fukushima (Drell et al., 2012).

The Principles

Drell et al. (2012) explain that the nuclear enterprise globally faces new and increasingly complex challenges. Successful leadership in national security policy will demand a diligent, continuous and multidimensional review of these recently growing threats and consequences. Concerning the seriousness of the possibly devastating

consequences accompanying nuclear power and weapons, the writers advocate two principles that could help avoid a nuclear catastrophe on a global scale:

First, the calculations used to assess nuclear risks in both the military and the civil sectors are fallible. It is difficult to analyze events where we do not have sufficient data, allowing us to identify every variable associated risk. Industry, governments and preoccupied citizens should permanently reanalyze the suppositions on which security and safety measures, the production of nuclear energy and emergency preparations are based. In such a context, it is possible that a particular variable could exceed expectations, go dangerously wrong and simply overthrow safety systems and the risk reviews on which these systems were put together. This is what occurred in 2011 when a combination of earthquake and tsunami – both of which exceeded calculations based on history – overthrew the Fukushima complex, breaking numerous safeguards that had been constructed into the plant and activating the meltdown of the reactor core and radiation outflows (Drell et al., 2012).

Second, risks accompanying nuclear weapons and power will likely grow substantially as nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear energy production technology spread in unstable regions of the world where the potential for conflict is high. Countries that are new to nuclear energy may not have efficient nuclear safeguards to secure nuclear materials and weapons – as well as a developed fabric of early systems of warning and nuclear confidence-building measures that could augment decision and warning time for leaders in a crisis – or the ability to securely regulate and manage the operation and construction of new civil reactors. As a result there is an increased threat of accidents, mistakes, or miscalculations including nuclear weapons, nuclear terrorism and regional wars. The consequences would be terrible: a Hiroshima-size nuclear weapon exploded in a major city today could claim a 500, 0000 lives and result in \$1 trillion in direct economic loss. Drell et al. (2012) argue that there is a paradox in the civilian side of the nuclear energy. Indeed, while an accident would be significantly less destructive than the explosion of a nuclear weapon, the threat of an accident happening is undoubtedly higher. Presently, 1.4 billion people live in the absence of electricity, and by 2030 the worldwide need for energy is likely to rise by about 25% (Drell et al., 2012).

With the additional need to minimize carbon emissions, nuclear power reactors will become more and more attractive sources for electricity, especially for developing countries. These nations, in return will need to meet the challenge of designing suitable governmental bodies and the expertise, the infrastructure and experience to sustain

nuclear power efforts with an appropriately high standard of security. As we witnessed it in Fukushima, a nuclear power plant disaster can be responsible for the spread of hazardous radioactive fallout, massive civilian displacements, and billions of dollars in cleanup costs. Such an event can also induce the public to be more skeptical about nuclear technology and institutions. The Fukushima accident persuaded developed countries like Germany to completely give up nuclear power, mainly by prolonging the life of current nuclear reactors while destroying nuclear-produced electricity and creating alternative sources of energy (Drell et al., 2012).

On the one hand we have advocates of nuclear disarmament, on the other we have the civilian use of nuclear energy. Should the case of Fukushima or Chernobyl altogether discourage any positive civilian use of nuclear energy? We have just seen that with the purpose to reduce carbon emissions in the atmosphere, an alternative solution is the nuclear-produced electricity. We admit that there are still risks of stealing in the civilian use of nuclear energy, thefts that can endanger our security. We have already discussed all the safety and safeguard measures that can be taken accordingly; therefore we advocate a civil development of nuclear energy for the many benefits it provides in electricity production, medicine, agriculture etc. Conversely, if we totally stop any civil exploitation of nuclear energy and continue to pollute our environment, it is not nuclear energy that will destroy us but our environment that would be full of pollutants, which would be responsible for the undermining of our health – see second section on Environmental Security –.

What we try to highlight is that, instead of taking this risk, we can use nuclear reactor as alternative sources of energy that would limit pollution by then reducing gas and carbon emissions in the atmosphere. It is true that using nuclear energy whether for military or civilian purposes is a risk, but we have the responsibility to make a decision that will not jeopardize our human security on this planet. Germany as mentioned by the author, opted for an alternative source of energy different from the nuclear one, because of the Fukushima accident, it is its right and its decision, but not every single state is going to opt for that choice if it has a rising demand for energy in the electricity sector!

2.4 Japan's Self Defense: the Issue of Nuclear Breakout

Samuels and Schoff (2015) contend that Japanese military planners have for long been undecided about going nuclear. On the one hand, souvenirs of dreadful strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki have supported antinuclear sentiment and helped defend

national policies supporting nonproliferation and abandoned a domestic nuclear program. On the other hand, Japan's nonnuclear aspirations are well established. Until its amendment in 2012, Article 2 of Japan's Atomic Energy Basic Law (1955) stated obviously that research and development, and use of atomic energy is confined to peaceful goals. Moreover, the country joined the IAEA in 1957 and has kindly supported the work of the agency. It also ratified the NPT in 1976 and sustained the treaty's indefinite extension in 1995 and as well signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1997. Japan was the first nation to ratify the IAEA's Additional Protocol in 1998, allowing a stricter regime for IAEA reviews of Japanese nuclear facilities (Samuels and Schoff, 2015). But it was a surprise in 2013 to see its resentment in refusing to join 74 other states that signed a statement in advance of the next NPT review stating that nuclear weapons are inhumane and must not be utilized under any circumstance. This displays the other and more realistic side of the Japanese approach to nuclear weapons (Samuels and Schoff, 2015).

The government of Japan does in effect believe that some situations might permit the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the fact that the ability of Japan to act on this belief rests uniquely in the US's hands is alarming for some bureaucrats and politicians in Tokyo (Samuels and Schoff, 2015). During periodic revisions of the Japanese nuclear option, national security has reliably been dependent on the full range of American military power to dissuade nuclear attacks against Japan (Samuels and Schoff, 2015). This policy has repeatedly been followed by regional nuclear-armed rivals as good reminders, demonstrating that nuclear weapons can be legal forms of self-defense. From this perspective, Japan made it plain since the 1950s that it reserves the right – and will maintain the capability – to develop its own nuclear weapons program. There is obviously a balance between Japan's nuclear approval and nuclear denial. Each time the regional environment has changed – such as after the first nuclear test of China in 1964, the end of the Cold War, Pyongyang's nuclear breakout in the 2000s, or the 2010 U.S.-Russia New Strategic Arms Reduction agreement reducing warheads and launchers – Tokyo has reconsidered its national policy before signaling for – and accepting – American guarantee on prolonged deterrence (Samuels and Schoff, 2015).

Initially American assurances were a controversial matter (Samuels and Schoff, 2015). In the 1960s, American nuclear weapons were widely distributed in the world. The United States kept onshore 3,000 nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific region, comprising some 1,200 on Okinawa, where American strategic bombers were based. This nuclear

deterrent did not actually cost much to Japan, that is, hosting American military bases and providing to its own defense. The combination of the unwillingness of Japan to participate fully in its own defense and Japanese's expressions of preoccupations concerning the dependability of the American nuclear umbrella emphasized Japan's cheap run on national security (Samuels and Schoff, 2015).

However, according to the authors giving assurances to Japan is more challenging today. Japan is confronted to new nuclear threats and relative changes in the regional balance of power. Although the US nuclear arsenal is more accurate and more potent than before, it is now less visible and smaller. Washington removed the last of its land-based nuclear arsenals from Asia in 1991 and has diminished its overall nuclear stock by nearly 75% since then, and additional diminutions are being envisaged (Samuels and Schoff, 2015). These reductions increased rising Tokyo's concerns about China and North Korea. Meanwhile, Japanese public opinion remains opposed to any nuclear armament development, and in this respect Japan would likely be the last state in Northeast Asia to conduct a nuclear weapons program. Because the demand for reassurance has escalated there are also signs of a more sophisticated debate in Tokyo about nuclear arms. The concerns are about how Tokyo sees its options, whether and how its nuclear ambition could change, and what this would imply for the region and the Washington-Tokyo alliance, (Samuels and Schoff, 2015).

The Current Posture of Japan

Samuels and Schoff (2015) support that the evolution of the nuclear ambition of Japan is basically attributable to political circumstances and a truthful review of American commitment and capabilities. They sustain that Japanese leaders have agreed that search for nuclear weapons is diplomatically, politically and economically unfeasible; at the same time they acknowledge that an independent nuclear deterrent is not necessary on condition that U.S. assurances remain believable to prospective enemies. Accordingly, Japan initially decided to deny itself nuclear arsenals. Japan's nuclear protection has two elements (Samuels and Schoff, 2015). The first includes confirming – and seriously reconfirming – the US capability and commitment to utilize nuclear weapons in defense of Japan. For instance, in 1965, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato requested Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to initiate the deployment of nuclear weapons against China in the event of war. President Lyndon Johnson and McNamara gave that guarantee. By 1976, each of the Japanese National Defense Program Outlines

has indicated that Japan will be dependent on US extended deterrence (Samuels and Schoff, 2015).

The second element includes Japan's maintenance of the foundation for its own program of nuclear weapons, a possibility envisaged by Japan. Former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi understood that nuclear weapons were unconditionally essential if Japan was to have power in IR, therefore he instructed his Cabinet Legislation Bureau in 1957 to formally state that the constitution of Japan authorized it to own nuclear weapons for self-defense (Samuels and Schoff, 2015). The writers inform that a member of the Japan's Atomic Energy Commission reminded how they were pressured on a regular basis to do basic research on how to make an atomic bomb. Prominent politicians have reaffirmed the constitutionality of nuclear weapons across the years, as well as current and former Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe and Taro Aso, correspondingly.

Furthermore, a significant policy study by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) noted in 1969 that despite joining the NPT or not, Tokyo will keep the economic and technical potential for the development of nuclear arsenals (Samuels and Schoff, 2015). Despite considerable opposition to this posture from inside Japan and from the world community, Japan has never shifted from its commitment to completing the nuclear fuel cycle. The same commitment involves the maintenance of robust enrichment and recycling capabilities, the stockpiling of separated plutonium, and the production of a fast breeder reactor that other nations – especially the United States – have given up for a long time as too dangerous and expensive (Samuels and Schoff, 2015). Actually, Japan has the largest nuclear weapons program of any NNWS. Of course after the 2011 tsunami-induced meltdown at the Fukushima power plant, the nuclear industry of Japan suffered a major blow, and there are several legal, political and technical restrictions that would make Japan's nuclear breakout tremendously problematic. In the meantime, it has always been of great importance for Tokyo to keep that option open (Samuels and Schoff, 2015).

The Nuclear Umbrella

Getting refuge under the US nuclear umbrella has always been controversial given that left-wing politicians contended in the mid-1960s that this policy was part of the United States' plan for world domination, and much of the public was afraid to be intertwined in a nuclear war between world powers (Samuels and Schoff, 2015). Certain conservative politicians such as Shigeru Yoshida and Hayato Ikeda from the pragmatic

branch of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and revisionists as Ichiro Hatoyama and Yasuhiro Nakasone advocated repeatedly for a domestic nuclear weapons program. The authors go on to argue that Prime Minister Sato, an advocate of Japanese nuclear armament, changed his mind when faced with the U.S.'s strong nonproliferation policy and his own government's internal studies concluding that dependence on extended deterrence was the best option forward.

When Sato realized that none of the conceivable alternatives – that is, the production of domestic nuclear weapons, nuclear sharing with the U.S., or publically negating U.S. nuclear protection – was considered realistic at that time by the majority of Japanese strategists, provided with high-level American assurances in 1967, he announced three nonnuclear principles: non-possession, non-manufacture and non-introduction. In 1968 he articulated the *four pillars policy*, and in 1970 Tokyo joined the NPT, leaving no doubt of Japan's dependence on the American nuclear umbrella (Samuels and Schoff, 2015). One of the four pillars is the three nonnuclear principles, and this pillar is followed by three additional pillars: (1) promoting nuclear power for peaceful purposes, (2) promoting global nuclear disarmament, and (3) relying on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for protection from international nuclear threat. The four pillar policy formally opened the nuclear umbrella, and this umbrella has remained open ever since despite the fact that it is perceived as unsecured by some.

Samuels and Schoff (2015) explain that Japanese national policy has emphasized the value of maintaining technical know-hows to impede both the United States and potential rivals to take the nonnuclear status of Japan for granted. Because of the technological sophistication of Japan, stable civil-military relations, self-contained nuclear fuel cycle, accessible and plentiful plutonium stockpiles, the country's nuclear ambition is intact and believable. Japanese leaders often recall their U.S. and regional counterparts – both privately and overtly – the importance of the American nuclear umbrella and the own capability of Japan to go nuclear if needed (Samuels and Schoff, 2015).

In line with the authors, Washington's response to this posture has been consistent. In effect, in 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Japan and reassured Washington's willingness and capability to meet the complete range of its deterrence and security commitments in an attempt to guarantee Japan that it is still well-protected under the US nuclear umbrella. Samuels and Schoff (2015) sustain that President Obama gave similar public declarations after Pyongyang's subsequent test in 2009 and 2013 when Prime Minister Abe required him to reassure the American commitment to defend

Japan with an *unshakable nuclear umbrella*. Dependence on U.S. extended deterrence persists for now despite embarrassment with the growing status quo. This embarrassment stems from diverse sources. Some Japanese analysts and politicians are concerned that a policy designed for a bipolar world will become less consistent in a multipolar world environment full with regional nuclear powers. In this viewpoint, Japan could become *disconnected* from American strategic thinking (Samuels and Schoff, 2015).

At the same time, some in Tokyo seek to impede this thanks to closer diplomatic ties with the United States, others advocate the post-Cold War official and diplomatic restraints that Japan chose to live with for the sake of economic development; Tokyo would pursue a distinct postwar diplomatic ties with Washington by taking more security and diplomatic issues into its own hands (Samuels and Schoff, 2015). The advocates of nuclear umbrella in Japan are concerned for a number of reasons. The U.S.'s budget problems, together with its efforts to reduce nuclear weapons in the world, exacerbate that concern over the durability of the American nuclear umbrella. Moreover, by some measures, American nuclear arsenals have withered with time. Washington has not produced a new warhead in more than 25 years, and it has not made a nuclear test since 1992. In addition to that, the American Departments of Defense and Energy affirmed in 2008 that the United States is now the unique NWS party to the NPT that does not have the capability to develop a new nuclear warhead. Of course, the Obama administration made some investments to improve current nuclear arsenals (Samuels and Schoff, 2015).

Some American military planners at the Department of Defense consider that when modern security problems are likely to escalate to war, the nuclear arsenal acquired from the Cold War will prove to be inappropriate for utilizations beyond deterring a large-scale nuclear strike against America or a close ally. Samuels and Schoff (2015, p. 484) quote John Hamre, former deputy secretary of defense, who stated: "The Cold War left us with a massive inventory of [nuclear] weapons we no longer need. . . [and] a shrinking community of nuclear experts hold on [to it] as a security blanket for a future they cannot define." Recent American administrations have considered that deterrence through conventional weapons is finally more reliable than any existing nuclear alternative (Samuels and Schoff, 2015). The problem according to the writers is that ongoing American investment in conventional military superiority is exactly what pushes weaker nations to seek uneven solutions with nuclear weapons – i.e. Iran and North

Korea – and encourages other world powers to continue with their own military investments – i.e. China –, further concerning regional allies such as Japan; there is no easy balance that actually guarantees security through force in the absence of a broader security dilemma. Samuels and Schoff (2015, p. 487) expressed the concerns of Japan about regional and existential threats, mainly starting with North Korea:

“Washington’s official assessments of North Korea’s nuclear capability are written vaguely but express confidence that the North will be able to produce nuclear-tipped missiles in the not too distant future and that their accuracy will improve. To strike Japan, North Korea could use some of its estimated 200 Nodong medium-range ballistic missiles, which have a range of 1,500 kilometers and a payload of one ton. North Korea is also developing a land-based intermediate-range missile (Musudan) that might be able to reach Okinawa and Guam. Although the accuracy of these missiles has been derided in the past, a battery of test launches in July 2006 suggested that North Korea had improved their performance, and in December 2012, it put a satellite into orbit for the first time using a three-stage rocket.”

As for the other regional and existential threat to Japan’s national security, Samuels and Schoff (2015, p. 488) observed:

“Compared with North Korea, China’s nuclear arsenal and conventional capabilities are much larger and weigh heavily on the minds of Japanese defense planners. The strategic force modernization of China raises the potential costs that U.S. policymakers would need to weigh when considering the option of intervening against Chinese interests on behalf of Japan or Taiwan. Although official Chinese policy states that China will not use nuclear weapons first—or ever against a non-nuclear weapon state—its intimidation tactics in the maritime and cyber domains have worried some in Japan that these tactics could someday spread to the nuclear realm. Many of its tactical weapons have enhanced ranges, accuracies, and payloads, and some put Okinawa within range when forward deployed. Upgrades to Chinese missile warheads—including multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles— are enhancing Beijing’s deterrent and strategic strike capabilities vis-a-vis Japanese and U.S. missile defenses.”

Samuels and Schoff (2015) argue that Japanese military planners have to question how much vulnerability America is disposed to tolerate among China’s strategic modernization and what it is prepared to do on Japan’s behalf, if anything, in retaliation to any moves from China. Some leading Japanese strategists advocate that a national nuclear deterrent, even though not enough to deter a power as big as China’s in all circumstances, could make things difficult to strategic planning in Beijing to the degree that China would think twice before threatening to utilize – or truly utilizing – its own

nuclear forces in a regional conflict or crisis. Samuels and Schoff (2015, p. 489) have mentioned Campbell and Sunohara from the book Nuclear Tipping Point: Why State Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, who observed: “The persistence of a Japanese-American alliance so robust that it can indefinitely dissuade Japanese leaders from acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be guaranteed.” Despite changing perceptions of threat amid Japanese policymakers, Japan’s level of confidence in American security assurances is high owing to the Obama administration’s recent diplomatic and military investments in Asia, Washington’s bilateral insistence on the criticality of alliances and robust support for Japan during the tsunami and nuclear accident at Fukushima in 2011 (Samuels and Schoff, 2015). For the meantime, Japanese military planners are carefully watching the American response to Sino-Japanese conflict in the East China Sea over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The authors argue that this is a great test case of Washington’s ability and willpower to halt Chinese aggression. The decline in the qualitative advantage that the allies have traditionally detained over China’s military forces is a great concern for Tokyo (Samuels and Schoff, 2015).

Samuels and Schoff (2015, p. 496) stated : “if the U.S.-China military balance in East Asia reaches parity, then the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella will be gravely shaken.” From this standpoint, the modernization of the Chinese and North Korean nuclear force programs will aggravate the security dilemma for Japan. However, such modernization could as well accelerate American rethinking of a potential Japan’s nuclear breakout. Even if a Japanese decision to obtain nuclear weapons may not be in the U.S. existing interest, Washington’s capacity to and determination to avoid it would weaken with time if China’s military power were to continue to expand and particularly if North Korea’s present status as a nuclear power were to become a normal part of the Asian strategic environment, under such a situation, Japan’s aspiration for the acquisition of nuclear weapons would seem rational and difficult to deter (Samuels and Schoff, 2015).

Partial Conclusion

In brief, we would say that armament is a legitimate action by states; for instance it can be perceived as a natural way to prevent attacks from other states or non-state actors, or as a way to get ready for an eventuality of war. Disarmament erupted as a measure to curb the ongoing military armament states were designing; this was due to the dangerous weapons that were being developed by states. Obviously, nuclear weapon technology is what had encouraged nations to take actions in the very hope of preventing an escalation to a nuclear war. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 is an historical example of the dangers WMD represent. In this section, we have carried out research on two specific issues: armament and disarmament in the 20th and 21st centuries, and nuclear security. In the first part of the section, we have argued about the military expenditures that states dedicated to their military budgets. We have discussed the world military expenditure, early approaches to disarmament and the practical obstacles to nuclear disarmament in which we have seen security concerns related to NWS and security concerns related to NNWS.

In the second part of this section, we have debated WMD and international law; we have examined what the international law does about the WMD. We have debated nuclear terrorism in the fighting and identification of the threat; we have seen and argued about the race between intergovernmental cooperation and catastrophe. The last point has been about Japan's national security which is primarily based on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Growing existential and regional tensions prompted Tokyo to get reassurance from Washington for its extended nuclear deterrence. Japan is concerned that Washington withdrew the majority of its nuclear arsenals from Asia and has not made any nuclear test since 1992, and most importantly the US congress's budget cuts on its military bases in Okinawa and the Pacific are many of the elements that pushes Japan to think about developing its own nuclear weapons program (Samuels and Schoff, 2015). The growing and sophistication power of the Chinese military and nuclear arsenals are amid other variables that convinced Japan to think may be about considering the acquisition of its own nuclear weapons. Inside impediments of course will not make it easy for this possible move of Japan because of the Fukushima accident of March 2011. If Washington goes on to give practical assurances to Tokyo, we shall see how it will manage the Sino-Japanese confrontation in the East China Sea over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. All in all, Washington and Tokyo see their future together.

PART II: ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

Partial Introduction

By tradition, the questions of global security have basically been centered on the military and national security issues. This means that governments grounded their security agendas on the defense of their territory in ensuring the integrity of their land, the security of civilians against possible foreign military intrusion or aggression. What we mean is that dealing with international security is huge and that traditionally it would be about the military and issues relative to territorial integrity (military viability). Then the concept of security extended to the economy. We had been therefore dealing with economic security (socioeconomic viability). Afterwards, it was security related to politics (political viability).

However, through our findings we come to discover that any single threat to human life represents a problem of security. We think about water scarcity which is becoming gradually serious. We have to mention as well the problem of population pressures, having effects on agriculture, probably resulting in food scarcity. Accordingly, we cannot solve problems of global security – climate change, environmental threat, terrorism, peacebuilding etc. – with isolationism because of the so-called national security interests. As the entire planet is threatened, now we need to overlook our national interests and sit down together and discuss in order to find out any applicable solutions. A good example on that matter has been COP 21 on global warming, a climate change conference held in Paris between November and December 2015. States are called to work together mostly because of the global society we live in. Understandably, our society is becoming increasingly global, and as our common security is endangered, integration is a good option.

Stone (2009) explores the concept of security according to Barry Buzan – an international relations scholar specialized in security issues –.

The issue of security has for a longtime concerned the mind of IR experts, in asserting that the traditional concept of security that mainly focuses on the state is antiquated because the concept was usually ascribed to power (Stone, 2009). This perception of security was considered during the time of the world wars, wherein states appeared to be in active competition for power. The post-Cold War period has demonstrated a radical change in international affairs in showcasing that the concept of security then became increasingly multifaceted and more complex (Stone, 2009). Stone

(2009) quotes the book People, States and Fear, by Barry Buzan. Buzan (2008) realizes that the concept of security was significantly limited to the national security issues. He widened the concept by integrating concepts that were not formerly taken into consideration in the security agenda; these included regional security, environmental and social sectors of security. Stone (2009) quotes another Buzan's work, that is, his article "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century". In his article, Buzan addresses the five fields of security sectors, which are politics, military, economy, society and environment. We would like to point out that in this section, we only address the environmental sector of security. The other fields of security are all addressed in the remaining chapters of the sections of this doctoral paper.

This conceptualization of security is remarkable because we shift from the traditional perception of security to the challenges global security represents today. As Buzan puts it, there is not only security related to the notions of state and power as these perceptions of security are traditional and outdated. Of course, this does not imply that they are no longer considered to be part of security studies; the point is that in the post-Cold War era the reality of our global community has changed. This has obligated us to reconsider the concept of security into conceptualizing it again by broadening it to other fields. This is precisely what Buzan did by proposing the five aforementioned fields of security. An interesting argument is that considering security questions as merely linked to power and state is limited and could only be viewed as the way nations in the world wars age were struggling for power (Stone, 2009). For the partial introduction of this section, it is important to make some kind of overview of what the concept of security is.

We consider it to be accurate for the reason that a great part of the general public is not aware that environment is now a question of not only national security, but global security as well. The degradation of the environment has to concern us, because anyhow human security, that is, life on the planet is dangerously being in jeopardy.

If we perfectly address this question, then we would know what impact environmental change can have on our security. Another aspect is to point out that natural resources and human beings are part of the environment. We regard environment as everything around us that was not made by human beings, or the physical locations that support life on the planet. As a result, the environment is about things around us like flowers, herbs, natural resources, ecosystems that support life. If our environment degrades our life as well will degrade in a way that jeopardizes us. What about natural resources? They are naturally arising substances in the environment

that have an impact on the economic life of countries, directly affecting the lives of people since they provide income to support life. The environment produces natural resources and human activities can therefore affect positively or negatively their quality and quantity. We have two categories of natural resources: non-renewable resources – oil, gas, germs – and renewable resources – water, forests, fisheries, wildlife –.

Matthew et al. (2010) contend that all along human civilization, the restraints that environmental conditions and their natural changeability imposed influential determinants of the security of people. As they see it, droughts, frosts, animals, pathogens, storms and other environmental unrests constituted a major cause of sicknesses, mortality and social trouble. In our modern society, technology, industrialization, trade, the use of fossil fuel and higher levels of societal organization have reduced these constraints previously imposed by the environment on human security (Matthew et al., 2010).

Since the consolidation of the contemporary nation-state characterized by trade, combined with the Industrial Revolution, there have been thousand times intensifications in the output of goods and services. In the same period, the world's population witnessed an increase ranging from one billion to over six billion people, and the majority of these people, consumes more, has a better education than in preceding generations, and of course lives longer (Matthew et al., 2010). In the meantime, the dangers that environmental change imposes on human life have not been eradicated. The level of pollution and consumption in our modern society, featured by high consumption of energy, has provoked huge reductions in forest cover, caused depletion of fish stocks, biodiversity losses, land, coastal and marine degradation, water pollution and scarcity (Matthew et al., 2010). This is also responsible for the contamination of people, plants, animals, made possible as a result of radioactive substances and chemicals, climate change and the rise of sea level (Matthew et al., 2010). These environmental changes are also global in so far as their origins rest in the consumption of resources in marketplaces often very distant from the locations where these resources are extracted (Matthew et al., 2010).

In this respect, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 1996) explained that the wealthiest people of the planet represent 20% of the world's population and consume 84% of all paper, 45% of all fish and meat, and possess 87% of the world's automobiles. Baumert and Kete (2001) informed that the EU countries and the United States were responsible for 52% of CO₂ emission between 1990 and 1999. The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP, 1997) provided some explanations of what

“global” impacts of environmental changes mean. That UN agency contends that *global* in this regard does not imply that responsibility for environmental change is uniformly shared in the midst of all people, or that the repercussions of these changes are equally distributed in all places.

On the contrary, “global” denotes the linkages between environmental change and social impacts across groups and distant places. Matthew et al. (2010) assert that around the world the forecasts for human security are profoundly affected by local and worldwide processes of environmental change. They claim that the complexity of the links between processes of environmental change and their effects across time and space enhance a new way of viewing and regarding the concept of human security. Wide-reaching environmental change challenges human security in ways that move beyond the dichotomy existing between the rich and the poor, the North and the South. Dealing with environmental change reveals the linkages, and even the roughness between the security of people and communities and the safety and sustainability of species, ecosystems, as well as humanity. Global environmental change is fundamentally an issue about the capability to provide an answer to new challenges and to reconcile the mounting discrepancies that degrade human life (Matthew et al., 2010).

In this section of our paper, we show the connection between individuals, the environment and security. Our major argument is that global environmental change represents new and in some situations unprecedented threats to human security. In this part, we deal with (I) Environmental Threats to Human Security, (II) Natural Threats to Human Security and (III) Fragmentation of International Law and the Synergy.

CHAPTER 3: ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY

3.1 The Rise of Environmental Issues in Global Politics

Hough (2008) informs that the rise of global environmental politics is a dimension of IR that is relatively new, even in politics. But this does not imply that environmental problems are in any way new issues. He argues that the extermination of some species of animals because of carelessness as a result of human activity and the decrease of forest areas due to overexploitation are phenomena that lasted for centuries. The author goes on to contend that environmental issues arose as a science in the nineteenth century, making possible the recognition of natural logical phenomena such as the carbon cycle and evolution, food chains and an understanding of humanity's place inside the environment. Pressure groups advocating conservation and policies to conserve nature started to emerge in the United States and Western European countries at the end of the nineteenth century. In that perspective, *Yellowstone* turn out to be America's earliest National Park in 1872 and the British Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (BRSPB) became the world's first conservation pressure group – and later the world's top international pressure group when it stretched out its membership to the countries of the British Empire – (Hough, 2008).

We can trace back the origins of international policy on environmental problems as far as 1889 and also an international agreement to hamper the extent of the disease *phylloxera* in grapes. In addition to that convention, we have had other accords as the 1902 Convention on the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture – the primary global instrument about the conservation of animals – (Hough, 2008). However, what motivated the conference were not environmental motives but somewhat economic concerns. The reason for that is because wine and the trade of food worldwide were dominant issues rather than the fauna and flora. At that stage of global politics, the main issues on the agenda were not environmental problems, nor empathy for animals, considering Western Europe and North America. The issues on the agenda were the military and economy, and there were more emphasis on the former. There was a significant change in this regard in the beginning of the 1960s, where we witnessed attention given to environmental issues in North America and Western European states and the coming of environmental politics, further than merely economic motives, on the global political agenda (Hough, 2008).

Hough (2008) explains that the major factor that brought that contribution had been the book Silent Spring by Rachel Carson – widely renowned as having launched ecology as a political ideology in the early 1960s –, which depicted the effects of the insecticide dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) on vegetation, rivers and animals; the book had an impact on American insecticide policy on conservation grounds. Another innovation in the book is that it took into account the implications for human health of indiscriminate insecticide use and this feature started to force environmental security to be included in the international political agenda. Then new political concerns started to be voiced in the wake of Silent Spring, this included the effects of *acid rain* – rain water contaminated by industrial emissions – and old issues such as oil contamination by tankers were being paid attention, (Hough, 2008).

Highlighted concerns about the effects of contamination on the human health and other forms of environmental change at the international level was notably made possible by the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) at Stockholm (Hough, 2008). The outcome of the conference – although it was boycotted by Russia and its Eastern Bloc allies – was that it perpetually put environmental security on the international agenda of politics. As a result, the conference brought about a legacy, that is, the creation of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), making permanent environmental commitment on global politics on the part of governments, by encouraging them to create new departments and ministers of the environment, and ultimately broadening and deepening an international network of pressure groups of the environment, (Hough, 2008).

As we consider this overview on the rise of environmental issues on global politics, we have come to discover that environmental security is a relatively new field in international affairs, a field only taken seriously some fifty years ago. This attitude on the part of the global political agenda proved to jeopardize the security of people. It is admitted that these concerns about environmental change started centuries ago; in this case attention seemed to have been towards animals and plants at the end of the nineteenth century. But the protection of animals and plants was motivated by economic reasons. The priorities for states at that stage of history were to ensure their military viability and economic power, mainly in North America and Western European countries.

Hough (2008) has stated that what actually brought a radical change for the rise of environmental issues on global politics has been the book Silent Spring by Rachel Carson. This book about environmental security awoke the governments of the world on

the importance to foment policies that would foster environmental protection. The book was so descriptive on the pollution on humans, animals and plants and therefore political decision-makers decided to take action. Another thing is that Carson described how environmental contamination was affecting the security of people. Security here refers to the fact that the life of people was being threatened because of water and air pollution. Accordingly, the global political agenda started to pay attention to acid rain and oil pollution by tankers.

Because the field of environmental security is recently recognized, the global political agenda opted for the creation of a framework where these environmental issues would be addressed on a regular basis, in the very aim to limit environmental degradation. This was the case as noticed above with the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) at Stockholm. This conference was the primary legal instrument to force states to be engaged in environmental security. With this in mind, it can be argued that the outcome of the conference has been the founding of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), which compelled states to create new departments and ministers of the environment.

The newly created UN agency was in charge of promoting the broadening and the deepening of a global network of pressure groups of the environment. This heritage of the 1972 Stockholm Conference was crowned with success because it is from that moment that on global politics they started to talk about sustainable development. This is in fact a philosophy born in the 1970s that encourage current generations to be careful about the mass production they practice, the high consuming society they are; they have to care about the environment by mitigating its degradation, featured by air and water contamination, if they do not future generations will be jeopardized. Indeed, in that case future generations might be left with a legacy of food and water scarcity, with thousands of pollutants which will result in more diseases such as cancers, heart attacks, and other awful diseases that do not exist yet today. At the moment, we witness for example many new types of cancers that did not exist fifteen or twenty years ago.

Another argument Hough (2008) brings about is that pollution does pay attention to boundaries. In other words, it does not respect frontiers. He exemplifies it with acid rain that became a serious issue in the 1960s not only because of the growing evidence that precipitation could be polluted and this could as well pollute groundwater and threaten the environment, but also because it was a problem in some countries whose governments were incapable of resolving this sort of matters. As a result, Sulphur dioxide

and other emissions from the burning of fossil fuels which are accumulated in the Earth's atmosphere can be turned to rainwater, some distance away from where they departed as smoke. The governments of Canada, Sweden and Norway were particularly facing this problem of contamination, but discovered that they could not resolve it because the problem originated from other sovereign countries (Hough, 2008). In addition, to resolve these kinds of environmental problems, an international cooperation was required, especially in the case of states which share rivers and other forms of water in their maritime frontiers.

An example of this global cooperation was the 1979 Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution Agreement, an accord that was signed between America, Canada and Western European countries, by fostering reductions in the amount of Sulphur dioxide and other industrialized emissions (Hough, 2008). The fact that it took so long for such friendly nations to reach this simple agreement is the proof that environmental issues presented challenges to the subsequent traditional determinants of government policy: self-sufficiency, sovereignty, the economic growth and the national interests. Equally important, the author contends that the 1970s witnessed a wake of global cooperation on reducing contamination between countries sharing the same springs of water. This idea demonstrated that the sovereign control of the collective goods of air, water and natural resources was irrelevant. Due to that, UNEP managed the creation of a series of Regional Sea Programs, as it was the case with the North Sea Convention and Mediterranean Action Plan (Hough, 2008).

Hough (2008) informs about the idea of a global commons. Global commons are commonly shared natural goods between sovereign states such as fresh water, clean air and high seas fish stocks, which are jeopardized by their continuous exploitation by states that will only result in their depletion and ruin (Hough, 2008). By the beginning of 1970s the Tragedy of the Commons concept commenced to become persuasive with fears that the economic security of the developed nations could be endangered by the Earth as a whole surpassing its capacity to endure the overproduction of these economies. One of the responses to these concerns was the rise of global political action on population pressures and the widespread thesis that these developed nations had to put restrictions to growth by decreasing their industrial production and economic growth (Hough, 2008).

Deforestation regarded for a longtime as a problem for forest-dwelling wildlife and human beings came back on stage when discovering the effect of carbon-sink, this

is the fact that trees absorb atmospheric carbon dioxide. The problem is that carbon dioxide in the air is toxic to mankind above a certain level and to some level participates in global warming.

Hough (2008, p. 149) mentions the article *The Economics of Climate Change* by Stern who contains that the loss of trees at a global scale participates more in global warming than the so-called effect of transportation. In effect, it is admitted that cars are great polluters because of the emissions of the smoke they release in the atmosphere. The argument Stern brings about is relevant in that trees contribute to our breathing in so much as they absorb carbon dioxide released in the atmosphere as a result of the burning of fossil fuels. This is actually a problem because trees are being destroyed every day for industrial and for livelihood reasons. Industrial because wood is used for paper, construction, the manufacturing of tables, chairs and other components proceeding from wood. Livelihood for the reason that in developing nations, mainly in villages or countries people cannot afford to buy gas for cooking, they therefore use coping methods in cutting trees. Although, this cannot be compared to deforestation at a larger scale, but it somewhat contributes to the destruction of the environment as the continuous loss of trees will result in the complication of life on the Earth by participating in global warming.

3.2 Environmental Issues as Threats to Security and Reasons for Environmental Problems

Even though the majority of the literature of the *environmental security* that emerged in the 1990s was centered on broadening the degradation of the environment to the list of conventional preoccupations employed to distinguish the possible military threats originating from other nations, a more remarkable school of thought focused at the same time on advocating for extending the significance of security by incorporating issues of environmental change (Hough, 2008). In this perspective, Hough (2008, p. 156) quotes the article *Redefining Security* from the journal *International Security* by Ullman, who was the pioneer of the re-evaluation of security in 1983, when he incorporated to the concept a less statist outlook by integrating to it the security of people threatened by the scarcity of resources rather than just sticking on a new category of dangers to the security of states. In 1989, an article "Redefining Security" by Jessica Mathews for the influential and conservative journal *Foreign Affairs* followed Ullman's route of arguments in a more state-centered analysis.

Hough (2008) points out that Matthews who is a former member of the American government's National Security Council stated that environmental issues with global consequences, such as climate change, deforestation and ozone depletion ought to become problems of states political agendas.

Ozone Depletion

In 1985, the British Antarctic Survey concluded what had been supposed by scientists for over ten years at the time. This survey proved that the Earth's ozone layer had a hole within (Hough, 2008). The author defines the ozone layer as a protective gaseous cover in the higher atmosphere that absorbs ultraviolet rays from the sun before they reach the surface of the Earth. This service is crucial for mankind and other forms of life given that ultraviolet particle emission can impact the health of people in the forms of skin cancer and other serious sicknesses.

To explain that, Hough (2008) indicates that the obvious and factual threat posed by the loss of this self-protective shell fostered a remarkably rapid global response. After some months following the British Antarctic Survey finding, the global community held the Vienna Convention on Protection of the Ozone Layer as a conventional framework to ensure the protection of the ozone layer. The international community amplified that framework treaty with the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, where 24 industrialized states signed an agreement for major reductions in the future use and release of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other chemicals known to be responsible agents for the depletion of the ozone layer. Since 1987, the framework extended to a series of amendments widening the reduction to be made by states and broadening its implementation to the rest of the world (Hough, 2008).

According to the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Program (WMO/ UNEP, 2006), the reduction of emission of CFCs was made possible thanks to major sustainable development principles established at the Rio Summit with Less Developed Countries (LDCs). WMO/UNEP (2006) concluded that from the 1987 regime of emission reduction of CFCs to the Rio Summit, we have witnessed the success of the regime by mounting recent evidence that the ozone layer has started to restore itself. Ozone depletion is a question that needs to be given a tremendous attention because it is concerned with human security. The problem with environmental issues is that they were not given attention by global politics as above-mentioned because security issues were confined to the military. Although there was a new

categorization of security issues during the 1990s focusing on adding environmental issues on the security agenda of states, Hough (2008, p. 157) mentions Ullman who wanted to cast the concept of security in a less state-centered outlook by encompassing within its responsibility the security of individuals jeopardized by resource scarcity. This argument is appealing because environmental security is not about a list of threats; it is about factual things we witness in our environment.

When we talk about resource scarcity, we refer to natural resources like water and food resulting from agriculture. It is not difficult to understand that environmental security is all about the security of people. Global politics had to take the issue of the environment seriously because its degradation will not spare political decision-makers and only hit poor people. In other words, environmental hazards are not to spare the rich and hit the poor. This means that if nothing is done accordingly on a global political scale, our common security shall be endangered sooner or later.

Another aspect has been concerned with ozone depletion. We have appreciated the definition Hough provided for ozone depletion. Hough (2008, p.156) defines ozone depletion as “a protective gaseous shell in the upper atmosphere which absorbs ultraviolet rays from the sun before they reach the Earth’s surface”. If the atmosphere loses this defensive shield, the Earth, therefore humans and every forms of life will be vulnerable to the entering of ultraviolet rays from the sun. As we have seen it, it is documented that the Earth’s ozone layer has a hole within. Accordingly, the automatic response of the international community to the British Antarctic Survey was made possible because the loss of this protective shell was an evident and a present threat. Ozone depletion is mainly due to the emission of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other chemicals identified as agents of ozone depletion. The automatic effect of ozone depletion is apparently skin cancers and other serious sicknesses.

The good news is that the response of the global community brought about fruits, as exemplified with the Vienna Convention on Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985 and fleshed out in 1987 with the Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone Layer (Hough, 2008). And the conclusions of the WMO and UNEP 2006’s report showed with evidence that these efforts of the world community bore fruits in that they contributed to the restoration of the ozone layer.

Global Warming

The most glaring case of how environmental change can be regarded as an issue of security is the threat global warming symbolizes (Hough, 2008). The average temperature of the Earth over the past century has significantly risen and it is now globally acknowledged that this is more than a normal development and this is likely to continue in that trend if it is not addressed. The basic cause of global warming is an aggravation of the natural phenomenon of the greenhouse effect, which is triggered by increased industrialized emissions (Hough, 2008). Increased emissions of methane and carbon dioxide across the years, mainly through the burning of fossil fuels, participated in the exacerbation of the natural trend of the atmosphere to trap some quantity of ultraviolet sunlight after it is reproduced from the surface of the Earth. The outcomes of that phenomenon are multiple but are mostly concerned with advanced desertification and the increase of sea-levels as a result of the melting of polar ice-caps (Hough, 2008).

Table 1: The ten major security threats posed by global warming, Hough (2008, 158)

1 More frequent and lengthy heatwaves
2 More frequent droughts
3 Coastal flooding due to sea-level rises
4 Reduced crop yields due to reduced rainfall
5 Spread of tropical diseases North and South
6 Increased rate of water-borne diseases in flooded areas
7 Ocean acidification due to carbon dioxide affecting fish stocks
8 More frequent and stronger riverine flooding in wet seasons due to glaciers melting/reduced water supply in dry season
9 Increased incidences of wildfires
10 More frequent and stronger windstorms

The framework convention on climate change arose two years after the Rio Summit and was amplified in the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 (Hough, 2008). Nearly the totality of the global community attended the conference and committed itself to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, by distinguishing less developed and developed states. The implementation of the cuts on the part of developed states was so significantly costly that it pushed some of them not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, something not experienced during the ozone regime agreements (Hough, 2008). This was the case of the United States, which particularly refused to ratify Kyoto in spite of signing the treaty. According to the U.S. government, there was no scientific evidence over global

warming and there were concerns about lesser restraints imposed on LDCs, but most importantly, America recognized that Kyoto is simply not in U.S.'s national interest given the economic cost. Albeit there is still a lack of scientific certainties over a complex issue as climate change, a definitive scientific agreement has emerged from the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) since its creation in 1988 (Hough, 2008).

In their fourth report, (IPCC, 2007), this considerable regrouping of the top climatologists of the globe were capable to state, within a scientific framework, that it was between 90 and 95 per cent evident that human action was accountable for global warming. Global warming is a universal problem considering both cause and effect, but the scale of human security threat is not equally distributed over the planet (Hough, 2008). On the word of the writer, it is arguably admitted that for low-lying island countries the forecasts of an increase in the level of the waters are a human and a state security endangerment of the extreme gravity. Nevertheless, for other states the threat is not factual, both chronologically and geographically, and the urgency to take action, which is usually necessary for governments to ratify costly environmental treaties, is not there. The danger global warming poses is not a question that is only concerned with a theoretical upcoming scenario. The human cost is already significant and is not only blatant in developing nations, where a number of factors can help explain the reasons for mortality figures (Hough, 2008).

Since the time the WHO made an estimate of 150,000 annual deaths as a result of global warming, the entire North has been hit by events such as the 2004 heatwaves in Western Europe which murdered 35,000 individuals (Hough, 2008). Another event in this regard has been Hurricane Katrina in 2005, which killed about 1200 people and provoked an estimated \$200 billion-worth of damage in the United States. The author admits that while it is impossible to prove that these events are only attributable to global warming, we are already witnesses of the changes mentioned in table 1.

Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)

The Rio Summit in 1992 was the climax for important international political action in the field of human health-threatening atmospheric contamination (Hough, 2008). The Governing Council of UNEP in 1997 fleshed out the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, the Rio Summit in Brazil) by the setting of a global binding agreement in order to eliminate little by little the production and use of 12

POPs (Hough, 2008). This includes eight organochlorine pesticides and polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) (Decision No.19/13c). That new instrument was known as the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (UNEP, 1997).

The parties to the Treaty were 127 governments at a Diplomatic Conference held at Stockholm (Sweden) in May 2001, opening a system that will continue to be updated by adding new chemicals to the initial 12 POPs, made possible with a Review Committee (Hough, 2008). The POPs regime, born of UNCED and developed and promoted for a longtime by environmental pressure groups, seems to embody a victory of environmentalism (Hough, 2008). Hough (2008, p. 159) quotes Buccini who argues in his article *Chair of the 'Fifth Session of the International Negotiating Committee for an Internationally Legal Binding Instrument for Implementing International Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants'*, that this 1997 Treaty on the progressive elimination of the production and use of POPs will protect future and present generations from birth defects, cancers and other tragedies caused by POPs.

Hough (2008) argues that the production and utilization of the 12 banned chemicals has for a long time ended in the majority of developed nations but their possessions demonstrate that they still represent a domestic threat to their populations. The 12 chemicals are highly persistent, in that they have the tendency to globally travel in the environment through a constant process of deposition and evaporation, and have the propensity to bioaccumulate in the foodstuffs of humans. For this reason neural disorders, sterility and cancer in individuals of the developed nations can be ascribed to the use of organochlorines in other parts of the world (Hough, 2008) .

This part is to some extent very appealing as it displays how hazardous POPs are for our environment. We have just seen that POPs are to be categorized into two groups: organochlorine pesticides and polychlorinated biphenyl. These chemicals have the peculiarity to contribute to air pollution because they travel globally in the atmosphere thanks to a continuous process of evaporation and are saturated in our foodstuffs. In reality, it is a serious issue because chemicals may be produced in different regions of the world and still have devastative impacts on the human life in other parts of the planet. We would like to bring about another argument, in fact although POPs bioaccumulate in our foodstuffs, it is as well admitted that as they are thousands and thousands in the atmosphere, and contribute to air pollution, we also breath them. The direct negative outcome is that they are within our bodies and destroy our immune system – destroy our

cells – and are responsible for many cancers and sterility and neural disorders as aforesaid. As stated before, pollution has no frontiers!

Deforestation

An evaluation of the role of forests as absorbers of carbon dioxide brought to the table the issue of overexploitation of forests all around the globe as to be a factual dimension of human security (Hough, 2008). As a result, the global community, mostly rich states attempted to bring a quick response to the problem at the Rio Summit by setting up a convention on forests. Regrettably, these talks on deforestations failed, since they only succeeded to have a weak and non-legally binding treaty, *The Forest principles*, which advocated the qualities of sustainable management of forests, but still gives states the right to continue deforesting by declaring that forests are resources under the sovereignty of states.

The failure of the agreement is understandable because for the majority of countries whose exploitation of forests represents a great part of national economy, therefore to regulate deforestation is an economic burden for them (Hough, 2008). For these states deforestation is not regarded as a sufficiently threatening issue to human security so as to encourage other states to make pressure on them. In the meantime, Hough (2008, P. 159) quotes the book Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Government by Humphreys who sustains that this is not a good attitude from states for the reason that deforestation aggravates global warming and may be considered as one of the major factors behind natural disasters such as mudslides down, which were one time naturally secure hillsides.

We withstand that deforestation is a serious issue as regards the environment, but is it possible to completely stop deforesting? Is not deforestation necessary for economic reasons? These questions are somewhat worth asking because saying that we stop cutting wood might not simply be realistic since we need wood for furniture, construction, for paper and many other things. It can be argued that we need to practice a good management of our forests, that is, a sustainable management of forests. We will still need wood for the aforementioned reasons, more importantly the exploitation of wood is an extremely important economic issue for many developing countries which see wood as vital for their economy by exporting it to western countries. Stopping deforestation seems simply not realistic as it is a big chain from developing and emerging to developed economies.

It is documented that most of the countries in the developed world no longer possess forests; we mean natural forests, except in some cases, artificial forests. This means that they need wood for construction reasons, for office materials etc. and their unique option is to import wood from developing and emerging economies. The conclusion is that deforestation is necessary for economic reasons, but we need to avoid over-deforestation since the automatic consequence will be the wiping out of humankind. We all know that forests are carbon sinks and their over-exploitation will naturally result in the complication of life on the Earth. If the greenhouse effect caused by the burning of fossil fuels such as methane, carbon dioxide and Sulphur dioxide is not absorbed by forests, the situation of air pollution will exacerbate and will eventually result in many communicable diseases, cancers, the inhaling of POPs, which all will be destructive for the human health.

Desertification

Hough (2008) argues that the most obvious demonstration of the *tragedy of the commons*' impact has been the progression of desertification, where we witness that deserts have developed in size at the expense of the productive lands neighboring them. Once land turns out to be dry in this manner it is of course lost forever in relation with its fertile value and this has implications for food security for the local people and to some extent, humanity as a whole (Hough, 2008). The acknowledgement of this reality fostered the holding of the 1994 Convention to Combat Desertification which sets forth regulations for the management of semi-arid lands (Hough, 2008).

The peculiarity with the Convention is that it was uncommon in international environmental politics in the sense that it was incited by LDCs instead of developed states. It was mainly African states, whose spread of the Sahara and Kalahari deserts affect the most, which supported the inclusion of this matter in Article 21 of the Rio Summit. Hough (2008) states that although the Convention has slowly advanced since 1994 and that it has now almost a global reach, it still lacks the legal rigor of its global warming or depletion counterparts. The absence of a strong human security dimension for all states has underdeveloped its improvement (Hough, 2008).

The Reasons for Environmental Problems

Kopnina (2013) informs that most thinkers agree that the increase in contrary effects of human action on the environment is related to the process of industrialization, consumption and populations' pressures. The environment and globalization are strictly

linked given that environmental security is inherently a global problem – for instance, chlorofluorocarbons released into the environment are contributors to stratospheric depletion of ozone layer in all places –. According to Greene (2001) this problem is global in the sense that chlorofluorocarbons in the atmosphere naturally cross the frontiers of states. In other words, air pollution has no boundaries.

Some factors can explain environmental problems, socio-economic factors and global political relations (Kopnina, 2013). The most probably best known causation of environmental complications is the Tragedy of the Commons. The writer argues that at both domestic and international levels, power groups, such as business lobbies may push their interests combined with those of governments more efficiently than environmental pressure groups or any environmentally-oriented people may do. In multifaceted industrial societies, other priority issues may prevail on environmental issues, (Kopnina, 2013).

With regard to this part, we come to the realization that the basic causation of environmental change is industrialization, consumption and population growth. Industrialization because it demands the transformation of our environment, if we industrialize we will necessarily practice deforestation because we cannot deal with industrialization if we do not have the intention to live in a modern society. A modern society is industrialized, with many cars, skyscrapers, and we all recognize that this modernization has a price: the degradation of the environment. Cars are contributors to air pollution; the greenhouse effect is a result of industrialization because of gas emissions in the atmosphere. Another argument is that even for LDCs, as they want to industrialize they will systematically destroy their forests since they need to build new cities.

When Kopnina (2013) argues that consumption is to be regarded as a major causation of environmental change, we agree with her because in a high consuming society as ours, as there is more demand for consumption of goods we will inevitably have an increase in the production of these goods. To produce or to augment the production of goods means somewhat to pollute the environment in that it is mostly in the production process that the burning of fossil fuels is made and this contributes to the depletion of the ozone layer. If we are not careful we might live future generations with a legacy of a planet where life is not possible.

The last thing the author mentioned in her argumentation is that population growth is also a major cause of environmental problems. This raises the issue of population

pressures we shall develop later. What we can say for now is that the increase of the world population will inevitably pose a problem of food and water security and other resource scarcity. All this may undermine human security. This is not just a future scenario; this is something we have started to witness today. The direct consequence may be the unwilling migration of population to other places for livelihood reasons.

3.3 Assessing Environmental Security

In this part, we analyze the different approaches of IR theorists on environmental security. Let us first explore the three arguments of Deudney taken from his article “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and Security”, from the *Journal Millennium*, and quoted by Hough (2008, p. 160):

1 It is analytically misleading to think of environmental degradation as a national security threat, because the traditional focus of national security – interstate violence – has little in common with either environmental problems or solutions.

2 The effort to harness the emotive power of nationalism to help mobilize environmental awareness and action may prove counterproductive by undermining globalist political stability.

3 Environmental degradation is not very likely to cause interstate wars.

According to Hough (2008) these arguments are interesting but they are outdated because Deudney confined security studies only to be attributable to military issues. These arguments according to the author are more statist and limited to the national security issues – the military –. If environmental issues are in effect, basically distinct from the problem of inter-state violence, however why does this impede them from being part of security issues? (Hough, 2008). Deudney as a good traditionalist IR theorist, limited security to something that involves a military reaction from the nation-state instead of seeing it as something that is in relation with the lives of people (Hough, 2008).

On the word of the writer, threats in relation with the environment challenge the inadequacies of conservative statist thinking in IR in a most profound way. Dyer another author Hough (2008, p. 161) quotes from his article *Environmental Security*, contends that international environmental problems represent the major security challenge to the globe since they are “seen as an externality to the international system, rather than an internal variable which can be addressed in terms of familiar political structures and their supporting social values”. Dyer goes on to say that global warming possibly jeopardizes the security of all life on the planet – and the states they live on it – and it is a danger that

does not originate from any specific state and which cannot be prevented by anyone country, irrespective of its military and economic capabilities.

Today states are faced with the Prisoner's Dilemma analogy as a polluter's dilemma in front of states operating in the global system when they are exposed to some environmental issues (Hough, 2008). The question "to pollute or not to pollute?", when applicable to the environment or waters, can bring about diverse "rational answers". The author explains that the rationally acting state can choose to favor continuing to pollute, when considering the economic costs suffered by reducing contamination, deceived by the fact that the destructive impacts of the contamination might be insignificant or tolerated in other places of the world. This option is chosen if other nations decide to reduce pollution and curb the global problem. The problem is that if all states simultaneously choose to take such a self-centered posture, the results of the contaminator might become harmful, with environmental costs (Hough, 2008).

The current political diplomacy on actions to fight global warming obviously shows this dilemma, since the potential costs of not succeeding to think and take action cooperatively are catastrophic (Hough, 2008). A patent example of environmental degradation is the disappearing of coastline around the world. Equally important, Nicholls (2011) argues that on a global scale, the loss of coastal land represents a significant challenge as large population concentrations are ever more vulnerable to the rise of sea level. Now, we would like to consider environmental degradation, especially coastal land loss in Louisiana, USA. The National Research Council (NRC, 2006) contends that the degradation of coastal marshlands over the past several years has been responsible for a number of complications, with damage to recreational and profit-making fisheries, decreased defense from hurricanes, and amplified vulnerability of infrastructure of the energy industry. Louisiana seashore is for the most defenseless part, as it loses up to 40 acres per year of coastline marshlands (NRC, 2006).

This case of Louisiana has to concern us. Can you imagine how many places are in the same situation in many areas of the world? Coastal land loss is becoming an increasingly worrying problem in particular because we are losing seashores and the direct outcome is that people in the future will not be able to go to the beach for enjoyment or recreational reasons. This is because there will not be any place to put our feet on. The threat is that as this situation continues, coastal populations, if not coastal states will be more vulnerable to hurricanes, tsunamis, because of the rise of sea level. All this stuff threatens human life, therefore participates in human insecurity.

And of course, we do know what is responsible for that: global warming. We sustain that, although we have had a rise in attention on the part of global politics, most still needs to be done so as to guarantee our security on the Earth. On the one hand, we should do everything in our power to leave a good legacy to future generations. It is admitted that the problem is to be part of the global political agenda, in other words governments have to put continual efforts to lessen this tendency towards the degradation of our environment. Indeed, the degradation of our environment means the degradation of all sort of life. On the other hand, it is also the responsibility of people – even if we blame industries that are the great polluters – to make their counterpart. For example, we should unplug our electronic devices – mobile phones, tablets and computers – when not using plugs; we have to turn off the electricity when its use is unnecessary.

3.4 Global Environmental Change and Human Security

Matthew et al. (2010) argue that global environmental change is unavoidably a social problem, which weakens human security – mostly the rights, values and needs of individuals and communities –. In this respect, they explain that people who are most reliant on ecosystem services and natural resources for their living are habitually the most sensitive to environmental change. In terms of needs for instance, the change in soil wetness can undermine nutrition in subsistence agricultural ménages; a decline in great quantity of fish can degrade income and food for fishers (Matthew et al., 2010). They go on to claim that a decline in the quality of surface or groundwater can undermine child and maternal health in communities lacking regular water supply.

The changing context wherein global environmental change is witnessed puts forward the fact that most attention should be given to how human security shifts across the time, mainly the dynamics of vulnerability in the context of several processes of change (Matthew et al., 2010). As for the authors, the dynamics issues that impact sensitivity and adaptive capacity means that human security caused by environmental change is by no way equally distributed on a global basis. We can perceive differences in the human security of people in many respects: between countries, cities, regions, villages and family circles. Matthew et al. (2010) contend that in many cases, the causation of differences are the dependence on ecosystems and natural resources, together with the degree of social power in accordance with political, economic and cultural processes.

The writers also note that in the meantime, global environmental change brings about new threats that possibly impact the security of large number and diverse groups of people. A higher regularity or scale of storms and extreme weather, the rise of sea level, the spread of invasive species, the melting of glaciers and changes in water availability and quality are to be expected threats to human security in new and unpredicted ways. Matthew et al. (2010) provide as an illustration the impacts of the Chicago and Paris heatwaves on aged citizens in 1995 and 2003 respectively, which exposed some of the new challenges global environmental change poses to human security, along with the importance of the underlying factors of vulnerability. Human security is to be understood here as the capacity of people and communities to have the options essential to mitigate, terminate or adapt to dangers to their human, social and environmental rights; it is also to have the capability and liberty to exercise these options (Matthew et al., 2010). When people and communities do not have sufficient options to adapt to or avoid environmental change in the point that their values, needs and rights are likely to be challenged, then they can be regarded as being environmentally insecure (Matthew et al., 2010).

We should pay attention to this passage as it shows the relationship between global environmental change and human security. As our environment goes on to degrade on a regular basis, can we just stand there and be inactive spectators? Here we would like to focus on the impact of global environmental change on human security. We cannot deny that our security depends on our environment, if we keep living in such an increasingly hostile environment, our life on the Earth will be undermined. The finality of global environmental change will be the destruction of humankind if nothing is done accordingly. Of course, this process is gradual, it has already started for instance with manifest examples the authors mentioned in their book, that is, the impacts of the Chicago and Paris heatwaves on elderly citizens respectively in 1995 and 2003, where we had had hundreds of dead victims.

We have said that the destruction of the environment is gradual in that for the moment environmental change first impacts our health; we will have more diseases than ever before. Second, when we deal with the undermining of life triggered by environmental change we would like to refer to how life is becoming more and more unbearable on the Earth. We can notice that food security is threatened by a decline in soil moisture – that weakens the agricultural sector – and in fish abundance. A decline in surface and groundwater quality can for example degrade maternal and child health in

areas deprived of water supply. Other threats caused by environmental change are simply realities today as above-mentioned by the authors: sea level rise – the case of Malesia’s tsunamis in 2004; Hurricane Katrina in 2005 –, a higher frequency of storms, the changes in water availability and quality and the melting of glaciers.

Security in this case has to do directly with the survival if not the life of humankind. When we argue that the finality of global environmental change is the destruction of all forms of life on the planet, we mean that as the environment keeps degrading life will not be possible someday. We admit that it is a pessimistic vision of the world, but undoubtedly we are going towards this direction if we do not take action accordingly on the political, economic and cultural levels.

CHAPTER 4: NATURAL THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY

In this chapter, we would like to address the relationships between resource scarcity and conflict. In fact, there is a direct link between the ongoing scarcity of resources and altercations between people who struggle to get whether renewable or non-renewable resources. Michael and Savana (2001) stated that there is evidence that global environmental change is affecting non-renewable and renewable resources in a way that wars at various levels are expected to arise either directly or indirectly as a result of that change. In this perspective, Michael and Savana (2001, p.124) mentioned the Global 2000 Report to the President in 1980 which argued the following:

“Environmental, resource, and population stresses are intensifying and will increasingly determine the quality of human life on the planet.... At the same time, the Earth’s carrying capacity...is eroding. The trends reflected in the Global 2000 suggest strongly a progressive degradation and impoverishment of the Earth’s natural resource base.”

4.1 Natural Catastrophes, Population Pressures and Demand for Resources

Hough (2008) informs that the most glaring factor of insecurity for the majority of the global population is entrenched in the natural, that is, from physical phenomena originating from the Earth’s atmosphere and its interior, and even beyond our globe. The phrase “Acts of God” refers to the idea of human powerlessness in front of such threats which are out of our control; however natural calamities are as much geological or meteorological as socio-political (Hough, 2008). For example, a natural catastrophe is a combination or connection of two opposite forces: those processes accountable for vulnerability on the one hand, and physical exposure to a danger on the other. It is the socio-political factors that cause people to be exposed to dangerous natural events. Such factor is the fact that communities live either through their ignorance or own choice, in places identified as susceptible to natural catastrophes (Hough, 2008). Another such factor is the ability or willingness of governments to take measures in order to mitigate the possible human cost of natural events expected to happen. The author provides a table not only to exemplify the awful scale of human casualties that can accumulate from natural events, but also the significance of socio-political components of such catastrophes.

Table 2: The ten worst natural disasters in history, Hough (2008, p.192)

Place	Date	Type	Fatalities
1 Huang Ho River, China	1931	Flood	3.7 million
2 China	1959	Flood	2 million
3 Upper Egypt and Syria	1201	Earthquake	1.1 million
4 Huang Ho River, China	1887	Flood	900,000
5 Shaanxi, Shanxi and Henan, China	1556	Earthquake	830,000
6 Huang Ho River, China	1938	Flood	500,000
7 China	1939	Flood	500,000
8 Bangladesh	1970	Cyclone	300,000
9 Tang-shan, China	1976	Earthquake	242,000
10 Indian Ocean	2004	Tsunami	235,000

Hough (2008, p. 192) on the Huang Ho River in China states the following:

“The Huang Ho and other Chinese rivers are more prone to dramatically bursting their banks than most of the world’s waterways but this has been well known in China for centuries. Overpopulation, poor government and the human propensity to risk residing in such hazardous places for the benefits of farming on the fertile soils deposited by flooding are major contributors to the shocking death-toll that has accumulated over time.”

Table 3: Average annual death-toll by types of natural disaster, 2000-06, Hough (2008, p. 193).

Types of natural disaster	Average annual death-toll
Tsunamis	1, 583
Earthquakes	9, 028
Extreme temperature	277
Floods	207
Windstorms	040
Avalanches/landslides	94
Wildfires	9
Volcanic eruptions	9

Across history, earthquakes and floods have embodied the most significant natural threat to human security; however we witness a shift in the 1990s where windstorms were responsible for more lives (Hough, 2008). As this table illustrates these three types of natural disasters have continually been accountable for thousands of deaths per year in the beginning of the twenty-first century. Two major events elevated the position of these phenomena to higher than ever before: the 2003 European heatwave and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (Hough, 2008).

Population Pressures and Demand for Resources

Michael and Savana (2001) argued that from a geographical viewpoint, it can be admitted that much of the conflicts over land, water and air will mainly occur in or at least originate from developing or LDCs. There are three factual beliefs that support that observation: population pressures, the deterioration of the environment and economic ties to resources. Developing nations account for the highest source of population pressures. Michael and Savana (2001) contended that it is estimated that the global population will average between 8 to 10 billion people something between 2020 and 2050. In spite of difficult conditions in the developing world and high mortality rate, annual population growth rates have more than doubled from less than 1 percent at the first half of the 20th century in 1950 to over 2 percent at the end of the 1990s (Michael and Savana, 2001).

In the 1990s between 80 to 90 percent of the global population growth took place in the developing world, with the highest concentration in their urban areas, with a growth rate of 3, 8 percent or doubling every 18 years. In this perspective, Michael and Savana (2001) pointed out that nowhere in the globe has population pressure had a significant impact on water as it did in the Middle East. Ideological, geographic and religious disputes in this part of the world go together with water-related conflicts. For instance, 97 percent of Egypt's water originates from the Nile River, with 95 percent of the Nile's water runoff coming from outside Egypt. Because the Egyptian population witnesses an alarming growth rate approaching 60 million in the 1990s, that state finds it difficult to sustain its population (Michael and Savana, 2001).

The potential conflict over the Nile's water has been so obvious between Egypt and Sudan, because the Nile enters Egypt from the northern border of Sudan; these both countries signed a treaty in 1959 to mitigate the risk of conflict. It is important to note that none of the other seven countries of the Nile basin signed that treaty (Michael and Savana, 2001). The writers claim that water is an issue accountable for major focus of peace negotiations in the Middle East. Michael and Savana (2001) informed that the 21st century brought about new factual security challenges that had never threatened human security as ever before. One of these new challenges is the problem of population pressures.

Michael and Savana (2001, p. 46) defined population pressure as "the total number of people in the world at any given time". They go on to explain that although the

total number is to be taken seriously, a significant issue is that of the distribution of the total number of the global population over the globe. In this respect, the writers sustained that the vast share of the growth is in the non-European or non-developed regions of the planet. They observed that in 1993, 94 percent of the global population increase happened in the developing world. At the end of the 1990s, 4.3 billion out of the 5.6 billion of the global population lived in the developing nations. Other challenges are entrenched in the age distribution in these countries.

In Central American and African nations, 45 percent of the population is below the age of 15. This figure increased from 47 to 49 in Iran, Iraq and Syria. These populations with a majority of young people are deprived of employment, medical attention, homes or including even clean drinking water, and have intense needs but uncertain future (Michael and Savana, 2001). The authors affirmed that to have a better understanding of the potential problem of population pressures for the future, we just have to make a little historical overview on the issue. A good attempt will be to examine how many years it took in the past to produce the first billion global populations.

For example, Michael and Savana (2001) informed that the first billion people mark was made about 1830. In other words, it took between two to five billion years for humankind to make the one billion mark, as far as reproduction is concerned. Then it took only 100 years for the global population to reach another billion, that is, the two billion mark. Afterwards, the three billion mark was reached only 30 years later in 1960. It dramatically took 15 additional years to make the 4 billion mark in 1975, and the five billion mark was topped in 1987. In the late 1990s, the world's population stabilized at around 5, 6 billion, with an equally stable twelve-monthly global population growth rate of 1.56 percent (Michael and Savana, 2001).

The problem with population pressures is the security problem it poses. In effect, there is a pressure on the resources necessary to sustain life on the globe in the sense that one of the consequences of population pressures is visible in the agricultural sector, therefore food security. As the production of food is being threatened with the ongoing desertification, the loss of fertile land, population pressures will definitely pose a problem of food's sustainability. Another aspect to be taken into account is the economy. As above-mentioned, the countries with the highest population growth rate are developing states. Governments there find it problematic to take care of their populations as life becomes more and more difficult because of the number of people living in their land. Living conditions are difficult as the employment rate is so low; a lot of people, especially

the youths are out of work, this picture mainly happens in Sub-Saharan African states. Other issues to bring to the table are poor healthcare and poor educational opportunities. When people of such states undergo such sufferings, due partially to population pressures, their decision is to migrate to other places such as Europe and North America. What we would like to imply is that another consequence of population pressures is migration.

Now as this chapter is about natural threats to security, we will top the argument of food security as threatening human security. Michael and Savana (2001) showed that with the growth of the population comes the bigger demand on the environment in many respects. In this regard, population pressures are responsible for more demand on the environment for eating, energy and raw materials. Then, we witness the increase of economic activity as the consequence of several people who create outputs that affect forests, provoke soil erosion, air and water pollution and many other environmental aspects (Michael and Savana, 2001).

Every year an area of agricultural land nearly the size of Ireland is gone to various forms of environmental degradation (Michael and Savana, 2001). Another argument the authors provide is that we have more people placing more demands on their local environment and having a significant impact on that environment.

4.2 Water Shortage and Global Water Problems

Michael and Savana (2001) postulated that oil has been for a long time a disastrous factor for conflict everywhere in the world, from court battles over environmental damage to Alaska coastlines to the coalition war led by the United States against Iraq. Despite all its impact over mankind in modern times, oil cannot compare with the influence of one of the most vital renewable resources: water. All across centuries, water has been crucial for the sustainability of civilizations. The first major civilizations of the world ascended from the valleys of the great rivers: the Indus Valley of Pakistan, the Huang He Valley of China, the Nile Valley of Egypt and the Tigris-Euphrates Valley of ancient Mesopotamia (Michael and Savana, 2001). The writers went on to argue that fresh water is a precondition to human security, therefore to human existence; conversely its shortage represents a global proportion problem. Water has been a serious factor of armed conflict across history, and if the global demographic trend does not stabilize, water will become an even greater cause for conflict, particularly in the Middle East (Michael and Savana, 2001).

Although more than 70% of the Earth's surface is enclosed with water, just a few of it is fresh (Michael and Savana, 2001). The total water volume enclosing the Earth is huge – around 1.42 billion cubic kilometers (km³) – but 97% of this total quantity is salt water, which is almost impossible to utilize if we do not take out the salt, an expensive process with highly energy-consumptive (Michael and Savana, 2001). The left over 3% is fresh water, yet less than 1% of that volume of water is freely available as surface water (rivers, lakes and streams) and ground water (aquifers). The rest is unreachable, as it is in polar ice caps, deep aquifers, glaciers and the atmosphere. The quantity of fresh water that is available for Man's use at any given time depends on the quantity of rainwater, the rate of water use and the quality of the available water (Michael and Savana, 2001).

Michael and Savana (2001) informed that rainwater is the source of all fresh water for the reason that it renews and refreshes ground and surface waters – and it is the number one Man's source of fresh water –. Little levels of rainwater jeopardize a number of countries in the world. In this perspective, it is evidenced that at least 80 arid and semiarid states, with nearly 40% of the global population face serious episodic droughts. In Africa, the worst drought of the century occurred sustainably in 1993. Several of the Africa's harvests were entirely destroyed, which raised concerns that, if the situation continued, mass famine would be witnessed as it was the case in Somalia. Consequently, it can be argued that rainwater patterns directly impact the volume of water available in these regions (Michael and Savana, 2001).

The second element that affects the volume of accessible fresh water is the degree at which the water is taken out from its source for industrial, agricultural and domestic usages. About 67% of global water supply is utilized to sustain agrarian production (Michael and Savana, 2001). The writers asserted that in Asia agriculture used 82% of the accessible water, 40% in the United States, and 30% in Europe. These statistics vary depending on the countries. In Egypt, more than 98% of all water used is for the production of crops, while in China and India they used around 90% of their water supply to sustain agriculture. If the trends of population pressures keep increasing, the demand for water to support the production of food will augment as well, therefore putting a further mark on fresh water sources (Michael and Savana, 2001).

Michael and Savana (2001) reported that industry as well uses water in an extensive way. About one-quarter of the global fresh water supply is utilized to sustain electricity production, manufacturing processes, and mining operations. Manufacturing,

as agriculture, uses great volumes of water to produce a finish item. For example, between 7,000 and 34,000 liters of water are needed to produce 1,000 liters of gasoline while between 8,000 and 10,000 are needed to make a single ton of steel. The volume of water utilized for industrial purposes differs according to each state's level of technological development. In Canada, industry represents 84% of all water used; in India it accounts for only 1%. Water is as well used in an extensive way for cooling in nuclear power plants which make electricity as well as in the removal of minerals in mining processes (Michael and Savana, 2001).

As a result, the development of industry has an impact on the quantity of accessible water for other utilizations, as well as agricultural and domestic. The rest of the 8% of the global fresh water supply is utilized for domestic applications. The amount of water utilized day-to-day differs with standard of living, people, customs, education and climate (Michael and Savana, 2001). It is not surprising that industrialized states utilize more water per person than agricultural states. The conclusion is that the way water is used openly impacts the volume of accessible water. Conversely, the quantity of accessible water directly affects the future development of a state (Michael and Savana, 2001).

The third factor impacting the quantity of accessible fresh water is the pollution of water. Agriculture is the major factor of water contaminants such as insect killers – pesticides –, residues and nutrients, as planters can as well intensify crop harvests by the use of pesticides and fertilizers that run off into watercourses or penetrate into ground water. The removal of water via canals for irrigation to sustain agriculture can as well has an impact over the quality of water. Michael and Savana (2001) exemplify it with the Aral Sea, which overlaps the border of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in West-Central Asia. In 1960, the Aral Sea was the number 4 largest inland body of water on the globe. Yet, because of extensive extraction for irrigation for 30 years, the sea has lost 40% of its size and 67% of its quantity. In addition to that, its salinity currently exceeds four times that of oceans (Michael and Savana, 2001).

The authors have just exposed in their book three major factors affecting the quality of water. They have first informed that the quantity of fresh accessible water for Man's use is dependent on precipitations, the quality of available water and the rate of water use. We cannot deny that water is a source of life and that life without water is unthinkable, that is, the end of civilization. Although water can be categorized among the renewable natural resources, nonetheless this does not mean that its shortage is not factual. It is easy to see that if rainfalls which are our main source of drinkable and pure

water fall unregularly, we will find it difficult to support agriculture. We might water crops with stream waters or river water, but if precipitations do not fall periodically, to support our agricultural production will be problematic.

The authors have admitted that another factor affecting the volume of fresh accessible water is the degree at which water is removed from its source for domestic, agricultural and industrial uses. Indeed, we have seen that 67 percent of the global water supply is used for agricultural production. We would like to point out that agriculture itself takes more than a half of the global water supply, this means that if water comes to lack the world will witness unprecedented cataclysmic moments with regard to food security. In this case it can be argued that it is to our own interest that we be careful about the use of water.

Obviously, the shortage of water will automatically impact the lives of people for many reasons. First and foremost, the problem of food security comes on stage. It is admitted that agriculture is the basic sustainer of life on the Earth; if it comes to diminish we might witness widespread famines in the world, which will directly affects human security. Another aspect to be regarded is that although water used for agricultural production might not be drinkable, we need drinkable water to support our day-to-day life. Governments have to conjugate a sustainable effort for water management in order to do everything in their power to avoid its scarcity. We talk about governments because water management is a political problem in a sense that the global political agenda has to get involved in it.

It is not certain that domestic use of water is that affecting water availability in the world. We rather acknowledge that it is the industrial use of water that contributes to its shortage. For instance, the authors have provided some data in this respect when they informed that between 7,000 and 34,000 liters of water are required to produce 1,000 liters of gasoline, meanwhile between 8,000 and 10,000 liters are wanted to produce only a ton of steel. From these figures, we figure out that industrial use of water may be one of the causations of water shortage in the future. The last feature affecting the quantity of fresh available water is water pollution. By the way, the writers argued that agriculture is the number one source for pollutants such as pesticides, nutrients and sediments because farmers enhance crop production thanks to fertilizers and pesticides that percolate into the water located in the ground.

The argument we try to call attention to is that although farmers need to protect their crops through the use of these chemicals, by preventing parasites and insects from

eating their crops, at the same time they participate in water pollution through percolation of these pollutants into ground water. It seems that we are facing a dilemma, we would like to support agricultural production to ensure food security and in the meantime, there is a risk of water pollution as regards ground water. Therefore, should farmers stop using fertilizers when we know that there is a great demand for food production that they have to support?

We are convinced that although it is almost impossible for farmers to stop using fertilizers because they would like to increase crop yields, there is a possibility to limit ground water pollution made possible through the prohibition of pesticides, nutrients and sediments. There should be legal norms to regulate this problem. This is the reasons why we have mentioned that governments have to take action. A possible arguments farmers may bring about to support the use of the above-mentioned pollutants is that their crops might be destroyed by insects that eat them and consequently jeopardize their productivity. Well, in this case governments should subsidize those farmers if such a situation ever occurs. We assert it in so much as insects might not eat crops systematically. This is the efforts both farmers and governments have to make in the purpose to undermine ground water pollution.

Water problems

Falkenmark (1989) described what is known as “water competition intervals”. She contended that states possessing $10,000\text{m}^3$ of accessible water per person annually – for all types of utilizations – or more have what she termed “limited water problems” – that is, problems related to water quality and dry seasons –. She claimed that countries having between $1,670\text{m}^3$ - $10,000\text{m}^3$ of water have “water stress” – general problems –, those having between $1,000\text{m}^3$ - $1,670\text{m}^3$ undergo “chronic water scarcity”, and those having less than 500m^3 of water per person annually are beyond what the author called the “water barrier”, this means that the need for the demand of water surpasses the current water supply. In other words, any economic advancement that would upgrade the living standard of people becomes nearly impossible to achieve (Falkenmark, 1989). She forecasted that 10 African states, having a population of 1.1 billion will be water stressed by 2025, with another 15 states beyond the water barrier.

The figures the author provided are interesting as they display a certain categorization of water availability per person annually. We can see through that hydrologist that we have different levels of water shortage; we first have countries with

“limited water problems”. Then we have countries having “water stress”; others suffer “chronic water scarcity”. The last categories are countries where water availability is very critical, those passing “water barrier”. This analysis on the part of the author displays the reality that all the countries of the world do not suffer the same water problems. In other words, they do not have the same availability of water. We admit that this approach by the author is actually interesting as it gives a notable understanding of water shortage.

Michael and Savana (2001) explained that fresh water availability is limited, and Man’s use of this important resource is not inconsequential for the future. Because of population pressures, there will be a growing competition between countries for a more important share of the accessible water for domestic, agricultural and industrial utilizations. The needs for greater share of the accessible water could unavoidably take us to conflicts solutions (Michael and Savana, 2001). The most factual example in this respect is the Middle East, which undergoes one of the highest rates of population pressures on the global scale. Whether the demand for additional sources of water will end into violent conflicts is dependent on the readiness of states to look for cooperative regional solutions (Michael and Savana, 2001).

After the discussion of this chapter, we are going to the next one about fragmentation. The goal is to understand why the fragmentation regime to international environmental law has been so unproductive. This is why another alternative is envisaged, this one is known as the synergy.

CHAPTER 5: FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SYNERGY

Morgan III (2016) reports that the focus of international environmental law (IEL) is the promotion of the welfare of people and the environment; meanwhile environmental law is very complex in many respects. In effect, though its objective is to make the promotion of cooperation between nations so as to reach joint achievements, IEL disreputably deals with issues separately and deprived of the capacity to treat the constant impulse and attraction between nature and humans (Morgan III, 2016). According to the author, an international agreement helps any number of parties to have talks and reach agreement on any combination of terms and to have interactions on the international arena between national, regional and international parties. Conversely, the interests and joint obligations of these parties differ. Parties can go on creating multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), despite the fact that they contradict, overlap and produce unsatisfactory outcomes (Morgan III, 2016).

The international agreement system has as outcome the proliferation of MEAs, which unavoidably generates fragmented regimes (Morgan III, 2016). According to the writer, fragmentation leads to the confusion of regulated entities and lack of basis and legal order for the global community, which puts at risk the reliability, the credibility and so the authority of international law. Morgan III (2016) argues that while fragmentation is an insistent characteristic of IEL, the harmonization and collaboration measures applied among three conventions that normalize chemicals, termed the *Synergy*, is a pragmatic illustration of how to resolve fragmentation-related problems. When the parties to the Stockholm, Rotterdam and Basel Conventions established the *Synergy*, they avoided creating duplicate institutions. Rather, they embarked on the utmost global treaty merger of the twenty first century by implementing information-sharing measures and enhancing their central administrative relations. The *Synergy* is the foremost illustration of the way to resolve fragmentation problems all through IEL (Morgan III, 2016).

The author informs that the governing body of the *Synergy* is comparable to the governing body of any other MEA since it has a Secretariat and a Conference of the Parties (COP). However, the parties to the *Synergy* did not have to redraft the texts of the three aforementioned chemical conventions for its creation. In its place, the *Synergy* is a combination of the secretariats and the COPs of the three chemical conventions, which for the first time met instantaneously in 2010. Each convention solves different

threats posed by harmful chemicals. The Synergy increases the global efficacy, reduces international expenditures, and offers standards that protect the environment and mankind (Morgan III, 2016). Though the principal emphasis of this chapter is about the way the Synergy overcame the fragmentation problem in chemical regulation, we will as well highlight the fundamental problems fragmentation brings about to IEL. This chapter is also about the different regulations that are performed in order to codify IEL.

5.1 Ad Hoc Approach to the Creation of MEAs and their Outcomes

Morgan III (2016) affirms that IEL has never had the audacity to work out the field and develop a global strategy to address environmental-related problems in a pre-crisis and effective way. Somewhat, IEL originated from an immediate need to address pre-existing and fast undermining environmental degradation. The spread of ad hoc agreements is proliferating. It is acknowledged that countries have negotiated more than 1500 bilateral, 1100 multilateral and 250 other environmental agreements, whose majority being discussed since the year 1960 (Morgan III, 2016). Each of the about 1100 MEAs basically has its individual institutional arrangements, with a secretariat, a COP, technical expert groups and advisory bodies. The administrative processes of the institutional agreements alone take time and manpower to be implemented and carried out (Morgan III, 2016).

It is easy to address international environmental issues with ad hoc arrangements, in so much as each issue only gets the attention of the public only when it enters crisis mode and nations act solely in accordance with public demand (Morgan III, 2016). When nations make ad hoc arrangements about individual issues so as to please the public, they reduce short-term costs (Morgan III, 2016). As parties to MEAs do not normally take into consideration issues in their totality at once, the arrangement method imposes the spread of MEAs and eventually leads to what is known as fragmentation (Morgan III, 2016). Fragmentation of IEL is not fit to the creation of a foundation with which generations to come can successfully resolve international environment-related problems, insofar as it demands to perpetually establish new institutions (Morgan III, 2016).

Fragmentation discourages efforts to put in place international arrangements inasmuch as the provisions of the different MEAs and resolutions of the different environmental processes are often changeable (Morgan III, 2016). Morgan III (2016, p.139) provides the following illustration to prove it:

“For example, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) seeks to promote, enhance, and maintain plant species diversity in forests. But climate change regimes, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol), also consider forests and their role in global warming. To climate change regimes, forests with young trees and other young plant life act as carbon sinks, which have the potential to absorb carbon dioxide throughout their lifetime. On the other hand, while old-growth forests accumulate large amounts of carbon dioxide over time, they eventually disperse carbon back into the atmosphere when they are harvested, burned, or when they die and decompose. Climate change regimes do not seek to maintain a balance between young and old growth forests; instead, they incentivize parties to reduce emissions. The UNFCCC requires its parties to publicly report annual carbon dioxide emissions by sources and carbon dioxide removal by sinks. In addition, the Kyoto Protocol allows its parties to consider carbon sinks to achieve their required emissions reduction targets. The provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and UNFCCC may incentivize their parties to maintain forests of young species, but they enable their parties to take actions that directly contradict the *in situ* protections guaranteed by the CBD.”

The author claims that the present regime of fragmentation has only negative outcomes for the parties that participate in MEAs negotiations. He provides an illustration of nations who might choose not to ratify an MEA – thus escaping entirely the binding nature of an MEA – but still take advantage of the cooperation of other countries that decided to ratify the MEA. The problem in this sense, as the author puts it, is that as it is up to the parties to abide by and enforce the provisions of the MEA on their own, parties to an MEA can use the present fragmentation regime method to benefit from one another. MEAs only bind the countries that have given their plain consent by means of ratification or accession (Morgan III, 2016). In so far as parties are free to reject MEAs’ provisions, it is not easy to truly agree to norms on the international arena. This is why parties are demotivated to comply with MEAs, in so much as the extent to which parties respect the provisions depends in part on the extent to which parties involved think that they are participating in a fair deal (Morgan III, 2016).

Advocates of MEAs argue that the ad hoc approach to IEL is essential to maintaining the sovereignty of state for the reason that the number one decision-body making process within MEAs is the national legislatures of the parties (Morgan III, 2016). However, the problem is that as acknowledged in the case of the United States’ lack of implementation by the Kyoto Protocol, although their argument response method may be the excuse of sovereignty, but at what cost to the environment and to the world

community? The reason for parties to meet for agreements is because they expect a mutual, positive outcome. Unfortunately, when parties have the right to withdraw whenever they want, they weaken one another, make evident unreliability, and definitely raise costs for all involved parties (Morgan III, 2016).

While advocates of MEAs support that the inter-working of global institutions permit flexibility through rapid responses to problems or imminent threats, Morgan III (2016) objects that the growing number of institutional bodies are more likely to duplicate or contradict. In this respect, he argues that COPs represent the major body to the success of a global institution. COPs normally meet once a year to negotiate amending provisions of agreements, adding new terms, or rather establishing completely new agreements. An adoption of a single COP and secretariat in order to see an all field of international issues proves to be more productive than multiple COPs and secretariats for each issue separately (Morgan III, 2016). This is what the writer calls the Synergy.

5.2 The Longstanding Fragmented Chemical Regulation Regime

Morgan III (2016) observes that during decades, global chemical regulation has mainly been submitted to fragmentation for the reason that the regulation is very complex. For instance, the multiple agreement regimes take into consideration all forms of dangerous chemicals and wastes during global trade and other transboundary movements, from their manufacturing to their removal. Although the existing global international chemical agreements were first established with the goal of protecting people and the environment, each agreement was passed to deal with an immediate need or to resolve an impeding problem (Morgan III, 2016). Consequently, they have diverse institutions, and they address their goals in diverse ways. Separately, the major MEAs governing chemicals were an obvious illustration of fragmentation in IEL, but put together they are leading the global community in remedying the issue of fragmentation (Morgan III, 2016).

Morgan III (2016) goes on to contend that at the beginning three major chemical conventions were established individually. The Basel Convention entered into force in 1992, and had the goal to reduce transboundary movements (TBM) of hazardous wastes and ensure environmental sound management (ESM) of hazardous wastes. With the growth of the global economy, TBM of hazardous waste from developed nations to developing countries increased, and developing nations found it difficult to implement ESM practices for the waste they received. Certain parties implemented the Ban

Amendment, an agreement that prohibits exports of TBM of hazardous wastes from developed countries to developing countries and reinforces the original efforts of Basel to put in place ESM to all TBM of hazardous waste (Morgan III, 2016). On the word of the writer, while all the parties of the Basel Convention do not comply with the Ban Amendment, 87 parties have ratified and implemented it.

The second chemical convention is the Rotterdam Convention, which entered into force in 2004. The convention provides an answer to the amplified international trade in hazardous chemicals. It comprises a legally binding Prior Informed Consent (PIC) procedure that permits parties to deny imports of a volatile list of dangerous substances that are prohibited by the Rotterdam Convention or prohibited by individual states (Morgan III, 2016). The third chemical convention in this regard is the Stockholm Convention, which also entered into force in 2004. The convention prohibited the release of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) into the environment. POPs are chemicals that are present in the environment for long periods of time; they accumulate in the greasy tissue of people and in wildlife, proliferate from one crowd to the next. They ultimately create cancers, birth defects, and other health issues in multiple living species (Morgan III, 2016).

Morgan III (2016) contends that the common goal of the three conventions is the protection of the environment and human health from dangerous chemicals. In the meantime, as they were established separately, they forced needless administrative costs on governing institutions and industries that were required to abide by their provisions in so far as three individual bodies supervised global chemical regulation as opposed to one overseeing entity. The three separate conventions demanded secretariats to gather information about dangerous substances and to submit reports to the parties. The separate conventions imposed excessive administrative costs on the parties for the reason that they established three separate databases designated to exchange hazardous chemical information (Morgan III, 2016). Separately, the three individual administrations provoked more resistance than inaction on the part of the global chemical industry. Morgan III (2016) claims that the Synergy solved the problem of fragmentation in chemical regulation, in as much as it combined the purposes of the three secretariats and established a unique clearing-house instrument to provide data storage and the exchange of information compulsory to the three conventions.

5.3 The Synergy Approach to MEAs

Morgan III (2016) explains that while IEL has traditionally been controlled by multiple regulatory bodies, the Synergy establishes that a single regulatory institution has the advantage to successfully put in place MEAs and other global environmental agreements. The Synergy is the highest global coordination and cooperation between the above mentioned three conventions that regulate hazardous substances on an international scale. Around 2002, each of the COPs of the three conventions was in favor of exploring the opportunity of a Synergy, hoping to reduce the excess administrative burdens related to similar exchange of information and reporting requirements between the respective secretariats of the conventions and the parties (Morgan III, 2016). According to the author, took about 10 years for the combination of all of the parties involved, from the initial discussion concerning synergizing to the legal action that consists of combining the three secretariats.

Morgan III (2016) informs that although the terms of the three conventions encompass diverse aspects of chemical regulation, the Synergy makes the promotion of a natural cooperation between them, and regulates hazardous chemicals from their production to their disposal. The Synergy decreases fragmentation by improving the administrative deficits for the parties to the conventions and their individual secretariats. In this respect, it is admitted that the experience with chemical regulation demonstrates that cooperation and coordination between MEAs, in lieu of additional creation of ad hoc agreements, gives the necessary energy to promote global environmental relationships within the 21st century (Morgan III, 2016).

5.4 Creating the Synergy

The creation of the Synergy was a multistep procedure (Morgan III, 2016). In the year 2002, the initial discussion between the parties about the Synergy started directly after the World Summit on Sustainable Development. Then in 2005, the parties to each individual convention opted for the idea of forming the Synergy and requested the three respective secretariats to gather and expose information concerning how a synergy between the three conventions would work. After that first step, in 2006, the parties to each separate convention established the first legal entity of the Synergy, that is, the Ad-hoc Joint Working Group (AHJWG), which comprises 45 representatives of the parties, 15 from each convention (Morgan III, 2016).

Eventually, the recommendations of the AHJWG represent the core of the Synergy's procedure. The AHJWG's recommendations support the criticality of individual COPs, but as well acknowledge the necessity for a new decision-making body by bringing about three extraordinary meetings of the Conferences of the Parties (ExCOPs) to the three initial COPs. The parties of each individual convention adopted the recommendations of AHJWG in 2008 and 2009 through their resolutions on cooperation and coordination on the national, regional and global levels. Basically, the three conventions still function as they did in the past when the Synergy was not yet effective, however the difference is that several of their administrative functions are collective (Morgan III, 2016).

The parties intended to centralize in a sense that in 2011, they created a joint Executive Secretary of the Synergy for a period of two years to be reviewed by the ExCOPs in 2013, and approved resolutions to later develop coordination and cooperation between the parties (Morgan III, 2016). In 2012, the joint Executive Secretary implemented a suggestion for a unique secretariat, which exemplified a transformation from the programmatic structure which is composed of three individual secretariats committed to each respective convention with a joint convention services group to a unique Secretariat. Consequently, the ExCOPs and COPs had meetings repeatedly in 2013, and the COPs only met in 2015. With a unique secretariat to oversee matters with regard to all the three conventions, the Synergy has a central control entrenched in its foundation. The robust foundation joint with centralized control allows the Synergy to work efficiently as a unique and complex decision-making structure.

5.5 The Synergy: the Solution to Fragmentation

First and foremost, the unique secretariat has the best equipment to offer education and information to the parties and additional parties involved in global trade of chemicals (Morgan III, 2016). Second, the clearing-house instrument ameliorates consistency of information consolidation measures, favorable for the transfer of data between the parties and all regulated bodies. Lastly, while the deconstruction of the three secretariats burdened the offices at the beginning, the creation of a single secretariat makes it easy for information flow, which decreases the deficiencies established by fragmentation regimes (Morgan III, 2016).

Before the Synergy, the three conventions did not synchronize attempts or try to form a common strategy for public awareness and outreach (Morgan III, 2016). However,

with a single secretariat there is a collective approach to inform parties about chemicals and the impact of their releases on the environment and human health. With one secretariat it is possible to maintain records that were formerly held by the three secretariats and the same is capable of providing information sticking to these records. The central control of a unique secretariat has the best equipment to draw conclusions from the data it accumulates and determines how to make available such data to the parties, for the reason that it has access to all relevant information and is not limited to a certain framework (Morgan III, 2016).

Another argument the author brings about is that the establishment of a unique secretariat finally lessens the fragmentation effects by providing the exchange of pertinent data in the middle of technical and scientific bodies of the three conventions thanks to the sharing of information with one another, and with other pertinent international institutions. The Synergy is the combination of the information exchange requirements of each convention into a unique multi-shareholder instrument that associates available resources concerning the three conventions, enables sharing of information about the practices of good management between the parties, and definitely facilitates the transfer of knowledge or expertise (Morgan III, 2016).

Partial Conclusion

This section has been about a number of issues vis-à-vis the environment. We have attempted to deconstruct the concept of security from its traditional understanding. In effect, we have seen that traditionally security issues were only confined to the military. The problem is that conceptualizing security this way is outdated. Of course the military is still a very significant facet of security and it will still be, but security has to be about protecting one's population from any sort of hazard. The police or the military can do nothing about POPs releases in the atmosphere.

In this part, we have seen three chapters. The first chapter is Environmental Threats to Human Security. In that chapter we have studied the question related to the rise of environmental issues in international politics. We have seen that the environment is a recent issue in global politics and only dates from the 1960s in the United States thanks to the book Silent Spring by Rachel Carson, which depicted the effects of the insecticide dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) on vegetation, rivers and animals. We have also assessed environmental security.

The second chapter is Natural Threats to Human Security. In this chapter, we have seen natural catastrophes and populations demand for water. We have provided many data about the number of dead casualties natural disasters can claim to have provoked. We have analyzed the connection between water shortage and conflict around the world. Obviously, water is a renewable natural resource, the question is: is that water equally distributed on the globe? We have examined the problem of population pressures. As we witness an amplified increase of the global population, this will and is already having an impact on food security because more people means more demand on the environment, and therefore more need for natural resources.

The third and last chapter of this section is about environmental law: Fragmentation of International Environmental Law and the Synergy. We have scrutinized what the ad hoc approach to the creation of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and the outcome of ad hoc agreements cause to global environmental law. In the regulation of environmental law, parties have been working individually on issues regarding environmental security. This way of working in isolation is called fragmentation. In other words, IEL has traditionally been fragmented with MEAs regimes. We have seen three conventions on chemical regulation regime: the Basel Convention, which entered in force in 1992, the Rotterdam Convention, which entered in force in 2004 and the

Stockholm Convention which also entered in force in 2004. The three conventions are an obvious illustration of fragmentation regime for the reasons that each had its own secretariat and this proved to be very expensive because of administrative costs.

This is why we have provided another alternative from our findings. That alternative is the Synergy. The Synergy is another way to conceptualize international environmental law. Through the Synergy the parties to the three conventions decided to create a single secretariat that will coordinate every data transfer and provide information to the parties. The Synergy represents a single entity that helps reduce administrative costs and is responsible for dealing with one single issue in its entirety during a single conference of the parties (COPs), rather than dealing with different issues in the ad hoc agreement regimes.

PART III: SECURITY THREATS TO STATES AND REGIONAL SECURITY

Partial Introduction

Abstract:

“Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence. Quite where this range of concerns ceases to merit the urgency of the “security” label (which identifies threats as significant enough to warrant emergency action and exceptional measures including the use of force) and becomes part of everyday uncertainties of life is one of the difficulties of the concept’– “

Buzan’s definition of security from his article “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century” in *International Affairs*, 67.3 (1991), pp. 432-433.

In this section, we deepen the concept of security; we explain how multidimensional the concept of security is. It is in that perspective that Buzan (1991) talked about the five sectors defining security, which are political, military, economic, societal and environmental. As Buzan pointed out, the five fields of security do not work in isolation from one another. Each addresses a specific domain comprised within a security problématique, but all of them are intertwined together with a strong connection. According to Buzan (1991), the most obvious threat that seems to present the major concern of security in many respects is the military dimension of security, because military threats can have impacts on all elements of the state on many grounds. Arguably, it puts in question the very simple duty of a state to ensure protection to its nationals. The military dimension of security can as well have a hostile effect on the layers of individual and societal levels. This security sector is particular since its objectives can have diverse levels of significance, and another thing is that it involves the employment of force (Buzan, 1991).

Buzan (1991) observed that political threats also symbolize a permanent concern for a country. But their peculiarity is that they can actually be more ambiguous and not easy to identify compared to military threats. Because a state itself is a political institution, a political threat with the purpose of making vulnerable that institution can be compared to a military threat (Buzan, 1991). Political threats can take the form of ideological competitions, or an attack to the state itself. The military and political fields of security that Buzan (1991) identified are followed by the economic, societal and

environmental fields of security. Buzan (1991) explained that societal security for example is certainly the most intriguing of the five sectors of security. He stated that this field of security deals with identity and culture and is intertwined with the political and military fields of security. Non-political viable states are not well equipped to deal with differences in culture and identity. It is documented that the majority of violent conflicts are those that have a societal component (Buzan, 1991). The writer also acknowledged that the concept of societal security is not easy to deal with, for the reason that it takes into consideration identities and cultures. It is a field that is basically subjective and has to do with contextual constructions. It can lead to politics of social exclusion and discrimination (Buzan, 1991).

The beginning of this partial introduction is an additional effort to provide a definition to security. By exploring the way Buzan analyzed the different sectors involved in addressing security, we want to give our readers the focus this chapter will be about. The economic field of security is to be taken seriously because it has to do with a state's ability to create wealth, to make the production of goods and services. This is an interesting field of security because it is admitted that what a state produces affects by whatever way the lives of its citizens. All things considered, economic security has something to do with the capacity of people to have good jobs, have a proper healthcare system, access to education, to water and electricity. This field of security is the core of all societal life. This is why we as well consider that it is closely linked to societal security Buzan developed in his article "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century".

Of course, we will not comment anything about the environmental field of security because we have already dealt with it in our previous section. Political security is important because it is connected to social stability. The political and military sectors of security are interrelated because a state has to be militarily viable in ensuring its sovereignty on its territory, and its capacity to ensure its authority over its citizens. For instance, if a rebellion ever breaks out, a state has to be capable to contain it by coercion, therefore ensuring its authority. So there is no doubt that the concept of security is multidimensional as aforesaid.

In this third section, we deal with four chapters: (I) Securitization, (II) Military Threats to Security from States, (III) Nonviable States, a Major Root for Conflict Today and (IV) Regional Security.

CHAPTER 6: SECURITIZATION

Hough (2008) observes that defining an issue as a pertaining to security is not just a theoretical matter but it takes into account real world meaning. The traditional Realist way of conceptualizing security assumes that military issues – and some economic issues for Neo-realists – are issues of security and as such they must be the priorities of governments above other *low politics* issues. For Hough (2008), governments do have the tendency to be Realist in their foreign policies and this high or low politics distinction is visible at the level of the expenditure states allocate to the achievement of military security as opposed to other issue domains. An example in this respect is the government of South Africa which increased its allocation of the state exchequer for the fight against AIDS during the period 2002-03 to \$1 billion from prior financial year. This was a major response the government provided to criticism because it had not done enough to curb that threat which devastated the lives of numerous of South Africans. In the meantime, we need to contextualize things because in the same period, the government expenditure for the military defense was \$21 billion. It is unrealistic for many South Africans to consider any invasion from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and other states to be more threatening than AIDS (Hough, 2008).

A remarkable argument in this regard is what Dorrington et al. (2002) stated. They asserted that about 5 million people in South Africa – 11 per cent of the population – are infected with HIV, and AIDS is the country's number one killer. AIDS killed about 40 per cent of all deaths in the year 2002. The problem is that it is not understandable as to why South Africa allocates such huge expenditure for the military defense when it has no evident external military threat (Hough, 2008). Ammann and Nogueira (2002) observed that serious comparisons between government expenses on diverse sectors are problematic because diverse policy ends cost different sum of money. Similarly, it can be admitted that South Africa's lack of military enemies is measure of the success of its military defense policy. Even if it this argument were to be acknowledged, the threat of AIDS in South Africa is permanent and therefore remains severe (Ammann and Nogueira, 2002). For the writers, there is no doubt that the government could make more efforts to eradicate the problem. They provide the example of Uganda, a relatively poor country in comparison to South Africa, which curbed HIV prevalence by half at the end of the 1990s by means of a rigorous public information crusade.

Hough (2008, p. 16) summarizes what securitization is as regard the following table that compares the causes of deaths in the world to the nature of deaths. He contends that in considering the figures of the table, a few qualifications need to be taken into account. He asserts that it is natural to die of ill-health because we will definitely die anyhow. Conversely, 32.5 percent of all deaths are accountable for communicable diseases which cannot be considered as unavoidable, the majority of individuals who die as a result of non-communicable diseases die precipitately from diseases like cancer that are at least in part, preventable.

Table 1: Causes of death in the world in 2001 (%)

Causes	Percentage (%)
Diseases	91
Miscellaneous accidents	4.1
Road traffic accidents	2.1
Suicide	1.5
Homicide	0.9
Collective violence	0.4
Natural disasters	0.05

Hough (2008) defines collective violence as wars and all organized assassinations with transnational war, political massacre (e.g. genocide), civil war, non-state violence (e.g. terrorism) and gang crime. He argues that out of the security threats in the world, it is documented that the ordinary citizen of the planet is least threatened by military action from a foreign non-state actor or from another state. He supports that the threats are unavoidably familiar and close to home. Security wideners, together with some Realists admit that issues that are not military can become securitized and therefore be prioritized within the national security status (Hough, 2008). It is important to explain that at the same time, the securitized issues in this respect are indiscriminately defined. On the one hand, the tendency of governments has been to select issues that are not military wherein military forces can help manage (Hough, 2008). The writer exemplifies it with issues such as fighting drug barons abroad or assistance in civil emergency operations. On the other hand, securitization has from time to time been associated with external non-military issues on the ground that they have domestic military impacts (Hough, 2008).

From this perspective, contemporary post-conflict nation-building exercises in Iraq, Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia have been remarkable for a militarization of development projects, with continuing armed forces being set out to reconstruction tasks

and gaining the approval of the natives (Hough, 2008). While such humanitarian activities may have some benefits for the locals, they are also definitely conducted by army expediency in lieu of human security. Because of this military expediency, pressure groups such Médecins Sans Frontière pulled out of Afghanistan in 2004 with its President, Dr. Rowan Gillies, Hough (2008, p. 17) quotes him: “we refuse to accept a vision of a future where civilians trapped in the hell of war can only receive life-saving aid from the armies that wage it”. The concept of security is subjective in that the security of governments does not compare to the security of the people they rule and represent (Hough, 2008). This truth has previously been recognized by governments as they sanctioned the development of global human rights law and this is as well obvious with the widespread persistence of hunger and treatable diseases in a world with enough food and medicine to eradicate them (Hough, 2008).

Let us examine table 2 by Hough (2008, p. 18).

Table 2: Security threats

Threats	The threatened			
Individuals	Individuals	Individuals	Individuals	Individuals
Societal groups	Societal groups	Societal groups	Societal groups	Societal groups
Government	Government	Government	Government	Government
Global	Global	Global	Global	Global
Non-human	Non-human	Non-human	Non-human	Non-human

6.1 The Concept of Security

Attempting to define security has to take many things into consideration. We can refer to the security of people, the security of citizens of a given state from any foreign invasion by a military force. We can also talk about the security of governments that can be threatened by economic sanctions for example. We can talk about security when a particular disease is threatening people – the case of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Africa – . Security has also to do with hunger, economic opportunities because most of the corrupt governments of the world, mostly in Africa do not give an equitable national income distribution to their populations; they do not enhance policies to foment job creations by reducing unemployment. This is to argue that the concept of security is multifaceted. We can extend the concept of security to any threat to the welfare of people around the world. The study of security in an international context is a sub-discipline of the multidiscipline area of IR (Hough, 2008). IR is the study of all political relations

between international actors, including states (represented by governments), international organizations (either non-governmental or intergovernmental), (Hough, 2008).

We would like to point out that IR were by tradition confined to interactions between states, because the nation-state is the major subject of IR. But things changed after WW II, with the creation of the United Nations including its different agencies. From that moment IR were not only confined to interactions between states, but also between states and international organizations because of their proliferation after 1945. It is important to note that traditionally the study of IR between states were limited to military issues and they were more statist and were about political power. Hough has failed to provide the latter mentioned details. Another argument Hough has not succeeded to provide is that IR are also relations between multinational corporations and states, in this case interactions have nothing to do with the military.

A concern Hough (2008) brings about is whether the studies of security should keep their traditional focus on military threats to the security of states or enlarge their emphasis to other fields. Table 3 provides the extension of the security concept Hough (2008, p. 10) examines.

Table 3: Single biggest fears for Africans (%)

Economic insecurity	37
Disease	21
Corruption	7
Illiteracy	6
War	6
Political conflict	5
Environmental destruction	3

Based on BBC World Service poll of 7671 people from Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Malawi, Zambia, Rwanda and Ivory Coast. The top fear in the table conflated from the poll's categories of 'poverty' (24%), 'unemployment' (10%) and 'poor economic development' (3%). The second fear of the table collates HIV/AIDS (14%) and poor health (7%).

6.2 Broad and Restricted Conceptualization of Security

We would like to point out that deepening the concept of security is about including the above-mentioned non-military approaches to security studies. From that perspective, we can consider what Ullman (1983, p. 133) suggested as keys to identify a threat to security. He said that a threat to security is:

“an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to a government of a state, or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.”

Of course this conception of security cannot be accepted by traditional Realists who confine security studies only to military force for the reason that they believed as Hough (2008) has argued, widening the concept of security will render it redundant by making it too all-inclusive and weaken the significant task of analyzing military threats and interstate conflict. Even if military threats to security are more evident than ever before in the 21st century, and possibly even more apparent than during the Cold War, deepeners and wideners of security studies claim that they are not the unique threats that states, people and the entire world are facing (Hough, 2008).

The deepeners and wideners of security pretend that during the course of history people have been destroyed by things other than armed forces and weaponries, and states have been devastated or destabilized by things different than armed conflict (Hough, 2008). In this sense, the security repercussions for states and population pressures and the depletion of resources needed to be regarded together with military threats from other states (Ullman, 1983). This statement by Ullman should be considered here because these threats can jeopardize life alongside military threats from states in that they all contribute to destabilize not only the security of governments, but also that of the people they rule. These threats ultimately jeopardize human security.

In fact, we can perceive that Ullman is an obvious example of wideners who understand that limiting security studies to the analysis of military threat or force is simply non-operational. Wideners of security studies embrace the human security concept and contend that the major referent object of security ought not to be the state or some sub-state groups, but the people of which these bodies/groups are composed of (Hough, 2008). This argument sustains that security is first a matter of people and what affects individual people. Other deepeners, Buzan et al. (1998) indicated that vulnerability and threats can appear in many diverse fields, military and nonmilitary, but to be considered

as issues of security they have to meet rigorously defined criteria that distinguish them from the normal conduct of the purely political statist vision of security studies.

What comes out from this argument is that the traditional conceptualization of security studies has obviously to be widened. Of course, we admit that no theory of IR has to be neglected. No theory is more important than another. From realism, constructivism, Marxism, structuralism, neorealism, socialism, to current theories of IR, all are exploitable. It is manifest that it is the Realist theory that has been dominant in the study of IR, with regard to many fields, ranging from geopolitics, armament, conflict resolution, and peace studies etc. to military strategies.

We have argued that conceptualizing the conduct of IR to the unique concept of power made possible through military force is outdated. We do not mean that the military is not an important aspect of security studies or that it has not to be regarded as important as to be included in the national security concept. The point is that restricting security studies uniquely to military forces is to have limited vision of security. It is in this respect that the concept of security has been widened by some internationalists such as Ullman and Buzan to make states reflect on other issues that can affect as well their security and can possibly be securitized and considered as to be part of national security. This is where the great debate between the Realists and other internationalists lie in.

All things considered, states have issues other than military that threatened their security as exemplified by Ullman who talked about environmental degradation, resource depletion and demographic pressures that were beginning to threaten both the security of people and governments. Today we cannot deny how dangerous environmental threats to security are glaring, proving that if nothing is done accordingly, life will be jeopardized. Widening security is allocating more money to combat AIDS. To simply look at this threat to human security is crucial because this disease does not spare the rich and only go to the poor's place. It can reach any body. What we would like to imply here is that although the military defense is about the national security interest, health issues have to be categorized in the same status for the reasons that as any foreign invasion from an military force can undermine life, in the same way serious health issues can be responsible for the destruction and therefore the degradation of life within states.

6.3 The Expanding of Security

Hough (2008) acknowledges that although the real concern that expanding the emphasis of security studies must not distract attention from military threats has some legitimacy, the intellectual rationale for preserving a restrictive focus is weak. Obviously, new issues need to be included among security threats. Hough (2008, p.9) quotes Wirtz, who argued in his book A New Agenda for Security Strategy? that global warming must be securitized when contending that “It is not exactly clear . . . how military forces can help reduce the build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere”. Wirtz has a point there! In effect, it is not documented that weapons ever did anything to mitigate global warming, or any other forms of environmental degradation.

It is admitted that arms cannot solve any single security issue. Military forces cannot mitigate the spread of AIDS; there is absolutely nothing they can do about it. We consider that extending the definition of security would be of a good help here. As Hough (2008) puts it, defining a problem as to be part of security on the ground of whether it implies military forces deprives the concept of any real meaning. Security is a human condition and defining it purely on the basis of state institutions whose end is to help secure their state and people in some dimension, rather than the people whose security is at risk, is both abnormal and irrational (Hough, 2008). A security problem is surely a problem which jeopardizes (or seems to jeopardize) one’s security.

If people, be they government ministers or private individuals, perceive a problem to threaten their lives in some manner and give a political response to this, then that problem must be considered as an issue of security (Hough, 2008). Understanding security this way is to adopt the human security framework of security. And so security is a social concept. This conceptualization of security is appropriate through opinion polls in a sense that individual people think of their security in different ways today than they did in the course of the Cold War (see table 4). It is as well noticeable in many ways that the global political agenda has enlarged its priorities of security issues since 1990. In fact, governments have now tended to give more priorities to problems such as environmental security, drugs and public health (Hough, 2008). According to the author, even explicitly military institutions, such NATO are focusing increasingly on non-military issues.

Table 4: Single biggest fears in the world (%), Hough (2008, p.10).

Crime	27
Terrorism	15
Health/ economic insecurity	13
Accidents/ natural disasters	12
War	8

Based on a survey of 6043 people in 11 countries: Brazil, Canada, France, India, Japan, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, UK, US. They were requested to name the single greatest threat to their life.

Source: Human Security Centre (2005: 50–53).

A thought-provoking question would be: who is securing whom?

Before providing an answer to this question it would be appropriate to make a little overview of the dominant political concept of IR, in its sub-discipline security studies. Hough (2008) observes that IR and the field of security studies originated in the 1930s, a period dominated by unprecedented military threats. We can thus understand why traditionalist Realists limit the security studies to power and object to widen them, it is simply because security was basically confined in the sphere of power made possible through the authority of the state in the first part of the 20th century (Hough, 2008). Realism was ascending at the end of WW II because the use of force had proved to be fruitful in mitigating aggression and reestablishing order in Asia and Europe (Hough, 2008). As a result, pre-World War II global cooperation, considering the League of Nations and softly-softly appeasement mediation vis-à-vis aggressors proved systematically unsuccessful to maintain peace.

The total war of WW II and the permanent threat during the Cold War, wherein entire populations were being endangered by the quarrels states had in an unprecedented way, linked the fate of individuals together with their governments as never before (Hough, 2008). Other concepts in security studies Hough (2008) brings about are the so-called twin concepts “national interest” and “national security” in the 1940s. Hough (2008, p.11) quotes Lippmann who said “a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war”.

The new pre-eminence of the United States and readiness to act on the international arena in 1945 was another factor vital to promote that approach. The US government found itself in a position of unprecedented international dominance and

forced to use its power in a way that it had never done in the past. When the government of the United States uses the prefix “national” in a political discourse, it is always a means to persuade its citizens to gather behind the government, and gain legality for a possibly controversial policy and wants them united and on board to support it, (Hough, 2008). To answer the aforementioned question, we would say that the state as Hough (2008) puts it, takes the responsibility to protect its citizens and requires their loyalty in return. This is the Realist approach of IR that sustains that the state is critical to securing the lives of its citizens. The conceptualization of IR, such as the conduct of IR, was very much frozen in time between 1945 and 1990 (see table 5).

Table 5: Narrow, wide and deep conceptions of security, Hough (2008, p.12).

Referent object of security	Types of issues		
	Military	Non-military	
	Using military means		Unsolvable by military
State	Narrow	Wide	
Non-state actor			Copenhagen School
Individual			Human Security

CHAPTER 7: MILITARY THREATS TO SECURITY FROM STATES

War between nations has always been central to the study of IR and largely as an unavoidable characteristic of nation-nation relations (Hough, 2008). This is logical as this form of conflict has historically been so dominant and so costly regarding the dead victims of war. The Realist model of influential nations competing for hegemony seems to be responsible for the scale and nature of the most important conflicts in history (Hough, 2008). The majority of wars listed in table 6 were clashes of the Titans which involved the world's number one military powers. The four major clashes had an accelerated impact on IR above their immediate governmental and human effect in the nations directly concerned relations (Hough, 2008). What distinguishes these conflicts with the Cold War is that, the latter would end with a peaceful transition to a new order, in lieu of military victory, which helped challenge the preeminence of Realism in the study of military power (Hough, 2008).

Table 6: The ten bloodiest inter-state wars in history, Hough (2008, p.25).

War	Years	Deaths
1. Second World War	1939-45	20,000,000
2. First World War	1914-18	8,500,000
3. Third Years War	1618-48	2,071,000
4. Napoleonic War	1803-15	1,869,000
5. War of the Spanish Succession	1701-13	1,324,300
6. Korean War	1950-53	1,200,000
7. Vietnam War	1965-73	1,200,000
8. The Crusades	1095-1272	1,000,000
9. Iran-Iraq War	1980-88	850,000
10. Seven Years War	1755-63	500,000

7.1 Ideological Geopolitics (the Cold War) and the New World Order

Agnew and Corbridge (1995) provided three diverse geopolitical orders: the British geopolitical order (1815-1875), the geopolitical order of inter-imperialist rivalry (1875-1945) and the Cold War geopolitical order (1945-1990).

Let us see together table 7 that best explains these geopolitical orders, taken in the book of Ó Tuathail and Dalby (1998, p.19).

Table 7: Modern geopolitics (after Agnew 1998; Agnew and Corbridge 1995).

Spatial practices	Representation of space
Geopolitical Order	Geopolitical Discourse
British Geopolitical order, 1815-1875	Civilizational Geopolitics
Inter-Imperial Rivalry, 1875-1945	Naturalized Geopolitics
Cold War Geopolitics Order, 1945-1990	Ideological Geopolitics
Transnational Liberalism, 1991-?	Enlargement Geopolitics

This table is illustrative of the different phases of geopolitics throughout history as proposed by Agnew and Corbridge.

Ideological geopolitics or the Cold War has to do with the tensions that erupted between the United States and the Soviet Union right after WW II. This is also what we call Cold War geopolitics. Ó Tuathail et al. (1998) explained that issues of geography were greatly in actuality during the Cold War, and got ground between the United States and the Soviet Union after WW II. They argued that from 1945 onwards, the states of Eastern Europe had fallen under the domination of the Soviet Union. The regime of Stalin was both a bureaucracy and dictatorship that had the determination to build a security sphere for itself in the purpose to impede another possible attack against its territory by potential western powers (Ó Tuathail et al., 1998). Approximately, 20 million Russians died defending their country against Hitler's invasion. The United States had a different experience of WW II because its population did not suffer the damage and the devastation of the war, such as mass murder as experienced in Europe, Asia and North Africa (Ó Tuathail et al., 1998).

At the end of the war, the most important rivals of America were in ruins, and America was the unique superpower of the world, a nation with extravagant self-confidence in its traditions and standards. The writers claimed that at the end of the war, the United States were unfortunately led by a president with no experience – Harry Truman who all of a sudden had the atomic bomb at his command, a very powerful weapon – find it difficult to view the world beyond its standards of democracy and capitalism. America, as previous world powers before it, did not resist to the temptation of claiming that its standards were universal standards of all (Ó Tuathail et al., 1998). Accordingly, a rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was probably unavoidable (Ó Tuathail et al., 1998).

Some in the Truman administration were in favor of diplomacy and envisaged a certain usage of *realpolitik* regarding Stalin. However, Ó Tuathail et al. (1998) pointed out that others supported the view that the Soviet Union had to be considered as a fundamentally imperialist power. This view of the Soviet Union was designed by the United States' chargé d'affaires in Moscow, George Kennan. Kennan wrote an 8,000 word report in February 1946, a communiqué that he sent to Washington, later known as the Long Telegram. In it, he explicated his understanding of the Soviet Union, as a geographically and historically power that had the determination to unfold the need to continually enlarge its territory (Ó Tuathail et al., 1998). According to Kennan, this was the principle of the Soviet Union and nothing could stop this geopolitical thinking and therefore the United States had not to make any compromise or come into contact with the Soviet Union. Many in the Truman administration welcomed Kennan's view of the Soviet Union, and therefore promoted it. As a result, the Truman administration's behavior towards the Soviet Union became hostile because the Soviet Union planned to interfere in the political affairs of numerous Eastern European countries to its personal benefit (Ó Tuathail et al., 1998).

Kennan was recalled to Washington in order to manage a new Policy Planning concerned with the "national security state" the US government designed at this stage of US-Soviet relationships. Understanding the Cold War is to understand the tensions that erupted right after the end of WW II in a sense that the Soviet Union became very aggressive towards western countries because of the military aggression undertaken by Germany. The Stalinist government took all the necessary measures to avoid any substantial invasion by western countries. Stalin distrusted the west in general, and particularly the United States (Ó Tuathail et al., 1998). How was the soviet geopolitical ideology manifest? We can first notice that the Soviet Union would manipulate internal political affairs of the countries of Eastern Europe for its own advantage. The second thing is that the Soviet Union, having supremacy over these satellite states could naturally impose its political ideology – communism –. In other words, the Soviet Union represented a hegemon – dominant state – over its satellite (Ó Tuathail et al., 1998).

We consider that the soviet geopolitics had also to deal with the extension of the soviet territory, in the very purpose to protect itself against any further aggression from the West. This subsequently clearly meant that the physical size of the Soviet Union was actually huge. The problem is that the soviet geopolitics did not respect the sovereignty of these eastern European countries but would impose its ideology there. This is where

the tensions would rise up between the United States and the Soviet Union. Something is to be taken seriously; it is the change of attitude of America towards the Soviet Union. America at the end of WW II would be willing to engage its relationships with the Soviet Union on the basis of diplomacy and realpolitik. But the communiqué delivered by Kennan was really responsible for America to wake up regarding the soviet politics. The battle is ideological; this is why we talk about ideological geopolitics because both super powers wanted to impose their ideals to the rest of the world in a world that became bipolar. The battle of ideology would extend to the third world as the United States would advocate that democracy and capitalism are the best standards of living. However, the Soviet Union would accuse America of imperialism.

A way for the United States to impose itself was the economic aid it provided to western European countries – the Marshall Plan – that helped to reconstruct the devastated countries of western Europe. The Marshall Plan was a way for America to control Europe, not by imposing capitalism, but by promoting it diplomatically while the Soviet Union would impose communism without the consent of its satellite states. As the clash continued in the third world, both super powers would support governments that would accept their ideologies.

We are going to examine the summary of the Cold War with table 8 by Hough (2008, p.28-29).

Table 8: Phases of the Cold War

1945-49	Onset	The Cold War could be said to have begun with the declaration of the Truman doctrine in 1947 but hostilities in US–USSR relations can be traced back to the closing stages of the Second World War and even before.
1949-53	Confrontation	In 1949 the USSR developed the atomic bomb and NATO was formed, setting the parameters for two armed camps and a massive arms buildup. The Berlin blockade brought the two sides near to war when the USSR challenged the US–UK–French control of East Berlin. China underwent Communist revolution in 1949 and the following year fought with the North Koreans against the USA and her allies.
1953-62	Slight thaw	The death of Stalin and ending of the Korean War (in stalemate) in 1953 heralded a lessening of tension. The 1955 Geneva Summit was the first attempt at Arms Control talks between the USA and USSR. Confrontation was not ended however; the Warsaw Pact was formed in 1955 by the USSR

		as an East European military alliance to rival NATO, and the USA and USSR came as close as they ever did to war in 1962 with the Cuban Missile Crisis when the USSR attempted to station warheads on the island.
1963-69	Coexistence	The Cuban missile crisis was resolved with a deal whereby the USA removed missiles from Turkey in exchange for USSR not stationing weapons on Cuba. The very real possibility of nuclear war in 1962 prompted improved dialogue between the two superpowers. Arms Control agreements were initiated and the logic of deterrence set into US–Soviet relations with both sides recognizing the other’s right to parity in military terms as a means of guaranteeing peace through the <i>balance of terror</i> .
1969-79	Détente	A major improvement in relations between the USA and USSR occurred following the accession of Nixon as US President. Extensive Bilateral Arms Control deals were agreed and the 1975 Helsinki Accords saw the East and West blocs agree on various forms of political cooperation. The USA recognized Communist China for the first time in 1979.
1979-85	Confrontation: Second Cold War 1979-90	The USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 ended détente. The USA did not consider this a tolerable incursion into a country in the Soviet sphere of influence and a period of renewed intense antagonism between East and West occurred. President Reagan increased military expenditure, abandoned Arms Control agreements and cut many economic links with what he termed ‘the evil empire’.
1985-90	Ending of the Cold War	Reagan’s aggression succeeded in upping the ante to a point the Cold War USSR could not match, particularly with the ‘Star Wars’ Space Defense Initiative (SDI). Gorbachev came to power in the USSR in 1985 and, in order to save his country from economic ruin, embarked on a policy of <i>rapprochement</i> with the West, pulling out of Afghanistan and signalling a withdrawal from East Europe. Gorbachev and US President Bush declared the Cold War to be over at the 1989 Malta Summit as Communist government fell in the six countries of the Eastern Bloc. A 1990 Paris Treaty officially ended the 45-year power struggle

The New World Order

Geopolitics after the Cold War was in reality a new form of geopolitics when there were concerns about the ends of that discipline within IR. In effect, at the end of the Cold War, the U.S. became the only superpower with no rival; as a result American politicians and statecrafts started to think about other politically accepted reasons to justify their new geopolitical orientation. Ó Tuathail et al. (1998) contended that in 1989 while the Berlin wall was destroyed, communist regimes in Eastern Europe were undergoing revolutions that brought them to collapse. Then in 1992, the Soviet Union disappeared as an empire. The Cold War ended as one of the competing superpowers fell down owing to the conflicts experienced by its bloc. Whilst the disintegration of the Soviet Union was becoming a reality, the United States – representing the western bloc – continued to be unchanged and in place empire (Ó Tuathail et al., 1998).

However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union was responsible for a severe crisis in the world politics because the political thinking that characterized the geopolitical ideologies of the Cold War since 1947 – global spatial strategy for intellectuals and statecrafts of geopolitics – were no longer relevant. Accordingly, the official *raison d'être* of the western geopolitics disappeared because of the collapse of the soviet empire (Ó Tuathail et al., 1998). For example, the once unchallenged institutions – the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the pentagon and a lot of geopolitical statecrafts – and other military structures that had substantially depended on the Cold War for a longtime, were then unexpectedly regarded as bureaucracies designed on overestimation. Therefore, the authors explained that the United States had to invent a new geopolitical thought – a new legitimation – that would justify its foreign policy. Subsequently, President Bush father administration talked about words like “uncertainty”, “unpredictability”, “instability” and “chaos” as the new dangers to national security.

As a response to the Iraqi invasion of the small state of Kuwait, President Bush had a legitimation and a justification to define what he called a “new world order” with the United States at its core, with the only responsibility “to do the hard work” of bringing freedom to the rest of the world” empire (Ó Tuathail et al., 1998). Another legitimation for the western world geopolitics and particularly America is the so-called New “Rogue-State Doctrine”. The rogue-states are states which are considered as major threats to the United States and the western national security empire (Ó Tuathail et al., 1998). This is another philosophy to justify the western practice of geopolitics after the Cold War. This

new political thinking arose as Iran was regarded as a potential nuclear world power. The rogue-states at the time included Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria and North Korea and had had a predominant antagonist image in Washington. The rogue-state doctrine enjoyed a great support from both political parties in Congress (Ó Tuathail et al., 1998).

This section reveals what had come after the Cold War was over. The U.S. was not prepared for the end of the Cold War, because it had been living in a geopolitical context of competition with a range of participants: the pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), intellectuals, policymakers and numerous think-tanks. All these institutions were soon of no relevance at the end of the Cold War because the public opinion in the U.S. started to question them and regarded them as too bureaucratic. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union as an imperial structure, the United States had found it difficult to adapt to that new geopolitical context of international affairs. For that reason, it had to think of new motives that could give its foreign policy a certain legitimation. The Kuwait invasion by Iraq was a great opportunity to rationalize that new policy, known as the new world order, in which President Bush portrayed America as to be the main nation to assure the security of the world. It can be argued that American intervention to protect Kuwait against its aggressor was highly perceived by the rest of the world as a humanistic act on the part of Washington since it portrayed the role of a defender.

7.2 Collective Security

The optimism created by the end of the Cold War soon seemed to have some foundation when two previous major protagonists were capable to agree to sanction UN-supported military action against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (Hough, 2008). In achieving this agreement the two major powers of the world were triggering a longtime-cherished dream which had not only appeared unrealistic during the Cold War, but had never occurred all along history. Under collective security, acts of aggression provoke collective reactions against the aggressors by the entire global community, in lieu of just by the state being attacked and its allies or other nations who believe their interests to be affected by the aggression (Hough, 2008). At the same time the writer states that it is important to note that it was not until the League of Nations that the idea of collective security was put in place. The League preserved collective security in tis Charter, affirming in Article 16 that a nation provoking war declared unjust by its member-states would be, indeed, conducting war against the whole organization. Unfortunately, it is

documented that the League failed and the aim of collective security was never achieved or started (Hough, 2008).

The writer goes on to argue that the eruption of WW II was obviously the indication of that failure, but by that time the League was an already irrelevant organization, which did not succeed to take action against patent acts of aggression by its member-states several times during the 1930s. This can be exemplified by the invasion of Manchuria by Japan in 1931, the invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) by Italy in 1935 and German military reoccupation of the Saar provoked some condemnations, but no military response. German, Italian and Soviet interventions in the 1936-39 Spanish Civil War were seemingly overlooked and, even though the Soviet Union was excluded from the League in 1939 for the invasion of Finland, but already too late (Hough, 2008).

Hough (2008) contends that the League failed to put in place collective security for basically two principal factors:

1. *It did not represent the entire global community:* the League was paralyzed from the beginning by not being a real international organization. The emerging predominant global power, the United States, had never been part of the organization in spite of the fact that Woodrow Wilson, its president had been its chief supporter at the Paris Peace Settlement. In the contrary, the U.S. withdrew and dwelt in its isolationism to only reemerge in 1941 at the time the world had become tremendously different. The other emerging world power, the Soviet Union, only took up membership in the League in 1934, at the time Japan and Germany and Italy decided to withdraw their memberships in frustration of the reproach they had received due to their military actions. Collective security is rooted in a sincerely collective commitment to maintaining the peace and it is less likely to be achieved if powerful military states are not disposed to contribute to making it become a reality.
2. *Its decision-making procedure was not functional:* deprived of any participation by the U.S. and any commitment to peace on the part of Japan, Italy, Germany and the Soviet Union, the League was left co-chaired by France and Great Britain. These two nations held permanent seats in the Council – as did the Soviets during their membership – and represented the unique powerful military antidote to violations of the League's Charter. The problem was that as France and Britain had recently undergone the bloodiest war in their histories and were witnessing economic depression, they did not have the military capabilities to embody the role of "policemen of the world". Both states practiced appeasement as political and diplomatic responses to aggression, in lieu of

confrontation, hoping that to grant some concessions to their rivals may be the best policy of preventing another disastrous war.

The UN's Takeover of Collective Security

Hough (2008) explains that when the UN was created collective security was not given up, but the newly founded organization learned from its precursor in developing a more original realist and Realist system. The UN made sure from its very beginning that its membership was as global as possible, despite a profound division in the global community from the intercontinental conflict the world had just suffered and the new one beginning to surface. It preserved the idea of a sub-group to make decisions on peace-keeping strategy, but explicitly granted more privileges to the most powerful nations. Though unanimity was the mode of decision used in the Leagues of Nations – knowing that it is super difficult for a decision-making structure to reach it – it was substituted with a voting system wherein only five of the UN's Security Council would have the power to veto treaties – France, USA, UK, China and Russia –. The same five nations would enjoy permanent membership in the Security Council with an ultimate ten nonpermanent members elected periodically from the rest of the United Nations member states and deprived of the veto power (Hough, 2008).

The permanent members from the winning side in WW II were regarded as the great powers of the future and would consequently be indispensable to implement collective security because there would be no UN military force for such operations (Hough, 2008). For the Security Council to take action against any threat to security, either for the implementation of collective security or any other peace-related issue, nine “yes” votes are necessary from 15 government representatives present at its head quarter in New York. In the meantime, these nine positive votes must comprise the consent of the “permanent five”. As a result, even 14 affirmative votes against one would not be sufficient to secure arrangement for action if the “one” is a permanent member (Hough, 2008).

These states symbolize a sub-system within the UN system, given that their agreement is a prerequisite for action on behalf of the almost global UN membership. The members of the Security Council can choose to abstain in lieu of voting against a resolution which, for the permanent five, does not denote a veto and would authorize action if nine other are obtained. China chose this option in voting at the 1990 Resolution engaging the Gulf War (Resolution 678) to avoid being involved in military action against

Iraq, but not to be perceived as to block the will of the other members of the Security Council and the global community as a whole. The Gulf War stands as a patent example of collective security (Hough, 2008).

We admit that collective security is a good instrument to ensure peace in the world. It is documented that collective security cannot be achieved without an international powerful military force. It can also be regarded as a tool for conflict resolution in a sense that the only way to combat a military threat is by a collective and legitimate use of force. Concretely, if a member of the international community threatens global stability, even regional stability, an international coalition should be undertaken to counter the aggressor. The author has been demonstrative in showing the failure of collective security in the past, most notably with the League of Nations. Although Article 16 of its Charter states that a nation waging war declared unjust by its member-states would be, indeed, waging war against all the members of the League.

The problem as stated by the author above is that the League failed to implement it because it did not have a commanding military power to compel states to act accordingly. The absence of an emerging global power as the United States to the organization made it even weaker because it meant the absence of a powerful military state. It was quite unexpected because President Wilson was a great advocator for the creation of the League in the Paris Peace Settlement. Another argument we would like to point out is also the absence of another predominant emerging global power, the Soviet Union. Now, we had an organization that claimed to bring peace and be global, deprived of the most powerful military nations at that time. Accordingly, the remaining military powers at the European scale – France and Britain – did not have the stomach to ensure global security by being the world's policemen since they had just suffered the bloodiest war of their histories. Obviously, the governments of both countries were weak and incapable to take any coercive action against any of their rivals who were undertaking military actions against other sovereign states by invading them, as France and Britain were still recovering from WW I.

It can be argued that it was impossible to achieve collective security in such a context, where France and Britain's policies concerning aggression from other major military powers were evidently based upon appeasement in lieu of confrontation. Hough (2008) reports that at the beginning of the Korean war in 1950 the Security Council gave its authorization for a global military action against North Korea for invading South Korea. This can be regarded as a striking occasion where the implementation of collective

security under the UN has been successful. The case of the Gulf War is even more striking because the Cold War was terminating, despite rivalries between the U.S. and the Soviet Union; both super powers were able to agree to sanction UN-sponsored military action against Iraq for invading Kuwait. As already mentioned in this chapter, the end of the Cold War was not a military victory from the United States, and the USSR was still a very powerful global power with advanced military capabilities. Collective security was a success to ensure peace. Collective security proves to be a good instrument to maintain peace in the world, but we discuss its weakness later in this paper.

CHAPTER 8: NONVAILABLE STATES, A MAJOR ROOT OF CONFLICT TODAY

8.1 Microstates and the Issue of Non-viability

Storie (2001) reported that in the area of IR, the concept of non-viability started to be present in the writings after the appearance of microstates in the 1960s. In the early 2000s, the world was composed of 191 independent countries and 58 dependencies. In the decades that followed WW II, many states, especially very small states, emerged when they succeeded to have independence from their previous foreign rulers. Most of these supposedly called microstates usually with small land-dwelling sizes and populations of less than one million people, had and keep having, too few financial resources to prevent them from being self-sufficient (Storie, 2001).

Microstates of this category that first attracted attention were the admission of the Republic of Gambia – population 592,000 – and the Republic of Maldives – population 143,000 – to the United Nations in 1965 (Storie, 2001). Many questioned their eligibility to have equal or even legitimate vote in the UN. The most remarkable illustration in this respect is the Republic of Nauru, which is located in the Pacific Ocean, 2,480 miles northeast Australia (Storie, 2001). This island only had 8.2 square miles and 9,400 people in the 1990s, and has been exploited for its phosphate deposit – its only natural resource –. Because of mining, 80% of the island is uninhabitable and its land is unproductive, and the phosphate mineral is on the verge to run out. Storie (2001) wondered if such a state should be given the right to have a legitimate vote in the General Assembly of the UN. He contended that this displays the very fact that microstates today can participate in the activities of various global organizations, and this brings about the reality of the fundamental and continuing conditions of global politics, that is, the formal equality of sovereign nations – no matter their resources, responsibilities and size – and their significant inequalities.

The non-viability rests upon the concept of dependency (Storie, 2001). Is a state viable if it is over-dependent on another in electricity, resources, jobs and protection? As an illustration, Lesotho, a state of 1.8 million people entirely surrounded by South Africa, economically depends on its neighbor, which provides completely land transportation links with the outside world. Financial aid, over 50% out of which comes from the South Africa Customs Union (SACU), supplies Lesotho with 26% of its Gross National Product (GNP), (Storie, 2001). Additionally, about 38% of its male labor force is composed of

migrant workers from South Africa. Susceptibilities participate in the non-viabilities of microstates (Storie, 2001). Their peculiar difficulty comes from their major vulnerability to crises and their lower capacity to counter them. Their size makes them especially vulnerable to both man-made and natural disasters (Storie, 2001). A military coup can easily succeed in a microstate than in a larger region where rebel groups might be destroyed or countered. In the same way one hurricane can terminate the economy of a microstate that depends on a unique crop (Storie, 2001).

We acknowledge that microstate issues are noteworthy in IR because they pose the problem of viability. Since they are so small they are dependent on many other countries in various issues as the case of Lesotho suggests, microstates pose the problem of vulnerability and security. Actually, to ensure one's security one must not depend on other states on even 20%. One argument is that they should have remained dependencies enjoying certain aid and autonomy from their former colonial masters, and to continue to depend on them instead of claiming independence such as to be sovereign states.

In effect, if they are incapable of sustaining themselves and are highly dependent on other states, how can they claim they are sovereign states? How can they ensure their security? If the foreign aid they receive is for whatever reason stopped, how would such states survive? This is why we have pointed out that those microstates – the Republic of Nauru, the Republic of Maldives, the case of Republic of Gambia is acceptable – should have remained dependencies. Our statement is that if a state claims to be sovereign it has to ensure its security and that of its people. We know that in such a globalized world as ours no state can live isolated. Every country depends on at least another in some areas.

In the case of developed countries, they are for instance dependent on the natural resources of developing nations or LDCs. But this does not mean that they are vulnerable. Dependence may as well be at the social and scientific levels as most students of developing countries ask for grants from developed states' educational institutions or even governments. In addition, in this global world all states are interconnected, at the same time we contend that this connection has not to contribute to their vulnerability. What we would like to imply is that small states are too much dependent on foreign aid, and this participates in their susceptibility. The international system is complex because a state that relies on foreign aid to survive is in our sense, nonviable.

Vulnerability as we develop it in the next points has also to do with the military and economy. As the author put it, microstates are economically and militarily nonviable because of their small size. Most of these countries are incapable to ensure their military viability, that is, they are unable to protect their territory from any foreign military occupational force. In other words, they cannot guarantee their territorial integrity. Their military is too weak, for this reason military coups have been so successful in such states because they are incapable to maintain their authority. Is a military coup likely to take place in the USA, or in Russia or even in China? Certainly not! The explanation is that the political and military structures of these states make it nearly impossible for such an event to succeed due to the authority of these states. Indeed, they can perfectly counter any rebellious troops; this is something we discuss in this chapter. The non-vulnerability issue is a real concern for internationalists.

Storie (2001) also brought about another fact; the issue of non-viability is no longer limited to microstates. He highlighted the second element of the non-viability issue, that is, the consequential propagation of many such microstates along with large states, which are at the same time nonviable and noncompetitive in the global system. A perfect illustration in this sense is the large emerging nonviable state Bangladesh; with a population of 119 million the country depends 90% of its capital spending on foreign aid. Its dependence on jute is worth 40% of its GDP. Another aspect is that the country is extremely vulnerable to its unpredictable and violent climate; Storie (2001) takes the case of a typhoon that claimed 144,000 lives and destroyed almost a full year's jute and rice crops. Appraising the non-viability of a state is a process that is tremendously subjective. IR theorists have attempted to create operation standards based on quantitative analysis employing variable that are measurable such as wealth, population, size, resource and military power (Storie, 2001). But according to the author, theorists should go further than quantitative variables and explore qualitative aspects like how well the state is handled. Storie (2001, p.99) contended that it is worth providing answers to the following questions: *"What is the country's ability to conduct international relations? Is it competitive? What is its ability to balance its budget? What is the country's ability to bring about political stability, economic development, and social transformation? Is the state able to maintain certain specified levels of public services, international representation, and a capable military establishment"?*

A remarkable statement the author brought about is his development of the non-vulnerability concept which takes into consideration not only microstates, but also large

states which are nonviable and uncompetitive. This is the second dimension of the viability problem. We have in effect seen that microstates posed a serious problem of susceptibility with regard to their high dependence on foreign aid and their incapacity to ensure their security, that is, their territorial integrity. The analysis has somewhat evolved as the author has demonstrated with Bangladesh. This brings forth the fact that we can have large states with a huge population in the meantime such states are incapable to sustain themselves economically. Of course, it would be interesting here to remind our readers that viability is a multidimensional problem. Although Bangladesh might be economically nonviable does not mean it is military nonviable. The specific case of Bangladesh is mostly about socioeconomic viability as the author has illustrated.

8.2 Socioeconomic Viability

An appraisal of economic viability should measure how well a state is capable of transforming its resources into socioeconomic development for its population in line with the more innovative standards of the global community. As just mentioned above, Storie (2001) indicated that viability has qualitative aspects that must be taken into consideration in lieu of just quantitative ones. A good example in this respect is Singapore, which is a good achievement of economic viability that is not proportionate to its population or small size. Singapore ranks 47th position in global GDP with only a population of 2.9 million people. Great quantity of strategic resources is an additional physical quantitative feature that has little association with socioeconomic viability. In this perspective, Switzerland, a small state of 6.8 million people has almost no natural resources, no valuable raw materials in commercially available quantities. Nevertheless, it has a GNP per capita about hundred times that of Nigeria – a globally recognized natural resource-rich state – (Storie, 2001). Another illustration of a viable state with nearly no resources is Japan. Although traditionally land size and fertility, population and resources – physical characteristics – were preconditions for economic viability – economic power – this is not necessarily the case in our day– (Storie, 2001).

Economic viability is by tradition measured with economic productivity. Storie (2001, p. 100) quoted Michael Porter, a renowned economist, from his book Competitive Advantage of Nations, who contended that “productivity is the prime determinant in the long run of a nation’s standard of living. Storie (2001) went on to support that the most often probable utilized figure to measure the productivity of a state is to look at its GNP per capita – the annual value of the final output of the goods and services of a state,

divided by its population –. GNP represents the value of a state’s economic activity and income of its residents. We contend that GNP should not be the only indicator to evaluate a state’s economic progress given that a state that seems to be productive and wealthy may be poorly managed.

If so, general development is jeopardized. As we have already mentioned, Storie (2001) explained that economists have looked for a more comprehensive system to include not only economic but as well social development. In 1990, the UN brought together a new indicator to measure human development, encompassing educational achievement, life expectancy and income into a compound human development index (HDI), (Storie, 2001). Table 9 depicts the wide disparities between Malaysia, considered to be a third world industrializing state, and the nonviable states of Sierra Leone, Nepal, and Somalia, where many people are so poor and are not assured of their basic needs, Storie (2001, p. 102).

	Life expectancy at birth (years)	Adult literacy rate (%)	Mean years of schooling	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$)
Country/Group	1992	1992	1992	1991
Nepal	52.7	27.0	2.1	1,130
Somalia	46.4	27.0	2.1	759
Sierra Leone	42.4	23.7	0.9	1,020
Malaysia	70.4	80.0	5.6	7,400
Industrialized	74.1	97.3	12.2	14,000
Developing	68.0	80.4	4.8	3,420
Least developed	55.8	47.4	2.0	1,170

Source: Human Development Report (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 105.

Another instrument to measure social development is the purchasing power parity (PPP), see table 10. Storie (2001) made clear that PPP designates the units of a state’s currency that are mandatory to purchase the goods in its local market that one US dollar would purchase in the American market. In addition to it, one can further measure social and economic development of a country by considering what its government spends on domestic development programs for example health and education (Storie, 2001). In this respect, Malaysia allocates 5.6% of its GNP to education and has one doctor for 2,708 people. In the meantime, Mozambique allocates nothing to education and averages one doctor for 39,500 people (Storie, 2001).

Table 10: Comparison of Economic Aid Received to GNP in 1990, Storie (2001, p.102).

Comparison of Economic Aid Received to GNP in 1990			
	(A)	(B)	
	Economic Aid Received per capita US\$	GNP per capita US\$	Aid/GNP per capita Ratio (A)/(B)
Bangladesh	17	184	0.092
Nepal	20	168	0.119
Haiti	25	324	0.078
Rwanda	36	279	0.129
Sierra Leone	15	146	0.103
South Asia	6	341	0.018
Sub-Saharan Africa	37	327	0.113
Latin America	11	1.618	0.007

Source: Ruth Leger Sivard. World Military and Social Expenditures 1993 (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1993), 42-51.

An important point the author analyzed to address the issue of external vulnerabilities that participate in a state being nonviable or noncompetitive, is trade and foreign aid. In the field of trade, to analyze a state's merchandize exports can display the level of competitiveness in the global economy. He defines merchandize exports as the goods a state produces and sells to other countries. The income a country earns from these exports helps see the amount of money it can afford to spend on imports and how much money it can borrow abroad. Developing nations pay for imports with the money they receive from the selling of their exports to industrialized states. Manufactured goods have more financial value than primary goods and are more costly and difficult to produce, (Storie, 2001). Nonviable states such as Mozambique, Rwanda, Haiti and Nepal export each less than \$300 million of merchandize goods per year. Malaysia, with a population about ten times that of Bangladesh, trades abroad nearly 16 times as much.

Another example is South Africa, whose economy is equivalent to that of Massachusetts and which exported more merchandizes – \$18,454 million – than 33 of the 35 remaining sub-Saharan states combined (Storie, 2001). The writer indicated that if nonviable states are incapable to sustain their exports, that is, if they do not export enough, where will the money to sustain their population and their economies come from? One feature of economically nonviable states is that they do not own extra money from their capital to allow them to purchase imported merchandizes such as energy and

food (Storie, 2001). He argued that their unique means to subsist is to borrow money and be dependent on foreign aid, as exemplified with Bangladesh. In the 1960s and 1970s, a number of developing states could import more than they exported as they borrowed money from foreign banks and governments of industrial states and international institutions. In order to reimburse the interests on these loans, the majority of these developing countries had to reduce imports in the 1980s, despite the fact that they were receiving more from their exports. By 1986, developing nations were spending about 20 cents of every single dollar received from exports in order to pay back old debts (Storie, 2001). In 1970, that rate was 10 cents; developing countries could not borrow as much in the 1980s since interest rates were extreme and financial institutions were less disposed to make additional loans.

As borrowing had become more expensive and more difficult, many LDCs came to be all the more dependent on foreign aid. An economically nonviable country is dependent on foreign aid to subsist. This sort of aid has a variety of sources, comprising individual donor states, financial international institutions and nongovernmental organizations. When examining aid dependence, by comparing economic aid earned per capita to GNP per capita, it proves to be extremely revealing. Table 10 above shows that highly poor states are extremely dependent on aid for their existence (Storie, 2001). In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa particularly, for every \$100 produced by the economies of this region, about \$11 is received in aid (Storie, 2001). It is not surprising that this region regroups a number of nonviable states. As we think through this part about socioeconomic viability, we can perceive that unfortunately several nations are economically nonviable. Storie has exposed the issue of merchandize exports to indicate the power of competitiveness in the global economy. In effect, if a country can export a lot of goods that it sells to other countries this will help it determine how much it can afford to spend on imports. It is true that dependency on foreign aid is a major characteristic to economic non-viability.

Nonetheless, the author has failed to underline that although a country needs to have money to import goods that it cannot produce, for example manufactured goods; at the same time depending on imports to sustain one's economy and the lives of populations can be another criterion of being economically nonviable. In reality, if a country imports more than it exports, its balance of payments, that is, exports minus imports, is negative. The automatic consequence is that such a state is highly dependent on imports to survive. What we would like to suggest is that imports should be regulated.

Of course, the good things will be to export more than one imports, in this case, the balance of payments is positive. As the balance of payments is positive it can help determine how much a state can borrow and is able to pay off. The problem here is to avoid being highly dependent on foreign aid to survive.

To examine socioeconomic viability as regards foreign aid is to see if a country's exports are so important that they can help see how much money it can borrow and reimburse after a fixed period. Apparently, if a country is able to borrow money to finance some domestic projects such as education and health, and is able to pay back all the borrowed money, then we can affirm that such a country is economically viable. The issue is when a country is incapable of paying back its loans and keeps borrowing money from individual donor states, international financial institutions or nongovernmental organizations. This demonstrates its incapacity to finance its own development, its own economy and therefore it contributes to its non-viability. Storie has argued that economically nonviable states have the characteristic not to have surplus capital to allow them to buy imported goods such as energy and food.

As these countries to survive depend on foreign aid, we would like to note that such aid is financial and economic, in some cases technical. A good discussion here would be to know whether it is possible to solve the issue of non-viability. It seems that this is actually complicated because dealing with non-viability means the capacity of a state to ensure its own economic security, by producing goods and services and by selling its products abroad. Regrettably, as the author has underlined, it is possible for states to produce primary goods, but manufactured goods are sold at a higher price and are visibly more complex and expensive to produce. The point is that it is not every country that can produce them. Accordingly, many states will continue to depend on others to survive. We consider that solving socioeconomic non-viability is inevitably an issue to consider for further research.

8.3 Military Viability

Storie (2001) indicated that military dimension is another important measure of viability. How could we identify military viability? Magyar (1985, p. 24) explained that a country is militarily viable if it has the capacity of "maintaining domestic order and at least the capability to assert its sovereignty vis-à-vis regional challenges to the point of discouraging an ill-conceived external military threat to the state". If we apply these criteria to all the nations of the world today, there would possibly be several

socioeconomically viable countries that could arguably be regarded as nonmilitarily viable (Storie, 2001).

A case in this respect had been the previously mentioned Kuwait in 1990. Its flat, nearly featureless landscape conceals immense oil and gas reserves, making the country the number one ranked oil-rich nation in the world. Reliant on oil for more than 80% of its export incomes, Kuwait ranks 51st in the global GNP per capita and 64th in HDI. In the meantime, Kuwait did not succeed to discourage a foreign military threat when its 11,000-strong, in part volunteer army was effortlessly defeated by a largely superior Iraqi force in August 1990 (Storie, 2001). But the writer reported that Kuwait has come to be more viable militarily from the time it got external military help to withdraw Iraqi forces from its territory.

The country signed defense agreements with the U.S., the UK, Russia and France. Kuwait is now reinforcing its military equipment hastily with weapons acquired from major western providers, (Storie, 2001). According to the writer, another state incapable to meet the test of military viability that ended in conflict was Cuba. When Jose Miguel Gomez was in office, the country witnessed economic prosperity from 1909 to 1925 thanks to American investment in gambling, tourism and sugar. From 1925 to 1956, two military regimes of dictators, first Gerardo Machado and then Fulgencio Batista failed to counter the activities of paramilitary groups and maintain internal order. The outcome of that situation was eventually the takeover by Fidel Castro and his coming to office in 1959.

Afterwards, Castro affirmed that Cuba was from that time a Marxist Leninist nation and connected politically, economically and militarily with the Soviet Union. Prior to the establishment of these alliances with the Soviets, Cuba was not militarily viable, and that non-viability was a major contributor to the US-Soviet missile crisis that could have ended with a nuclear war. The problem Storie (2001) mentioned is that after the Cold War, the former Soviet Union went on weakening its relationships with Cuba. As a result, Cuba is becoming ever more militarily and economically nonviable (Storie, 2001). The author stated that the majority of current conflicts are happening in developing countries or LDCs that have no military viability. In this sense, Mozambique, Angola, Chad, Liberia and Rwanda are good examples in that they did not succeed to ensure their sovereignty vis-à-vis regionally abetted domestic challenges. And as stated by the author, it is documented that many civil wars occurring in such countries originated from their incapability to impede outside interference. And so, once the wars were waged, anarchy

took place. Accordingly, hundreds of thousands have gone short of food until death and others have been killed. And others have left their homes for refugee camps in nearby states, in that way undermining entire areas (Storie, 2001). Military viability is a major issue in IR in a sense that it denotes the main instrument to ensure sovereignty, the writer pointed out.

A few questions are worth asking: what is sovereignty? Why is it that important for states? The following lines will be an attempt to address these questions. The way we see it, sovereignty is the ability for a state to guarantee its security be it at the military, political or economic levels. In the case of military viability, it is the capacity to discourage any foreign force to ever have the intention to invade or attack another state for whatever reasons. A good example is Russia. To ever think of invading Russia for whatever military force is a headache because such force is already discouraged in advance to ever undertake such an action. We would like to imply that a state that is militarily viable should be capable to protect its population from any foreign military invasion, or at least to ensure the integrity of its territory. This is why the issue of military viability has dominated the study of IR with the Realist theory given that before, during and after WW II, Realism proved to be the best ideology for states.

In effect, it seemed that security was first all about the use of force and the capacity of that force to gain political ends. In other words, politics used the military to achieve its ends. Failed states unfortunately are incapable to ensure their security against both domestic and external challenges. Kuwait again is a good illustration to underline considering its military non-viability. Military viability is not only about guaranteeing the integrity of one's territory, but also the capability to maintain domestic order. To maintain domestic order is to discourage any attempt to destabilize the state by any guerrilla activities, in this case the state has to maintain its authority. A militarily viable state cannot tolerate any eruption of rebellious groups no matter their claims. The state should act accordingly, that is, to destroy the rebels or put them to jail and prevent any form of anarchy. Now, if a state fails to do it as exemplified with Rwanda in 1994, then that state is militarily nonviable.

8.4 Political Viability

Storie (2001) pointed out that an additional dimension of the viability issue is at the political level. He admitted that political viability is measured subjectively, differing from economic and military viability which can be measured with objectivity – a number of economists have created computer models or projections to measure economic development –, political viability is complex to quantify in many developing states and LDCs. In the meantime, the author argued that the incapacity of a state to build a strong and viable economy closely matches a poorly established political machine. In this respect, Rwanda, Haiti and former Yugoslavia are glaring examples of countries wherein political unpredictability and poor organization have conducted to their disintegration. What do we mean exactly by political viability? Hughes (1994, p.64) stated that for a political entity to have the status of a state, it should have these four characteristics: “(1) territory, with clear boundaries; (2) a population; (3) a government, not answerable to outside authorities, with control over the territory and the population; and (4) sovereignty, or recognition by other states as a legally equal player in the global environment”.

The latter two attributes parallels the definition Magyar provides to political viability. Indeed, Magyar (1985, p. 24) described political viability as follows: “the ability to gain international recognition but also to demonstrate the progressive development of institutions responsive to the reasonable expectations of its citizens for social and economic peace, progress and justice”. Storie (2001) informed that we have many current cases of government incapable of gaining global recognition or legitimacy and not being receptive to their populations. After Tito passed away in 1980, political instability in the former Yugoslavia has conducted to significantly mishandled social and economic reforms. Failing to regulate political issues that ranged from religious to ethnic groups, the former Yugoslavia disintegrated into four republics, each competing for autonomy. The Yugoslavian government failed to provide economic and social peace and justice as a result of political instability. We all know the results: civil war, economic breakdown, ethnic cleansing and outside imposed sanctions (Storie, 2001).

Storie (2001, p. 106) gave another example of a politically nonviable state, that is, the Democratic Republic of Congo:

“Located in Central Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo is one of the continent’s largest countries. Its population comprises approximately 40 million people. With its huge mineral, agricultural, and energy resources, the Democratic Republic of Congo should be rich. Instead, political instability

and 25 years of mismanagement have reduced it to one of the world's poorest states. The Democratic Republic of Congo has oil reserves, and its hydro potential could supply much of Africa if fully exploited. Despite rich soils and the fact that 80 percent of its people are involved in farming, the Democratic Republic of Congo is not self-sufficient in food. Political crises and economic collapse have exacerbated the Democratic Republic of Congo's long-standing problems of corruption and human rights abuses. Clearly, the Democratic Republic of Congo's managerial incompetence is to blame for its nonviable status in the international arena."

As the author put it, politically nonviable states are featured by improperly constructed governments failing to settle political problems requiring wide domestic legitimacy. It is documented that essentially in sub-Saharan Africa, the chief causes for disintegration can originate from incapable governments, political corruption and a lack of managerial talent. From the independence era to present, innumerable people have died in Africa as the automatic outcome of governmental mismanagement and incompetence (Storie, 2001). In spite of inheriting economic and administrative infrastructures from their former colonial rulers, and in spite of accessing to modern technology, education, information, international markets and investment capital, a number of states have disintegrated – Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Liberia –. Even countries that are militarily and economically viable may be exposed to disintegration because of governments badly formed (Storie, 2001).

This passage about political viability is all about managerial skills the governments of collapsed states need in order to govern their countries. This chapter is about the non-viability issue that is responsible for conflicts today, if governments lack the capability needed to manage policies that will participate in the welfare of their populations, they will soon meet barriers or resistance to their governance or power. They should be able to redistribute the fruits of their economic growth to their citizens by allocating more funds to education – may be by granting some scholarships to students to go and study abroad and acquire technical know-how and come back to contribute to the development of the country – and health by providing a better healthcare system. At the economic arena, they should enhance policies that contribute to the creation of employment.

The major problem of failed states is not only that they lack management skills, but also they are so deeply involved in corruption. When people starve, when they cannot have a good education for their children and access to a good Medicare, tensions will arise. These tensions will propel people to be ripe for an insurrection against the government. Another possible argument is that in such an environment rebel groups are

likely to prosper and recruit people. A civil war has broken out! The argument we would like to bring about is that we cannot deny the evident link between nonviable states and the potential conflicts that can break out within them. To acknowledge it is to find out a way to help out these governments acquire managerial skills such as to handle their countries, foment good policies and good governance.

Prospective Outcome of Non-viability

On the word of Storie (2001), socioeconomic, military and political viabilities are in reality intertwined. Regrettably, the so-called failed states – Rwanda, Comoro Islands, Equatorial Guinea, Haiti, Burundi and Somalia – display all the three dimensions of non-viability. 65 of the 79 states involved in key conflicts and civil violence are in developing nations (Storie, 2001). All the three dimensions of non-viability are accountable for the majority of them. These wars claimed the lives of 4 to 6 million people in the 1980s and pushed millions of people to flee their countries to avoid death or repression (Storie, 2001). The main refugee-generating states of the 1980s were unmistakably nonviable, this included Mozambique (1.7 million), Yugoslavia (1.8 million) and Afghanistan (4.3 million). As the world population increases by 93 million each year, the problems of nonviable states such as political instability will intensify (Storie, 2001). In the 21st century increasingly additional nonviable states may collapse because of the just mentioned factors.

The proliferation of nonviable states could have disastrous and cascading effects on the international system in this century. Indeed, key challenges to human security, although originating from nonviable states, will have substantial impacts beyond national boundaries (Storie, 2001). For instance, millions of people will migrate to other states in search of better living conditions – the case of Haitian refugees in the 1990s –. The fast rate of population pressures combined with a lack of development opportunities will keep overcrowding the globe, contributing to the huge pressures that are already patent on shrinking nonrenewable resources (Storie, 2001). The author claimed that the international community cannot achieve any of its main goals – environmental protection, fertility reduction, peace and social integration – without addressing the non-viability issue.

After discussing the non-viability issue in this chapter, we are moving to the next one which is about regional security.

CHAPTER 9: REGIONAL SECURITY

9.1 Regionalism: Historical Overview

Felicio and Graham (2005) informed that all along history, human civilizations of any type and size have longed for their security and welfare above everything. The construction of what has come to be termed “architecture of peace” has been the official aspiration through which human societies should avoid conflict and live in harmony. In the modern era, nations have looked for ways to build that “architecture of peace”. Before the 20th century, regional security was all about diplomatic strategy and political statecraft (Felicio and Graham, 2005). On the word of the writers, international security, that is the idea of the world acting as one component for its own redemption and security, was a concept that did not exist at that time, beyond at least the philosophical sphere of Kantian idealism. In the 19th century there were attempts to forge continental peace by means of state policy in two regions: America and Europe. The primary effort to impede war and preserve global peace on international scale, conducted to the enactment of the League of Nations Charter in 1919. The League of Nations Covenant was based on four principals: collective security, non-aggression and pacific settlement, self-determination and minimum arms levels. The League was limited basically for three reasons: the right of a state to resort to war in the event pacific settlement proved not to be successful; the universal veto on decision-making preventing consensus in situations of crisis; and the voluntary nature of military contributions to enforcement action (Felicio and Graham, 2005). All this contributed to the failure of the collective security mechanism, therefore the League failed because of repeated aggression by some of its member-states.

International collective security was reinforced in the second attempt to create another global governmental organization dedicated to the preservation of global peace and security – the creation of the United Nations at the end of WW II – (Felicio and Graham, 2005). The UN’s Charter of 1945 established the ultimate principles wherein the contemporary “security architecture” of the global community continue to abide by. War was entirely eliminated, with an operative mechanism, at least theoretically. The veto on enforcement decisions was uniquely limited to the five great powers – the USA, the UK, the URSS, France and China – in lieu of all member-states. And the contribution of military troops from member-states for enforcement action became mandatory (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

It is documented that the subsequent six decades after the establishment of the UN have by contrast showed that collective security has not worked in the unrestrained way envisioned by the framers of the Charter (Felicio and Graham, 2005). The arrival of nuclear weapons made the multidimensional aspect of collective security to be asymmetrical, whereas ideological geopolitics between the U.S. and the Soviet Union divided the global community and seriously paralyzed the Security Council for more than 40 years (Felicio and Graham, 2005). From the end of WW II to present, strategic stability at the global level has been made possible, although insecurely, due to bipolar nuclear deterrence. Felicio and Graham (2005) withstood that for its part the UN searched for ways to improvise and adapt conflict resolution and management techniques. From the mid-1950s to the beginning of the 1990s classical peacekeeping was undertaken by the UN, and UN peacekeepers verifying mutually agreed ceasefire agreements with the consent of the parties to conflicts. Over the past years, tough peacekeeping has been implemented with UN-authorized forces engaging in enforcement action for the security of civilians or humanitarian issues (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

9.2 The Current Challenges of Regionalism

The progresses witnessed in recent years have placed a severe pressure on several of the traditional doctrines and principles of multidimensional security (Felicio and Graham, 2005). The authors argued that in such a context we subsequently need an updated version of the architecture of peace. Definitely, they observe that five mistake-lines are present in the main doctrines of the current security system:

- The principle of the non-use of force is challenged by the doctrine of *pre-emption in a just war*.
- The principle of domestic jurisdiction is undergoing a far-reaching metamorphosis as a result of the controversial doctrine of humanitarian intervention of the 1990s, refashioned in a more acceptable form in the doctrine of a *responsibility to protect*.
- The traditional doctrine of recognition has been challenged by the forced *regime change*, in 2003, of a recognized government of a member-state without explicit UN authorization.
- The principle of the concurrence of the permanent members of the Security Council has been challenged by the notion of an *unreasonable veto* developed in February 2003 during the Iraq crisis.

- The right under customary law of all states to possess weaponry (including WMD) that they deem necessary for their self-defense, and to enter into and withdraw from disarmament treaties, has been replaced by a new norm – the doctrine of ‘compulsory but selective disarmament’.

Felicio and Graham (2005) explained that because of these challenges to the current security system, Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General advocated talks at the diplomatic level at the UN. In 2003, he asked the UN and regional organizations to redouble their efforts to guarantee peace. He said that they could no longer take for granted that global organizations were sufficiently strong to deal with challenges facing them. Kofi Annan went on to claim that some institutions might need drastic reform. It was crucially important not to let recent different differences among member-states to continue, and it is also vital to find a unity drive founded on a common security agenda with an intercontinental unanimity on, and reaction to the most important threats. Kofi Annan created a High-Level Panel on Change, Challenges and Threats, with an obligation to examine the landscape of security and peace; to detect the contribution of collective action in dealing with the most important challenges and threats; and to endorse changes essential to safeguard collective action, especially by the UN. The panel’s report, released in December 2004, holds practical and extensive proposals intended to settle the debate of security and facilitate a shared security agenda, with global unanimity over threat perceptions and agreement over a real cooperative response and reformed UN Organization (Felicio and Graham, 2005). Felicio and Graham (2005, p. 9) informed that the Panel provided the following recommendations:

- *Collective security*: Collective security rests on three pillars: collective vulnerability (today's threats recognize no national boundaries); national limitations (no State can by its own efforts dispel that vulnerability); and national fallibility (it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibilities to protect its own peoples and not harm its neighbors). We all share responsibility for each other's security, and the test of global consensus will be action.
- *Threat Perception*: The world faces six clusters of threats: economic and social; inter-state conflict; internal conflict; spread of certain weaponry; terrorism; and transnational crime.
- *Development as Conflict Prevention*: Development is the indispensable foundation for a collective security system.
- *Use of Force*: No charter amendment is needed concerning the use of force:

- The self-defense provision (article 51) needs neither extension nor restriction of its long-understood scope.

As in the past, a threatened State can take military action as long as (i) the threatened attack is imminent; (ii) no other means would deflect it; and (iii) the action is proportionate. A State may therefore act in anticipatory self-defense on a pre-emptive basis, including against a threat of terrorism.

- The collective security provision empowering the Security Council to authorize any other military action is also adequate, with the language of chapter VII inherently broad enough. No State may take preventive action against, for example, acquisition of nuclear weapons-making capability, in the name of anticipatory self-defense; such action needs Security Council authorization.
- In deciding whether to authorize force, the Council should systematically address five criteria: seriousness of threat; proper purpose; last resort; proportional means; and balance of consequences. The international community has a 'responsibility to protect' the citizens of any State, including through intervention, if its government is unable or unwilling to protect its own people from 'avoidable catastrophe' (genocide or other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law).
 - *Security Council Reform*: Security Council reform should meet four principles: membership for contributing countries; representativeness; effectiveness; and accountability. The Council should expand to 24 members.
 - *Peace-building*: A Peace-building Commission should be established to identify and assist fragile states.
 - *Regional Cooperation*: Consultation and cooperation between the UN and regional organizations should be expanded and could be formalized in an agreement. But authorization from the Council for regional peace operations is necessary in all cases.

9.3 Constructing Regionalism

The strategic relationship between the Security Council and regional organizations is vital to the success of a future regional-global security mechanism (Felicio and Graham, 2005). The building of such a mechanism in the multilateral age can be approached in taking into consideration three separate periods: shaping the constitutional relationship (1919-45); constructing the institutional network (1946-91); and designing a framework for cooperation (1992-2004), (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

The Constitutional Phase

The vital linkage between regionalism and universalism in security doctrine has been gradually formed in the two developmental moments of institutional planning: 1919 and the beginning and mid-1940s (Felicio and Graham, 2005). The discussions over both the League and UN have left the foundations for the present security system. In a sense, the security procedure represented by the League of Nations was, somewhat a fundamentally regional issue, being established as a result of WW I in Europe and designed to impede any repetition of violence (Felicio and Graham, 2005). Nevertheless, regionalism generally played no substantial role in the League's efforts at conflict management and resolution (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

In the initial planning for the establishment of a new global organization during WW II, the question of security regionalism became a subject of dispute (Felicio and Graham, 2005). A number of delegations were in favor of regionalism, led by the Arab states and the Latin American bloc, with the support of Britain and its commonwealth and as well the Soviet Union, but a majority in the US planning team opposed regionalism (Felicio and Graham, 2005). As a result, a fateful compromise was reached, that is, the introduction in the UN Charter of the principle of the *inherent right and collective self-defense against armed attack*. The purpose of this introduction was to persuade regionalists of their freedom, under a system that is centralized, to react to aggression from outside their area with no interference of the Security Council (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

In the meantime, Felicio and Graham (2005) argued that the concluding provisions agreed in the Charter are the reflection of what has been termed *mild discouragement of regionalism*. The Charter gives to regional organizations the right to maintain peace and security in the very purpose to support the Security Council's major role in this respect. Nothing is to obstruct the existence of regional organizations to deal with global peace and security as are applicable for regional action, on condition that they are in compliance with the provisions and principles of the Charter. But all this was in theory because in practice the Charter made provisions for an ambiguously apprehended regionalism, with regional organizations encouraged to take action in pacific settlement but enforcement exclusively to be assumed on the authorization of the Security Council (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

The Institutional Phase

As already mentioned by Felicio and Graham (2005), the 40 years of the Cold War weakened the functional operation of the Security Council and therefore the enhancement of any regional-global security mechanism. At the same time, it was at this period that the process of decolonization happened, together with the proliferation of regional organizations almost in all areas of the world. The 1940s witnessed their setting up in two regions where the political awareness of regionalism was most advanced at that time-period: the Arab world and Latin America, the two most proponents of regional security during the *constitutional phase*. Afterwards, we witnessed in the 1950s a torrent of unprecedented creativity in regional institution-building in the European continent (Felicio and Graham, 2005). According to the writers, the unpreventable process of regionalization went on through the subsequent three decades. At the time the process of decolonization had run its course in the African and Asian continents in the 1960s and the Caribbean and the Pacific in the 1970s, accompanied by latecomers in the 1980s and the newly-independent states in the central part of Asia in the 1990s, an intercontinental network of regional and sub-regional organizations was definitely established (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

The Cooperation Phase

Alongside with the enhancement of the global *fabric of peace* designed in the course of the 1990s, the UN started to act on the acceptance of the potential for a more significant implication of regional organizations in a cooperative relationship with the UN in the search for global security (Felicio and Graham, 2005). A succession of meetings was held since the 1990s aimed to enhance a strategic cooperation between the universal institution and the regional organizations. The authors sustained that this partnership has taken two possible forms: a succession of high-level meetings between the UN Secretary-General and regional organizations, and two general meetings between the Security Council and regional organizations.

Obviously, the UN is seriously looking for possibilities to enhance a regional-global security mechanism for the 21st century (Felicio and Graham, 2005). Two phenomena particularly featured the experience in strategic planning for that purpose: improved interest from regional organizations themselves and the enhancement of a standard framework of collaboration between them and the UN. Felicio and Graham (2005) reported that in April 2003, the Security Council organized an encounter, under

Mexican presidency, for the first time with regional organizations. Solely six regional organizations took part to the meeting – AU, ECOWAS, EU, LAS, OSCE and OAS – under the theme “the Security Council and Regional Organizations: Facing New Challenges to International Peace and Security”. The aim of the encounter was to generate an interactive dialogue between regional organizations and the Council, maybe bringing IR to a new stage, because the situation at the time forced the Council to identify courses of action that would reinforce global security (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

A second encounter in this perspective was in July 2004 under Romanian presidency, this time with the objective to identify new methods of cooperation between regional organizations and the UN and enhancing innovative approaches to the resolution of conflicts and processes of stabilization (Felicio and Graham, 2005). The meeting was attended by seven regional organizations – AU, CIS, LAS, NATO, OSCE, OAS and ECOWAS – and a Presidential Declaration was produced. The Council concluded that meeting on a regular basis on specific issues with regional organizations would produce momentous added value to UN-regional cooperation for security and peace, grounded on complementary and comparative advantages (Felicio and Graham, 2005). Accordingly, the Council has belatedly started to enhance cooperation with the regional and sub-regional organizations that are focusing on the fields of security challenges and peace such as counter-terrorism, conflict management and resolution, and peacebuilding (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

9.4 The Complexities of Regionalism and Typology of Regionalism

The Complexities of Regionalism

Felicio and Graham (2005) explained that the enhancement of the regional-global security mechanism is obstructed by an ensemble of complexities. These refer to doubts over the significance of the central concepts of *arrangement*, *organization* and *region*; the physical duplication of regional organizations and other organizations (including overlapping of membership); contention over the domain of application of their functions; and ambiguity over their purposes – including unpremeditated and occasional competing mandates. All these complexities are due to the fact that the UN Charter does not provide any definition of “region”. However, Felicio and Graham (2005, p.14) specified that a definition provided during the San Francisco Conference gives a conceptual notion as is maybe necessary:

“There shall be considered, as regional arrangements, organizations of a permanent nature, grouping in a given geographical area several countries which, by reason of their proximity, community of interests or cultural, linguistic, historical or spiritual affinities make themselves jointly responsible for the peaceful settlement of any disputes which may arise.”

Felicio and Graham (2005, p.14) specified that taking into account the numerous considerations relating to both region, arrangement or organization, an authoritative definition has been provided as follows:

“A union of states or an international organization, based upon a collective treaty or a constitution and consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, whose primary task is the maintenance of peace and security under the control and within the framework of the United Nations.”

According to the writers, the membership of regional organizations and similar organization is confusingly complex. This brings the debate of what does establish a *region*, and of course what is a truly telling concept of *region*. In this perspective, it is difficult to suggest the most applicable and authoritative definition in order to gain clarity over geographical regionality. Felicio and Graham (2005) affirmed that the field of application of a regional organization or other international organization has become a significantly controversial issue. The fact that in recent years some organizations operated *out-of-area* in a *hard security* function provoked some political contention but the UN seems to be disposed presently to give recognition to such operations as not only to legitimate but to welcome them. The debate is both at the level of mandate and membership. This advances the question of whether it is lawful, in a constitutional sense for a regional organization under chapter VIII of the UN Charter to operate out of the geographical zones of its own regional membership (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

Another problem the writers brought to the table is that these regional organizations have overlapping missions, although they seek to work in partnership with the UN in peace and security. The mission issue of regional arrangements and organizations is problematical in a sense that some belong to economic issues, others to security, and some to broader cultural and political identity drives (Felicio and Graham, 2005). Therefore, it can be argued that the proliferation of regional and other organizations has posed the problem of multidimensional mandate developments. In this respect, some organizations have experienced *mandate creep* through force of circumstance, engaging in the domain of security and peace from the vantage-point of

economic mission (Felicio and Graham, 2005). Other regional organizations have entered what is referred to as *mandate crab*, extending laterally across geographical space, expanding and broadening their focal regions. The last category of them is those which have assumed actions that resemble *mandate stray*, in a sense that they in effect exceeded their legitimate authority in some cases beyond the limits of the UN Charter. Felicio and Graham (2005) posited that in such complexities it is necessary to have a better clarity and order in the issue of mandates in the regional-global mechanism for security and peace.

Typology of Regionalism

The writers reported that if the UN's vision of a regional-global security mechanism made possible by both regional organizations and the Security Council is to have factual meaning, the form of that mechanism will necessitate substantive content. The indispensable concept in that mechanism is regionality. The first prerequisite is consequently to achieve a common apprehension over the concept of region for the objectives of global peace and security, that is to say, to enhance a structure to identify security regions. The three dimensions above mentioned and developed – membership, focal region and mandate – are fundamental for the analysis of the regional activity up to the present time and the forecasts for the development of a regional-global security mechanism (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

Membership

Vis-à-vis organizations themselves, the Security Council has listed three categories: global organizations, regional and sub-regional organizations; but Felicio and Graham (2005) noted that the UN Secretariat has not identified any such classification in its high-level summits. At the same time, the authors distinguish between six types of governmental organizations:

- *Global*: Universal or near-universal membership from all world regions
- *Trans-national*: Membership from all or many regions of the world but whose membership is confined to a selective criterion that precludes universality (political, religious, cultural);
- *Cross-Regional*: Operational focus on one region but whose membership extends beyond it;
- *Regional*: Operational focus on a region and whose membership equates totally or near-totally with the region, with no external membership.

- *Sub-Regional*: Operational focus on a sub-region within a *parent region*, and whose membership equates totally or near-totally with the sub-region, with no external membership.
- *Cross-Sub-Regional*: Operational focus on a sub-region but whose membership extends beyond the sub-region to include other members with (but not beyond) the *parent region*.

Focal Area

The geographical territory for which the organization is responsible constitutes the second area of uncertainty with regard to the territorial jurisdiction (Felicio and Graham, 2005). Certain organizations have an obviously-defined region of application; others do not. It is also evident that some are undoubtedly meant to have international reach in their field of application; but another category is those with regional or sub-regional area emphasis. The issue is strictly similar to the membership typology. Meanwhile, the difference is that some organizations may have focal area that goes beyond their exact membership (Felicio and Graham, 2005). This argument is important as it helps distinguish between those with an authentic internal focus and those with an external focus as well. To make this distinction has significant effects for any partner relationship with the UN.

Mandate

The problem with the mandate given to regional or whatsoever organizations is the confused terminology that is employed (Felicio and Graham, 2005). In the present terminology, the basic distinctions are between peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and collective security. There are now two ways to apprehend the peacekeeping, that is, traditional and contemporary peacekeeping. Traditional peacekeeping is about the verification of mutually-agreed ceasefires after a truce and with the agreement of the parties to conflicts – an instrument for conflict containment where coercion is to be used only in self-defense – (Felicio and Graham, 2005). Contemporary peacekeeping encompasses more complex, multidimensional mandates that go beyond the verification of ceasefires to involve a comprehensive range of post-conflict activities and that outspread to the utilization of force beyond self-defense (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

Felicio and Graham (2005) claimed that certain peacekeeping missions have a dimension of peace enforcement. The point is that the concept of peacekeeping and peace enforcement can overlap with significant constitutional consequences. If traditional peacekeeping is regarded as the application of Chapter VII of the Charter, then regional

organizations are free to assume such missions on their individual initiatives under article 52 and without the authorization of the Security Council. All at once, *peace enforcement* is within Chapter VII and a regional organization can solely assume it under the authorization of the Security Council (article 53). Although peace enforcement is a contentious concept, it is fundamentally regarded as an instrument to govern and implement a peace agreement, (Felicio and Graham, 2005). The concept is in the meantime embedded with difficulties, as the UN was prevented from creating its own peace enforcement units (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

The negative experiences with peace enforcement in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina jeopardized the concept, prompting a change of policy from the United States support for, to opposition towards UN peace enforcement. As a result, in recent years the tendency has been away from reliance on UN-commanded peace enforcement operation in support of *fusion* operations wherein the UN and other global organizations cooperate in different ways over the same mandate. Different from the UN peace enforcement mandates are military actions authorized by the UN to use force – all necessary means – to achieve a stated objective without the required agreement of the parties to conflicts (Felicio and Graham, 2005). Nonetheless, such military operations usually act as forerunners of the peacekeeping missions of the UN and are completely under the supervision of the contributing states and not under UN command. Lastly, Felicio and Graham (2005) informed that collective security refers to traditional interstate conflicts, including aggression or break of the peace, of the sort that existed before the existence of the UN and for which it was basically established to manage. Such military operations authorized by the UN have been very infrequent. In that perspective, only two happened in the history of the UN – against North Korea in 1950 and Iraq in 1990 –.

9.5 The Political and Legal Dimensions of Regional Security

The political Dimension

The political dimension of regional security is fundamentally the comparative advantage of regional and international approaches to peace and security (Felicio and Graham, 2005). A series of questions according to the authors, are worth asking: Is the world ruled more efficiently and more astutely by a unique universal hegemon exerting power over the entire planet or by a number of regional hegemons accomplishing the same role under delegated authority from the center? Is international hegemony or

regional hegemony preferable for global stability? Must they be seen in contradistinction or might they be developed within an operational and mutually reinforcing multilateral mechanism for an integrating world? Felicio and Graham (2005) underlined that the issue of regional hegemony has linkage with international legitimacy. In a world characterized with tangible regionalism each UN individual member-state would be a member of one specific region. In this respect, the Security Council could give responsibility for a conflict to one specific regional or sub-regional organization and stay not involved, delegating the organization a particular authority to pursue, to good effect, conflict management and resolution and report back to the global decision-making institution. The authors noted that the reality is however different, particularly with the position and role a unique superpower – the United States – which makes difficult any factual regionalism in the keeping of global peace and security, being the unique nation that can believably pretend to perceive the entire world as its *region* (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

This brings a factual blockage to the development of a regional-global security mechanism. In practice, every situation of conflict delegated to a regional organization by the Security Council will automatically have the American national interest involved, together with those of the regional hegemon and other regional countries. Felicio and Graham (2005) contended that the question of international and regional hegemonic legitimacy is not limited to the United States. Indeed, some prior colonial powers have the tendency to see it as their responsibility to interfere if circumstances in a conflict directly affect what they consider critical to their national interests. Examples can be provided in this perspective, with the United Kingdom's intervention in Sierra Leone, France in Côte d'Ivoire and Burundi and Belgium in Rwanda. All things considered, in each situation, regional security interests and national political interests are strictly linked (Felicio and Graham, 2005). The political dimension of global and regional security unavoidably evokes the problem of permanent representation on the Security Council. It is useful to explore this in the assessment of the merit of regional representation on the Security Council in the event of important Council reform in the future (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

We are persuaded that the political dimension of regional security is crucial in the development of a regional-global security mechanism. It is important that the cooperation between the UN and regional organizations be more productive in a sense that the Council should explore ways to delegate powers to regional organizations in conflict resolution and management. The African Union (AU) for example should be granted that

delegated power to take enforcement military actions when it is necessary in the African continent. This regional organization should have the power to impose factual sanctions on any enemy of peace in Africa. Therefore, if cooperation is not effective, we will not see the relevance of the AU. This can be exemplified with the war in Libya when the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 decided to undertake military actions against Muhamad Qaddafi in 2011, without any prior negotiation with the AU. People in the African continent perceived that the AU has no power and that the institution is purely an association of African heads of states who occasionally meet and discuss from time to time. What comes out from this observation is the evidence that the UN should respect the territoriality of regional organizations in coordinating their activities. This will change the negative perception people have about the AU in Africa as they do not actually perceive its role in conflict resolution and management.

Another discussion is the permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Of course, the Council needs a reformation with regard to regionalism. We consider that as we need a more effective regionalism, the architecture of the Security Council necessarily is to be redesigned. Apart from the permanent five and the elected ten – the non-permanent members –, the Council should add one additional member per regional organization, to hold a permanent seat and have as well the veto power. Later, we debate in details the reformation of the Council, in the last section of this research paper: peace and conflict resolution. But for now, as investigator we favor the representation of each regional continental organization in the Security Council. We do not consider necessary for a sub-regional organization to be represented in the Council for the reason that its membership is too negligible in comparison for example to a regional continental organization. For example, the Economic Community of Central Africa's States (ECCAS) does not need to hold a seat at the Council as it has only eleven member-states. Conversely, the AU needs to hold one because of its membership. The relevance of each regional continental organization of holding a permanent seat at the UN Security Council is to allow a better cooperation between these organizations and the Council. The present Council is discriminatory as the world has changed; we are not at the end of WW II, or in the Cold War. In fact, we are in the 21st century, a context where a reformation of the Security Council is more than necessary.

Felicio and Graham (2005) held that reforming the Security Council is not peanuts! In effect, the Security Council, in 2004 does reflect an obvious preeminence regarding the objective realities of economic and military power, financial contribution and global

population. The five permanent members account on average, for more than two-thirds of global military spending, well over half of the global economy, over half the financial contributions and two-fifths of the global population. These figures are very telling regarding the ever-evolving concept of legitimacy. The Security Council pretends that because of its major contributions at the military, economic and financial levels for peacekeeping, it must remain unchanged (Felicio and Graham, 2005). But the writers contended that with the new legitimacy of the population factor and as well UN peacekeeping troop contributions, the claims of the five permanent members do not hold water. This brings about the question of whether in the development of the regional-global security mechanism for the 21st century greater attention ought to be paid from now to security regionalism. All in all, no matter what the future holds in this respect, the rise of security regionalism is obviously intended to have a powerful outcome on the configuration and functioning of the Security Council in the 21st century (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

The Legal Dimension

Felicio and Graham (2005) underlined that the linkage between the law and politics has always been a fragile one at the global level. In scrutinizing the legal dimension of regional security, the critical distinction to pay attention to is that between soft and hard security. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter fosters regional organizations to take action in soft security – finances and population – but imposes tight restrictions over them in hard security – military, then economic – (Felicio and Graham, 2005). Regional organizations may take action under article 52 in deterrence and pacific settlement and peacebuilding, but article 53 prevents them from taking such initiatives on their own in enforcement. However, it is documented that in several occasions regional organizations have undertaken such enforcement action in ahead of Security Council authorization (Felicio and Graham, 2005). On the word of the writers, the question of armed intervention is generally politically debatable and legally contestable. Two issues are particularly relevant to the constructive development of a regional-global security mechanism: self-defense and armed intervention. Felicio and Graham (2005, p. 26) argued the following:

- *Armed Intervention*: There is no disagreement that interventions with armed force without Security Council authorization (explicit or implicit) are a violation of the Charter and international law. What is more disputable is the occasional retroactive approval given by

the Council. Strictly, retroactive authorizations are incompatible with the Charter and therefore are violations of international law. The general view advanced by governments is that the predominance of the Security Council must continue to be supported, and thus that only advance authorization is permissible.

The problem, however, is that the Council's historical record on this matter does nothing to inspire confidence that it will apply such standards with any rigor. In a world of instantaneous telecommunications and continual Council sessions, only advance Council approval of enforcement action can be accepted.

- *Self-Defense*: The self-defense provision of the UN Charter, article 51, has ballooned out over the past half-century to become the most oft-cited and flexibly interpreted legal justification for armed action.

This was never envisioned by the framers of the Charter and it is not favorable to the strengthening of the system of collective security. The Security Council was not given explicit provision to judge the legal, or even the political validity of a claim of self-defense. Member-states are required simply to notify it of any actions undertaken (Felicio and Graham, 2005). Notable examples of *extreme use* of article 51 include US-led OAS naval quarantine against Cuba in response to Soviet missile installations (1962). A variant of self-defense is the *protection of nationals*, policy which has been used to justify other cases of armed intervention (Felicio and Graham, 2005). This has encouraged intervention in a number of Cold War and post-Cold War situations, such as Belgian intervention in DR Congo (1960) or British intervention in Sierra Leone (1997). Armed intervention for the protection of citizens is generally considered as a customary right in international law that long preceded the UN Charter (Felicio and Graham, 2005). When the operation is short and swift and operationally limited to the exclusive objective of saving specified individuals, it is generally authorized. When it is used as a cover for the continued presence of foreign troops and the nationals no longer remain the focus, it clearly violates the Charter (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

The most controversial case of self-defense in recent times concerns the US-led intervention in Afghanistan in 2002. The legal justification for Operation *Enduring Freedom* had been SCR 1368, evoking the right of self-defense and the Security Council's readiness to take all necessary steps to combat all forms of terrorism. In 2005, however, the *Enduring Freedom* coalition continued to remain in Afghanistan with the objective of eradicating terrorism – still under the justification of self-defense –. This raises the question of when a pretended self-defense operation might be seen to have

failed. Article 51 consents the right of self-defense only until such time as the Council has taken *necessary measures* to maintain the peace. No standards have been developed by the UN Security Council to rule on either the original validity of a self-defense operation or the time-limit (Felicio and Graham, 2005). It may be argued that the operation has shifted from US self-defense to an Afghanistan demand for a continuation of the operation. If it was the case, it showcases a lack of transparency in such issues and a need for a practice whereby requests for the presence of foreign troops should be reported back to the Security Council (Felicio and Graham, 2005). May be such requests ought to have the approval of the Council, as it was implicitly the case with the SCR 1559 of September 2004 concerning the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

Felicio and Graham (2005) supported that if conflict management were left in the hands of regional organizations rather than to the UN Security Council, it is undoubtedly that traditional self-defense would be significantly reduced. Regional organizations would probably be more interested into looking to regional collective security as a way to undertake military action against aggression and there would be furthermore, less inclination, and surely less scope to achieve beyond the region in the justification of self-defense (Felicio and Graham, 2005). Nonetheless, today the contemporary concept of self-defense is featured by massive explosions in major cities, prompting automatic consequences for international stability and evoking an instantaneous international response. In the 21st century, the global role of the UN Security Council is self-patent. Regional organizations are subordinate to the need of the Security Council to provide an international response to a global threat. The Security Council has the responsibility to respond to global aggression. However, we have a new phenomenon, that is, non-state aggression by private groups against the nation-state (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

The question is: what is the right institution to respond to attacks by individuals or groups? The Council responds to these sorts of aggression as if they were traditional types of aggression, by using military forces, but this is not the appropriate response. They advocated the need to consider another institution created to apply the rule of law: criminal investigation, apprehension, prosecution and conviction – at the universal level – . Regional organizations will have to play a role in this as their interaction with the Security Council on the contemporary threats of terrorism and proliferation is already on the agenda due to two meetings of the Security Council in 2003: the first on counter-terrorism and the second on new threats (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

Partial Conclusion

The major purpose of this section has been to understand the meaning of security. We have provided an approximation to what is securitization. In this case, we have dealt with the concept of security itself; we have studied the broad and restricted conceptualization of security and of course the expanding of security. After this first approach to securitization, we have seen what military threats to security from states are; then we have discussed economic threats to security. As for the military threats, we have seen what they were during the Cold War notably with ideological geopolitics and the new world order after the Cold War.

At the same time, we have debated the concept of collective security. We have seen that collective security was the act of undertaking military action against an aggressor by using an international coalition. We have also seen that collective security, first attempted by the League of Nations was a failure. Nevertheless, the same has been successful with the establishment of the United Nations, which precisely avoided making the same mistakes did. Under the UN, collective security was successful in the Korean War (1950-1953) and against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. It is in fact a traditional conflict resolution and management promoting the use of military force to safeguard peace.

We have examined the issue of non-viability, that is, nonviable states as to be a major cause of conflict today. We have seen that microstates are fundamentally nonviable. In this perspective, we have examined the three dimensions of the viability issue: economic, military and political viabilities. And the last chapter of this section has been on regional security. In it, we have basically considered the obvious cooperation between the UN Security Council and regional organizations in the issues of peace and security. We have debated complexities of regionalism in the development of a regional-global security mechanism into dealing effectively with peace and security in the world. Here and now, we are moving to the next section, that is, Military Strategies and Terrorism.

PART IV: MILITARY STRATEGIES AND TERRORISM

Partial Introduction

Abstract:

“War cannot be divorced from political life; whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.”

Clausewitz. Taken from the book Theory of War and Strategy (page 233).

Military strategy is an amazing and fascinating discipline because for centuries nations or people had always wanted to ensure their supremacy or hegemony, as it was the case with the Roman Empire, Napoléon, the Babylonian Empire and the Acadian people. Before we continue, it would be appropriate to provide a definition to military strategy, although a universal definition does not exist. In this perspective, we will consider the definition of Goodman (1993), who held that military strategy and tactics are vital to the waging of armed conflict. Strategy is the coordination, the planning and the general management of military operations to achieve total military and political ends (Goodman, 1993). We will as well examine the definition Colonel Lykke, Jr. (1989) provided. The author by referring to ancient Greece stated that military strategy was the “art of the general”. He pointed out that the definition of military strategy does not find a universal consensus. Subsequently, Colonel Lykke, Jr. (1989) borrowed the definition of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms of 1987, that is: “The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force”. The author quoted General Maxwell D. Taylor who gave a characterization of strategy during a visit to the American War College in 1981. According to General Taylor, strategy consists of ends, ways and means.

Colonel Lykke, Jr. (1989) provided the following table to explain General Taylor’s characterization:

Strategy = Ends+ Ways + Means	
Component	Definition
Ends	Objectives towards which one strives
Ways	Course of action
Means	Instruments by which some end can be achieved

From this table, the author provided another definition of military strategy taken from the 1985's edition of the Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, which is: "The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives". Colonel Lykke, Jr. (1989) contended that military strategy is part of national strategy and must be in accordance with national policy – an overall course of action that the government adopts at the domestic level in pursuit of national objectives –

. Understanding strategy in this regard brings us to consider that strategy = Ends + Ways + Means and we can therefore design a methodology to military strategy (Colonel Lykke, Jr., 1989).. "Ends" can be regarded as military objectives, and "Ways" are about the many approaches of implementing military power. And finally, "Means" are concerned with the military resources – money, logistics, manpower, material etc. – needed to undertake the mission (Colonel Lykke, Jr., 1989). Then the writer came to the conclusion that:

Military Strategy = Military Objectives + Military Strategic Concepts + Military Resources. As for the author, this theoretical understanding of military strategy is relevant to all three levels of war, that are operational, strategic and tactic. Military strategic concepts of a military strategy and military objectives pose the problem of resources' demand, which obviously shows that strategy is deeply influenced by the availability of resources (Colonel Lykke, Jr., 1989). The author went on to argue that if we fail to take into account military resources as integrant element of military strategy, then we might witness the situation that is known as strategy-capabilities bad fit – mismatch –. What then is military objective?.

Colonel Lykke, Jr. (1989) defined it as to be a particular mission or job to which military endeavors and resources are applied. Among a military objective, we have the deterrence of aggression, the protection of lines of communication; defend the homeland, the restoration of a lost territory and defeating of an enemy. In the author's definition of military strategy, we notice that the basic objectives are concerned with those of national policy as seen above. He showed that national policy is also about the ultimate elements of national power, that is to say, politics, economy, society, psychology and the military. Now, let us try to define the "Means" – we want to refer to the military resources that fix capabilities of the above military equation –. The means are strategic and tactical nuclear forces, defensive and offensive forces, conventional general-purpose forces, war

material, active and reserve forces, manpower as well as weapons systems. In the case of the United States, the writer points out the importance of the potential support of friends and allies. In the development of force strategy, the strategic concepts regulate the category of forces that ought to exist and the way they are utilized (Colonel Lykke, Jr., 1989).

The following figure displays a specific model of national security, America's most vital interest, which is sustained on a stool with three legs whose name is *Military Strategy*. We can see that the labels of the three legs are *objectives*, *concepts*, and *resources*. The figure displays the fact that the legs must be well-adjusted, or national security might be jeopardized as shown in figure 2.

Figure 1: A Model for Military Strategy (from the book Military Strategy: Theory and Application by Colonel Lykke, Jr., p. 182).




FIGURE 1

Figure 2 underlines the fact that if military resources are not matched with strategic concepts or obligations or are not compatible with military capabilities, we may have serious problems. The angle represents risk, that is to say the possibility of failure, damage or loss, or of not accomplishing an objective. It is of course the responsibility of the army to determine if there is any associated risk with a strategy and the level of that

risk. Accordingly, to guarantee national security, the three legs of military strategy should not only exist, but they should also be well-adjusted (Colonel Lykke, Jr., 1989).

Figure 2: Unbalanced Military Objectives, Concepts, and Resources May Jeopardize National Security (from the book Military Strategy: Theory and Application by Colonel Lykke, Jr., p. 183).



The first part of this partial introduction was meant to have a definitional approach to military strategy. We have seen that it is impossible to talk about strategy if we do not take into consideration military objectives, military strategic concepts and military resources. The author underscored that we cannot have a successful military strategy if we do not consider these fundamental elements. In effect, we can design a strategy, and might not be able to carry out the strategy because we might be in lack of the means necessary to achieve ends. This has been a primary attempt to the understanding of military strategy. However, Bartholomees, Jr. (2010) argues that defining strategy is difficult because the word is being used in different domains of societal levels. It is true on the word of the author that some words may be unique to the conceptual context although the word has other uses. And the author exemplifies it with the word *passion* which has a specific meaning in Christianity that differs from that of the secular world. Strategy likewise has a specific meaning in the military.

The term has a military legacy and is regarded as an essentially military activity of wartime, that is, the way military commanders use their troops to win conflicts (Bartholomees, Jr., 2010). The writer goes on to sustain that strategy was military exercises to get to a battleground, and the tactics undertaken once the armed forces

were engaged. However, the word strategy has been used outside the military arena in modern times; it includes subjects as diverse as business, medicine and even sports. With the mutation of the term, the army had to invent another term, in the case of the U.S. military the term has been turned to operations or operational art – to refer to the high-rank military art strategy was once in the past –. From that perspective, strategy implies not only the military elements of power, but also other elements of power such as politics and economy (Bartholomees, Jr., 2010).

Bartholomees, Jr. (2010, p.13) also reaffirms that there is no unanimity on the definition of military strategy. The author quotes the definition of Clausewitz (1978):

“Strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war. The strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose. In other words, he will draft the plan of the war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it: he will, in fact, shape the individual campaigns and, within these, decide on the individual engagements.”

Clausewitz’s definition is acceptable as it displays the fact that when we go to war we compulsory need to determine our military objectives and even the political objective of the war. In fact, before engaging in a war we must define the military objectives, we have of course political objectives as well, these are achieved through military forces operating in the battlefield (Bartholomees, Jr., 2010). But the writer explains that because this definition is too classical, it is not satisfactory – it is only about the military element and is at the operative level instead of the strategic level –. Clausewitz’s definition is more about the enhancement of a campaign strategy. It is not because Clausewitz said something that it means that the thing is true, but it does make the thing worth to be considered (Bartholomees, Jr., 2010). Accordingly, Clausewitz’s definition can be overlooked. Afterwards, Bartholomees, Jr. (2010, p.14) brings us to consider the definition of Scott (1968), that he finds actually remarkable: “the art of concerting a plan of campaign, combining a system of military operations determined by the end to be attained, the character of the enemy, the nature and resources of the country, and the means of attack and defense”.

According to Bartholomees, Jr. (2010), the definition includes some important elements that Scotts puts together; however, the definition is still narrowed to military operations. Then the author quotes the definition of military historian H. Liddell Hart that he considers more modern. According to H. Liddell Hart strategy is “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy”. And lastly the writer quotes the

definition of strategy we have seen above, which is that of the U.S. Army War College in its 2001 edition, which defines strategy in two different manners: “Conceptually, we define strategy as the relationship among ends, ways, and means”. The second way is as follows: “Strategic art, broadly defined, is therefore: the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests”.

After considering all these definitions of military strategy, Bartholomees, Jr. (2010) provides his own definition of strategy. According to him, military strategy is basically a problem solving process. He goes on to say that we have simply to ask the following questions at the moment of defining strategy, which are: what do I want to do? What do I have or what can I reasonably get that might help do what I want to do? And what is the best way to use what I have to do what I want to do? Then Bartholomees, Jr. (2010) definitely agrees with the American War College that military strategy is the combination of the association between ends, ways and means.

As we have just provided definitional approaches to what military strategy is, let us point out the different military strategies we deal with in this section. In effect, we deal with the following military strategies: extermination, exhaustion, annihilation, intimidation and decapitation. It is admitted that among the military strategies, the strategy of intimidation has been very successful with the possession of nuclear weapons by states, especially nuclear warheads. Another aspect is that the strategy is the favorite for terrorist organizations to compel governments to do something in order to achieve their political ends.

This section is subdivided into five chapters: (I) a Brief Overview of Military Strategy, (II) the Five Basic Military Strategies, (III) Military Threats from Terrorists, and (IV) State Responses to Military Threats from Non-State Actors.

CHAPTER 10: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MILITARY STRATEGY

This part is about understanding historically how the military started and as well see the traditional tactics of warfighting. We would like to examine strategic and tactical principles of warfare, strategic and tactical maneuvers, the emergence of modern warfare, and finally the two world wars. Goodman (1993) held that all along the past, military officials and warfighters have always designed what they regarded to be the most important tactical and strategic principles of war. In this sense, Napoléon I had for instance 115 principles. Most of the well-recognized traditional principles are the offensive, security, unity of command (cooperation), objective, maneuvers, economy of force and the mass. The peculiarity is that the majority of the cited principles are interrelated.

10.1 Strategic Principles of Fighting

No matter the size of military forces, they ought to have a clear defined objective in spite of potential distractions (Goodman, 1993). Offensive operations – seizing and taking advantage of the initiative – for example, would give the possibility of choosing objectives. Equally important, offensive operations also highly augment the eventuality of surprise and security – protection against the possibility of being surprised or not having the ability of surprising the adversary– (Goodman, 1993). Unity of command is necessary to the achievement of objectives, the capacity to use all troops efficiently – economy of force – and the concentration of superior force at an important point – mass –. Maneuver is concerned with the many ways military forces are deployed and moved to get offensive, surprise and mass (Goodman, 1993).

10.2 Tactical Maneuvers

As for the classification of the different types of offensive maneuver, Goodman (1993) exposed the following: envelopment, penetration, defensive-offensive maneuvers and turning movements. The penetration is one of the most ancient maneuvers of military science. This is understood as a main attack that tries to enter by force the enemy line meanwhile secondary other attacks prevent the enemy line from the possibility of freeing its reserves.

Envelopment has to do with a secondary attack attempting to hold the center of the enemy – single envelopment – or attacks on both sides (double envelopment) of the enemy with the very purpose of threatening the enemy's line of retreat and communications (Goodman, 1993). This causes the enemy to fight in quite a lot of fronts

and the eventuality to be destroyed. Defensive-offensive maneuvers involve attacks from a powerful defensive position after the aggressive enemy has had its forces reduced in strength. And finally, Goodman (1993) contended that turning maneuvers are considered to be indirect military operations that try to strike wide nearby the enemy's position so as to prevent the enemy's supply and lines of communications in such a way that the enemy is obligated to leave a strong position or possibly be surrounded.

10.3 Initial Strategy and Tactics

Goodman (1993) postulated that the Mediterranean basin saw the beginning of modern military strategy and maneuvers. It was under the leadership of military commanders like Philip II (382-336 BC) and Alexander the Great (356-323 BC) of Macedonia and Hannibal (247-183 BC) of Carthage that the primary paces were undertaken in the military discipline. Hannibal was a highest strategist whose overwhelming victories showed the Romans that the flexible attack maneuvers of their legions necessitated supplementation by unity of command and advanced horse soldiers.

Accordingly, the Romans changed their citizen-soldiers with a remunerated professional military whose equipment, skill at fortification, training, road building and siege warfare became renowned. Philip II put together cavalry, infantry and basic artillery into an organized, trained and maneuverable aggressive military force supported by engineers. His son Alexander became an outstanding tactician with his focus on planning, keeping open communication lines and supply, security, the use of surprise and a continuous hunt of enemies (Goodman, 1993).

10.4 The Development of Modern Warfighting

Goodman (1993) underlined that Gustav II Adolf, King of Sweden (1611-1632) has been regarded as the father of modern military maneuvers as he reestablished them into military discipline. His well-organized military forces consisted of small, mobile units equipped with highly advanced and maneuverable fire weapons and supported by mounted dragoons – his invention – equipped with saber and carbine. Frederick II (the Great) of Prussia (1740-1786), the leader of offensive and mass, waged war at a time of limited warfighting – weapons were small and costly – road and systems of supply were insufficient (Goodman, 1993). During the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), Frederick was surrounded by a coalition attack on Prussia. Then he opted for a strategy of interior lines,

supplemented by an extremely meticulous military force and horse artillery – his invention – Frederick would hurriedly maneuver, gather an advanced military force at some important point along the encirclement line, and with massed fire weapons, attack hard against the enemy's lines before moving to another point. With the age of Napoleon I modern warfare was definitely born (Goodman, 1993).

Concerning the last part of this overview, we would like to see the trench tactics to nuclear strategy during the two world wars. Goodman (1993) held that WW I started with rapid, huge, national mobilizations and classical offensive military operations. Two scientific developments in warfare were to adapt to the strategic and tactical discussions of the 1920s and 1930s. Then the advocates of airpower such as strategists Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchel, Henry Arnold and Hugh Trenchard came on stage (Goodman, 1993). All these theorists advocated that airpower alone could help win armed conflicts, not only by attacking enemy forces but by strategic bombing, that is massive strikes on industries, cities and communication lines and supply, this was one of the allied strategies during WW II. Another innovation during WW I was the creation of tanks – motor-powered protected vehicles –, (Goodman, 1993).

Fuller (1878-1966) quoted by Goodman (1993) advocated the utilization of the tank as the new cavalry of contemporary warfare. In this regard, the German military force was the first to combine effectively the utilization of airpower and tank power in the tactical offensive in the battlefield in the blitzkriegs, under the supervision of military commanders like Heinz Guderian and Erwin Rommel, who successfully conquered the majority of Europe during WW II. The invention of nuclear weapons during the war and afterwards, brought together the introduction of the new nuclear science strategy and tactics (Goodman, 1993).

After this overview of military strategy, we are now going to tackle the second chapter, that is, the five basic military strategies.

CHAPTER 11: THE FIVE BASIC MILITARY STRATEGIES

This is one of the major parts of this section because we are going to see now in details the different military strategies that range from the traditional to the modern strategies. In reality some strategies are impossible to be applicable because of the norm of international law of war. In effect, in the case of the strategy of extermination, we can comprehend that it is unimaginable that in contemporary warfighting a nation decides to exterminate all the inhabitants of an enemy's state if it be the winner of a particular armed conflict. This is because in old times war was not regulated and there was no international law. In this part, we examine the following military strategies: extermination, exhaustion, annihilation, intimidation and decapitation.

11.1 The Strategy of Extermination

Bowdish (2013) defines the strategy of extermination as a plan that describes how military means and concepts of engagement are utilized to achieve the elimination of a group of people. This strategy is rare and is hardly defined as an authentic strategy in books or articles or even magazines on strategy for a specific purpose. As a strategy its use is regarded as amoral in present times and is against the norms of international law. However, its simplicity as a strategy does not mean that it has to be overlooked, given that on occasion it is still used, although wicked, it needs to be understood in its theory in order to develop counter strategies, (Bowdish, 2013). The majority of strategists have mostly avoided the strategy of extermination in their investigations and debates of strategy and theory of war (Bowdish, 2013). The writer explicates that the use of the strategy of extermination was meant to either possess an entire territory and its related resources or to eradicate a hated enemy.

Bowdish (2013) sustains that the strategy has basically two levels, he calls the first level *absolute extermination*, where the whole people of a wanted territory or including a hated group was killed, with all men, women and children. The second level is less extreme, which the author calls *selective extermination*, where the men were killed, however the women and children were either integrated or sold into slavery, depending on the tradition of the moment. Both of these variants of extermination can be found in the Bible, with God, somewhat shocking to some, ascribed to the foundation of the strategy of extermination (Bowdish, 2013). The strategy of absolute extermination is

observable in the old testament of the Bible, with God instructing the Israelites to exterminate the Amalek, a hated enemy of the Jews – the Holy Bible, I Samuel 15:3 –:

“Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass.”

An illustration the author provides about selective extermination is also apparent in the Bible – the Holy Bible, Deuteronomy 7: 1-3 –:

1 When the LORD thy God shall bring thee into the land whither thou goest to possess it, and hath cast out many nations before thee, the Hittites, and the Girgashites, and the Amorites, and the Canaanites, and the Perizzites, and the Hivites, and the Jebusites, seven nations greater and mightier than thou;

2 And when the LORD thy God shall deliver them before thee; thou shalt smite them, and utterly destroy them; thou shalt make no covenant with them, nor show mercy unto them:

3 Neither shalt thou make marriages with them; thy daughter thou shalt not give unto his son, nor his daughter shalt thou take unto thy son.

Bowdish (2013, p. 203) contends that the Romans also used the strategy of extermination when it was in accordance with their national interests, as shown in the following extract:

“The Punic Wars consisted of three wars fought between Rome and Carthage between 264 BC and 146 BC. The first two wars were won by Rome, but at great expense and only temporary resolution. Both sides sought Mediterranean hegemony. Cato the Elder, a Roman statesman, visited Carthage in 153 BC to check on the status of the Carthaginians, expecting them to be downtrodden and poor due to the harsh terms the Romans had imposed after the Second Punic War. Instead, he found a vibrant and wealthy city, an army, and a navy. Cato, alarmed by the resurgence of the hated Carthaginians, began a political mobilization campaign to end the threat once and for all, calling for the extermination of Carthage. In 146 BC, the Romans eventually laid siege to Carthage, destroying it and killing a great number of men, women and children. The rest were sold into slavery.”

Bowdish (2013) brings about the fact that the strategy of extermination was condemned in a UN resolution after the Holocaust of WW II. In 1944, a Polish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin had considered the strategy of extermination as genocide. He furthermore extended the term to portray a crime committed with the intention of destroying, in part or in whole, a national, racial, ethnical or religious group. Nevertheless, regardless of international law that prohibits genocide, the practice of extermination continued to be observed in the late 20th and early 21st centuries as witnessed with genocides in Rwanda, Bosnia and Sudan (Bowdish, 2013).

11.2 The Strategy of Exhaustion

Bowdish (2013) defines what the strategy of exhaustion is by quoting it from the Oxford Essential Dictionary of the US Military (2004) that defines it as strategy that emphasizes the ongoing and often indirect destruction of the enemy's military power and determination to resist. Nonetheless, the strategy is useful only in certain circumstances, for example "when a nation is unable or unwilling to apply the force necessary to achieve its objectives through the annihilation of the enemy but risks high casualties and materiel losses and a protracted war, either of which may be politically unacceptable" (The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the US Military 2004).

Bowdish (2013) holds that the strategy is mostly used by the weaker side to a conflict since it does not require a superiority of military forces. In the meantime, it does require persistence given that the utility of the strategy is the avoidance of critical battle, only if local situations give advantages to achieve a victory. The writer underscores that the strategy of exhaustion is one of the oldest strategies in warfighting, as exemplified by Wu-Tzu, one of the great antique Chinese chief of strategy, who defined its utilization at the strategic level of warfare. Sawyer (2007, p. 211) gives us an extract:

"Ch'u's character is weak, its lands broad, its government troubling [to the people], and its people weary. Thus while they are well-ordered, they do not long maintain their positions. The Way [Tao] to attack them is to suddenly strike and cause chaos in the encampments. First snatch away their ch'i-lightly advancing and then quickly retreating, tiring and laboring them, never actually joining battle with them. Then their army can be defeated."

At the operative level, Clausewitz (1976) regarded exhaustion as a possibility to reduce a stronger side to a conflict to be relatively weak. As for the author, exhaustion as a strategy was essentially advantageous while on the defensive, a way of reducing the enemy's resources and willpower to resist, at the same time trying to gain time in order to mount an offensive when possible. Clausewitz (1976) also viewed the use of exhaustion in some circumstances at the tactical level, for instance when the defeat of the enemy's military forces was not probable. In this perspective, the main objective was to make the war more expensive to the enemy. Clausewitz (1976, rev. 1984, p. 93) contended that this could be achieved in three ways:

"... [T]here are three other methods directly aimed at increasing the enemy's expenditure of effort. The first of these is invasion... simply to cause general damage. The second method is to give priority to operations that increase the enemy's suffering. The third, and far the most important method ... is to wear down the enemy. ... Wearing down the

enemy in a conflict means using the duration of the war to bring about a gradual exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance.”

Bowdish (2013) sustains that the strategy of exhaustion has to be dictated by the situation. The decision to utilize the strategy of exhaustion has to be motivated by a perfect estimation of the forces available to both parties to a conflict in the context of the geo-strategic situation and wanted political ends. It is a strategy well matched to a state outmatched in military capabilities against an invading enemy force. In the meantime, it is habitually a strategy of second alternative, utilized when a nation’s basic military forces prove to be unable to overcome or to withstand an enemy by an unsuccessful strategy of annihilation. The strategy of exhaustion is normally more operational after a state’s survival interests are at risk, as the whole people can be militarized or trained in either warfare or supporting roles, thus contributing to resist the enemy forces (Bowdish, 2013).

Bowdish (2013, p.211) provides an example of the strategy of exhaustion with the American independence war, as he quotes the book For the Common Defense by Millett and Maslowski (1994, p.69):

“George Washington initially sought out decisive battle with his “dual army,” consisting of Continental regulars and militiamen, against the British army. The British army was simply qualitatively and quantitatively superior to the American army. However, the British Empire had great demands for its military elsewhere, as Britain also faced France, Spain and the Dutch Republic in a global war, concurrent with the American Revolution. After a series of costly victories and defeats in the north, the Americans effectively settled into a strategy of exhaustion. Washington had learned the hard way that decisive battle with the British needed to be avoided. At Trenton, Washington and his force of 2,400 men surprised a 1,500 man garrison, capturing or killing almost 1,000 of the Hessians. When General Cornwallis responded with 6,000 troops in an attempt to decisively engage and destroy the Americans, Washington and his men slipped away. Security, good intelligence and the maintenance of freedom of action were critical in allowing Washington to hit the enemy and evade a larger force pressing in on him.”

Bowdish (2013) explains that despite the fact that the new strategy of Washington was logical considering the disparity in quality and quantity between the parties to the conflict, that is, the opposing military forces; it as well suffered from one of the strategy of exhaustion chief weaknesses: demoralization of troops. When avoiding decisive battles, the war could be prolonged to finally overcome the enemy forces. However, long-drawn-out conflict is a double-edged sword in a sense that it can be demoralizing to one’s own military troops and population as it is to the enemy forces. Avoiding crucial battles and

limiting the combat to small attacks, battles and the destruction or capture of supplies proved to be demoralizing amongst the troops of Washington and war exhaustion in the American population, who could easily regard the strategy as indecision and cowardice, in lieu of a military strategy just designed for the situation (Bowdish, 2013).


Bowdish (2013) contends that when France entered the war in 1778, followed by the Spanish in 1779 and the Dutch in 1780, Washington's strategy changed. At that time, Britain had more concern about the change of the situation as the war shifted from a rebellion to a "global war". After a time of strategic impasse, the colonists increased by French military enforcement, supplies and Navy had the military capabilities essential to put in place a strategy of annihilation, which ended in Yorktown on October 17, 1781 with Cornwallis's capitulation.

11.3 The Strategy of Annihilation

Delbrück (1990, p. 109) defined the strategy of annihilation as a strategy "which sets out to attack the armed forces and destroy them and impose the will of the conqueror on the conquered". Considering the strategy of annihilation is the supposition that as long as the enemy has resources to resist, it will maintain its determination to resist. On the strategy of annihilation, Clausewitz (1976, rev. 1984, p. 77) contended:

"The worst of all conditions in which a belligerent can find himself is to be utterly defenseless. Consequently, if you are to force the enemy, by making war on him, to do your bidding, you must either make him literally defenseless or to at least put him in a position that makes this danger probable. It follows, then, that to overcome the enemy, or to disarm him--call it what you will--must always be the aim of warfare."

Bowdish (2013) holds that the strategy of annihilation can therefore be used to acquire almost any political ends that an opponent has within its power to give. He goes on to sustain that the strategy requires a superiority of military forces when completed through erosion. Of course, it does not automatically demand absolute superiority of forces at the tactical level of warfare, although it does demand at least local superiority at the operative and strategic level of warfare when completed through attrition.



From this figure, Bowdish (2013) explains that there are essentially two lines of attack to the strategy of annihilation – annihilation through attrition and annihilation through dislocation –. The first approach focuses on the physical destruction of the enemy’s military forces to the point they no more have the physical ability to combat. In effect, the enemy’s troops are killed and its equipment is destroyed. The second approach focuses on breaking the unity of the adversary’s military forces so as to prevent them from maintaining the determination to combat. From this point of view, the objective, is to destroy the motivation of the enemy’s military forces through psychological dislocation. All things considered, both approaches aim at disarming the enemy, causing it to capitulate (Bowdish, 2013).

Annihilation through Attrition

As just mentioned, in annihilation through attrition, the purpose is to seek out the physical destruction of the enemy, destroying its troops and its military equipment (Bowdish, 2013). The strategy uses a direct approach, that is, the involvement of straightforward engagement of the enemy without wasting resources or time attempting to surprise or deceive, which according to Clausewitz (1976) questionably rarely achieve much anyway.

Bowdish (2013, p.214-215) gives an example of annihilation through attrition in the American Civil War:

“The situation that confronted Grant after his appointment as Commanding General of the Army by Abraham Lincoln necessitated a strategy of annihilation. The situation dictated a strategy that could achieve victory within the shortest time possible, before support for the war was lost. Grant understood this and set out to defeat the two principle armies of the Confederacy, the Army of Northern Virginia, led by

Robert E. Lee, and the Army of Tennessee, led by Joe Johnston. Grant directed George Meade, in charge of the Army of the Potomac, to destroy Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, using a potential attack on Richmond to force Lee to fight. Grant similarly ordered William Tecumseh Sherman, in charge of the Army of the Tennessee, Army of the Cumberland, and Army of the Ohio, to defeat Johnston's Army of Tennessee and take "the heart of Georgia", Atlanta, a major Southern city. This was made clear in Grant's direction to Meade, "Lee's Army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes there you will go also."

Bowdish (2013) claims that the Southern forces were defeated as a result of the strategy undertaken by the Northern forces. Each combat was approached with the purpose of destroying the Southern military forces decisively. The flanks of the enemy were attacked continually, using the strategy of annihilation through dislocation employed as a sub-strategy at the tactical level to the primary campaign's strategy of annihilation through attrition.

Annihilation through Dislocation

The purpose in annihilation through dislocation is to break the will of the enemy's military forces to fight through psychological dislocation (Bowdish, 2013). On the word of the writer, psychological dislocation generally involves the utilization of an indirect approach, attacking along a line of least expectation, surprising and mystifying the enemy, and putting panic and fear in order to break the unity of the enemy's military forces. In this manner, an enemy is more probable to capitulate or give up an objective. According to the U.S. Marine Corps (1997), maneuver warfare doctrine, implemented by the U.S. Marine Corps, is fundamentally a style of warfighting that utilizes the strategy of annihilation through dislocation, since it is based on breaking the unity of the enemy's military forces. The U.S. Marine Corps (1997, p. 37, 73) summarized the strategy this way:

"Rather than pursuing the cumulative destruction of every component in the enemy arsenal, the goal is to attack the enemy "system"—to incapacitate the enemy systemically. Enemy components may remain untouched but cannot function as part of a cohesive whole (37).

... The aim is to render the enemy incapable of resisting effectively by shattering his moral, mental, and physical cohesion—his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole—rather than to destroy him physically through the incremental attrition of each of his components, which is generally more costly and time-consuming (73)."

Through this, it is easy to see that the aim of the strategy is not the physical destruction of the enemy but the destruction of its military capability, in order to break its troops psychologically so as to provoke unwillingness for the enemy to continue fighting (Bowdish, 2013). This however, does not mean that the enemy cannot keep battling, but the problem is that the mind of its military troops is down. As an illustration we have German victory over the French in WW II. According to Bowdish (2013), the situation of Germany in May 1940 was advantageous. Hitler employed deceit, subversion and intimidation in not only reconquering much of what Germany had lost in the Treaty of Versailles, but also, with the easing fast defeat of Czechoslovakia and Austria, Denmark, Poland, Norway soon followed the list.

Bloch (1999) explains that the combination of tempo, terror and surprise of the German offensive was overwhelming. The French were never capable of recovering, even though they could withdraw from engagement and attempt to reorganize their defenses. The issue is that the French were confined to the old doctrine of time-distance that was no longer applicable because of the great tempo made possible through mechanized warfare. Bloch (1999, p.38), a French staff officer who participated in the primary defense of Belgium describes it as follows:

“The truth of the matter was that the Germans advanced a great deal faster than they should have done according to the old rules of the game. ... It was perfectly obvious that as soon as the Army of the Meuse had been broken, and the enemy began to show signs of becoming active on our front, the only hope of reestablishing the general situation lay in our ‘disengaging,’ and establishing a new defensive line sufficiently far back to ensure that it would not be overrun before it had been organized.”

Bowdish (2013) underlines that the strategy of annihilation through dislocation was well coordinated to the material means and doctrine that the Germans had modernized. The Germans combined their armor assaults with Stuka dive-bombers, linked by radio communications, in a joint arms approach. The Stuka had been equipped with sirens, called *Horns of Jericho*, which wailed as the bombers dove, producing a petrifying sound that frightened and panicked those of the ground, increasing the psychological dislocation of the enemy. Describing those Stukas, Bloch (1999, p, 54) declared:

“Nobody who has ever heard the whistling scream made by dive-bombers before releasing their load is ever likely to forget the experience. It is not only that the strident din made by the machines terrifies the victim by awakening in his mind associated images of death and destruction. In itself, and by reason of what I may call its strictly acoustic qualities, it can so

work upon the nerves that they become wrought to a pitch of intolerable tension whence it is a very short step to panic."

Bowdish (2013) provides some analysis about how Hitler operated. Indeed, Hitler would first secretly mobilize his military troops on the border of his intentional victim state, often justified by some fake infraction committed against the ethnic Germanic peoples of the targeted state. When his troops were ready to engage the attack, he would deliver an eleventh hour ultimatum to the targeted state. Regrettably, his military forces would attack before the end of the ultimatum, regardless of the deadline. The targeted state would rapidly capitulate or fall, deprived of the time necessary to mobilize its troops and prepare a defense. The strategy was deceiving in the sense that Hitler would violate treaties or lie about his intents to engage attacks, pretending defense of his own nationals. In mobilizing his military plans for each targeted state, Hitler would insist that each nation needed to be taken in a short period of time in order to present a *fait accompli* to discourage any potential intervention by outside military powers (Bowdish, 2013).

11.4 The Strategy of Intimidation

Bowdish (2013) defines the strategy of intimidation as the deterrence or compulsion from some action by violence or threat. Nonetheless, we are going to examine the relationship between psychological intimidation and physical force, maybe best defined by Schelling (1966). In effect, the author pointed out that it is the threat of destruction or more damage to come that can make somebody concede something. It is when violence is dormant that somebody's choice can be influenced, that is violence that the enemy thinks can be inflicted. Then Schelling (1966) went on to underscore that the threat of damage can have an impact on somebody's motivations. The aim of intimidation is not that the damage and the pain itself but it is the impact on someone's attitude that is vital.

Bowdish (2013) asserts that the efficiency of intimidation is when it is achieved without violence, in other words when intact objectives are achieved without fighting. Indeed, the enemy is intimidated when giving up the political ends without a battle or bullied against the taking of an objective through a combat. To intimidate an enemy, an adversary might perform the skillful utilization of trickery, by making one's military forces appear more frightening than they are in reality. It is apparent that the strategy of intimidation requires physical demonstration of power in order to obtain believability in

the head of the enemy. This demonstration of power can be reached through battlefield success, military parade or the testing of nuclear weapons (Bowdish, 2013).

Then Bowdish (2013) reveals that there are two versions of the strategy of intimidation, which are compellence and deterrence. Compellence as a strategy is meant to generally seek to intimidate an adversary into pushing him to give up a political objective, if possible without violence, that is, without fighting, grounded on the danger of action. As for deterrence, the author holds that it seeks to intimidate an enemy into not taking action, that is, not to pursue a political end, thanks to the threat to use force. This strategy is basically utilized as a defensive strategy. The writer explains that both approaches of strategy use threats. A good example of compellence is Hitler's invasion of Denmark.

Shirer (1990) informed that on April 9, 1940, the Germans delivered their ultimatum at 4.20 Am, requiring the Danes immediately to accept the "protection of the Reich" with no resistance. While at the time the King of Denmark and his advisors debated their options with the Danish Army Chief, General William Prior, formations of Hitler's bombers overflowed the city, dropping propaganda brochures calling for peace while a negotiation was underway between the Danish and German governments. The display of German airplanes and the vision of a destroyed Copenhagen from the air, combined with Hitler's military forces in the city, intimidated the Danish King and his advisors against the advice of General Prior. The automatic outcome is that the Danish accepted the German demands, despite the fact that they witnessed demonstrations from the Danish people.

In compellence, the threat seeks out to force an enemy to do something, while in deterrence the threat seeks out to dissuade the enemy from doing something (Bowdish, 2013). In deterrence the utilization of force is regarded as a failure of the strategy meanwhile in compellence a partial use of force is an option in order to make the strategy effective. Bowdish (2013) takes the case of terrorism as an example of intimidation through compellence. He points out that terrorism has always been regarded as the thoughtful and systematic murder of innocents to stimulate fear for political objectives. There are two approaches in terrorism, that is, a political message that consists of a terrorizing act of propaganda by word, in giving a description of the desired political objective that the targeted inhabitants should have in the very purpose of avoiding killing. The other approach is a terrorizing act of propaganda of the deed. In this perspective, intimidation is made possible through an act of violence, which demonstrates the killing

power of the terrorists, with additional threat of more destruction of innocent people to come, (Bowdish, 2013).

The attacks by Al Qaeda against the World Trade Center and Pentagon are an illustration of how the strategy of intimidation through compellence is employed as the basis for terrorists (Bowdish, 2013). In his 1998 fatwa, bin Laden gave his political objective to rid Islamic lands of American presence by the killing of Americans. In his fatwa, bin Laden (1998) contended the followings:

“The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military— is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. ... We—with God's help—call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.”

Bowdish (2013) explains that the indiscriminate killing of Americans had to serve as a lesson to others to intimidate them from supporting US presence in Islamic lands. The assaults on the World Trade Center and Pentagon gave the impression that Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden, the origin of the threats, were more powerful than they really were. The veracity and reach of the attack were so convincing displaying that more killing was scheduled if the U.S. did not withdraw from the Middle East. However, Al-Qaeda did not intimidate the government of the United States, as the U.S. did not withdraw from the Middle East and embarked on a campaign to wipe out Al-Qaeda. This illustrates the risks involved if the strategy of intimidation comes to fail (Bowdish, 2013).

Then Bowdish (2013) goes on to observe that the strategy of intimidation through deterrence seeks to scare the enemy from seeking a political objective through the threat of force. The writer quotes Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms which provides the following definition of deterrence: “The prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits”. The writer underscores that the psychology of deterrence is based on a significant assessment of beliefs. This implies that the deterring party must project that it values the political object with the intent to back up the use of force if the other side attempts to gain the political objective, the threatened side must believe that the deterring side has both the possibility to do costly

harm out of proportion to the possible gain associated with the objective and the intent to do so. As a result, the author admits that the credibility, both in the power behind the threat and the intent to employ it, is of vital importance in the strategy of intimidation through deterrence.

An illustration of this strategy was in the nuclear impasse between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. Pedlow (1997) contended that the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 created a collective defense policy between Western Europe and the United States against any attack by the URSS, a mounting threat. Article 5 of the treaty affirmed, "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or America shall be considered an attack against them all". Soviet aggression against any NATO state had to be deterred by the threat of a nuclear strike by the United States. From this point of view, the two nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to terminate WW II seemed convincing for a US strike. While the effectiveness of the strategy of intimidation is not easy to evaluate as the intentions and beliefs of policy-makers cannot be known for certain, the URSS did not attack any NATO states, even if it did occupy other non- NATO European states during the Cold War, (Pedlow, 1997).

11.5 The Strategy of Decapitation

Bartholomees, Jr. (2010) holds that the strategy of decapitation consists of eliminating specially the enemy chief commander, or leader. Today the strategy is mostly known as *regime change*, which aims at concentrating systematically on the enemy regime leadership. In this regard, there may be some supposition without proof that the present leader of a political regime (supposedly supported by a group of complices) is the entire reason for an international dispute. The outcome of that supposition is the elimination of the present malevolent leadership, which will probably end in its replacement by a regime disposed to grant the concessions required by the opposing nation or state alliance (Bartholomees, Jr., 2010). The problem with the strategy of decapitation is the validity of the assumptions around it. First, the assumption that the population of a nation is good and might not conceivably endure the policies of their wicked leader is not true in the majority of cases (Bartholomees, Jr., 2010). As a result, decapitation will not resolve the problem for the reason that simply removing the government does not systematically terminate or stop the determination of either the military forces or the people (Bartholomees, Jr., 2010). In the second assumption, we

can see that a potential new regime does not necessarily guarantee that the new leadership would be better than the current one. Bartholomees, Jr. (2010) contends that achieving political objectives with decapitation is very poor, if not very limited. The Bush Administration understood it with its invasion of Iraq despite a successful removal of Saddam Hussein's regime.

The strategy of decapitation is the last military strategy we have dealt with in this chapter. The strategy is interesting as it displays the fact that if military commanders in a battlefield are eliminated, then the soldiers are dispersed and might possibly fight at every flank. And this might cause them to retreat or eventually be destroyed. It is admitted that on the battlefield military forces receive order to execute a given military mission, but if military commanders are destroyed, military forces might be disorganized.

In the present regime change as the modern adaptation of the strategy of decapitation, we are convinced that it is not that bad as a strategy. We have seen different types of strategies, and hold that none of them has to be overlooked. In the case of regime change it is true that it might not work in every case, but we disagree with the author when he says that achieving political ends with that strategy is very poor, because it depends on the situation. We contend it because every use of decapitation is case specific as exemplified with Côte D'Ivoire during the political crisis raised after the disputed presidential elections of December 2010. There has been a regime change and the country is currently witnessing political stability and economic development.

What the author has not mentioned is that a regime change can be the cause of political instability, economic unrest and eventually chaos. In effect, we have seen the disappearance of some states after they had undergone a regime change. The most glaring illustration is Libya after the killing of its leader Qaddafi in October 2011 (decapitation), the new Libyan rulers were divided into two groups and engaged in a civil war which today is not actually over and puts that country in an unprecedented political instability. Accordingly, Libya no longer exists as a state neither as a nation. From that point of view, we can conclude that the strategy of decapitation is not appropriate every time, but is to be considered.

TERRORISM, A MOUNTING ISSUE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

We are now entering a field that requires military attention as two basic doctrines to fight terrorism are usually considered: counterterrorism and terrorism preemption. There are also other approaches such as appeasement, but no matter the doctrine that we choose to address the issue of terrorism, we need a deep involvement of the military, to some extent, the police. In this section, we investigate military threats from non-state actors, we also scrutinize what the international community has been doing so far with regard to the responses it provides to deal with such a controversial issue as terrorism. In some cases, the global community favors appeasement, zero tolerance, containment and diplomatic measures, sometimes as just mentioned counterterrorism or preemption, that is, to combat fire with fire. In this perspective the war against terrorism is not going well, despite the bold pronouncements of the Clinton Administration, the United States basically reacts – and often, badly – to attacks on its nationals and interests abroad (Sloan, 2000). Equally important, is the fact that the media, wrongly or rightly, has as well projected to foreign people the image of an often hostile and self-righteous world power that is unproductive in countering skilled and strong-minded enemies who are taking the offensive in an even more aggressive violent form of conflict. While these depictions may not be exact, they do highpoint a bad reality abroad (Sloan, 2000). In spite of the bold political discourses, those who attack the United States have conducted their operations with relative impunity.

In spite of the propagation of security measures and training in counterterrorist strategies, in spite of its definite desire to go on an offensive approach, Washington, is all the same in a fundamentally passive and reactive position abroad (Sloan, 2000). This is due to the absence of an efficient doctrine to counter non-state violence in general, and especially a doctrine of terrorism preemption that can be part of founding the development of the necessary skills and policies to take the initiative away from the terrorists. As we develop it in this section, terrorism can be regarded as a form of criminality. It seems that for the author, the United States has to change its approach towards terrorism in adapting a more preemptive approach. Of course, our aim is not to say whether preemption or counterterrorism is the best approach. Our preoccupation in this section is to examine the different approaches that are explored by the global community in addressing the problem of terrorism, or somewhat in combatting it. Sloan

(2000) supported that terrorism is the manifestation of the changing nature of warfare, or certainly a new form of warfare.

A number of possibilities are explored to combat terrorism in the United States: they can stress the significance of law enforcement function, the crucial role of the intelligence community, the employment of diplomacy or the prerequisite to engage in military actions against non-state violence and the sponsors of terrorist groups abroad (Sloan, 2000). The author argued that regrettably the utilization of force until his writings (2000) has been regarded uniquely as the last resort option in retaliation to a continuing incident. The reluctance to employ the military option to reactive missions, much less in preemptive actions, is the combination of an essential omission in enhancing an important capability to attack terrorists abroad (Sloan, 2000).

The problem is that before even the Clinton Administration with various civilian politicians in general and the military in particular, terrorism is still not regarded as to be a form of warfare that demands a military response (Sloan, 2000). If there has been a failure to implement a counterterrorism doctrine, and especially a doctrine of terrorism preemption, it is specifically due to the fact that the military is not disposed to admit that terrorism is a new form of warfare that demands a military doctrine to address it abroad (Sloan, 2000). Obviously, the writer underscored that the military may not be willing or have the capability to be involved in this new form of warfare. May be senior officers and officials in the Department of Defense would rather fight the old wars of the interstate nature, or expectantly be ready to fight the most unlikely kind of future wars abroad (Sloan, 2000).

At the same time, the writer noted that even though the military is undecided, non-state military forces already declared a war on and engaged action against the United States and its allies. Subsequently, whether the military wants it or not, it must design a doctrine that will allow it, together with the Congress, the establishment of foreign policy and when needed, an outstanding role in the use of the tactics and the strategies of the art of warfare not uniquely to react to but to engage those who are now undertaking terroristic warfare abroad (Sloan, 2000). The writer acknowledged that this is not to advocate that such a doctrine ought to deal uniquely with the use of military forces. As terrorism has various features, is combated on several fronts, and is constantly shifting, the armed forces should work with all the institutions and agencies in charge of fighting terrorism. One of the characteristics of this section is to emphasize on the role the military should play in providing a doctrinal leadership in what is now a very real warfare.

Sloan (2000) informed that the contemporary age of terrorism was manifest in the killing of eleven Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972. Ever since, the brief electronic images of terrorists holding hostages and authorities at bay have been projected on the screens of televisions on a regular basis. The bombings, the skyjackings, hostage takings, assassinations and other acts of massacre continue to be the main topics of the media and strengthen a public view that the global community is either reluctant or incapable of responding to – much less take action against – those who are engaging in a progressively damaging attack on the fragile civil order abroad (Sloan, 2000). Regrettably, as stated by the writer, that perception is fundamentally right. In spite of general statements of condemnation and the drafting of agreements or other diplomatic actions, an integrated global approach to fight terrorism is not even put in place.

Sloan (2000) indicated that since President Nixon, the official policy was no concessions to any terrorists' demands. But the official policy of no concessions has been disregarded incident after incident. The Reagan Administration illustrated the case with negotiations and concessions that conducted to the liberation of the passengers on TWA Flight 547 in Lebanon in 1985. At the same time, President Reagan and many of his senior advisors have publicly declared that they will take an even aggressive posture against global terrorism than previous administrations did. Yet modern programs to fight terrorism remain basically defensive and reactive.

The explanation for this posture is complex and intertwined as at the most senior level there are still no consistent policy. This means that each situation determines the reaction, and although military action might have been undertaken, it has only been engaged after a terrorist attack has hit (Sloan, 2000). Most importantly, the souvenirs of the aborted Iranian hostage rescue attempt raise severe interrogations about the capacity of the United States to take action against, or take a preemptive posture against non-state military forces. The author brought about another argument, that is, the preoccupation over the life of the hostages, intensified by amplified media coverage, leads policymakers to start negotiations in lieu of real military action against the criminals abroad (Sloan, 2000).

In presenting the issue of terrorism, we have not defined what terrorism is until now. We regard terrorism as an act of violence mostly perpetrated against civilians to spread a general climate of fear. Terrorism has two main objectives: to compel policymakers to do something or to deter them from doing something. To convey their

message terrorists use intimidation through act of violence or criminality intending to scare the targeted population of the intended victim state. This violence is manifested through mass killing of bomb attacks, exploding buildings, airport, airplanes etc. We talk about scaring people not policymakers because they are never scared as they are always secure. We rather talk about their civilians whom they have the responsibility to protect, maybe not only using a defensive approach, but as well a preemptive one.

Sloan (2000) admitted that defining terrorism is not easy as the definition has to take into consideration a number of characteristics. He underlined that terrorism can be regarded as premeditated and calculated utilization of force to reach certain objectives. Cooper (1974, p.4) defined terrorism as “a purposeful human activity primarily directed toward the creation of a general climate of fear designed to influence, in ways desired by the protagonists, other human beings, and through them some course of events”. In this perspective, Sloan (2000) argued that terrorism is goal-directed criminality. This means that its perpetrators should not be rational, but their actions are far from mindless. It is therefore utilized to promote certain response from the actual victims and from a greater public.

As Cooper (1974) stressed that terrorism is directed to the creation of a general climate of fear, Sloan (2000) supported that it can be argued that terrorism is essentially a physiological weapon, for those who utilize it play on the most elemental terrors. As terror is a human natural phenomenon, terrorism is its watchful exploitation. The author went on to explain that those who initiate terrorism search to exploit both individual and collective fear of what may come to pass. Terrorists look for ways to integrate a fear into the mind of people and intimidation as they engage acts that oblige individuals and groups of people to integrate the existence of life-frightening situations of which they are not the perpetrators. They enjoy crucial success when they can integrate into the mind of the intended victim audience a common sense of haplessness and powerlessness.

It can therefore be acknowledged that acts of terrorism are used to establish a specific mental state, a state of terror targeted at the audiences watching. Sloan (2000, p. 2) quoted Richard Clutterbuck in his book Guerrillas and Terrorists, who noted that “terrorism aims, by the use of violence or the threat of violence, to coerce governments, authorities, or populations by inducing fear”. By quoting this author Sloan (2000) implied that beyond individuals, acts of terrorism are also directed towards institutions. Any doctrine that would be used to counter terrorism should acknowledge that it is a form of psychological operations (PSYOP).

However, it can be acknowledged that maybe the most outstanding point in developing a doctrine to aggressively counter terrorism is an acknowledgment that the techniques of psychological intimidation as employed by terrorists can be a weapon against them abroad (Sloan, 2000). In this regard, Sloan (2000, p.3) quoted Gazit and Handel from the book Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Counterintelligence, who noted that “psychological warfare is a powerful weapon in the war against terrorism. Its aim is to hit the terrorist organization at its most vulnerable spot—the motivation of its members and the readiness of others to join its ranks and operate within its framework”. Sloan (2000) underlined that if an offensive is to be propelled against terrorists, the authorities should take initiatives towards their own tactics or campaign to create fear.

As terrorism as a psychological weapon is intended to a larger public than the immediate victims, it is important to acknowledge that terrorism is as well a method of communication abroad (Sloan, 2000). To prove it, Sloan (2000, p.3) quoted another definition of terrorism (Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism) that states that “terrorism is the threat of violence and the use of fear to coerce, persuade, and gain public attention”. The writer explained that non-state military forces aim to communicate something on a small or national scale about their purposes, such as simple assertions of their existence, specific demands, or evidence of their power to control the course of events and impose subsequent exigencies. They need to evidence their capacity to intimidate, weaken or bring a government to collapse, in the purpose to gain recognition for themselves and their purposes.

Sloan (2000) pointed out that any policy to counterterrorism should integrate the means by which the message of terror and intimidation can be not simply undermined but also substituted by a signal that the government or the authorities are able to eradicate the agenda of terror established by acts of terrorism. Through manifest operations the authorities should display *to the audiences watching* that they are meeting the threat of terrorism efficiently. Another argument the author underscored is that the authorities should demonstrate that they have the capacity to indicate non-state actors that they cannot engage in their acts of massacre without being punished. Sloan (2000) specified that terrorism is without doubt a crime, but terrorists may perceive themselves as soldiers in a conventional sense. Moreover, several countries which sponsor terrorism view such actions as an element in a military strategy. Definitely, to differentiate between terrorism as a criminal act and as an act of political or armed conflict is more and more

being intertwined, as it is the case with the marriage of convenience between terrorists and drug dealers that has conducted to the development of narcoterrorism.

Terrorists are murderers, but it is as well important to acknowledge that terrorism is a different type of conflict, and that overcoming it will require not only the implication of the law enforcement community but also that of the military abroad (Sloan, 2000). At the same time, it must be emphasized that considering terrorism as to be more than a criminal act does not suggest that the criminal has some degree of legitimacy for his or her actions. Sloan (2000, p. 4) quoted Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick from “Defining Terrorism”, *Catholicism in Crisis* who noted:

“Terrorism is *political* in a way that crime is not; the terrorists act in the name of some political, some public purpose. [However,] while the conception of the actor transforms the act, and while a purpose related to a public goal makes an act political, it does not make it moral. A public purpose does not make a terrorist who has been arrested a political prisoner.”

What comes out from the author’s observations is that terrorism should be regarded as a form of criminality. Then the author went on to assert that terrorism can also be considered as a form of political warfare. In this respect, he indicated that terrorism has been and will continue to be used as a tool of political destabilization. As a result, terrorism is one of the strategies and tactics related to the concept of “indirect aggression” as established by the Soviet Union and practiced by various countries (Sloan, 2000).

On the word of the author, terrorism is the systematic attempt to destabilize a society with the final objective of causing the collapse of law and order and the loss of self-confidence in the state. As for the writer, it has become a chief tool in protracted political warfare that is in an environment where there is neither war nor peace. To design a policy of counterterrorism, strategists should develop the capacity to engage in the own political warfare of non-state military forces (Sloan, 2000). It will require the critical role of the intelligence community as it gathers information and carries out operations against terrorists and the states that sponsor them (Sloan, 2000).

CHAPTER 12: MILITARY THREATS FROM TERRORISTS

12.1 The Increase of Political Non-State Violence in the World

Hough (2008) underlined that the rise of this form of warfare can be justified by the coming together of two features. The first factor allows the weak to take on the strong. This cannot only be attributed to non-state actors, because this phenomenon is not new. Guerrilla conflict dates back to the Peninsular War at the beginning of the 19th century when irregular Portuguese and Spanish forces were capable to reach military achievements over a far stronger French invading military. The same occurred at the end of the 20th century when Vietnamese and Afghani *Davids* were capable to prevail on the American and Soviet *Goliaths* . The second factor behind the rise of *the era of terrorism* is the advance of communication technology in the end of the 20th century (Hough, 2008).

For terrorism to be effective it needs an audience to communicate its message to and bring terror to. The widespread and sophisticated utilization of internet by Al Qaeda embodies the most obvious illustration of the age of terrorism (Hough, 2008). Low-priced and available flight tickets have as well contributed to the facilitation of the international operations of non-state violence. Globalization has also been a contributor to non-state political violence in helping raise funds for the campaigns of terrorists (Hough, 2008). This is illustrated by the fact that it has specifically helped nationalist groups as expatriate communities in other countries are often disposed to support the struggle of their brothers in the name of brotherly love or brotherhood.

In this viewpoint, Irish republicanism greatly profited from fundraising among American citizens of Irish descent, in the meantime Sikh nationalism in the 1980s was as much organized by Indian migrants in Canada as those residing in the country looking for secession from India (Hough, 2008). The writer emphasized that globalization also participated in the easy acquisition of weapons by terrorists since the end of the Cold War. This acquisition is consequential of their fundraising activities. Political non-state violence has little by little come to be more and more globalized, however this trend is not entirely new. Marxist-leaning and armed Marxist groups synchronized their actions in the 1970s as illustrated by the 1975 kidnapping at an OPEC meeting in Vienna wherein the suspect trinity of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Red Army Faction and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine were involved. Carlos the Jackal played the role of

the freelance international terrorist, connecting such leftist groups in this era, in the same way Osama bin Laden had been doing since 1990 for Islamic radicals (Hough, 2008).

The author underscored that terror tactics of non-state violence are countless and have advanced across the time. The hijacking of airplanes (skyjacking) was the favorite tactics of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the takeover of diplomatic missions was common place in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Recurrent favorite strategies include the assassination of very important personalities (VIPs), hostage-taking and the detonating of bombs in government or public buildings (Hough, 2008). The 9/11 attacks are amazingly the combination of skyjacking and the total destruction of public buildings with the additional ingredient of suicide bombing in a single unprecedented initiative.

The writer has highlighted the factors that are accountable for the rise of political non-state violence in the age of terrorism. The author mentioned that the advance of communication technology in the latter part of the 20th century is a significant factor that fostered terrorism. We have seen in the introduction of this section that terrorism is a form of psychological weapon, as such terrorists need to convey a message not only to the governments of the victim states, but also to the people watching it from all around the world. To convey their message of terror, they need means of communication, that is, technology. It is in this perspective that terrorists overused the internet as a result of globalization.

Another aspect globalization has provided is the facility to acquire weapons in the weapons market. Arguably, if terrorists have a coercive power today it is because most of them are supported financially at a global scale as their propaganda helps them raise funds for the paramilitary operations they undertake. The nationalists abroad who support them ideologically also support them financially. The financial power of the terrorists allows them to acquire the weapons needed to strike their intended victims and to a lesser instant, make bombs. It cannot be denied that among terrorists we have educated people with certain scientific capabilities, allowing them to invent some explosive materials. The good news until now is that no non-state military actor has ever acquired biological or nuclear weapons allowing it to strike wherever and whoever it wants.

To acquire the components that are needed for the creation of such weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is difficult, otherwise the whole world would have been imperiled. We insist that terrorists have qualified personnel to manufacture such weapons; hopefully they never found what it takes to make them. Another good news is

that no terrorist organization has nuclear weapons. The reality is that such acquisition would bring non-state military actors to be undoubtedly regarded as new actors of international law, as their power would be comparable to that of the nation-state. Of course, state violence can be legitimized in international law, but such has never been the case with non-state violence. Therefore, in such a context, terrorist organizations would have the power to coerce comparable to that of the nation-state with the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Table: Top ten bloodiest single acts of non-state terrorist violence, Hough (2008, p.76).

Place	Date	No. killed	Action	Perpetrators
1 New York/Washington DC/ Pennsylvania	Sept. 2001	2998	Hijack of airplanes and suicide attacks on government and public building	Al-Qaeda
2 Abadan, Iran	Aug. 1978	430	Arson of theatre	Islamic revolutionaries
3 Beslan, Russia	Sept. 2004	331	Hostages held at a school killed during siege	Chechen separatists
4 North Atlantic	June, 1985	331	Bombings of Indian passenger plane	Sikh nationalists
5 Mumbai	Mar. 1993	317	Series of bombings	Local Islamic gangsters allegedly working for Pakistani government
6 Beirut	Oct. 1983	299	Suicide bombing of US and French troops	Hizbullah
7 Lockerbie, UK	Dec. 1988	259	US passenger plane Bombed	Libyan-backed anti-Western group
8 Nairobi	Aug. 1988	257	Bombing of US embassies	Al-Qaeda
9 Mumbai	July 2006	209	Bombings of railway stations	Kashmiri liberationists
10 Bali	Oct. 2002	202	Tourist (chiefly Australian) nightclub bombing	Jammu Islam

Note: List excludes casualty figures from full-scale civil wars and counter-invasion insurgencies.

Terrorist State

Sloan (2000) informed that in this situation a state is apparently using the strategies of non-territorial global terrorism against US citizens and interests abroad. It is manifest with an assault on a US embassy or other American installations, the takeover of hostages, the holding of a takeover airplane and similar incidents. Although this is not a form of state-sponsored terrorism, it is indeed a terrorist state using the most powerful form of armed diplomacy (Sloan, 2000). Such an act is closely to be compared to an act of war. Then it would justify counterterrorist operations from the United States, which should be engaged as fast as possible. The sort of target selected for a strike of retaliation could be a governmental installation, especially a military base. The kind of military forces employed could be conventional or special assets used either jointly or individually (Sloan, 2000).

General constraints would be essential on the utilization of military forces in invasive attacks in order to reduce the possibility of civilian casualties and retaliation against American nationals, given that the public awareness of the operation will be widespread once it was launched. This type of secret action would be a signal to the American audience of the resolve capacity of the government to effectively respond to an incident. It would also be a signal to the terrorist state that by undertaking actions against the United States it cannot remain unpunished (Sloan, 2000).

As we observe, the terrorist state is a depiction of a state that is not having good diplomatic relations with the United States, although diplomatic ties might exist, they are embryonic. There is no cooperation with the government of the United States whether at the social, technical, military or economic levels. The point is that the state in question might not be an obvious enemy of the United States, but is less likely to offer collaboration neither. At this stage, it can be argued that a terrorist state may be the refuge of non-state military groups, but of course it would not admit it. We can compare a terrorist state to a rogue state that displays what President Bush father Administration called “uncertainty” or “unpredictability”. It is evident that the terrorist state represents a threat to the national security of the United States.

It is complex to preemptively undertake military actions against a terrorist state without a certain legitimation from the American citizens in particular and the world in general. An example of rogue-terrorist state has been Iraq. When Saddam Hussein decided to invade Kuwait in 1990, the Bush Administration decided to take action against Iraq, the question is: were American interests and citizens in jeopardy during the Gulf War? Well, although it is difficult to assert whether US interests were threatened, what is sure is that American civilians were not endangered during the war. But this example of the Gulf War should display how a terrorist state can behave sometimes, or how from that time the US government obtained legitimacy to preemptively take action against any act of aggression. Another response to a terrorist state is again the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. We would like to highlight that a terrorist state is a state of course that would never declare a war to the United States, but uses what the author has called *armed diplomacy*, a more subtle warfare that is directed against the security of US citizens and interests overseas.

12.2 State-Supported Terrorism

Sloan (2000) showed that in this situation it is more difficult to certify if the state is secretly implicated in preparing for or engaging in a terrorist act. Of course, that state may be acting that way while simultaneously denying this support to terrorist groups to the rest of the world. In fact, the state might be sustaining nonterritorial global terrorist groups as a form of indirect aggression against the target state – for the purpose of our study, the United States. In the meantime, if there is a manifest indication of the culpability of the state, direct military actions can be undertaken against the supporting state and the terrorist organization just as in the case of the terrorist state (Sloan, 2000).

In this respect, Sloan (2000) sustained that special and conventional operations forces could be employed secretly, and there continues to be an exigency for constraints on the use of force. Meanwhile, the choice of targets is no longer confined to regular military forces and installations but may involve particular terrorist groups and their home headquarters, demanding secret action. Sloan (2000, p.34) mentioned Brian Jenkins, from his article “We Needn’t Rule out the Use of Force against Terrorism”, who stated: “Here we confront a campaign of terrorism instigated and directed by a handful of adversary states. Its violence is deadlier and can have a serious effect on American policy. *Here, defensive measures may not be enough*”.

Considering this passage, it is plain that the writer believed that solely dealing with terrorist acts on the defensive posture is not the right doctrine. It seems that a clear preemptive counterterrorism doctrine is to be the priority of the United States. Therefore, instead of retaliating each time an attack is perpetrated against the United States, the government has to adopt a proactive and preemptive approach towards terrorist activities. We admit that Georges W. Bush adopted this approach with what he called the “War on Terror” during the time he was in office. This political approach however, was adopted as a retaliation to the 9/11 attacks. What the author tried to point out is that the permanent political attitude of the United States should be terrorism preemption. On the word of the author there is no way we can negotiate with terrorist perpetrators, we have to punish them, that is, to eliminate or destroy them. Their destruction will require undertaking military preemptive actions.

12.3 Non-State Radical Violence without Sponsorship and Non-State Military Groups

Sloan (2000) admitted that it is not easy to start action against the government of a state which is either not disposed or competent to deal with its own extremists. Equally important, terrorists can basically be regarded as *non-state actors*, and as such considering the use of force against them is not easy. As it is also difficult to prove state culpability or implication, there are serious concerns about the use of any armed forces in either terrorism preemption or counterterrorism operations. Arguably, if we consider that such terrorist groups are engaging in a form of warfare, covert military operations can be envisaged, especially by the personnel of the Special Forces community (Sloan, 2000). The writer advocated the creation of a new force to engage in this type of warfare in covert operations, wherein the targets may be terrorist organizations and irregular forces.

Another argument the author brought about is that because such operations would necessarily be secret, there would be fewer constraints on the use of force. The operations will convey to terrorist groups the message that their acts of massacre will not remain unpunished. In other words, they cannot continue to act in impunity. As such military operations would be secret and the signal would not be destined to a large public awareness. As the aim of the United States is to counter these non-state military groups, the U.S. should also use long-standing psychological operations intended to break down the determination of terrorist groups and their paramilitary operations (Sloan, 2000). According to the writer, one can consider additional preemptive actions before such

groups increase their capacity to initiate operations against American nationals and interests at the local and national levels or overseas (Sloan, 2000).

Non-State Military Groups

Sloan (2000) acknowledged that this is perhaps the most difficult kind of situation to consider. Despite the fact that terrorist groups may consider themselves as engaging in their own nonterritorial or non-state type of warfare, they are as well civilian actors and so it is not easy to justify the use of armed forces against them. Furthermore, because the targets are humans and very small, terrorism preemption and counterterrorism missions might best be conducted by the clandestine services of the intelligence community. However, on the word of the author it is important to observe that although the operation is complex, experience has taught us that once small terrorist cells go preemptive they are not easy to stop, especially when they select easier targets of opportunity. It is in this respect that the author specified the criticality to consider terrorism preemption before such people engage their operations to the intended target.

As above-mentioned, along with the writer's view, it is critical to develop a new force to conduct such missions. Non-state violence is a type of warfare in a gray zone, and a preemptive force would have the capability to undertake military activities in black operations (Sloan, 2000). Considering the extremely secret nature of such missions, the constraints on the utilization of force would virtually be quasi absent as long as disclosure of the operation would be anticipated. It is important to observe that in these kinds of military operations it is difficult not solely to target the organizational structure of huge terrorist groups, but also to target the individual cells of very small terrorist groups is even more challenging (Sloan, 2000).

The author stated a fact that should be considered here, that is the reality that terrorists are first and foremost civilian actors despite their claims of conducting their own nonterritorial and non-state type of warfare. Therefore, it is problematical to justify the use of military forces against civilians. Well, we admit that they may be civilians, but they are as well criminals, authors of acts of extreme violence. Of course undertaking robust military actions against them can be regarded as a violation of international law if such actions are disclosed to public awareness.

The problem with this assumption is that at times they are military groups armed in a conventional way, they might not own tanks, helicopters, cruise missiles or other similar weapons, but they have the coercive power necessary to destabilize the authority of a

state. This is why dealing with non-state military groups is not always a question of covert military actions. We validate the statement of the writer regarding the creation of a military unit from the intelligence community targeted to address non-state violence in a clandestine basis, that is, the use of force would not be restricted given the nondisclosure of the operations. This of course aimed to engage terrorists covertly and destroying them and discouraging any further attempts to terroristic activity. On the other hand, terrorists seemed and seem not to be intimidated by such actions advocated by Sloan. Military actions are not necessarily to be undertaken covertly when the terrorist organization openly take initiatives against a state.

For example, the military operations engaged against the Islamist State militant soldiers in Mosul (Iraq) in 2017 are a perfect illustration of a non-state violence against the authority of a state. The Iraqi military is fighting the insurgents as they keep perpetrating acts of violence on civilians who are under their control. The government is apparently undertaking a counterterrorist operation against the military group, with some constraints on the use of force. Indeed, it can be admitted that any use of chemical or biological weapons against the insurgents would be considered a direct violation of international law

CHAPTER 13: STATE RESPONSES TO MILITARY THREATS FROM NON-STATE ACTORS

13.1 Appeasement, Zero Tolerance, Containment and Diplomatic Measures

Appeasement

Hough (2008) observed that one option available to governments in addressing the challenge of terrorism is to come to some type of arrangement with the terrorist group threatening to engage or continue a campaign of violence. This may take a form of concession to the demands of a military group regarding a particular issue or action, such as an agreement to release political prisoners in exchange for the safe release of hostages. Governments have carried out this course of action more often than it is sometimes valued as a simple means to avoid killing. Of course, concessions are often kept covert by governments because they do not want citizens or potential terrorists to consider them as cowards. The Japanese government is a good illustration in a sense that it made various significant and covert concessions to the Japanese Red Army in the 1970s. The author observed that all governments, although they deny it, have given concessions to terrorism from time to time to avoid killing (Hough, 2008).

The writer brought about another argument accountable for appeasement, that is, in response to longer-term campaign of violence from non-state military groups, the authorities of a country may come to the realization that the unique way to reach peace is through some kind of peace talks with the terrorist organization as in the case of inter-state conflicts are every so often settled. Actually, concession is more likely to occur in a state war against a terrorist group than in war with another state since absolute military defeat of the enemy is not the issue. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) possibly never comprised more than 1000 active militants but the UK military forces were not able to defeat them, given that its members were not clearly distinguishable from ordinary citizens (Hough, 2008).

Since many IRA cells operated in London and elsewhere in England, this brought the UK government to covertly initiate a dialogue with the IRA in 1985, conducting finally to a compromise peace talk which saw a previous IRA member take up a position within a power-sharing executive seat for Northern Ireland (Hough, 2008). The Irish peace settlement represents a mutual compromise, with the IRA landing down its armed struggle in exchange for a share of power; but non-state violence may succeed to win a long-standing campaign and oblige the surrender of the government. The African

National Congress (ANC) definitely obliged the white minority government of South Africa to give in and accept a democratic revolution (Hough, 2008).

In situations where rebel groups represent a minority opinion then appeasement is less likely to be achieved from a democratic perspective. In this respect, Neumann (2007) underlined that negotiations with non-state actors are the only way a democratic government can expect to terminate a conflict. In the meantime, he observed that the process needs to be well shaped than making unexpected major concessions. He took the case of the Colombian government which made some concessions to leftist guerrillas in 1998, including conceding a huge tract of land to the FARC – which became known, unofficially as Farmland –, permitted the empowerment of the guerrillas in lieu of terminating the war. The requirement of integrating armed rebels into the democratic process has to be phased on a gradual basis as exemplified with Northern Ireland (Neumann, 2007).

As we see it, appeasement is a method of conflict resolution between governments and non-state actors, based on mutual concession. Our aim here is not to judge which approach is best to counter terrorism or address this issue. We just want to consider it as one of the options governments have at their disposal. We can imagine how difficult and embarrassing this option may be for the authorities who may use it as the last resort. We have mentioned that terrorists are criminals. Now, the question is: why is it that governments negotiate with perpetrators of acts violence?

The author asserted that governments accept to negotiate settlements with non-state actors to avoid the killing of their nationals who are victims of hostage-takers overseas. It can be argued that negotiation in this situation seems to be an obligation, in order to avert the massacres of their citizens detained overseas or nationally by terrorist groups. As it is so humiliating for governments to negotiate with the perpetrators of violence, they undertake such peace talks secretly.

We have seen with Hough that many peace settlements between the government and terrorists have gone well allowing the release of hostages for governments and political prisoners for rebellious groups. Because appeasement has some drawbacks as the Colombian government experienced in the 1998 aforementioned peace settlement, which was a failure, other governments have rejected appeasement as a way to terminate warfare, given that it is not every peace process that has been successful as that of Northern Ireland and the UK government. So, other governments have opted for zero tolerance, with all its consequences for the life of potential victims of hostage-takers.

Zero tolerance

Hough (2008) underscored that while appeasement may spare the lives of civilians in the short term, the potential drawback of this approach to conflict resolution with terrorists is that it might encourage other non-state actors that violence pays out. The official approach of the governments of the United States, Israel and Russia, the main three targets of many terrorists in recent years, has been mainly characterized by the phrase *no deal with terrorists*. President Putin has declared this with explicit terms: “Russia does not negotiate with terrorists, it destroys them” (Hough, 2008). The foundation of such a rough strategy is the belief that only by being viewed not to give in can non-state violence be dissuaded in the long term. The short-term outcome may be a loss of lives, however the famous military adage that you may have to lose a battle in order to win the war holds water (Hough, 2008).

The author illustrated it by the concessions by the Indian government to Islamic militants who skyjacked a passenger plane in 1999 which produced some hostile reactions in the national press, especially in the eve of the 9/11 attacks on the United States and its full-scale military response. In this respect, Hough (2008, p. 79) quoted Chellaney from his article *India Paying for its Soft Response to Terror*, who posited:

“If any state deals with terrorists, it not only encourages stepped-up terrorism against its own interests but also creates problems for other nations. A classic case is India’s ignominious surrender to the hijackers of flight IC-814. One freed terrorist hand-delivered by the foreign minister is the suspected financier of Mohammed Atta, the alleged ringleader in the September 11th terrorist strikes. Another released terrorist founded a group in Pakistan that has claimed responsibility for major Kashmir strikes.”

Hough (2008) stated that proof as to whether zero tolerance or appeasement is the most fruitful strategy to address non-state violence is not clear. Hough (2008, p. 79) quoted Laqueur from his article *Reflection on the Eradication of Terrorism*, who made the case for zero tolerance when observing that “the more severe the repression, the less terrorism tends to occur”. Laqueur founded this assertion on remarking the relative lack of non-state violence in authoritarian political systems compared to democratic systems, observing that “terrorism in Spain gathered strength only after General Franco died”. Hough (2008) recognized that there is some truth in that assumption of Laqueur; yet, there is little chance that the citizens of most democratic countries would accept the idea of living in a police state in order to prevent terrorist threats. Besides, the zero tolerance

posture of the governments of the USA, Russia and Israel has been followed by amplified level of non-state violence committed on their citizens over the past decade.

Hough (2008, p. 79) illustrated how governments can differ in their approach to address non-state violence, when he postulated:

“An approach to non-state terrorism came in 1996 when the Peruvian Marxist revolutionary group MRTA entered the Japanese embassy in Lima and held the ambassador and hundreds of staff hostage (Peruvian President Fujimori was ethnically Japanese). The Peruvians sent in commandos, who succeeded in getting the hostages out whilst killing their captors (some allegedly by summary execution after they had been arrested). Ultimately, Fujimori’s overall stance against the twin threat posed by the MRTA and the Maoist Shining Path gives weight to Laqueur’s views on countering terrorism. He used the campaign against them to justify ‘emergency rule’ of Peru during his presidency, in which democracy was effectively suspended and special powers given to specialist military forces and intelligence services.”

Hough (2008) sustained that this approach to address terrorism by the Peruvian President drew some criticism within Peru, and principally from other countries, but was successful in incarcerating more than 1000 members of Shining Path and lessening their murderous campaign which had claimed 35,000 lives since 1980. In addition, the capability of the MRTA to threaten state’s authority has never been the same thing as a result of their defeat in 1996. All things considered, it seems that there is no simple easy answer to the question of whether or not governments must negotiate with non-state military groups or at least change their conduct in proportion to their demands (Hough, 2008).

The 9/11 attacks, the bloodiest terrorist attacks ever perpetrated in the United States, provoked a major retaliation with the use of the military which successfully inverted the image of the American government viewed as hosting terrorists in its soil and was responsible for the capture of various members of the perpetrators of the atrocity (Hough, 2008). At the same time, the 9/11 assaults also raised much discussion in the U.S. as to why they had been attacked. It is true that the U.S. never envisaged talking with non-state actors as it was not a serious option for the government, some reassessment of Middle East policy, underlying the factor accountable for anti-Americanism in groups such as Al-Qaeda, was implemented (Hough, 2008).

Accordingly, we observed President Bush in 2001, while preparing for war in Afghanistan recognized the unpopularity of his state’s traditional support for Israel in the Muslim world by affirming his support for a viable *Palestinian state* (Hough, 2008).

Additionally, in 2003 American troops started the process of their withdrawal from their bases in Saudi Arabia and therefore willingly or unwillingly started to satisfy a major demand of Al-Qaeda. Hough (2008) went on to underscore that the American and Israeli governments have a relatively tough posture in dealing with non-state military forces but the “no-deals” approach is actually more oratorical than concrete. The Israeli government had peace talks with non-state forces in the buildup of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and is known to have approved the release of Arab detainees (Hough, 2008).

Containment and Diplomatic Measures

Hough (2008) informed that the most quick and predictable response of the US government to the 9/11 attacks was to take practical measures to reduce the repetition of such an event. All governments confronted to a considerable threat of non-state forces seek for ways to secure themselves and their populations in blocking such threats by the toughening of prospective terrorist targets. Security measures were reinforced at the majority of international airports in the 1970s in retaliation to the popularity of skyjacking and as a result non-state forces stopped using this specific terror tactic (Hough, 2008).

Of course, the suicide pilots of the 9/11 strikes avoided meeting extensive security checks on international flights into the U.S. by taking over passenger airplanes on internal flights, reputed to be much laxer in security measures. Even at the wake of the bombing of Oklahoma in 1995, by the American anti-federalist Timothy McVeigh, the US understanding of security continued to be externalized and moved to tough checks on international flights in the 1990s (Hough, 2008). Conversely, since the 1970s airport security on internal flights in Israel has been as tight as it is the case for international flights. By 2001, US security on internal flights for the first time started to be comparable to that of Israel (Hough, 2008).

Hough (2008) reports that increased preoccupation with state-sponsored terrorism from the 1980s forward conducted to the amplified use of conventional foreign policy instruments aimed to pressure governments thought to be sponsoring or providing refuge to violent non-state military forces. In that case, the definite diplomatic option is the cutting of all diplomatic ties with another state. To withdraw diplomatic recognition to governments regarded as supporting terrorist groups sends a powerful political message, although an appropriate common response to this kind of situation, this is still a rare practice in IR (Hough, 2008).

One disadvantage of the contemporary diplomatic tendency of politicizing recognition – as opposed to the traditional *Lauterpacht doctrine* of giving recognition to a government that is in control whether one likes it or not – is that the consequential outsider states are left free from diplomatic influence. Hough (2008) contended that the fact that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan had never been recognized by the United States or any Western country made things difficult to make political pressure on the regime to give up members of Al-Qaeda located in their territory in the wake of the 2001 9/11 strikes on the United States.

Where diplomatic and economic ties exist, regimes supportive of violent non-state forces can be jeopardized upon the removal of economic cooperation with them, that is, cutting any financial support (Hough, 2008). Withdrawing recognition can push the states supportive of terrorism to shift their ways in order to reestablish economic ties with states from which they were not in good terms. An illustration of a diplomatic measure is notably the Qaddafi regime in Libya in the 1990s, which seemed to cease providing sponsoring to anti-Western terrorist groups in response to the diplomatic pressure of isolation and encouragement of the return to normal relations and beneficial trading relations (Hough, 2008).

13.2 Intergovernmental Collaboration and International Responses to Radical Non-State Violence

International Cooperation

Hough (2008) indicated that one of the primary actions undertaken by the government of the United States after the 9/11 attacks was the attempt to build a *coalition against terror*, acknowledging that it would be in need of the support of not only traditional allies but also that of as many countries as possible, in the purpose to pursue a long-lasting campaign against the perpetrators of such massacres. The diplomatic isolation of Afghanistan made the aid of its neighbor Pakistan indispensable, especially because it was one of only three states recognizing its government. In this respect, standard diplomatic bargaining was highly to the forefront with Pakistan rewarded by the U.S. for turning its back to Afghanistan, and taking the risk of undergoing the wrath of segments of its own people in acting this way. Sanctions imposed in the wake of testing its nuclear armament in 1998 and military coup d'état that had brought its leader Musharaf to office were lifted. The U.S. as well courted China and Russia, and states such as Syria, formerly declared by the United States as terrorist-sponsored state. Then

Hough (2008, p.84) made the following observation explaining as to why America needed to form a coalition:

“That the world’s only military superpower should need to coalition-build and horse-trade like this was testimony to the fact that the nature of military politics in a unipolar world is not necessarily distinct from previous eras of International Relations, even if the sources of insecurity are far different from that encountered by the statesmen of yesteryear. In 1999 Turkey secured the capture of the PKK leader Occalan with the assistance of Israeli secret services. The state system itself is challenged by the rise of political actors who defy traditional norms of sovereignty, diplomacy and the resort to arms, and its members are increasingly rallying to its defense.”

International Responses to Radical Non-State Violence

Hough (2008) underscored that it had taken an astonishingly long time for governments to provide global responses as a collectivity to seek to get rid of the universal threat posed by non-state military forces. The behavior of a number of states to highlight nationalist struggles or to see advantage in a rival nation being destabilized by civil conflict prompted the development of international law and other cooperative arrangements for several years (Hough, 2008). The Conventions of the UN outlawing skyjacking and hostage-taking were ratified in the 1960s and 1970s but it is not before 1985 that the Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions (579, 40/61) gathered almost all the of the global community (Cuba was the only nation to vote against the General Assembly Resolutions) in condemning all forms of non-state violence (Hough, 2008).

The writer claimed that countries have been slower in developing extradition treaties and allow Interpol investigation for politically rather than criminally-oriented assailants. The end of the Cold War enhanced solidarity and made the way for more systematic approach to political non-state terrorism. The G7 started an unprecedented approach for state collaboration against the threat of international non-state military groups in the 1990s (Hough, 2008). The G7 together with Russia in 1996 held a summit about terrorism in Lyon, which sought to coordinate the approach of states to the issue in a way that avoids the need for appeasement with hostage-takers and uniformly rough sentencing for this kind of act of criminality. The summit also included to collectively recognize non-state forces as illegitimate by criminalizing fundraising for such groups (Hough, 2008).

In 1993 the Security Council – under Resolution 864 – imposed sanctions on a non-state actor for the first time and was successful in bringing UNITA to the negotiating table through, travel ban, weapons and financial embargos on the members of the terrorist group. The achievement of these sanctions fostered similar Resolutions against the members of Al-Qaeda as a retaliation to the 2001 strikes on the United States. The writer informs that Resolution 1373 (2001) really goes above just targeting bin Laden and his allies, and demands the entire global community to outlaw the hosting and/or financing of all non-state violence. Another international response to radical non-state violence has been the UN's 2005 Madrid Summit (Hough, 2008). The summit was broadly reported to be a failure for not finding an agreed definition of terrorism. In the meantime, it did succeed to reach an agreement on the main approaches necessary to curb the problem of non-state military forces. Five pillars, or five "D"s, were identified and therefore amplified in a Global Strategy Against Terrorism release in 2006. The writer reports that the five pillars of the UN 2006 General Assembly are:

- Dissuade disaffected groups from choosing terrorism as a tactic to achieve their goals.
- Deny terrorists the means to carry out their attacks.
- Deter states from supporting terrorists.
- Develop state capacity to prevent terrorism.
- Defend human rights in the struggle against terrorism.

13.3 Counterterrorism and Its Limitations

Counterterrorism, a Question of Doctrine

Sloan (2000) advanced that if the capacity to engage in offensive operations against non-state forces and the states that sponsor them is to come true – whether such military operations are conducted within an extended definition of counterterrorism missions or under a new heading of terrorism preemption – the issues of definitions should be addressed in the fleshed out context of the development of a doctrine. The doctrine gives the theoretical basis for the phases that are essential to efficiently take initiative against these non-state military forces. The doctrine also helps engage the states that are now participating in this new kind of conflict and this has come to be a growing nuisance to the national security of the United States (Sloan, 2000). The author went on to affirm that military services have the duty to design the necessary doctrine to prepare to fight wars that may not be entirely acceptable by the existing leadership and governmental officials

and the public. They should get ready with a body of capability and concepts if and when they are required to protect national security from enemies and threats that even in the present time may not be perceivable.

Fundamental Principal: Can we consider Terrorism as a Form of Warfare?

By tradition, we have been regarding terrorism as a criminal act, and therefore the doctrine addressed to fight it has been that of criminality as if we were in charge here. This kind of approach to terrorism will emphasize police rather than military operations against non-state military forces. Of course, we admit that non-state violence is an act of criminality, but only viewing it this way may lead us to fail in the way we have to fight it. Counterterrorism has not to consider terrorism only as a criminal act, maybe a little more, perhaps as an act of war. Therefore, it would be considered differently in the military point of view. We are convinced that if terrorism is regarded as a type of warfare, now the United States would design a serious military doctrine that will help address it properly, considering that this form of warfare is not like the traditional one as in the inter-state war, but a new form of warfare that requires a particular military doctrine adaptable to current security challenges.

In addressing acts of non-state violence, it is essentially important to identify the nature of the act in the simplest context (Sloan, 2000). This is where the question of a fundamental doctrine should be dealt with; the doctrine will consist of philosophies concerning the objective of the military, the nature of the warfare, and the linkages of military force to other power instruments (Sloan, 2000). The development of an essential doctrine on non-state violence in general, and especially of an offensive doctrine of counterterrorism or terrorism preemption has been delayed by the ongoing lack of agreement on whether non-state violence must be seen as a form of warfare that is therefore subject to a doctrine related to the science and art of war (Sloan, 2000). The writer pointed out that senior civilian officials and military officers have expressed the view that non-state violence has in effect come to be a type of warfare. It is in this logic that Sloan (2000, p.19) cited Robert C. McFarlane, prior assistant to the president for national security affairs, who declared in his address *Terrorism and the Future of Free Society*: “Our problem for the future is that below the threshold where deterrence works, below the strategic level, we face an insidious new threat. This threat is not war as we have known it, not the threat of nuclear attack, but this new form of warfare, of terrorism”.

And James Watkins, chief naval operations, quoted by Sloan (2000, p.19) went in the same line with McFarlane in *Terrorism: An Already Declared War*, when he said that “Like it or not, we and our allies are engaged in a new form of global warfare, unlike other traditional forms of warfare, which is difficult to deal with in a coherent and planned fashion”. CIA Director William J. Casey also shared his view on non-state military violence in “International Terrorism”, when he posited that “We are engaged here in a new form of low-intensity warfare against an enemy that is hard to find and harder still to defend against” (Sloan 2000, p. 19). Lastly, the author brought about another statement, this time, that of Verne Orr, former Secretary of the Air Force. Orr did not only speak about the fact that non-state military violence has come to be a type of warfare, but also linked this development to a critical importance of a doctrine in debating diverse challenges now encountered by the military chief commanders. On “Perspectives on Leadership”, Orr contended: “A third challenge to our military leadership is to make sure doctrine keeps pace with the evolving threat. We need only to go back in history to illustrate that we must never again prepare to fight ‘the last war.’ Future warfare may not exist in the traditional sense. It may be nothing more than well-organized and coordinated terrorism, perpetrated by highly dedicated and heavily armed terrorists on a mass scale” (Sloan 2000, p.20).

The way we see it, there seems to be no doubt as to whether terrorism is a form of warfare. In other words, terrorism is definitely an act of war and regarding the author’s view, we must develop a doctrine, that is, a military doctrine to address it. The author believed that if the army develops such a doctrine, it will have a theoretical basis on which to rely on in order to better face this new threat. The issue here is to finally acknowledge that such a military doctrine will not just be about having defensive approaches to non-state military forces. Rather, if we take into account what Sloan implied, the US authorities had and have to adopt a more aggressive approach to non-state violence; they should develop both the doctrine of counterterrorism and terrorism preemption.

This implies the active commitment of the military in going on the attack instead of expecting terrorists groups to hit and react thereafter. Another possible argument is that for years, military officials did not regard terrorism as an act of war but as an act of criminality, therefore the police not the military should deal with it. Many recent events have displayed that this view is wrong. Indeed the terrorist attacks in France in November 2015 and March 2016 are perfect illustrations that terrorism should be

considered as an act of warfare. The specificity with terrorism is that it is not a form of traditional warfare as the enemy is not a state but non-state actors who take initiatives not only against United States, US citizens and interests abroad, but also against its allies. These terrorists are engaged in a non-territorial warfare; this is why we can understand why it had been so difficult for the US military to engage terrorists. What should be noted is that it seems that some prominent military officials according to the above cited illustrations, have acknowledged the importance of a doctrine to fight terrorism, and therefore have come to regard it as a new form of warfare. Terrorism is not something that is ignored by anybody in our new global environment. We just need to turn on our television to only witness its atrocities. In the following lines we would like to see what counterterrorism is and its possible limitations.

Counterterrorism as an option

Hough (2008) underlined that the major part of non-state violence has embraced the form of terrorism for the reason that states do not counter such tactics easily as they are used to resist more conventional military maneuvers or actions. And so, nations confronted to persistent non-state military forces have adapted to military forces accordingly by forming special counterterrorist units. Another option for states was as well to adapt their existing special forces to the terrorist threat. A state that used this form of preemptive actions has been Israel. The government of Israel allowed its Intelligence Agency Mossad to initiate a preemptive operation called “Wrath of God” as a direct retaliation measure to the 1972 Munich Olympics extermination of Israeli athletes by the Palestinian terrorist group Black September (Hough, 2008).

A Mossad military unit was assigned the task of destroying Black September and given power to do so by all means necessary, even when this meant to violate norms of international law by going to other countries uninvited to commit murders. This contentious tactics was justified as Black September members were wiped out by September 1973. However, the unintentional assassination of an innocent waiter in Norway, unlucky enough to resemble a certain member of the target terrorist group displayed the limits of such an approach (Hough, 2008).

The writer informed that British counterterrorism has been conducted by the Special Air Services (SAS), established in the course of WW II as a special unit to operate behind the lines of the enemy. The SAS came back on stage in its new role in 1980 when a siege at the Embassy of Iran in London was terminated with the

assassination of five hostage-takers, and the arrest of one. The SAS was as well at the core of the British campaign against the violence of the Irish nationalists in the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, and as it succeeded in assassinating various members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) personnel; this was an important factor that brought the IRA to the negotiating table with the British government. Basically, an agreement had been achieved with both sides acknowledging that the absolute destruction of the other was simply impossible. After the 9/11 strikes on the United States, a number of states revised their defense doctrines, and such military units are becoming less “special” and increasingly a standard security military force (Hough, 2008).

From the above lines we can perceive that the author exposed how states like Israel and Britain undertook counterterrorism. In the case of Israel, we can note that the Mossad was only empowered to retaliate and to engage the terrorist group Black September after it had hit. This showcased that governments had mostly had a defensive approach towards non-state violence. Conversely, the Mossad in the operation “Wrath of God” was empowered to use any means to reach its ends. Its ends were the eradication or destruction of Black September. Although the approach has been so successful in wiping out Black September by September 1973, the fact that Mossad violated norms of international law by entering other states uninvited in order to destroy by all means its target had shown the limits of the approach with the killing of an innocent waiter in Norway, unfortunate enough to resemble a member of the target group. We understand the will of the Israeli government in opting for a counterterrorist approach towards terrorism; in the meantime it did not need to violate norms of international law. Rather, it should have cooperated with the governments of the countries where it believed members of the Black September to reside.

All things considered, as witnessed with Britain, it appeared that special units had the missions to counterattack terrorists both on a defensive and preemptive basis. These units were in charge of dealing with non-state violence. This is exactly what Sloan advocated, the creation of a secret force from the intelligence community in the United States targeted to initiate covert operations against non-state forces. In the case of Britain we have seen how successful terrorism preemption has been. Well, we have some questions on our mind: considering that counterterrorism is fighting fire with fire, is counterterrorism always productive? Are there any limits to terrorism preemption?

Hough (2008) contended that the 2001-2 war in Afghanistan was the unique full-scale warfare to have been initiated against an armed non-state military force but from

time to time conventional responses at a lesser level have been utilized. The United States bombed Libya in 1986 as a way to strike back this country for its leadership role in a various incidents around the world targeting American soldiers. In the same way, US air attacks aimed targets in Afghanistan and Sudan related to Al-Qaeda in retaliation to the bombing of their embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Israel again has fought fire with fire by using military might to combat non-state forces as exemplified with its invasion of Lebanon in 1982, 1996 and 2006, which sought to destroy terrorists, as well as their most recent intrusion in Hezbollah bases with the purpose to secure their northern frontier (Hough, 2008).

Similarly, Turkey engaged Kurdish separatists by entering Iraq where the PKK has fortresses. However, these partial military actions have had the tendency to be highly unsuccessful, even counterproductive (Hough, 2008). For example, the US attacks of 1998 touched an innocent target in Sudan and the Israeli intrusion of 1982 is best recalled for an extermination in a Palestinian camp of refugees. The greatest Libyan-backed anti-American atrocity took place two years after the Americans bombed Tripoli and Al-Qaeda was far from being deterred by any state action targeting it (Hough, 2008).

All in all, counterterrorism is not always productive. We consider that the Bush Administration policy “War on Terror” was both a good counterterrorist and preemptive approach to terrorism, but this did not participate into curbing terrorism on a global scale. Some years after the 9/11 strikes, we witnessed the Madrid attacks of 2005 at Atocha, at the core of Madrid; we had the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015 in Paris, the strikes of November 13, 2015 in France, and the Brussels attacks on March 22, 2016. Of course, we are not going to list the different terrorist attacks, but what we do want to imply here is that it seems that the more preemption and counterterrorism the more we witness terrorist attacks all around the world.

Another assumption is that counterterrorism has not discouraged non-state military forces to continue to commit their attacks. Preemption might have some limits in that some innocents are often the wrong targets in lieu of the targeted terrorist groups as exemplified with the Israeli incursion of 1982 which is mostly remembered for a massacre in a Palestinian camp of refugees. Because counterterrorism in some circumstances proved unproductive does not imply that states should be acting on a defensive basis. But our understanding is that non-state military forces are neither intimidated by preemption nor by counterterrorism.

Partial Conclusion

In this section, we have first explored what military strategy is and then tackled the issue of terrorism. We have first attempted to provide a definitional approach to military strategy. In this perspective, we have considered the definition of Goodman (1993), who held that strategy is the coordination, the planning and the general management of military operations to achieve total military and political objectives. Bartholomees, Jr. (2010) argues that defining strategy is difficult because the word is being used in different domains of societal levels. On the word of the author, it is true that some words may be unique to the conceptual context although the word has other uses, for instance the word *passion* has a specific meaning in Christianity that differs from that of the secular world. Strategy likewise has a specific meaning in the military.

Then the author quotes the definition of strategy, which is that of the U.S. Army War College in its 2001 edition, which defines strategy in two different manners: “Conceptually, we define strategy as the relationship among ends, ways, and means”. The second way is as follows: “Strategic art, broadly defined, is therefore: the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests”. After attempting to bring about an acceptable definition of military strategy, we have discussed the first part of this section that is of course military strategies, wherein we have conducted research on the five basic military strategies. These are the strategy of extermination, annihilation, exhaustion, intimidation and decapitation.

Then we have discussed terrorism as a mounting issue in international affairs in the second part. We have essentially conducted investigation on two themes divided into two chapters in the second subsection. We have examined military threats from terrorists and state responses to non-state violence. Now, we would like to target the last section of this doctoral paper, that is, peace and conflict resolution.

PART V: PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Partial Introduction

What is peace? For the common people peace is the absence of warfare, or violent conflict. This definitional approach to peace is not bad, but is limited. In effect, the concept of peace goes beyond this common perception. Peace can also be considered as the absence of every forms of violence. These categorizations of peace have a label in IR: negative and positive peace we would like to comment on the following lines. Grewal (2003) asserted that the word peace is difficult to conceptualize for the reason that it is often utilized as an unreal and utopian word. The word “peace” refers to scenarios of harmony and happiness in mental, social and political sense often inconsistent with the reality of a messy and non-harmonious world.

The area of peace research is an effort to find ways to live in a nonviolent world (Grewal, 2003). In this last section of our paper, we examine both peace theory and conflict theory, two related but separated fields within peace research. We describe the disparities between two types of peace derived from peace theory and applicable to society and politics, these are positive and negative peace. These terms were first coined by Galtung, in the Editorial to the primary edition of the *Journal of Peace Research* in the year 1964, (Grewal, 2003).

As stated by Grewal (2003), the history associated with the distinction between positive and negative peace stems from the 1950s wherein peace research was too deeply dedicated towards direct violence, such as warfare and assault and was dominated by North Americans. The Peace Research Institute of Oslo and the *Journal of Peace Research* were a source of fresh understanding in peace theory. In the 1960s, Galtung broadened the concept of peace and violence by including indirect or structural violence and this was a direct challenge to the predominant ideas about the nature of peace (Grewal, 2003). This broadened definitional approach to violence conducted to the expanded definition of peace (Grewal, 2003). The author reported that Galtung in his 1964's article, “An Editorial”, suggested therefore that negative peace “is the absence of violence, absence of war” and positive peace “is the integration of human society”.


Grewal (2003) emphasized that in 1964 Galtung did not particularly use the expression “structural violence” but “human integration”. Furthermore, these two types of peace must be considered as two separate dimensions, where one is possible without the other. Models of positive peace policies and proposals are improved human

understanding thanks to communication, international cooperation, peace education, conflict resolution, conflict management and arbitration etc. (Grewal, 2003).

Galtung argued that the motivation behind the original concept of the idea of positive peace was the health sciences, wherein health can be viewed as simple absence of sickness (Grewal, 2003). In the same way, two sorts of remedies obtaining from the analogy of health are pertinent for peace research: curation aimed at negative peace and prevention aimed at positive peace. Seemingly, the role of peace studies is to carry out research simultaneously on negative as well as positive aspects of peace, both the conditions for absence of violence and the conditions for peace (Grewal, 2003).

Galtung’s chief argument is that an adequate understanding of violence is a prerequisite to understand and define peace (Grewal, 2003). Figure 1 shows that peace is not simply an absence of immediate violence (negative peace) but as well absence of structural violence (positive peace). Structural violence originates from violence in the structure of society, rather than direct violence, that is generated by coercion.


Figure 1: The Expanded Concept of Peace and Violence, Grewal (2003, p.3).



Grewal (2003) reported that by 1990 in his article “Cultural Violence” Galtung introduced a new dimension of violence: the concept of cultural violence referring to those aspects of culture which can be employed to justify and legitimize violence in its direct or structural form. Symbolic violence built into a culture does not destroy or

mutilate like direct violence or the violence existing or built into the structure, but it is employed to legitimize either one or both as for instance in the theory of *Herrenvolk* or a superior race. Cultural violence was added as a type of violence alongside direct and structural violence. The flow of violence stems from cultural via structural to direct violence (figure 2).

Figure 2: Causal Flow of Violence, Grewal (2003, p.4).



After examining Galtung’s article “Cultural Violence”, we have found out additional symbols of cultural violence. Galtung (1990) underlined that symbols like stars, crosses and crescents, flags, anthems and military parades, the ubiquitous portrait of the Leader, inflammatory speeches and posters are aspects of cultural violence. He explained that cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look right, or at least not wrong. The study of cultural violence emphasizes the way wherein the act of direct violence and the fact of structural violence are legitimized and then made tolerable in society (Galtung, 1990). A way to achieve it is by making reality opaque, so that we do not view the violent act or fact, or at least not as violent. In this perspective, peace studies require a typology of violence, in the same way a disease is among the preconditions for health studies (Galtung, 1990).

Arguably, the author had to conceptualize another definition of violence. He viewed violence as “avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible”. Threats of violence are also violence. Mingling the difference between structural and direct violence with four classes of basic needs we get the typology of Table 1(Galtung, 1990). Admitting that the four classes of these basic needs are the result of extensive discussions in several parts of the globe, Galtung (1990) identified the following: *survival needs* (negation: death, mortality); *well-being needs* (negation: misery, mortality); *identity,*


meaning needs (negation: alienation); and freedom needs (negation: repression). The result is eight kinds of violence with subtypes, easily detectable for direct violence but more difficult for structural violence (see Table 1).

Table 1: A Typology of Violence, Galtung (1990, p.292).

	Survival Needs	Well-being Needs	Identity Needs	Freedom Needs
Direct Violence	Killing	Maiming Siege/ Blockade Sanctions Misery	Desocialization Resocialization Secondary citizens	Repression Detention Expulsion
Structural Violence	Exploitation A	Exploitation B	Penetration Segmentation	Marginalization Fragmentation

Afzaal (2012) exposes Galtung’s violence triangle. He asserts that there are various distinct ways to classify the phenomenon of violence. He summarized three major types of violence: (1) personal or direct violence, (2) structural or indirect violence, and (3) cultural or symbolic violence. Galtung suggested that the three types of violence can be represented by the three corners of a violence triangle. The triangle is meant to underline that the three types of violence are causally linked to each other (Afzaal, 2012).

Figure 3: The Violence Triangle by Galtung,



Among the three types of violence identified in the triangle, the writer argues that direct or personal violence is the most obvious. Everything from threats and moral abuse to rape, war, murder and genocide form this category. It is labeled personal violence because the perpetrators are human beings (Afzaal, 2012).

Grewal (2003) contended that Kenneth Boulding has criticized Galtung for downgrading the study of international peace by calling it “negative peace” and by

introducing the concept of structural violence. According to this critic, such ideas take peace researchers into theoretical domains – like development studies – where they have not enough expertise. By unifying these two concepts, Boulding coined the term “stable peace”, borrowed from the concept of the absence of war from negative peace (Grewal, 2003). Whereas Boulding investigates situations where peace is present, Galtung tries to look for situations where conflict is present, what violences it does and how to reach peace (Grewal, 2003).

Dugan (2003) examined the concept of stable peace by Kenneth Boulding from his Book Stable Peace, published in 1978. Boulding coined the term “stable peace”, which refers to the peace we are longing for in intractable conflict. He defined stable peace as a “situation in which the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved.” Even if the majority of Boulding’s work is directed to relations between and among states, he included in the definition of stable peace at all levels of social groups: businesses, churches, families and nations, (Dugan, 2003). Boulding identified various factors as fundamental in the development of stable peace:

- Habit: “The longer peace persists the better chance it has of persisting”;
- Professional specializations which comprise conciliators, mediators, marriage counselors, and diplomats, together with a web of integrative relationships among leaders;
- Rise of travel and communication within the system;
- Web of economic interdependence;
- Mutually compatible self-images that do not comprise the utilization of force against one another; and
- Taboos against the utilization of violence within the stable peace system.

Dugan (2003) brought about another consideration of stable peace by Alexander George, who provided somewhat a more specific definition on a global level. George defines stable peace as “a relationship between two states wherein neither side considers using force or even making a threat of force, in any dispute between them. Deterrence and compellence backed by threats of military force are simply excluded as instruments of policy.” George contrasts stable peace with his two other features of peace – precarious peace and conditional peace – (Dugan, 2003). Precarious peace is a state of acute conflict which signifies “little more than a temporary absence of armed

conflict. “Conditional peace is relationship wherein general deterrence plays a major role, although the possibility of stronger threats or even actual violence is maintained for situation of crisis. Dugan (2003) to illustrate these two types of peace, took the case of the ongoing Middle East situation that tends to oscillate between precarious and conditional peace, still falling every so often, into war. In this point of view, the Cold War is a good example of conditional peace. On the contrary, the ongoing peacefulness between Canada and the United States or the Baltic states is a stable peace system (Dugan, 2003).

Arie Kacowicz’s approach of stable peace has conducted to what he called “zone of peace”. By zone of peace, Kacowicz (1998, p.9) meant a “discrete geographical region of the world wherein a group of states have maintained peaceful relations among themselves for a period of at least thirty years – generation span – though civil wars, domestic unrest, and violence still occur within their borders, as well as international conflicts and crisis between them.” Kacowicz (1998, p.15) explored the following zones of peace since 1815:

Table 2: Zones of Peace

Zones	Periods
Europe	1815-1848
Europe	1871-1914
Western Europe	since 1945
North America	1917 to the present
South America	1883 to the present
West Africa	1987 to the present (again, K wrote in 1998)
East Asia	since 1953
Australasia	since 1945
The ASEAN countries of Southeast Asia	since 1967
Eastern Europe	1945-1989

This last section of our doctoral dissertation is subdivided into two subsections. In the first subsection, we inspect two themes divided into two chapters: (I) an Alternative System to War and (II) Building a Culture of Peace. In the second subsection, we deeply examine conflict theory. This one is divided into three chapters: (I) the Reasons for War, (II) Strategies for International Conflict Resolution and (III) Peace Process and the Spoiler Issue.

CHAPTER 14: AN ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM TO WAR

World beyond War (WBW, 2015) in expressing their conviction that violence is not an essential component of conflict among states and between states and non-state actors, they assert that war itself can be eliminated. According to them, human beings have lived in the absence of war for most of their existence and the majority of people in the world live in the absence of war most of the time. Armed conflict was invented 6,000 years ago and produced a malicious cycle of warfare because people, fearing strikes by militarized countries found it necessary to imitate them and therefore started the cycle of violence that has culminated in the last 100 years in a situation of permanent war (WBW, 2015). War currently threatens to wipe out civilization as weapons have come to be even more devastating. WBW (2015) argue that at the same time, in the last 150 years, innovative new knowledge and tactics of nonviolent conflict management have been emerging. The armed-conflict system does not work; it does not bring peace or even minimum security. What it produces is mutual insecurity (WBW, 2015).

WBW (2015) go on to underscore that wars are endemic diseases, in that in an armed-conflict system everybody has to beware of everybody else. The world becomes a dangerous place as the armed-conflict system makes it so. States think that they are victims of threats and plots by other states, convinced that the others' military power is targeted to their destruction, while failing to see their own faults, that their own actions are responsible for the very behavior they fear and arm against as rivals become mirror images of each other (WBW, 2015). The writers illustrate it with a number of events: the Indian-Pakistan conflict, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the American war on terror which creates even more non-state military forces against states. In addition to this is the race for minerals, particularly oil, as states continue an economic system of infinite growth and addiction to oil. From this perspective, it can be argued that the armed-conflict is self-fueling, self-reinforcing and self-perpetrating (WBW, 2015).

By thinking that the world is a dangerous place, states arm themselves and act violently in a conflict system and consequently proving to other states that the world is a dangerous place and so should be armed and act as well. The problem with this attitude is that the goal is not to avoid war, but to win it (WBW, 2015). Alternatives to specific conflicts are never really looked for and the idea that there might be a substitute to armed-conflict system, nearly never occurs to people since they cannot find what they do not search for (WBW, 2015).

14.1 The Need for an Alternative System and the Impact of War on the Environment

WBW (2015) inform that WW I was justified as the "war to end wars", unfortunately war never brings peace. It could bring about a temporary ceasefire, a desire for retaliation, and a new arms race until the next war. Conventionally, the failure percentage of war is 50%, this means that one part always loses. But the reality is that even the so-called winners undergo terrible losses (WBW, 2015). At any one place war is fought, there is always suffering, as people witness the destruction of infrastructures and art treasures. Equally important, in the last decade of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, wars appear not to get to an end, but to last longer for years and even decades without peace settlements (WBW, 2015). In this way, the writers underscores that wars create a state of continuous war, or what some analysts are now terming "permawar" (WBW, 2015). In the last 120 years, the world has undergone various wars as listed by WBW (2015, p.14):

"the Spanish American War, the Balkan Wars, World War One, the Russian Civil War, the Spanish Civil War, World War Two, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, wars in Central America, the Wars of the Yugoslav Devolution, Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf Wars, the Afghan War, the US Iraq war, the Syrian War, and various others including Japan versus China in 1937, long civil war in Colombia, and wars in the Congo, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Arab-Israeli wars, Pakistan versus India, etc."

By examining this part, we understand that according to the writers' view, an alternative system to war is more than a necessity because the war system has become even more destructive for the human civilization. If war is a disease as argued by the writers, this means that we can find a cure to it. We do know that in the medical analogy there are diseases that have no cure, but such seems not to be the case with the war system. If we acknowledge that war is a human invention as stated above, therefore we can make it become illegal if we want to, as we did with slavery which is now only found in history books. In other words, it is unacceptable for the institution of slavery to be practiced as such was the case in the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. Sticking to the writers' point, it is possible to do the same with the war system. War can become illegal.

WBW (2015) claim that ten million people were killed in WW I, between 50 to 100 million in WW II. WMD could, if employed, terminate civilization on the globe (WBW, 2015). In contemporary armed conflicts, it is not uniquely soldiers who die on the battleground. The concept of "total war" brought about the destruction of noncombatants

as well in such a way that today several more civilians, including children, women and old men who are killed in battles than are soldiers. The writers maintain that the modern practice of warfare by contemporary armies has been indiscriminate bombings of high explosives on cities where large concentrations of civilian populations try to survive the carnage.

WBW (2015) go on to assert that war degrades and destroys the environment – the ecosystems – upon which humans rest. The preparation for war is accountable for the releases of tons of toxic chemicals in the environment. They highlight that the majority of sites that are superfund in the United States are on military bases. In this regard, nuclear weapons factories like Fernald in Ohio and Hanford in Washington State have polluted water and ground with radioactive waste that will be toxic for thousands of years (WBW, 2015). Warfare causes thousands of square miles of land to be useless and dangerous as a result of depleted uranium, landmine weapons and bomb craters that fill with water and become malaria infested. Chemical weapons eliminate rainforest and mangrove swamps. The military uses a great quantity of oil and emit tons of greenhouse gases (WBW, 2015).

Today we cannot deny the impact of war on the environment. The writers have shown that it is not only armed conflict itself that is dangerous for the environment, but the preparation for war is also responsible for the degradation of the environment. In a war system it will always be like that, the environment will keep degrading because of the continual preparation for an eventuality of war. This point suggested by the writers displays the fact that the ongoing preparation of warfare contributes to the destruction of our ecosystem.

What about when war has already been waged? It is apparent that if a nuclear warhead is launched to a particular location it will not be inconsequential to the environment. In the first place, agriculture will be impacted as that land where that missile would have been launched will no more be arable or cultivable. The other problem is the threat of radioactive waste it will discharge on the environment. The release of two bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 is a glaring illustration. The radioactivity they produced lasted over 30 years provoking malformations such as children born with birth defects, as the result of their parents inhaling the radioactive air pollution provoked by the mentioned bombings.

WBW (2015, p.15) provide the following illustrations on the impact of war on the environment:

- Military aircraft consume about one quarter of the world's jet fuel;
- The DoD uses more fuel per day than the country of Sweden;
- The DoD generates more chemical waste than five largest chemical companies combined;
- A F-16 fighter bomber consumes almost twice as much fuel in one hour as the high-consuming US Motorists burns a year;
- The US military uses enough fuel in one year to run the entire mass transit system of the nation for 22 years;
- During the 1991 aerial campaign over Iraq, the U.S. utilized approximately 340 tons of missiles containing depleted uranium (du) - there were significantly higher rates of cancer, birth defects and infant mortality in Fallujah, Iraq in early 2010;
- One military estimate in 2003 was that two-thirds of the army's fuel consumption occurred in vehicles that were delivering fuel to the battlefield.

WBW (2015) hold that the importance of an alternative system to war lies in the fact that there is already more peace in the world than war. The 20th century was a period of atrocious wars; nevertheless the majority of states did not fight other states most of the time (WBW, 2015). The United States combatted Germany for six years but both countries were at peace for ninety-four years. The U.S. has not fought Canada since 1815, and has never fought France, Sweden, Brazil etc. Guatemala has never combatted France. This suggests that most of the countries of the world live in the absence of warfare (WBW, 2015). In effect, since the year 1993, the occurrence of war has been decreasing. In the meantime, we notice the changing nature of warfare (WBW, 2015). The writers argue that an alternative system is essential because we have changed major systems in the past. The old institution of slavery was mostly eliminated within less than a hundred years, although we witness significant new forms of slavery hiding in many places of the world (WBW, 2015).

In 1993, European states founded the European Union after combatting each other for more than a thousand years. In 1994, we saw the termination of the apartheid system in South Africa (WBW, 2015). The writers from that perspective emphasize that war can be overcome since findings in archeology and anthropology show that war was a social invention about 6,000 years ago with the rise of centralized state, slavery and patriarchy. Therefore, on the word of the writers, we learned to do war. But more than a thousand

years prior, people lived without large-scale violence. The armed-conflict system has controlled human societies since about 4, 000 B. C. (WBW, 2015).

14.2 Common Security and the Withdrawal of Military Bases

WBW (2015) note that conflict management as practiced in the iron cage of war is self-defeating. In what is known as the *security dilemma*, nations think that they can only make themselves more secure when making their rivals less secure, thus conducting to escalation to arms race that has culminated in conventional, biological, chemical and nuclear weapons of horrifying destruction (WBW, 2015). The concept of common security stands in the fact that a state can only be secure when all states are and the model of national security leads only to mutual insecurity, particularly at a time where nation-states are permeable (WBW, 2015). The writers argue that the original concept behind national sovereignty was to put a limit around a geographical territory and control everything that attempted to cross that limit. In the technologically advanced world of today, this concept is outdated. States cannot individually keep out ideas, economic forces, immigrants, disease organisms, information, ballistic missiles, or cyber-attacks on defenseless infrastructures like power plants, banking systems and stock exchanges. Security should be addressed globally if it is to exist at all (WBW, 2015).

We consider that common security is another name for collective security we have already discussed in this research paper. The writers gave an idea of what national sovereignty is in asserting that it was to draw a line around a geographical territory and control everything that attempted to cross that line. We do not totally agree with the writers as such a conceptualization of national sovereignty is in fact partial. We do not mean that their definition is not acceptable, but rather limited. National sovereignty is not only about geographical control of one's territory, but it is also about avoiding any external influence to national politics or political management of one's nation. This is precisely the problem of common security; it touches the sovereignty of states, in what is called in politics external interference in national political affairs.

It is good to undertake international coalition against a so-called aggressor or destabilizer of global peace, but the issue of external interference comes to the table. When the United Nations did not respect the decision of the Constitutional Court of Côte D'Ivoire regarding the results of the presidential elections' vote in December 2010, by pretending that the court was overusing its authority, it is a pure violation of sovereignty. Conversely, in the political crisis in Spain between the government of Mariano Rajoy and

the regional government of Catalonia demanding independence from Spain, the Spanish Constitutional Court ruled against the independence of Catalonia. We did not see any outside interference against that decision – whether from the UN or the EU – because EU countries, even the UN respect the sovereignty of Spain.

But in the case of Côte d'Ivoire in 2011, an international military coalition led by France with the government of Nicolas Sarkozy was launched against the former president of Côte d'Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo. This is why we have claimed that the conceptualization of sovereignty by World beyond War is incomplete. In the meantime, we share the assertion that to address the above-mentioned security challenges, nation-states should cooperate on a global scale as many of these security issues cannot individually be addressed by states.

WBW (2015) inform that a way to bring about an alternative system to war is to phase out foreign military bases. In 2009, the writers indicate that the American contract on air base in Ecuador was on the verge to expire and the Ecuadorian president made the following proposal to the U.S.: “We will renew the base on one condition: that they let us put a base in Miami.” The American Government rejected the offer. The British people would find it unthinkable if their government allowed Saudi Arabia to establish a huge military base in the British Isles (WBW, 2015). In the same way, the USA would not allow any establishment of an Iranian air base in Wyoming. These foreign military establishments would be viewed as a threat to their national security, their safety and their sovereignty (WBW, 2015).

Foreign military bases are famous for the control of population and resources of the receiving state. They are sites from which the occupying power may hit within the receiving or host state or against states on its borders, or perhaps dissuade attacks (WBW, 2015). Another thing is that these foreign military bases are extremely expensive for the occupying state. The U.S. is the major example in this regard, holding hundreds of military bases in 135 nations around the globe. The consequence of foreign military bases is that they are accountable for resentment against what is viewed locally as a form of domination having a supremacist nature (WBW, 2015). As a result, the writers advocate the elimination of foreign military bases as a pillar of an alternative global security system.

Phasing out military bases as stated by the writers is a good pace towards conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy. Military bases are financially very demanding for the occupying country. Governments such as that of the United States spend trillions of

dollars in their military budgets and most of this money goes to support the maintenance of these overseas bases. Foreign military bases have social, political and environmental consequences in the host country. We have had several cases where soldiers have raped local girls and they have been protected and not been judged for their crimes, creating as mentioned by the writers a serious resentment because of such acts of violence, but also because a military base is a symbol of political and supremacist domination.

It is seldom seen civilians in favor of foreign military bases, as they do not feel secure because these bases pretty much look like an invading force by a powerful militarily occupying state. At the political level, a foreign military base can be used to strategically contribute to the takeover of power in favor of a political leader. As for the environment, after a military base has left there is radioactive waste because of military activity. The soil is less likely to be arable, and it therefore poses a problem to agriculture. In addition, foreign military bases pose a problem of environmental security in the countries they are undertaking military activity. For this reason, along with the writers' opinion, military bases should be eliminated as they represent as well a symbol of violence in the mind of the population of the host country.

Weyand (2012) deals with the negative externalities of the US military bases. He contends that overseas military bases are responsible for negative social externalities in host countries. Maybe the most illustrative example of these negative social externalities is the history of military violence against the women of Okinawa in Japan. From the time of the American occupation at the end of WW II women in Okinawa have been victimized in military violence. Between WW II and the Korean War, physical and sexual violence against Japanese women was indiscriminate and widespread. The writer goes on to inform that in recent years date-rape violence has been growing. The most dishonorable and punishable incident of rape happened in September 1995 when two Marines and a sailor kidnaped a twelve-year old girl they picked out at random, raped and beat her, and left her on the seashore. After the incident, the USA invoked Article 17 of their Japanese SOFA agreement, which gives the U.S. jurisdiction over crimes committed by US soldiers in Okinawa, and refused to give the soldiers to Japanese authorities (Weyand, 2012). The US response along with the rape shocked the Okinawan population and provoked massive anti-American demonstrations, and conducted to a movement to expatriate American troops from the Island. In 2005, after a decade of unrest and continual military

violence against the women of Okinawa, the US government accepted to transfer over a period of six years, thousands of troops from Okinawa to Guam (Weyand, 2012).

The government of the United States has not diplomatically answered back to complaints about the negative externalities provoked by its overseas military bases (Weyand, 2012). In response to the rape of the twelve-year-old girl, General Richard Meyers, commander-in-chief of US troops in Japan, declared “this was a singular tragedy caused by ‘three bad apples’” although he was aware that sexually violent crimes that the US soldiers committed against Okinawan women were running at the frequency of two per month (Weyand, 2012). Likewise, Admiral Richard Macke, commanding officer of American forces In the Pacific, affirmed: “I think that [the rape] was absolutely stupid. For the price they paid to rent the car [with which to abduct their victim], they could have had a girl.” These impolitic statements all the more contributed to fuel the fire of outrage in Okinawa (Weyand, 2012).

Weyand (2012) brings about another negative externality of military bases, that is, the environment. He argues that overseas military bases are also accountable for negative environmental externalities. In this respect, a case of this is the history of American military pollution in Vieques, in Puerto Rico (Weyand, 2012). During sixty years, the island of Vieques was the property of an American live-bombing range and ammo facility. The writer goes on to report that in 2005, the Environmental Protection Agency listed the Navy’s live-bombing range as one of the greatest dangerous waste sites in the American soil. The land and water surrounding the range have been extensively polluted. As a result, coral reefs and sea-grass bed have undergone serious damage from bombarding, sedimentation, and chemical pollution. The groundwater has been polluted by explosives and nitrates (Weyand, 2012). Accordingly, the site has been extensively contaminated by heavy metals such as depleted uranium and investigations have demonstrated that these metals have entered the food chain. In 2003, following years of demonstrations and protests, the American Navy was removed from Vieques (Weyand, 2012).

Weyand (2012) informs that the United States has also contaminated Japan. The American army has used the reservoir of the Fukichi Dam, that provides water to the people of Okinawa, for training exercises, and important amounts of waste munitions have been discovered in the surroundings water area. Yet the government of Japan is incapable of preventing this contamination or to compel the government of the United States to find a solution to the environmental damage it provokes (Weyand, 2012). In

their SOFA's military agreement with Japan, the United States explicitly avoided liability for any environmental destruction its military bases might provoke. Weyand (2012, p. 406) gives the following details in that defense agreement:

Article 6 of the SOFA, the section containing the "no liability" provision, reads: "The United States is not obliged, when it returns facilities and areas . . . to restore the facilities and areas to the condition in which they were at the time they became available ... or to compensate Japan ... in lieu of such restoration."

From the writer's analysis, we understand that military bases pose a serious problem of security, and as already mentioned, wiping them out might be a step forward toward an alternative system to the war system as we know it today. We have just seen flagrant examples of how these bases can be hazardous for the environment wherein they are located. We have also seen the social negative externalities these military bases are responsible for – the rape of Okinawan women on a regular basis –. This makes the residents of the host state even more hostile to the presence of this foreign military presence. In the case of Japan we have seen that its government can do nothing about the pollution of the environment in Okinawa because of Article 6 of their defense agreement as just noted. Another statement as mentioned in the first section of this paper: "Armament and Disarmament", is that the American presence in Japan is meant for strategic reasons. In fact, the bases are there to protect Japan from any outside military aggression, especially from China and North Korea. Japan heavily relies on the US nuclear umbrella.

We have already pointed out that Japan renounced to conduct nuclear programs in exchange of military protection, in this case nuclear deterrence from the United States. Accordingly, the government of the United States is not willing to pay the financial degradation caused by its military activity for the reason that as cited by Weyand (2012, P.406) "it is strange that the American military should have to pay damages for practicing warfare to protect Japan." From this standpoint, we can observe that unless Japan decides to become a nuclear-weapon state as opted Pakistan and enter the issue-specific possessor regime and therefore expels US bases from its territory, it will never be able to solve the social and environmental negative externalities caused by the presence of American military bases in its soil. As long as Japan will continue to be dependent on the protection of the United States, its residents will continue to suffer these negative social and environmental externalities.

14.3 Dismantlement of Military Alliances and Reinforcement of Global Institutions

Military alliances such the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are residues from the Cold War (WBW, 2015). With the disintegration of the states of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact alliance disappeared, yet NATO extended up to the borders of the former Soviet Union in violation of a promise to former Premier Gorbachev. This situation has resulted in great tension between the Russian Federation and the West. According to WBW (2015), some even refer to it as the beginning of a new Cold War, intensified possibly by an American supported coup d'état in Ukraine, the Russian annexation of the Crimea and the civil war in Ukraine. NATO is a positive strengthening of the armed-conflict system, reducing rather than creating security (WBW, 2015). NATO has also undertaken military activities well above the boundaries of the European continent. It has come to be a force for mobilized efforts in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa (WBW, 2015).

We come to the realization that World beyond War after advocating phasing out military bases since they participate in the instability of the world, therefore contributing to insecurity, advocate the abolishing of military alliances as they are also instruments of the war system. Their argument seems to hold water as the existence of NATO creates extreme tension between Russia and the member-states of NATO. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact as well disappeared with it; it seems not lawful in this respect to have institutions of the Cold War that still act strategically, even to some extent against the strategic interests of the Russian Federation. Tensions rose because Russia does not tolerate the violation of the promise made to Gorbachev regarding the geographical delimitation of NATO. NATO is obviously an instrument of warfare; we have instances that can prove it. When the writers inform that NATO has taken on military exercises well beyond European frontiers, we share this assertion because in the Libyan war of 2011 against the government of Colonel Qaddafi, the first attacks were carried out by NATO forces when they bombed Qaddafi troops in March 19, 2011.

From this perception, we can argue that NATO's military activities are no longer limited to the European continent as a military organization originally designed to deter the Soviet Union's possible aggression against any western country during the Cold War; the organization is mostly acting as an international military organization. In line with the writers' view, if an alternative system is to be shaped, it is essential to dismantle such a

military organization as there is no more any Soviet Union threatening the stability and security of Europe and the United States; there is only the Russian Federation. We do not consider Russia to be threatening or destabilizing the security of Europe. For this reason, NATO should disappear. Of course, it is easier to say it than implementing it. This issue is extremely political as for NATO to be dismantled this must be the will of the political elite of its member-states. Apparently, the writers of *World beyond War* seem idealistic in this issue because dismantling NATO is not something that is likely to occur. Of course, we understand the view that as NATO is a military organization fueling military tensions, it should perhaps be phased out.

Reinforcing international institutions has been another argument of the authors of *World beyond War*. In effect, WBW (2015) state that global institutions for the management of conflict without violence have been developing for a long time. A body of very practical international law has been evolving for centuries and needs to be additionally developed to be an effective part of peacebuilding system (WBW, 2015). For instance, in 1899 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) – the World Court – was established to arbitrate quarrels between nation-states (WBW, 2015). The League of Nations followed in 1920. An association of 58 states, the League was rooted on the principle of collective security. WBW (2015) underline that the League did participate in some peace settlements and instigated international level peacebuilding efforts.

After the failure of the League for the reasons already debated in other sections, the United Nations was set up after the Allied victory in 1945 as a new effort at collective security. As well an association of sovereign states, the UN was thought to adjudicate arguments and where this was not achievable, the Security Council could decide to pass sanctions or provide a counter military force to cope with an aggressor (WBW, 2015). The UN greatly extended the peacebuilding initiatives initiated by the Leagues. The writers maintain that international institutions for conflict resolution should be strengthened because whether the Leagues of Nations or the United Nations, both institutions failed to dismantle the war system despite their good efforts. In this respect, the writers consider that the United Nations along with other international institutions engaged in conflict management ought to be constructively reformed to become more efficient in keeping the peace, including reforming the Security Council, the General Assembly, peacekeeping forces and actions, funding, its relations with non-governmental organizations and possibly adding new functions (WBW, 2015).

Let us now move to the next chapter, that is, Building a Culture of Peace.

CHAPTER 15: BUILDING A CULTURE OF PEACE

WBW (2015, p.49) quote the definition of Elise Boulding – founding figure of the discipline Peace and Conflict Studies –, who stated:

“Put in the simplest possible terms, a peace culture is a culture that promotes peaceable diversity. Such a culture includes lifeways, patterns of belief, values, behavior, and accompanying institutional arrangements that promote mutual caring and well-being as well as an equality that includes appreciation of difference, stewardship, and equitable sharing of the resources. . . . It offers mutual security for humankind in all its diversity through a profound sense of species identity as well as kinship with the living earth. There is no need for violence.”

WBW (2015) inform that a culture of peace is the opposite of a warrior culture, also known as a dominator society, where warrior gods instruct the people to create hierarchies of rank so that men control other men, men dominate women, there is continuous antagonism and repeated physical violence and nature is seen as something to be dominated. In a warrior culture, safety is only for those people or nations that are at the top, if they can remain there. No society is entirely one or the other, but in the modern world the tilt is toward the warrior societies, making necessary the growth of a culture of peace if civilization is to survive. Societies that socialize their children for violent behavior make wars more likely, and in a vicious circle, wars socialize people for violence (WBW, 2015).

15.1 The Reformation of the United Nations Security Council

WBW (2015) report that Article 42 of the UN Charter gives the Security Council the responsibility to maintain and to restore peace in the world. It is the unique UN institution having binding authority on member-states. The Council does not have an armed force to conduct its decisions. Rather it has the power to call on the military forces of member-states. Yet, the methods and composition of the Security Council are obsolete and only minimally effective for maintaining and restoring the peace (WBW, 2015). The Council is composed of 15 members, 5 of which are permanent – the victorious powers in WW II, U.S., Russia, U.K., France and China who have the veto power –. At the time of writing in 1945, they required these conditions or would not have allowed the UN to exist. These five also claim and own leading seats on the governing bodies of the major committees of the UN. WBW (2015) indicate that this gives them an unequal and undemocratic amount of influence.

The world has radically changed in the subsequent decades after the creation of the UN as the institution went from 50 members to 193, and population balances have also changed radically (WBW, 2015). Besides, the way in which the Security Council seats are chosen by four (4) regions is as well unrepresentative as Europe and the UK have four seats while Latin America has only 1. The African continent is also underrepresented. It is perhaps unthinkable that a Muslim state is represented in the Council. It is high time to rectify this situation if the UN wants to have respect and authority in these regions (WBW, 2015). One proposal the writers of *World beyond War* make is the increase of the number of electorate regions to 9 in which each region would have a permanent member and two revolving members to add up to Council to 27 seats, thus more perfectly reflecting domestic, cultural and population realities.

We would like to come back to what Felicio and Graham (2005) explained in part three of this paper, the section related to regionalism and security. They indicated that former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan established a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, a group of experts, with a mandate to examine the landscape of peace and security, and to ensure efficient collective action, especially by the United Nations. Felicio and Graham (2005) pointed out that identifying “security regions” and associated Chapter VIII about regional organizations could have repercussions for the reform of the Security Council, i.e. through the question of membership. It is now generally accepted that an enlarged membership is essential in order for the Council to be more legitimate and representative.

The writers underscored that disagreement has existed as to whether there should be additional permanent members in the Council. Two developed nations, Japan and Germany are in quest of membership; however it has disapproval both from neighboring developed nations and from countries of the South. Proposals that major states from the South – such as Brazil, India and Egypt, and possibly South Africa or Nigeria – must as well be given permanent seats at the Council also encounter opposition from close neighbors. Granting the veto power to such new permanent members is also controversial (Felicio and Graham, 2005). On the word of the writers it is also commonly that a new electorate system is required within the Council.

One of the possibilities to put forward within the UN working group has involved the idea of regional representation: not “direct representation” in the form of a regional organization but “indirect representation” through a member state (the specific state changing through rotation) representing the region. Five seats have been suggested, for

example each for Africa, Latin America/Caribbean, Asia, Europe and the Arab group. But agreement is less likely to be achieved on this issue (Felicio and Graham, 2005). The UN-High-Level Panel has recommended an extended Security Council of 24 members. The Security Council, not capable to agree on one model of extension, has proposed two models for the consideration of the member-states. The two models visualize membership being distributed according to four “regional areas”, that is Africa, Asia-Pacific, Europe and the Americas (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

Then:

Model A

Continuation of the P-5 with veto power	5 P
Six new permanent members without veto	6 P
Thirteen extra rotating two-year seats	13 E
	24

Model B

Continuation of the P-5 with veto power	5 P
Eight new rotating but renewable four-year seats (Semi-permanent)	8 P 11 E
Eleven extra rotating two-year seats	24

Felicio and Graham (2005) explored the implications of bringing together security regionalism and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter regarding regional organizations for the reform of the UN Security Council. The writers explored the potential improvement for the legitimacy and authority of the Council that could be gained by adopting the representative role of Chapter VIII on regional organizations discussed in chapter 9 about regional security. The “security regions”, the Chapter VIII vis-à-vis regional organizations and the corresponding composition of the Security Council membership are visible in tables 3, 4 and 5. Table 3 illustrates the current Security Council membership of 15 nations based on the present electorate mechanism, compared with a proposal of an enlarged Security Council of 24 countries (see table 4 and 5). Table 4 is focused on the two models offered by the UN-High-Level Panel of experts; meanwhile table 5 is concentrated on the global-regional mechanism debated in chapter 9. Felicio and Graham (2005) explained that two criteria are used for each security region:

- the regional state spread (RSS), namely the variety in the number of regional states per Council seat for each region;

- the regional population spread (RPS), especially the variety in the average population size for each Council seat for each region.

The writers brought about the importance of extending the membership of the Council in asserting that considerable improvements will be achieved in both the RSS and the RPS if the Council is extended to 24 members. On the word of the authors, advantages will be as follows:

- the number of States per seat improves from 13 (Table 3) to 8 (Tables 4 and 5);
- the RSS improves from 19 States today (Table 3) to 12 in the case of eight regions in Table 5; and improves further to 3.5 in the case of four regions in Table 4; and
- the population per seat improves from 411 million (Table 3) to 257 million (Tables 4 and 5);
- the RPS improves from 1.35 billion today (Table 3) to 476 million with the Panel's two models (Table 4) and, even better, to 385 m. in the case of the eight "security regions".

Felicio and Graham (2005, p. 49) provided the following tables concerning the present size and the recommendations of the UNHLP to extend the UN Security Council:

Table 3: Current Size (15 Members), 2004 Membership, Model A presented by the UN HLP

Security Regions (S.R.)	Responsible Agency	S.R Pop (million)	No. of Regional States	No. of UNSC Seats	Regional Spread's UNSC per		P-5
					States per seat	Pop. Per seat (m.)	
Sub-Sahara Africa	AU	643	43	2	21.5	322	
North Africa-West Asia	I.A.S	289	21	1	21	289	
Europe	COE	643	41	5	8.2	129	France, UK
Central Asia - Caucasasia	CIS	218	9	1	9	218	Russia
South Asia	SAARC	1,373	7	1	7	1,373	
East Asia		1,481	5	1	5	1,481	China
South East Asia / Pacific	ASEAN	561	24	1	24	561	
Americas	OAS	847	35	3	11.7	282	USA
Unattached		110	6			--	
Total/Average		6,165	191	15	12.7	411	5
RSS					19		
RPS						1,352	

Table 4: Expanded Size (24 members) Model A and B presented by the UN HLP

Security Regions (S.R.)	Responsible Agency	S.R Pop (million)	No. of Regional States	No. of UNSC Seats	Regional Spread's UNSC per		Permanent Members	
					States per seat	Pop. Per seat (m.)	Model A P5+P6	Model B P5 only
Africa		832	53	6	8,8	139	2	0P+SP
Europe		813	47	6	7.8	136	4-FR, UK, Russia+1	France, UK & Russia + 2 SP
Asia and the Pacific		3,673	56	6	9.3	612	3 - China + 2	China + 2 SP
Americas		847	35	6	5.8	141	2 - USA + 1	USA + 2 SP
Unattached			0			--		
Total/Average		6,165	191	24	8	257	11	5 P + 8 SP
RSS					3.5			
RPS						476		

The High Level Panel has not pursued the issue of responsible agency.

Felicio and Graham (2005, p.50) gave their own proposal of the Security Council reformation based on security regions:

Table 5: Expanded Size (24 Members) Based on 8 ‘Security Regions’ and ‘Chapter VIII Security Agencies’

Security Regions (S.R.)	Responsible Agency	S.R Pop (million)	No. of Regional States	No. of UNSC Seats	Regional Spread’s UNSC per		P-5
					States per seat	Pop. Per seat (m.)	
Sub-Sahara Africa	AU	643	43	4	10.8	161	
North Africa-West Asia	I.A.S	289	21	2	10.5	145	
Europe	COE	643	41	3	13.7	214	France, UK
Central Asia - Caucasasia	CIS	218	9	2	4.5	109	Russia
South Asia	SAARC	1,373	7	4	1.8	343	
East Asia		1,481	5	3	1.7	494	China
South East Asia / Pacific	ASEAN	561	24	2	12.0	281	
Americas	OAS	847	35	4	8.8	212	USA
Unattached		110	6	--		--	
Total/Average		6,165	191	24	8	411	5
RSS					12.0		
RPS						385	

WBW (2015) advocate the elimination of the veto power or its revision. The Security Council decides to employ force to maintain or restore peace, to appoint the Secretary General’s position, applications for membership, and to amend the Charter and procedural matters which can impede questions from even coming to the table. The permanent five tend to hold and use a de facto veto. At the Council the veto has been exercised 265 times, mainly the United States and the former Soviet Union, to block action, thus making the UN become an impotent body (WBW, 2015).

The writers of World beyond War claim that the veto restricts or blocks the Council. It is profoundly undemocratic and unfair in a sense that it allows the holders to impede any action against their own violations of the Charter’s provision on aggression. WBW (2015) advocate to simply get rid of the veto or to allow permanent members to cast a

veto, but 3 members casting it would be sufficient to obstruct passage of a fundamental or contentious issue.

The authors of *World beyond War* and Felicio and Graham have provided us with suggestions about the possible reformation of the United Nations, especially the Security Council. From the writers' standpoint, the Council's system is purely undemocratic and illegitimate and this lessens the authority of the United Nations around the world. The absence of a Muslim nation on the Council is telling and displays the disrespect the Muslim community has for this global organization. The entire world is not likely to be represented on the Council, as member-states already have their voice at the General Assembly. The point is about the representation of each region on the Council. Felicio and Graham have proposed from a regional security perspective that each geographical location be represented by a state on a rotation basis.

We have seen the different propositions made, but we definitely consider that each part of the world should be represented. We are also convinced that the model Felicio and Graham propose about eight security regions is less likely to become a reality. We consider that every regional organization should be represented on the Council as a permanent member. For instance, to extend the Council, the AU, the EU, the OAS, and Asia for example, should all hold a permanent seat on the Council. It is not about expanding the Council by including more countries as permanent members, we rather see that every regional organization should be represented, including a representative of the Muslim bloc. It is likely that if we extend the Council from that angle, the authority and the legitimacy of the UN will begin its recognition process. Now, a controversial issue has been mentioned by the writers of *World beyond War*, that is, to revise or eliminate the veto. They made two remarkable proposals: to simply repeal the veto or to allow the permanent five to cast a veto, but 3 members casting it will be necessary to block a decision. We opt for the second proposition.

As discussed in chapter 7, the other problem on the Security Council is that of the veto power owned by the permanent five. We have seen that for the Security Council to take action against any threat to security, either for the implementation of collective security or any other peace-related issue, nine "yes" votes are necessary from 15 government representatives present at its headquarter in New York. In the meantime, these nine positive votes must include the consent of the "permanent five". As a result, even 14 affirmative votes against one would not be sufficient to secure arrangement for action if the "one" is a permanent member. In this viewpoint, we cannot deny along with

the writers that the Council is purely undemocratic and its electorate system obsolete. The issue is seriously contentious, as it is not probable that the Council changes overnight. At the same time, sooner or later the Council will have to undergo a reformation as it is intrinsically undemocratic and illegitimate.

15.2 Exposing Old Myths about War

WBW (2015) debunk myths about war, we are going see them one by one.

Myth 1: it is impossible to eliminate war

To assert it is to submit resignedly to determinism, to be certain that we human beings do not make our history but are the helpless victims of forces beyond our control, that we have no free will. In fact, it was once said that it is not possible to abolish slavery, dueling, blood feuds and other organizations that were profoundly entrenched in societies of their time, practices which are now, if not entirely in the garbage can of history, globally assumed to be eradicated. War as aforementioned is a social invention, not a permanent characteristic of human existence.

Myth 2: war is in our genes

If this were true, all societies would be waging war all of the time, which we know is not what is going on. During the most recent 6,000 years, war has been infrequent and some societies have not experienced it. Some have witnessed it and afterwards abandoned it. War in this respect is a social event, not a biological event.

Myth 3: war is natural

It is not easy to get people to kill in warfare. A great state of psychological conditioning is required even to get them to fire their guns and most of the time they are traumatized by the experience and undergo post-traumatic stress disorder. Several veterans of warfare end up depending on medical treatment – taking tablets – a number of them kill themselves, incapable of living what they have done on the battlefield.

Myth 4: we have always had war

War is an invention of the last 5% of human existence. Archeology finds few evidence of armed conflict or war-gods or dominator societies before 4, 000 BC.

Myth 5: war is inevitable because of crises beyond our control like resource scarcity, environmental crises, over-population, etc.

Human beings are endowed with rational behavior. War is always a choice and other choices are always available if people employ their genetically given imagination and inventiveness. Nonviolent confrontation is always a choice, as it is the case with economic sanctions, negotiations, and several other responses to aggression.

Myth 6: we are a sovereign nation

Sovereignty is based on the idea that a people can draw a line around themselves and keep out anything they do not want to enter their country, by war as a last option. In reality, borders are currently wholly penetrable. We cannot ban intercontinental ballistic missiles, ideas and information, disease organisms, migrants and refugees, new technologies, economic influences, the effects of climate change, cyber-attacks and cultural artifacts such as films and musical trends. Equally important, the majority of countries are not at all homogenous but have extremely mixed populations.

Myth 7: we go to war to ensure our defense

We should note that *defense* is different from *offense*. Defense is meant to protect one's border from intrusion as opposed to aggression, which means to cross another state's borders to attack them. Establishing military bases around the globe is offensive and it is counterproductive, fostering hostility and dangers rather than terminating them. It makes people less protected. A defensive military approach would only be about a coast guard, anti-aircraft weapons, and other troops capable of deterring or resisting attacks. Current American military expenditure is nearly entirely for projecting military power around the world: offense, not defense.

Myth 8: some wars are "good" wars; for example, WW II

It is in effect documented that cruel regimes were wiped out in WW II, but to affirm it is to use a questioning definition of "good". WW II resulted in crushing destruction of cities and all their cultural treasures, massive environmental contamination, an economic loss of unprecedented proportions and not least, the deaths of 100 million people, the arrival of two new superpowers, and the coming of the time of nuclear terror. And both parties to the conflict had the choice of taking steps that would have avoided warfare in prior years and decades.

Myth 9: war and war preparation bring peace and stability

The ancient Romans stated, “If you want peace, prepare for war.” The result was only war after war until it destroyed them. What the Romans regarded as “peace” was to dictate terms to the helpless defeated enemy. The same thing happened after WW I which was not a peace but a ceasefire that would only last 20 years. Waging war brings about new enemies, resentment, distrust and additional wars. Preparation for war causes other states to have the sentiment that they must get ready and so a vicious circle is established which makes continual the armed-conflict system.

Myth 10: war makes us safe; war may be unjust and bloody but in the end it makes us safe, corollary: “the price of freedom is blood.”

War makes everyone less safe. The losers lose, the victors lose, and all the survivors lose. In fact, nobody wins a contemporary war. Numerous are exterminated on both sides. If by chance the “victors” fight the war in the losers’ land, the victors however have countless dead victims, spend money that could have been used to benefit their own populations, and pollute the earth through greenhouse gas emissions and the release of toxics. The “victorious war” prepares the way for future arms races and unpredictability, leading eventually to the next war.

Myth 11: war is necessary to kill the terrorists

War mythology tells us that “our” wars (whoever “we” are) kill evil people who must be destroyed to defend us and our freedoms. In fact, while some “non-state actors” are destroyed, latest wars waged by wealthy nations are one-sided slaughters of innocents and ordinary citizens and end up creating more terrorists while poisoning the natural environment. Rather than opting for a violent response to terrorism or invasion, which are just symptoms of a conflict problem, it is more sensible to look for the origins of the disease which has led to the conflict.

15.3 Peace Journalism and Peace Education

Galtung (2015) contends that to argue something about peace journalism, something has to be argued about peace. To argue something about peace, something has to be argued about conflict and its resolution. To argue about conflict resolution, something has to be argued about the United States’ profound participation in numerous international conflicts. Journalism’s role is not uniquely to report on the world; the role of peace journalism is to detect forces and counterforces for and against peace and to

make them and their conflict visible, thus creating outcomes that could be possible resolutions (Galtung, 2015).

We acknowledge that Galtung's assumption that to say something about peace journalism, something has to be said about peace is noteworthy in a sense that if we deal with peace journalism we deal with issues that participate in peacebuilding or peace culture. If we say something about peace it is obvious that we will argue about conflict resolution, of course it is a complex analysis. We comprehend in this standpoint that peace journalism has to do with peace issues, therefore peace research. As we see it, it implies that a peace journalist is not likely to make an inflammatory propaganda about a specific issue. He is neither influenced by an external force that dictates his or her analysis or research. He or she is somebody who deals with conflict resolution and peace education in a sense that as mentioned later, a journalist is an educator and therefore somebody who influences the mind and intelligence of his or her watchers or readers.

In this respect, he or she should especially pay attention to the way he or she handles information before it is released to the public as his or her aim is not glory but to convey a culture of peace rooted in the fact that counter violence is not the unique option or answer to violence as the mainstream media would like to communicate it to the public. Definitely, Galtung's point is of great consideration here as he makes clear that if a reporter engages in peace journalism he or she will deal with the development of a culture of peace and somewhat conflict analysis and research.

In this part the writers of *World beyond War* contrasts peace journalism to war journalism. They explain that the movement of peace journalism was invented by peace scholar Johan Galtung, in which writers and editors give the reader a possibility of considering nonviolent responses to conflict rather than the traditional reaction of counter violence. WBW (2015) inform that a number of reporters, writers and news commentators are focused on the old story that war is inevitable and that it brings peace. Peace journalism is different because it emphasizes on the cultural and structural origins of aggression and its effect on actual people – in lieu of abstract analysis of states –, and examines conflicts in terms of their real complexity in opposition to war journalism's simple "good guys versus bad guys." Peace journalism as well seeks to make public peace initiatives usually ignored by the mainstream media. WBW (2015, p. 62) quote the 10 features of "PJ" that the Center for Global Peace Journalism offers in its publication *The Peace Journalist Magazine*:

“1. PJ is proactive, examining the causes of conflict, and looking for ways to encourage dialogue before violence occurs. 2. PJ looks to unite parties, rather than divide them, and eschews oversimplified “us vs. them” and “good guy vs. bad guy” reporting. 3. Peace reporters reject official propaganda, and instead seek facts from all sources. 4. PJ is balanced, covering issues/suffering/peace proposals from all sides of a conflict. 5. PJ gives voice to the voiceless, instead of just reporting for and about elites and those in power. 6. Peace journalists provide depth and context, rather than just superficial and sensational “blow by blow” accounts of violence and conflict. 7. Peace journalists consider the consequences of their reporting. 8. Peace journalists carefully choose and analyze the words they use, understanding that carelessly selected words are often inflammatory. 9. Peace journalists thoughtfully select the images they use, understanding that they can misrepresent an event, exacerbate an already dire situation, and re-victimize those who have suffered. 10. Peace Journalists offer counter-narratives that debunk media-created or -perpetuated stereotypes, myths, and misperceptions.”

Peace education, peace research, peace journalism and peace blogging are part of the newly emerging culture of peace (WBW, 2015).

It seems to us that this analysis by the writers of World beyond War should be considered as when we most of the time watch the news we have the impression that reporters are guiding our thoughts and intelligence in a subjective way. Most importantly, as mentioned in the 10 characteristics above, they cause us to view good guys against bad guys in their reports. This is what the mainstream journalists are doing, we can perceive that they take position and are very subjective. The collateral is that journalists are to some extent educators and influence people’s understanding and opinions, for this reason they have to be careful about what kind of discourse, analysis and images they provide and bring to people to their home television screens, newspapers or computers. A failure to do that job appropriately will result in a failure to develop a real culture of peace.

As the writers of World beyond War have debunked old myths about war, arguably, these war journalists are still stuck in the paradigm that war is inevitable and that it brings peace. Fortunately, peace journalism has emerged as a new form of journalism that carefully pays attention to the kind of images to display to the screen, as they consider the drawbacks of their reporting; they are very watchful about the words they employ, as they know some words can be very inflammatory. This kind of journalism seems to be the sort of reporting the world needs if we would like to develop and solidify a culture of peace.

Peace Education

Harris (2010) advocates the importance to present the case for the study of conflict, violence and peace in African universities and to debate ways wherein this could happen. He states that peace studies may not mean the same things to different people. Harris (2010, p. 293) quotes the article *Peace Education Theory* by Ian Harris, who has enlisted five meanings of peace studies: human right education, development education, conflict resolution, international education and environmental education. The writer's analysis is mainly focused on the causes of conflict and non-aggressive ways of dealing with conflicts. Harris (2010) goes on to indicate that every discipline has its own terminology and peace studies are no exception. Conflict is ascribed to an incompatibility of needs or interests between two or more parties – individuals, groups or states – and is so common as to be viewed as unavoidable (Harris, 2010). Violence is an option to deal with such conflicts and Galtung (1990) as seen in the partial introduction of this section has identified three types of violence. Physical or direct violence means actual or threatened physical or psychological injury to another party; domestic violence – albeit this might bring together wider aspects, especially verbal or economic abuse –, corporal punishment and war are glaring illustrations.

Structural violence is ascribed to the damage resulting from political, social and economic structures in society (Galtung, 1990). It usually has not the intent to harm but is at the same time fatal. The apartheid system in South Africa is a glaring illustration (Harris, 2010). Galtung (1990, p.145) argued that structural violence implies a “quiet process, working slowly in the way misery in general and hunger particularly, erode and finally kill human beings.” Harris (2010) comments that this kind of violence therefore describes the structures which maintain the supremacy of one group at the core of power over another group at the periphery. In a more pragmatic way it can refer to low wages, illiteracy, landlessness, poor health, limited or non-existent political representation or legal rights and generally, limited control over much of their lives unavoidable (Harris, 2010). If those who undergo structural violence resist or try to change their condition, they may face direct violence. The negligence, exploitation and exclusion which are characteristics of structural violence destroy in comparison to direct violence but they vastly destroy more people (Harris, 2010).

Harris (2010) underscores that cultural violence is a relatively distinct concept and is ascribed to the rationalizations or justifications for using corporal violence or structural

violence on another group. This would include a belief in some kind of hegemony of one party over another – i.e. Israel over the Palestinians, white over black South Africans and one state over another during time of war – and the belief in the hegemony of one ethnic group, probably defined by culture, language or religion over others. As discussed earlier, we have a categorization of peace, including positive and negative peace, stable peace, precarious and conditional peace. Harris (2010) for the purpose of his analysis defines peace as a way of life committed to the non-violent resolution of conflict, and a commitment to personal and social justice. Now the question is, why should we study peace?

Harris (2010) withstands that four key reasons can be recommended. First, conflict – by which is simply understood a difference of interests between two groups – is both common and unavoidable. The second reason is that violence is a common response to conflict albeit, being the result of the choice of individual groups, it is never unavoidable. Violence is ethically and spiritually unwanted. Violence might provide a *fast fix* but is expensive and possibly unproductive; it is improbable to solve the conflict to the contentment of each of the groups concerned. This means that there will be victors and losers and the conflict might re-emerge.

The third reason is that the non-violent resolution is commonly efficient. This requires according to the writer, a vast increase in the number and skills of negotiators, mediators, implementers and monitors of peace settlements. Another point is the importance of individual mediators in practicing the logic of mediation and not resorting to power-based diplomacy, which might be accountable for several of the failures of international mediation efforts in African civil wars during the 1990s (Harris, 2010). Professional training must be a precondition for those who act as mediators. The fourth and last reason to the above question is that peace studies is rooted on the conviction that human beings (as nations, individuals and groups) are educated in the broadest sense of the term, to deal with conflict in specific ways unavoidable (Harris, 2010). More effective and less costly ways of addressing conflict can be learned. This last reason highlights the fact that peace studies is about changing the mentalities of nations, groups and individuals regarding the way conflicts are best managed (Harris, 2010).

The Introduction of Peace Studies in African Universities

The discipline of peace studies is obviously a recent discipline in the Western world and can be traced back to the beginning of the 1960s (Harris, 2010). The discipline

has been only recently established in African universities. Harris (2010, p. 299) provides us with the results undertaken by the University of Peace, with its overview *Africa Program* (2003) which enlisted peace studies teaching and research in 34 African universities. Despite the fact that numerous universities give one or more courses about peace, only a few of them have peace studies programs offering paper qualifications in peace studies (Harris, 2010). The overview showed that in South Africa, only Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University in Port Elizabeth and the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban offer postgraduate degrees in conflict resolution or peace studies, whereas the University of the North West at Mmabatho offers a first degree studies in international relations and in peace. In Zimbabwe, Africa University gives postgraduate programs in peace and governance, though in Kenya, Hekima College – part of the Catholic University of Eastern Africa – offers postgraduate studies in international relations and in peace. The amount of peace studies programs is unquestionably amplifying, in part as a result of the efforts of the Africa Section of the University of Peace, located in Addis Ababa.

It seems to us that Harris has noted that peace education is fundamental for the building of a culture of peace, especially in the African continent. Before tackling how important it is to introduce peace education in universities' curricula, he has explained the options that are available to us when we are faced with a situation of conflict, at the same time defining what conflict is. He said that violence is one of these options, but noted that this does not mean that violence is inevitable, it is just a choice. Then he stated that the other response to conflict is its peaceful resolution, that is, no use of violence. And Harris has explored Galtung's categorizations of peace: positive and negative peace, in order to explain the concept of violence. Indeed, he argued that according to Galtung there are three types of violence – direct or physical or corporal violence; structural or indirect violence and cultural violence. After presenting all these concepts, the writer has come to the importance of applying them into peace education programs at university level, especially in African universities.

As we think through this approach, we admit that it is to be carefully examined as it displays one of the prerequisites for a peace culture in the African continent. The writer has paralleled the necessity of peace education with the growing number of civil wars in Africa in the 1990s, most of which have been unsuccessful in their peace settlements. For this reason, African people, particularly university students need to be trained in the values of peace but at academic level. This implies that African universities should

introduce peace studies in their curricula and offers degrees in conflict resolution, peace studies and international relations, by printing in the mind of peace students the necessity of an alternative system to the current war system. Education will obviously play a major role in this respect. But there is a concern, if there are so many degrees offered by these universities and then therefore numerous students graduating in peace studies, what will be the employment opportunities for these graduates?

This question is not easy to address as we acknowledge that all these graduates will not be employed by the respective Ministries of Foreign/External Affairs of their respective countries; all may not have the chance to work at the UN as peacebuilders, or peace specialists, or even work at the AU. Arguably, their options for employment are limited. Given these glaring and practical impediments to peace students, is there a hope? As we see it, the hope of these graduates is not lost at all, we propose that they create their own structures where they can serve as consultants for peace-related issues like non-governmental organizations, as government bodies can come and ask for their expertise. This will possibly give them the opportunity to acquire work experience in the field of peace (their major), therefore having ways available for the applicability of their knowledge. What we try to underline is that although there might be fewer job opportunities for peace research students, this by no means should prevent them from entering the train of peace culture in their community and day-to-day activities.

Fulcher (2012) sustains that children are the future. They are presented as a world of possibilities, a world where we can create beautiful and important changes. At the same time, children might also be viewed as a threat to the extent that they represent or are perceived to be the vehicle for the perpetuation of identities and groups regarded as negative, or of a perpetuation of troubles which do not get to their end with the contemporary adult generations. These two contrasted considerations of children are instantaneously found in conflict and post-conflict environments where opposing groups view children consecutively as threats or as representing hope (Fulcher, 2012). A central problem is that children are educated by their environments. Those who have witnessed warfare have unavoidably been educated by warfare. Most importantly, in terms of ongoing responses, conflict educates children how to respond to power (Fulcher, 2012).

At the time conflict occurs children are regularly deprived of formal education and are faced with the destruction of family and of a community that would have given experiences with a wide range of learning opportunities (Fulcher, 2012). Accordingly, children lack the possibility to learn and acquire experience which will challenge their

knowledge of violence and conflict. Current approaches to peacebuilding do not receive children as legitimate participants. This makes things difficult since children having been taught by warfare are deprived of the chance to be educated in peacebuilding. As a result of the exclusion of children from the peacebuilding process, peace is presented to them as a product, not as a process. In the same way that children are ignored for war-making decisions they are ignored for peacemaking decisions (Fulcher, 2012). As an alternative to this description, the writer proposes the utilization of peace education. Peace education may serve to support and protect children in the process of peacebuilding by teaching concepts and skills which children can draw upon when confronted to new warfare or when dealing with the repercussion of past conflict.

Fulcher (2012, p.41) quotes the book Contemporary Conflict Resolution by Ramsbotham et al. who identify four major fields to be addressed by peacebuilders: political stabilization, physical safety, economic growth and psychological healing. These writers argued that peace education interconnects with these fields through its attention to reflection, capacity building and representation.

Fulcher (2012, p.41) mentions another peace scholar's book Working for Peace: Implications or Education' in Henderson, by Monez who contended that peace education seeks to help students "design strategies of action which can contribute to the shaping of a world characterized by social justice and absence of exploitation." The use of peace education is diverse and includes both wider conceptualizing of peace and world development as well as specific skills sets which can help people communicate views within personal conflicts (Fulcher, 2012). According to Morrison from his book Peace Education, quoted by Fulcher (2012, p.41), these skills may include but are not limited to: listening, cooperation, problem solving and reflecting, skills that help cultivate the ability of the individual to manage conflict and conceptualize greater change. Fulcher (2012) emphasizes that the skills and initiatives previously discussed necessitate being accessible to all children irrespective of whether they are in a position to attend formal education.

Yet, the setting up or re-institution of formal education is one of the most basic products of peace frequently presented to children. She argues that schools are capable of working towards the regeneration of society through meticulous planning of classroom structure and a curriculum which emphasizes on inclusive history and multi-cultural learning opportunities and goals. On the other hand, the writer explains that classroom structure and curriculum may also be used in ways which jeopardize peace education.

For instance, in some Sri Lankan schools with playgrounds sponsored by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil – a former militant organization that was based in northeastern Sri Lanka founded in May 1976, the organization was militarily defeated by the Sri Lankan Government in May 2009 –, the playgrounds were equipped with wooden guns mounted on see-saws, with the goal of normalizing violent behavior (Fulcher, 2012).

According to Fulcher (2012) there is a broad and mounting concern over the capacity of peace education to be effectively used in traditional classroom settings. This comes from the observation that traditional classrooms are essentially violent in that the rights of the child or student to discovery and express himself are subject to the rights of the governing body or teacher. Although there are several traditional schools that provide courses in peace education, the definition of peace is often determined by curriculum in lieu of consultation, in the same way the playground equipment of the Sri Lankan primary school was controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil (Fulcher, 2012).

The writer believes that the establishment of a peace culture that is collaborative and adaptable demands a move away from traditional education to progressive education, the assurances of which are freedom of self-expression and discovery. Even though there would surely be no guns on see-saws in a progressive classroom, the classroom does not need to dramatically appear different from a traditional classroom. At the same time, in a progressive classroom the use of peace education is based on the child or student cooperating with the adult leaders in lieu of resting uniquely on the teacher or adult board. Fulcher (2012) indicates that this is important for children because it allows them to create their own perception on peace. If peacebuilders encourage and give opportunities to children to communicate and develop their personal viewpoints on peace, these viewpoints and the skills developed instantaneously may accordingly be applicable to the peacebuilding process. In addition, by creating non-traditional learning structures for peace education, peace comes to be more a process than a product for children (Fulcher, 2012).

Peace education gives the possibility to a child who has witnessed significant, negative and personal powers to become powerful in the process of peacebuilding and simultaneously helps the child who has experienced significant violence become powerful in a new and more positive way (Fulcher, 2012).

Fulcher in her analysis has mostly examined peace education in a post-conflict environment. We perceive that peace education is central for children who experienced violence on a regular basis in warfare situations. Peace education can be viewed as a

way for integration if not reintegration in society. There must be a way to psychologically heal children from their psychological malaise for the reason that they might suffer resentment and hatred. Resentment that can be perpetrated in the form of violence if they are not under a psychologically clinical treatment. The author has called such treatment peace education, as a way to reintegrate children into a culture of peace and offer them better opportunities for the future. In this respect, peace education is needed for children after a conflict, but as well for the adults.

There is a point the writer has not effectively developed , although she mentioned how important it is to shift from traditional classroom to progressive classroom as seen above; she failed to develop the idea that peace education should not only be undertaken in a post-conflict environment. We have welcomed the illustration by Fulcher, of the Sri Lankan school sponsored by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil, where the playgrounds have been outfitted with wooden guns mounted on see-saws, as a way to normalize violence. This illustration shows that even though we might not be in a warfare environment, we should be careful about the way we educate children. In a culture of peace, educators or the government cannot certainly allow wooden guns on the playgrounds of schools. We consider that although peace education might be a matter of classroom, parents should be watchful about the kind of setting they provide to their children.

We would like to be illustrative: If we let children play warfare videogames like *Call of Duty*, *Ghost Recon*, *Medal of Honors* and so on, what do we expect these games are conveying to them? More importantly, if the toys we buy to kids are guns, missiles, Kalashnikovs, knives etc., shall we be that surprised if afterwards we discover a violent behavior or act from them? What we try to underline is that parents at home with the quality of education they provide to their children should participate in peace education, therefore in a peace culture.

Now that we have ended the discussion of the first subsection of this part, in the second subsection we deeply debate conflict theory, especially conflict resolution. This second subsection is of course the last part of our doctoral dissertation and will begin with its own partial introduction.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Partial Introduction

Conflict resolution is a major field in IR as the world has turned out to be drowned in a range of conflicts and this is a significant challenge for the world community. The field has become a concern because if we no longer have a stable world we cannot interact peacefully in having good diplomatic, economic, commercial and political interactions among states. Now, what is international conflict resolution? Wanis-St. John and Ghais (2014) define international conflict resolution as that body of knowledge, practices, rules and organizations that strive to prevent, reduce and transform potential or actual violent conflict within and between states.

It is possible to provide another definition to international conflict. Of course international conflict encompasses the antiquated war, violent confrontation between sovereign states acting through coercion with at least one state fighting outside its boundaries (NAS, 2000). Nonetheless, some conflicts are currently regarded as threats to international peace and security although two states might not be fighting. This happens basically when norms of international law are violated in intrastate conflicts, such as human rights, democratic governance, and self-determination. In this case, a severe international action – including the use of threat or force – has to be conducted to seek prevention and resolution as in the case of interstate wars (NAS, 2000).

In this perspective, some internal conflicts within states are being treated as international – the Syrian war is a flagrant example since 2011 where Bashar Al Assad was sometimes accused of using chemical weapons; the 1994 Rwandan genocide is another illustration –. Sandole et al. (2009) underscore that the field of conflict resolution broadly includes studies that are concerned with social clash. The writers go on to stress that some overall remarks can help us describe basic characteristics of conflict resolution. Firstly, the field of conflict resolution takes into consideration both perceptual and structural causes that affect conflict systems. In this standpoint, conflicting parties are linked to their perceptual frame in assessing their contacts with their rivals. Consequently, one can reframe all conflicts in a sense that the perceptions of parties vary (Sandole et al., 2009). Secondly, the field of conflict resolution deals with social conflicts and conflict resolutions strategies – techniques – as processes that are dynamic. In this regard, it is also admitted that third parties can play a critical role in conflict transformation (Sandole et al., 2009). The writers mean that third parties are

capable of helping parties to a conflict to conjointly achieve satisfactory outcomes if they are incapable of reaching an arrangement through their own endeavors.

Thirdly, all parties to a conflict have an impact on the relationships. In other words, instead of blaming the other party for the cause of the conflict, the field is concerned with what parties can do in order to positively impact the process of the conflict (Sandole et al., 2009). The field is interested in clash at all levels of human contact, for example interactive, intergroup and intercontinental, having in mind that conflicts are subjective phenomena. As a result, in the very purpose to assist the conflicting parties in finding their own resolutions, intelligent analyses of conflicts have to be anticipated as to create and improve confidence between parties in conflict and to overcome the differences and clichés that impede problem-solving practices, (Sandole et al., 2009).

It would be accurate to understand the model that is used to approach conflict resolution. From which moment the practice of IR was interested in conflict resolution? According to Sandole et al. (2009), the model includes the following:

- Traditionally, the practice of IR has been restricted to the confines of security studies discourse, which offers partial options to specialists of IR. Foreign policy bureaucrats often see the conflict resolution field as a "new age" crusade not having much importance to the conduct of real world issues.
- The current state of the writings in conflict resolution makes it possible to build synthesis between studies of IR and the field of conflict resolution.
- The rapidly changing world requires systematic frameworks that take into account activities and practices of foreign policy behavior of states in order to understand and design foreign policies vis-a-vis quickly rising new international situations, and then to communicate these possibilities to a wider public.

It is important to point out that in the practice of conflict resolution, the practice of diplomacy is required. In this section, we want to examine the most effective models for conflict resolution. As stated earlier, war is a human invention, that is a social invention and as such we have the cure for it. A well-known modern body that plays a significant role in international conflict resolution has been the UN. Wanis-St. John and Ghais (2014) underscore that the UN was created to make the promotion of global peace, at the same time that it preserved existing states, harmonizing the major world powers and deterring emerging nationalisms inside postcolonial boundaries. But unfortunately, according to the writers the UN system did by no means eliminate war in its entirety, even though it participated in the mitigation of interstate wars. The main role of the UN in

international conflict resolution is its deployment of multilateral peacekeeping missions (mediation) and peacekeeping – interposition of impartial UN-commanded armed forces between warring parties – as well as peacebuilding (Wanis-St. John and Ghais, 2014).

The authors go on to emphasize that over the years, the UN Security Council has frequently stated with greater intensity that sovereignty cannot be used as an excuse for governments that either wage unfair war on other states or seriously infringe the human rights of their own people. When political regimes willingly infringe the security of their own citizens, the international community reserves some right of multilateral intervention, (Wanis-St. John and Ghais, 2014). On the word of the writers, whereas new models such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are still in elaboration; sovereignty can no longer be regarded as an armor behind which human rights can systematically be violated.

We develop three chapters in this subsection: (I) the Reasons for War, (II) Strategies for International Conflict Resolution and (III) Peace Process and the Spoiler Issue.

CHAPTER 16: REASONS FOR WAR

In discussing conflict resolution, it seems to us that it would be accurate beforehand to trace the causes of warfare in order to have a good understanding of this section whose main concern is to work on how to resolve these conflicts we currently call world conflicts. Wanis-St. John and Ghais (2014) quote Waltz from his book Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. Waltz distinguished three types of images of international affairs that, put together, can help enlighten global conflict and warfare. According to him, the three contrasted images are as follows: human nature (also called the individual level), the composition and structure of states (also called the state level), and the anarchic state system (also called the system level) inside which nation-states exist and compete for survival. Even if among the three levels, Waltz favored the third image to explicate war, however the compilation of the three has a joint outcome: leaders and citizens with inherited and learned patterns of human violence who live in tyrannical, weak, or overly aggressive states, interrelating with each other in the absence of a main restraining universal authority, should inevitably be drawn into violent international conflict.

Table 6: Causes of Civil Wars (from the book Handbook of Conflict Resolution by Wanis-St. John and Ghais, p.4).

Underlying Cause or Condition	Causal Pathway
Cognitive processes	Symbols, exclusive identities taken to extremes.
Ethnic mobilization	Interactions between ethnic groups and the state (e.g., differential political treatment or rights, different rates of development).
Poverty	Ambiguous: Ease of rebel recruitment? State weakness? Becomes grievances?
Disintegration of empires or large, multiethnic states	Contestation of new boundaries, fear of domination by one ethno-national group over another, conflicting promises, unrealistic expectations of nationalism.
Grievances	Disparate or unfair political or economic treatment by the state relative to expectations
Economic opportunities of warfare	Corruption, organized crime, or sale of valuable resources by warring parties; financing of warring groups by outsiders; weapons trade; pools of young unemployed, failed demobilization and reintegration of combatants.

Weak states	Lack of legitimacy, lack of governing capacity, lack of effective mechanisms for peaceful resolution of differences, inability to manage or defeat rebellion.
Ideologies and belief systems	Absolute, uncompromising goals; heightened motivation; support from strong outside actors.
Wars themselves	Increased polarization, economic deterioration, and militarization.

According to Wanis-St. John and Ghais (2014) symbols are important as for the mobilization of followers in a civil war. Opatow (1990) underlined that social exclusion and moral exclusivity eventually prepare the way for violence launched by out-groups, therefore war. Civil wars broke out in the beginning of the 1990s, and then shrank quickly over the following decade, but unfortunately are currently almost the double they were in the 1950s (Wanis-St. John and Ghais, 2014). At the same time, traditional interstate war seems to have disappeared but of course not completely, according to the writers.

What comes out of the authors' analysis is that we have to pay attention to the nature of international conflicts. In effect, most of today's conflicts are not the old-fashioned existing between nation-states; we mean a country against another country. What the writers underline is that the current trends of international conflicts are civil wars, which constitute a great challenge for the global community in a sense that they are more difficult to solve than interstate wars. Why? Principally because it is about people of the same nations and cultures fighting against each other.

What Opatow pointed out is also to be well thought-out. Indeed, what causes rebellion to rise up in a country is the social exclusion some part of the population – poor young people in several cases – undergoes on the part of the ruling elite. In such a context, it is easy to recruit these people as they are willing and ripe to take up arms and fight against the government which they consider as the oppressor. A civil war has waged. Arguably, if people who are socially excluded have the opportunity to take up arms, they will not hesitate. Social exclusion is a result of poor and bad governance.

16.1 Poverty and Conflict

Wanis-St. John and Ghais (2014) claim that it is sometimes admitted that poverty can be considered as a cause of civil war – the same as terrorism –. Henderson and Singer (2000) in this regard believed that it is true that poorer countries have more possibilities to witness civil war than rich countries, and Collier et al. (2004) admitted that both low GDP and inequality of income within a country are accountable for longer civil war period. However, this last statement is debatable given that according to Collier et al. (2004) the recruitment of guerrillas is easier in the midst of the poor, who are in need of better economic opportunities. Wanis-St. John and Ghais (2014) argue that although lower GDP can be responsible for the waging of a civil war, it is most of the time combined with other factors such as lower education levels, higher birth rates, and lower levels of democracy. These mentioned problems make it hard to consider poverty as to play an isolated role causing warfare.

In view of this part, poverty is but not the only social cause of conflicts. Some authors stated that it has to be associated with lower GDP, other favored poverty as the most factual cause of war. What is obvious is that as Collier et al. (2004) stated, it is easier to recruit rebels among the poor. The explanation is that the poor are disfavored and excluded from socioeconomic life. We consider low GDP to be playing a role in a sense that the more countries are poor the more a civil war is likely to wage as Henderson and Singer (2000) held. Conversely, it is easy to remark that wealthiest countries never experience wars; this is simply due to good governance and good income redistribution, a good healthcare system and good social system as a whole.

Poor countries need to improve their governance. Another thing that is evoked in this first part is that though lower GDP can be responsible for conflict, it has to be associated with some additional factors that should not be neglected – lower education levels, higher birth rate and lower levels of democracy –. This latter is noteworthy because obviously civil wars only occur in non-democratic states. What we mean is that it is not documented that civil wars ever happened in democracies, except in newly democratic countries. This statement shows forth that democracy seems to be one of the preconditions for conflict prevention.

16.2 Grievance and Weak States

As for Kriesberg and Dayton (2012), political grievance undoubtedly is accountable for many civil wars and help unscrupulous front-runners mobilize followers. Some authors like Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2000) and Jakobsen and De Soysa (2009) have rejected the importance of grievances in civil wars. Meanwhile, Wanis-St. John and Ghais (2014) emphasize that when a category of a people within a population feels that it is being disfavored in income distribution, this represents the sort of grievance that can result in war. This statement is well-matched with prior theories on relative deprivation in centering not on absolute economic or political well-being but well-being in relation to expectations from the populations (Wanis-St. John and Ghais, 2014). On the word of the writers, this is demonstrated by the civil wars in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala, as well the unstable political transitions in the Philippines and Haiti, which make available confirmations that grievance constitutes a major reason in explaining as to why people organize for fighting and naturally state response through repression.

As aforementioned, civil wars are a matter of poor and undemocratic countries; it is in fact obvious that the sentiment of being discriminated against in a country while other parts of the population are enjoying a wealthy life with all opportunities can cause people to wage a rebellion. Most importantly, when there is a possibility to get armament. Grievance is therefore to be regarded as a non-negligible cause of conflicts. We perceive that grievances create hatred against the political elite that rules a country, and against not only those people who are favored but also towards all the rich. It can be argued that although a country may be poor if its wealth is well distributed and if there is no grievance experienced from the population, there is no doubt that we have another pace towards conflict prevention.

Another reason accountable for civil war is weak states. Wanis-St. John and Ghais (2014) indicate that weak states are states whose institutions are incompetent to resolve social conflict, mitigate grievances, or suppress violent opposition. Cunningham (2006) argued that when a rebellion starts in a strong state – democratic and developed state –, it is rapidly repressed by the government. Wanis-St. John and Ghais (2014) contend that a group of insurgents might not find as much support if the government has wide legitimacy. Indeed, a strong state has effective and legitimate capabilities for the maintaining of security and the resolution of conflict that are viewed by citizens as

legitimate (Wanis-St. John and Ghais, 2014). In contrast, Call and Wyeth (2008) highlight that the absence of these legitimate mechanisms in weak states constitutes a vacuum in which rebel groups may perpetrate their grievance through violence.

We acknowledge that a state that is incapable of reestablishing order after a rebellion has broken out is a state with a nonexistent military viability that is an instrument states usually use to secure their sovereignty and authority. In other words there is no sovereign state without a military viability. The outcome is that a weak state is non-militarily viable. The reason for this statement is that a state is supposed to have the military coercion able to respond to aggression from non-state actors – rebel groups – and reestablish order. Weak states are opportunities for rebels who are sometimes able to have the military capability to takeover power from the government. This raises the problematic of the political economy of wars, which is the ability to finance and support a rebellion. A government that claims to be sovereign should be capable to restore its authority.

16.3 The Decrease of Interstate War

Wanis-St. John and Ghais (2014) affirm that besides some factors explaining the reasons for civil wars, we have to examine those that validate the decrease of interstate wars. The writers contend that the post-World War II UN system of global peace preservation has somewhat been fruitful in dropping the occurrence of interstate war. Another thing, they argue is that the usage of UN peacekeeping missions has been as well positive in dropping war incidence. The explanation of that success can be found in the spread by the United Nations, of the norm of territorial integrity, the fact that state boundaries are not violable. Some territorial conquests include Turkey's takeover of part of Cyprus – which remains disputed –, the invasion of East Timor by Indonesia until East Timor got independence, Morocco's pretention that the Spanish Sahara belongs to her – remains disputed –, the victory of North Vietnam and the Vietcong over South Vietnam and the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq (Wanis-St. John and Ghais, 2014).

Despite the rising disputes over territoriality – navigation, fisheries, maritime delimitation, chemical contamination–, states have regularly turned to the UN to resolve their conflicts, through the International Court of Justice and stick to its ruling in place of warring militarily (Wanis-St. John and Ghais, 2014). In the same way, to avoid and minimize conflicts, regional geopolitical organizations such as the AU, the OAS and the EU arbitrate interstate conflicts and deploy ceasefire monitors, peacebuilding and

peacekeeping missions (Wanis-St. John and Ghais, 2014). Apart from the UN systems and these regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), the writers inform that the decrease of interstate wars can be ascribed to the progressively huge network of institutions for a large variety of economic, environmental and political collaboration within which states are embarked in. Wanis-St. John and Ghais (2014) claim that because states now belong to a complex ensemble of institutions such as IGOs (the UN, the AU, the EU, ASEAN, OAS etc.), trade regimes (for example the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA), military alliances (such as the NATO) and treaties (the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), they are incapable of solving their disputes through coercion. As a result, they can only interact diplomatically.

Another argument the authors underline is that interstate peace is made possible mostly when states are democracies, and enjoy free markets and trade with each other; they argue that liberal peace theory commonly holds that international trade encourages diplomatic relations between trading states. Barbieri and Schneider (1999) contended that peaceful relations between trading states is possible through the promotion of good relations and a sense of community, or most importantly, the fear to lose economic advantages generated thanks to trade. Despite these gains by the world community we should not idealize the success of the world in curbing interstate conflicts (Wanis-St. John and Ghais, 2014). According to the authors, some nations are exceedingly weaker than others, and this makes them defenseless to the interests of super powers. WMD are still available to those who can afford to buy them, and North Korea is threatening to use them – nuclear weapons –, the proliferation of these arms is actually troublesome. Seemingly interstate wars have shifted in their shape to become civil wars in so much as states might be pursuing their benefits by assisting one side in another nation's internal war (Wanis-St. John and Ghais, 2014). Accordingly, these conflicts become proxy warfare, and are more likely to last longer.

However, Goldstein (2012) argues that thanks in part to the decrease of international warfare, the general number of bloody victims per year in all conflicts combined is less than half the number it was during the Cold War.

Table 7: Tools and Practices for International Conflict Resolution (from the book Handbook of Conflict Resolution by Wanis-St. John and Ghais, p. 12).

Prevention	Early warning	Conflict-sensitive aid delivery	Economic development as prevention	State capacity building
Negotiation	Precursors, Ripeness	Pre-negotiation, Problem-solving, Back Channels	Negotiation Per se	Implementation and renegotiation
Sanctions and Inducements	Arms embargoes	Trade sanctions	Positive inducements – aid, membership in IGOs, etc.	Aid to strengthen local conflict resolution capacity
Peace Processes (Negotiation or mediation)	Ceasefires	Declarations of principles	Interim agreements	Comprehensive agreements
UN and Regional Organization Conflict Resolution	Peacemaking (mediation to prevent or resolve)	Military observer missions and peacekeeping forces (interposition of neutral forces)	Peace enforcement (combat)	Preventive deployment

CHAPTER 17: STRATEGIES FOR INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION

NAS (2000) contended that during the Cold War, it was understandable that international conflicts were treated as warfare occurring between states that act on behalf of constant and discrete national interests embedded in natural resources, geopolitics etc. From that perspective, warfare between nation-states reflected contradictory interests. In such a context, the main method for conflict management had been the traditional military, economic and diplomatic means of influence, as well as the threat of the use of force (NAS, 2000). This was manifest through state coalitions to avoid or alleviate violence, the use of armed force – defensive alliances such as the NATO, deterrence and coercive diplomacy –; economic sanctions and other tangible non-military threats and punishments, such as the removal of foreign aid (NAS, 2000).

NAS (2000) pointed out that an innovative progress since the end of the Cold War has been the arrival of three underused strategies for the resolution of international conflicts. These strategies are *conflict transformation*, *structural prevention* and *normative change*. Conflict transformation has to do with the reach of accommodation between warring parties through cooperating processes that take belligerents to reconcile tensions, redefine interests, or reaching an agreement (NAS, 2000). Structural prevention is a process that aims to create institutionalized systems of laws and norms or organizations that launch and strengthen nonviolent patterns to adjudicate or arbitrate parties in conflict's disagreements, in accommodating conflicting interests and making over conflicts by reaching as well a consensus (NAS, 2000). Normative change is when institutionalizing and developing official principles and informal outlooks whose main objective is to create a new context for conflict management.

Table 8: Strategies and Tools for Conflict Resolution (from the book International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War, by NAS (2000 p. 5).

Strategies	Tools that Feature the Strategy
Power politics	Threat of force, Defensive alliances, Economic sanctions, Bargaining as a tradeoff of interests, Power mediation
Conflict transformation	Problem-solving workshops, Alternative dispute resolution, Reconciliation by truth commissions
Structural prevention	Electorate system design, Autonomy, Legal guarantees of free speech and association, Civilian control of military organizations
Normative change	OSCE innovation of human rights norms

Note: these strategies and tools are often used in combinations, moreover, the conceptual distinction among them are sometimes blurred in use.

Sandole et al. (2009) provide a series of strategies for conflict resolutions.

17.1 Third Party Roles

a. Transformative Intervention

Actor gets involved in the transformation of the dysfunctional rapport among the parties to a conflict, with the objective to create mutual intellectual and value space among the rivals.

b. Facilitative Mediation

Actor mediates with the purpose of helping belligerents find their individual solutions. It can be in the form of easing exchange of information and problem-solving procedures, and completed by bringing together new means for the conflict system, and improving trust among the belligerents.

c. Interactive Conflict Resolution

Nations indirectly support or aid to start up informal third party assisted small group problem-solving initiatives in order to resolve their differences in unofficial secret meetings.

d. Conflict Resolution Training

A skill-building exercise led by third parties with the goal of making partakers to be more active in dealing with their differences.

e. Post-Conflict Rehabilitation

Actors initiate or sustain societal reintegration efforts in the conflict-torn nation.

f. Structural Intervention

Actor get involved as a third party, and undertake activities designed to change the incentive structure of the conflicting parties with an expectancy that they would cause the parties to change their warring activities.

g. Peacebuilding, Peacekeeping

Helping the parties to create and enhance democratic institutions such as electoral systems, financial reforms, and constitution writing with the belief that democratic

practices will mitigate the structural sources of the war. Sending peacekeeping forces to deter the conflict.

h. Initiating Bilateral Cooperative Programs

Actor helps the parties to a conflict to develop their bilateral cooperative programs mostly in low-politics domains such as culture, business, education, and sports – Multitrack framework –.

i. Negative Incentives

Actor removes economic and/or political rewards from the warring parties –or from one of the disputing parties – with the expectancy to change the parties' attitude, and the course of the war.

j. Power Mediation

Third parties impose a solution on a conflict in order to improve their national or institutional interests. Pressing the disputing parties in to reach an arrangement through the use of force.

k. Military Intervention

Actor militarily intervenes to mitigate or change the course of an already prevailing battle.

17.2 Partisan Roles

a. Problem-Solving Diplomacy

Actor is a party to a continuing conflict, and chooses to change the prevailing competitive course of action into collaboration.

b. Unilateral Concessions/Gestures

Actor undertakes a concession, or gives an olive branch to the "enemy" in order to de-escalate the tension and set a collaborative tone to the relationship with the other party.

c. Problem-Solving Negotiations

Undertaking or enthusiastically taking part in a cooperation process that seeks to reach effective and jointly advantageous agreements.

d. Cooperation with a Mediator

Actor accepts the support of a mediator in the conflict. The state, as a party to the conflict, dynamically seeks for a third party to initiate or assist in a peace process.

e. Exchanging Visits, Agreements

Improved regular interactions and diplomatic official visit between the states in conflict. Signing agreements on soft issues or to end war.

f. Positive Commitments and Traditional Diplomacy

Actor expresses its collaborative attitude on political issues. Actor attains its domestic interests by adapting a win-lose outlook to foreign policy.

g. Threats, Warnings, and Punishments

Actor issues threats and warnings to restate its determination vis-à-vis an issue or position. State makes decisions and castigates the other party.

h. Commitments, Accusation and Blaming

Actor restates its commitments to the already existing conflicting positions or opinions. Condemning the other party for its actions, positions, and boldness.

i. Armament and Strategic Coalitions

Building up weaponries of higher technology or increasing the quality and the number of arms. Forming military coalitions with like-minded states to preserve and improve the state's power.

j. Military Interventions and Leadership

Actor sends its armed forces to achieve its strategic objectives. Taking action or offering cooperation to shape an intercontinental alliance to act jointly on world issues.

k. Rewards and Praising

Actor uses "carrots" to influence the other party's position according to its personal preferences. Actors express their gladness with an already existing improvement or outcome.

We would like to remind our readers that the above strategies are developed by Sandole et al. (2009). The authors emphasize that an actor turns out to be a party when it has a direct interest in the rapport with another party and undertakes a number of actions – going from minor to hostile – to reach its objectives. In other words, an actor assumes a partisan role when it wants to deal with a situation where its direct stakes are confronted. On the word of the writers, bilateral interactions are the modest forms of such relations.

At the global level, bilateral relations could be directed thanks to the usage of classical diplomatic instruments, which might include issuing threats, warnings and punishments (g), commitments, accusations and blaming (h), and taking leadership (j). These actions constitute foreign policy tools that are commonly used, particularly with rivals. Sandole et al. (2009) claim that in an international context where decision-making practices are dominated by military strategic anxieties, the party can decide to make decisions by improving its military power (i), shaping strategic alliances (j) and occupying other places.

The authors provide the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003 as a glaring example. As for problem-solving diplomacy, Sandole et al. (2009) underscore that this is an exceptional kind of bilateral contact used when one of the conflicting parties wants to end an already existing hostility. Starting problem-solving negotiations (c), asking for third party support, and collaborating with a third party (d) are the type of actions that are undertaken to improve existing hostile relations between conflicting parties.

17.3 Economic Sanctions

Another interesting strategy in conflict resolution over the years has been the implementation of economic sanctions on a state or belligerent parties when they do not want to stop warfare. Beforehand it is important to have a definitional approach to economic sanctions, although NAS (2000) stated that defining this strategy is difficult as there is no single universally accepted definition to the strategy. NAS (2000, p. 126) defines economic sanctions as follows: *actual or threatened denial of economic relations by one or more states (sender[s]) intended to influence the behavior of another state (target) on noneconomic issues or to limit its military capabilities*. Some elements should be paid attention in this definition. The definition implies that there is (a) a coercive action, as opposed to inducements; that (b) the instrument is economic, most of the time it is about commercial relations but as well monetary relations; that (c) the objective is to impact non-economic policy, e.g. foreign policy actions (NAS, 2000).

Table 9: Typology of Sanctions' Objectives (from the book International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War, by the National Academy of Sciences, p. 127).

	Limited	Extensive
Containment	Military capabilities	Economic warfare
Anti-aggression	Policies (e.g., terrorism, proliferation)	Wars invasions
Domestic Political Influence	Democratization, human rights	Regime change

It appears to us that economic sanctions are a good strategy for conflict resolution but it is also important to stress that they are mostly used in the case of interstate conflict but not actually in civil wars. In effect, sanctions can be used against a state that has been aggressive against another state with the objective to change its behavior. These sanctions may include economic and armed embargoes by the world community to punish the behavior of the aggressive state. Economic sanctions have proven to be significantly effective in putting the target state in a factual isolationism that prevents it from trading with other states of the global community.

The outcome is that the target state starts undergoing the economic impact of sanctions given that it can neither import nor export its goods. Economic sanctions were applied to Saddam Hussein after he invaded Kuwait. Late Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi was embargoed and had no choice but to negotiate with the international community. In this latter case, when the population started to witness the economic effect of isolationism in the 1990s, Qaddafi started to lose his legitimacy in his country, and this is what subsequently forced him to go to the negotiating table. Although economic sanctions are a good strategy; however they should be utilized in a way that does not jeopardize the living conditions of civilians.

In that perspective, sanctions must be directed against governments by blocking their money in international banks, or impeding members of governments to go abroad, even by repealing diplomatic relations with the target state.

17.4 Prevention and Early Warnings

Zartman (2005) argued that great attention to conflict resolution has been directed to early warning and prevention, an ambition entrenched in the UN Charter but used occasionally. Wanis-St. John and Ghais (2014) underline that prevention is essentially resolution at previous phases of conflict escalation. The objective of prevention is to prevent violent manifestations of conflicts. In this respect, conflict prevention can be regarded as the implementation of tools of conflict resolution, settlement and management at an initial level before the conflict escalates to violence (Wanis-St. John and Ghais, 2014). The number one challenge of conflict prevention is to identify structural conflicts where violence is probable to arise. Generally speaking, there are two approaches to early warnings. The first approach consists of identifying groups or countries that display structural situations that are causes prone to violent conflict. The second approach includes assessing minorities or countries that are more likely to wage a conflict (Wanis-St. John and Ghais, 2014).

Wanis-St. John and Ghais (2014) claim that a remarkable revolution in prevention has been made possible thanks to the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces to anticipate future warfare – a preventive deployment –. Economic development in a country can be considered a tool for conflict prevention since there is obviously as stated earlier, a link between poverty and civil war (Wanis-St. John and Ghais, 2014). The writers go on to contend that state building is another tool for conflict resolution. From this point of view, Holsti (1996) indicated that good governance is conducive of good management of developing and current conflict and eventually participates in the prevention of violence. As for Wanis-St. John and Ghais (2014), state building is now regarded as a significant instrument for the prevention of conflicts. Ramsbotham et al. (2005) underlined that where governance is legitimate and accountable to populations, and when the rule of law triumphs, armed conflict is less probable.

We admit that prevention and early warnings are brothers that should not be separated. Prevention as a strategy has been used by the UN, it is called preventive diplomacy. Actually, the UN has done a great job in this respect. In effect, as soon as we had had signs of early warnings, for example when having problematic ongoing presidential elections in a country, the UN would practice preventive deployment by sending its peacekeeping forces to discourage potential warlords from taking arms, or deterring a government from exercising repression on innocent civilians. Unfortunately, preventive deployment has not been implemented in every case.

The way we see it, the UN has to carefully do everything in its power to identify early warnings, to see whether it is necessary or not to send its peacekeepers to a region. The UN has not paid attention to the presidential held in Gabon on August 27, 2016, where the supposed president elect Jean PING was not the person proclaimed by the bodies in charge of releasing the results of the elections. Accordingly, a lot of demonstrators took to the streets and there was an extremely violent repression from the government of Ali BONGO ONDIMBA, the president elect according to the announcement of the presidential results. He deployed the police, the military and his personal guard to repress civilians in response to their demonstration as people did not agree with the results announcement of the presidential.

Subsequently, a lot of civilians were savagely killed and others were imprisoned. It is certain that as the presidential campaign itself was hot, the global community through the UN should have perceived early warnings, that these elections would be somewhat eventful. The UN should have sent some peacekeepers to deter the government's repression. This is why we agree with the writers when they argue that prevention is essentially resolution at previous phases of conflict escalation (Wanis-St. John and Ghais, 2014). Gabon almost went through a civil war for the failure of the world community to pay attention to the things that happened in there.

17.5 Negotiation

Apart from the other above-mentioned techniques or strategies for conflict resolution, negotiation appears to be a significant and peaceful resolution of conflict that is somewhat to be distinguished from sanctions like embargoes. Negotiation is the moment where two parties to a conflict accept to come to the table in the hope of mitigating violence and see how they can find an agreement that mutually satisfies their demands. In other words, the outcome of a negotiation in conflict resolution is to reach an agreement. If it is an intrastate conflict, then negotiation gives place to reconstruction, reconciliation, state building, peacebuilding and peacemaking. But the great question is: what is the suitable time to engage into a negotiation? Can we start a negotiation any time? Or is there an appropriate time to negotiate? These questions will bring us to deal with the ripeness theory later on.

Zartman (2007, p.465) claimed that negotiation is “the first line for conflict resolution”. We do not totally agree with Zartman because although negotiation may appear to be the first step for conflict resolution, nevertheless it does not guarantee that a conflict is more

likely to mitigate for the reason that not every negotiation has proved to be successful, especially when it has been initiated at the wrong moment. Although the outcome of a negotiation is to find a jointly acceptable agreement, there is not always a guarantee that the parties will abide by the terms of the agreement. What we want to highlight is that although it is admitted that negotiation is a significant tool for conflict resolution, we should not force the parties to negotiate, we should however convince them to negotiate.

In the case of civil wars, it is quite impossible to see the parties enter a negotiation without the assistance of a third party. In the meantime, in interstate conflicts, it is possible to initiate bilateral discussions at the diplomatic level, and then eventually end warfare. Seemingly, Hopmann (1996) emphasized that global negotiations include some of the self-motivated interactive and international levels of negotiations but also huge diplomatic organizations, the eventuality of military force, the power of international and non-state actors.

A key issue in the case of civil war is about who are the legitimate parties to negotiate, especially when there are many armed rebel groups (Wanis-St. John and Ghais, 2014). The authors hold that civil wars contrast with interstate conflicts in so much as the legitimate parties to negotiate are recognized states. This argument should be considered with great attention as the authors contend that it is generally admitted that all major rebel groups need to be represented during a negotiation process.

In this standpoint, Nilsson (2008) argues that there are risks that the excluded armed groups become spoilers – sabotaging the peace process through post-negotiation violence –. In contrast, parties at the negotiating table may also become spoilers, (Stedman, 1997). In our understanding, this implies that parties do not respect the reached agreement during the negotiations. The explanation might be that the agreement did not suit the parties and that they only signed it because of international pressure – third party roles – but not by conviction. To avoid the parties to a conflict to become spoilers we must carefully identify their different claims and see how a consensus that suits all parties can be achieved.


As stated above, we cannot engage in negotiations when we want it, but do it at the right moment. This is where the issue of ripeness comes on stage. NAS (2000) highlighted that the metaphor of ripeness is used in conflict resolution because it is not difficult for statecrafts and practitioners of international affairs to understand. The metaphor implies that there comes a time where negotiation is to be initiated, out of which it would be risky as far as the outcome is concerned. NAS (2000) pointed out that

there are basically two different methods to approach and conduct negotiation (and its simplified form, mediation). The first approach claims that the clue to successful conflict resolution rests on the permanent suggestions for a solution. In this respect, conflicting parties resolve their conflict by reaching a satisfactory agreement; of course this involves making some compromises. The second approach sustains that the clue to a successful resolution of conflict rests on the scheduling of efforts for resolution. This implies that parties to a conflict start to negotiate as soon as they are prepared to do it – when none of the parties is incapable of defeating the other, and parties see themselves in jeopardizing and painful difficulty –. From this moment, they turn to the suggestions for conflict resolution that has generally been available for a longtime and that only seems attractive in the present time (NAS, 2000).

NAS (2000) called our attention on the fact that the second approach does not pretend to have the unique answer – since it refers to the first one –, however the substance of the proposals for a solution advocated by the first school is unproductive until the time is ripe. This is exemplified by the fact that the first approach has always focused its attention on finding the right answer not considering the right time to negotiate. Conversely, NAS (2000) made clear that the issue of scheduling does not avoid the analysis of substance; especially there is no guarantee that we shall have successful results once negotiations have been initiated. Nevertheless, more attention should be dedicated to the timing issue because the substance analysis has not taken it into account (NAS, 2000).

NAS (2000) clarified that the intent of ripeness theory is to tell why parties to a conflict are ripe to their own endeavors and those of others, to turn the warfare on the way to resolution through negotiation. The idea of ripe time lies in the perception of parties of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) optimally combined with a blocking, past or newly mitigated catastrophe. The other element needed for a ripe time according to NAS (2000), is the perception of a way out. In this perspective, it is not necessary that parties to a conflict identify a specific solution, uniquely a sentiment that a negotiated solution is possible and that the other party shares this sentiment. For this reason, NAS (2000, p. 228-229) states: *If the (two) parties to a conflict (a) perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and (b) perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for resolution (i.e., for negotiations toward resolution to begin).*

Figure 4: Factors affecting ripeness, elements of ripeness, and the decision to negotiate (from the book Conflict Resolution after the Cold War, by the National Academy of Sciences, p. 230).



Now, we want to tackle mediation – a facet of negotiation in conflict resolution –. Wanis-St. John and Ghais (2014) explain that transnational negotiations are negotiations piloted with the help of a third party when the parties to a conflict find it difficult to negotiate openly. This form of negotiation is mostly used in the resolution of civil wars. Mediators may be the UN, states, regional organizations, local and international non-governmental organizations, religious organizations, prominent personalities acting on their own name, or a combination of such people (Wanis-St. John and Ghais, 2014). As for eminent personalities, the writers inform that this can include former high-rank officials, such as Jimmy Carter, or Nelson Mandela.

Although the mediator is widely a greater entity than a personality, there is still often one main individual – head of state or special representative to the UN Secretary-General – who heads global sessions and chairs the mediation group. Wanis-St. John and Ghais (2014) provide the latest examples of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who attempted to arbitrate the Syrian civil conflict, and former Senator George Mitchell who served as a mediator in Northern Ireland.

CHAPTER 18: PEACE PROCESS AND THE SPOILER ISSUE

It is good to initiate a peace process, notably peacemaking and peacebuilding, but the problem is that not everybody is ok with it. There is a category of actors in a conflict who will oppose the peace process especially when their interests are directly challenged. These actors are called spoilers, the enemies of peace who do not care about civilian casualties and are more likely to wage violence in the purpose to impede the peace settlement. Some explanations can be provided. Sometimes conflicts are a source of business when warring parties grasp the opportunities to sell natural resources for their well-being, the purchasing of weapons, and to give salaries to their militias. In such a context, peace is seen as an enemy for these spoilers because they are making money out of war. Another category is the kinds of spoilers who are excluded from the negotiating table, and therefore consider that since they were not invited they have no agreement to abide by. Stedman (1991) held that peacemaking in civil war is a risky business. In fact, the major source of threats comes from spoilers – people and parties to a conflict who think that the ongoing peace process challenges their power and interests and who make use of violence to mitigate any attempts to complete peace – (Stedman, 1996). NAS (2000) explained that when signing a peace agreement and implementing it, peacemakers are at risk to attacks from those who do not agree with their peacemaking. Most importantly, the risk of peacemaking escalates the lack of confidence and insecurity of the civilian populations who have less to gain if conflict is repeated.

NAS (2000) informed that when spoilers achieve their goal as demonstrated in Rwanda in 1994 and in Angola in 1992, the outcomes are tragic. In both incidents, the victims of unsuccessful peace processes were considerably greater than the victims of war. About 300,000 people died when former Angolan president, Jonas Savimbi rejected the results of the UN-monitored elections in 1992 and drowned Angola back into civil war. More than 800,000 people died a little less than three months when Hutu extremists in Rwanda refused to implement the peace Accords in 1994 and plunged the country in genocide (NAS, 2000). The writer sustained that if all spoilers were successful, the search for peace in civil wars would be seriously fruitless. Fortunately, not all spoilers have succeeded in their ambitions. For instance in Mozambique, the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), failed in meeting its obligations to the peace process and decided to threaten to boycott elections and resume war. Eventually, RENAMO joined legislative politics, accepted the outcome of the elections, that is its political defeat

and remove weapons from its troops, as a result the civil war that had taken the lives of thousands of civilians was terminated (NAS, 2000).

Now, some questions are worth asking: what are the factors that are responsible for the success of spoilers? What can be done to effectively deal with the spoiler problem? The difference between the success and failure of spoilers is rooted in the role of the global community as coordinators of peace process (NAS, 2000). Where the international community has implemented operative, coherent policies for managing spoilers and defending peace, there has been a limitation of damage and peace has prevailed. In contrast, where the global community has failed in the enhancement and implementation of such strategies, spoilers have been successful at the expense of hundreds of thousands of civilian lives (NAS, 2000).

18.1 Types of Spoilers

Walter (1994) held that there is a certain literature on civil war that considers civil wars to be rooted in the beliefs that warring parties are only motivated by insecurity and solely seek party survival. According to NAS (2000), this statement implies that the unique reason for parties to a conflict in warfare is their fear that if they take weapons down and make peace, their enemy will take this opportunity to destroy. In that sense, the spoiler's attitude can be managed only by decreasing the anxiety of the spoiler thanks to international assurances (NAS, 2000).

Betts (1994) underlined that all warring parties in a civil war seek total supremacy. This statement is discussable given that all parties to a civil war seek supremacy, but all of them do not seek total supremacy (NAS, 2000). Some parties want exclusive supremacy and acknowledgment of authority; some desire leading supremacy; others seek a substantial part of power and finally another category wants to exercise power dependent on democratic systems. NAS (2000) identifies three types of spoilers: limited, greedy and total. Limited spoilers have limited goals, for instance recognition and redressing grievance, a share of power and basic security of supporters. Total spoilers seek total power and recognition of authority. This means their goals are nonnegotiable.

The greedy spoiler is to be found between the limited spoiler and the total spoiler. The greedy spoiler has objectives that go beyond the calculations of cost and risk. He may have limited objectives that can increase when facing low costs and risks. However, he may have total objectives that contract when facing high costs and risks (NAS, 2000).

18.2 Strategies for Spoilers Management

NAS (2000) defined custodians of peace process as global actors whose job is to supervise the enactment of peace agreements. These international actors can be supranational organizations and individual states that play third roles in conflict resolution. These custodians of peace processes followed mainly three strategies to manage spoilers. The first one is (1) inducement, which is to offer the spoiler what he wants; the second is (2) socialization, or shifting the spoiler's behavior to fit in an ensemble of established rules; and (3) coercion, which is to punish the spoiler's behavior or to reduce his possibility to terminate the peace process (NAS, 2000). The writers informed that Inducement takes into consideration measures to deal with grievances that blockade peace process. Custodians try to persuade the spoiler to participate in a peace process or fulfilling its agreement by meeting the spoiler's claims, which are of several types.

NAS (2000) underlined that spoilers may affirm that their behavior is a result of their (1) fear and ask for greater protection; (2) fairness, and ask for greater advantages; (3) justice, and ask to legitimate and recognize their position. Socialization calls for international actors to create a set of rules for satisfactory behavior by parties that engage into the peace settlement or seek out to join the peace process. The established rules therefore become the basis for assessing the claims of the parties if they are legitimate or not. Coercion as a strategy has to do with the use of threat or retribution for the deterrence or alteration of unacceptable spoiler's behavior or the reduction of his possibility to obstruct the peace process. One of its variations is *coercive diplomacy*, which is the use of threat and demand (NAS, 2000).

Although this strategy is occasionally used, it was used by NATO with its air strikes against Bosnian Serbs in 1995; Bosnian Serbs at the time were spoilers. Another variation of coercion is *the use of force to defeat a spoiler* (NAS, 2000). This strategy as well was rarely used against a spoiler, except when the United Nations decided that Somali guerrilla leader Mohammed Farah Aideed was responsible for an ambush by his forces against Pakistani peacekeeping forces, and when Indian peacekeepers made an attempt to disarm by force Tamil insurgents and arrested their leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran in Sri Lanka (NAS, 2000).

After dealing with strategies for spoilers' management, now rises a problem: What strategy can fit each type of spoiler? For example, can we use socialization for a total

spoiler? Or use coercion against a limited spoiler? Or even use coercion against a greedy spoiler? Or simply, is it always appropriate to use force against a total spoiler? These questions are worth asking as they raise the issue of matching strategies to the type of spoiler. In this regard, NAS (2000) maintained that an accurate analysis of the type of spoiler is critical for the choice of a suitable strategy for the management of a spoiler. Total spoilers are absolutely unfit to a peacemaking; they should be overcome or marginalized in a way that they can do nothing to obstruct a peace settlement (NAS, 2000). The writers argued that a limited spoiler can be managed by meeting his non-refutable claims. They can accommodate a greedy spoiler when he has limited goals, but accommodating him may increase his ambition for additional concessions (NAS, 2000).

A total spoiler because of his exaggerated demands that are non-negotiable cannot be pacified through inducement, nor can he be socialized. In addition, there is a risk that if both inducement and socialization are used for a total spoiler, they will reward him. Coercive diplomacy and the use of force can be appropriate to defeat a total spoiler (NAS, 2000). The authors underscored that since few custodians are disposed to use coercion to manage a spoiler, however they ought to reinforce the parties involved in the peace settlement in a way that they can assure their own protection.

This is made possible if custodians legitimize the parties participating in the peace process and delegitimize the spoiler, by impeding the spoiler from resources – both weapons and capital – for warfare, and by the redeployment of peacekeeping forces to protect the parties of peace. Inducement can be a good option to manage a limited spoiler if his claims are okay with the other parties to a conflict. The greedy spoiler involves a long-term strategy of socialization and as he is not a total spoiler, there is a chance that he engages in the peace settlement (NAS, 2000).

Partial Conclusion

The first subsection of this part has been about examining peace theory, that is, to essentially provide a definitional approach to peace. We have seen that to define peace is to have a good understanding of violence. We have appreciated a categorization of peace: positive and negative peace by Galtung (1964; 1990) with his classification of violence – personal or direct violence, indirect or structural violence and cultural violence –; stable peace by Boulding (1978); and precarious and conditional peace by George (2000). We started to examine an alternative system to war where we have seen that although it may sound idealistic, it is actually possible to consider another system than the current war system. We have studied the need for an alternative system and the impact of war on the environment, the withdrawal of military bases from other nations, the dismantlement of military alliances and the reinforcement of international institutions (WBW, 2015).

We have comprehensively examined the building of a culture of peace as a way to mitigate aggression and the war system. The reformation of the United Nations Security Council has been debated, as presently state or regions' representation or electorate seats' system is purely or extremely undemocratic and illegitimate. Then we have debunked old myths about war, which underline as to why the world has been living in a war culture. The last discussion has been about peace journalism and peace education. We have considered along with Galtung that to argue something about peace journalism, something has to be argued about peace. To argue something about peace, something has to be argued about conflict and its resolution. To argue about conflict resolution, something has to be argued about the United States' profound participation in a number of international conflicts (Galtung, 2015).

The second subsection of this last part has been an effort to carry out research on conflict theory, as well as to evaluate the techniques that can help us know how to solve international conflicts. In dealing with conflict resolution, we have found that we have two types of conflicts: interstate and intrastate. The way to deal with each category of conflict differs, that is to say the strategies that are needed to appropriately deal with interstate or intrastate conflicts are different. Of course, there are some similarities and techniques that may work in both cases. We have principally been discussing three issues in the resolution of international conflicts subdivided into three chapters: (1) the reasons for

war, (2) strategies for international conflict resolution and (3) peace process and the spoiler issue.

Social exclusion and moral exclusivity eventually make the way ready for violence launched by out-groups (Opotow, 1990). Arguably, if people who are socially excluded have the opportunity to take up arms, they will not hesitate. Social exclusion is a result of poor and bad governance. Apart from social exclusion, the causes of conflict are poverty, grievance and weak states.

As far as the second chapter of this section is concerned, that is to say traditional and emerging strategies for conflict resolution, we have seen a number of strategies. These strategies involve: power politics, conflict transformation, structural prevention, prevention and early warning, normative change, third party roles, partisan roles, economic sanctions, and negotiation – including ripeness and mediation –. Concerning the last chapter of this paper, we have been interested in the spoiler issue in peace settlement. We have seen that it is good to initiate a peace process, but the problem is that not everybody is ok with it. There is a category of actors in a conflict who will oppose the peace process especially when their interests are directly challenged. These are spoilers. We have identified three types of spoilers: limited, greedy and total.

Among the strategies for spoiler management, we have seen that custodians of peace process followed mostly three strategies to manage spoilers. The first one is (1) inducement, which is to offer the spoiler what he wants; the second is (2) socialization, or shifting the spoiler's behavior to fit in an ensemble of established rules; and (3) coercion, which is to punish the spoiler's behavior or to reduce his possibility to terminate the peace process (NAS, 2000).

During the peace process spoilers represent a serious problem to peacebuilding, peacemaking and peacekeeping, however by no means we have to allow them to achieve this goal. For this reason, we have to deal with each type spoiler accordingly. When we refer to the typology of spoilers and the strategy to deal with each spoiler, it can be argued that there is no way we should negotiate with total spoilers in so much as they want to destroy the peace process. In the meantime, custodians of peace settlement must examine ways to effectively socialize a spoiler that is fit to it, and induce a spoiler that is well-matched to inducement.

As the discussion of this last section about peace and conflict resolution comes to an end, we are now going to conclude this doctoral paper.

CONCLUSION

A number of challenges are faced by the world community in actuality; we have debated these challenges. We have seen that security is not just concerned with military issues, but also includes other fields like *economic security, environmental security, health security, food security, community security, political security and physical security* (Bosold and Werthes, 2005). We have subdivided this paper into five major parts: (I) Armament and Disarmament, (II) Environmental Security, (III) Security Threats to States and Regional Security, (IV) Military Strategies and Terrorism, and (V) Peace and Conflict Resolution.

In the part of armament and disarmament, we have seen that armament is a legitimate action by states, as it can be perceived as a natural way to prevent attacks from other states or non-state actors. Disarmament erupted as a measure to curb the ongoing military armament states were developing; this was due to the dangerous weapons that were being developed by states. Observably, nuclear weapon technology is what had encouraged nations to take actions in the hope of preventing an escalation to a nuclear war. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 is an historical example of the threats WMD represent.

In the first chapter, we have argued about the military expenditures that states dedicated to their national budgets. We have discussed early approaches to disarmament and the practical obstacles to nuclear disarmament. We have debated nuclear security where we have discoursed weapons of mass destruction and international law; we have examined what international law does about the WMD threat. In the second chapter, we have debated nuclear terrorism in the fighting and identification of the threat; we have argued about the race between intergovernmental cooperation and catastrophe. Nuclear terrorism is an attempt by states to deprive terrorists of the possibility to acquire WMD like chemical and biological weapons, along with nuclear weapons.

The last point of this chapter has been about Japan's national security which is primarily grounded on the US nuclear umbrella. Growing existential and regional tensions prompted Tokyo to get reassurance from Washington for its extended nuclear deterrence. Japan is concerned that Washington withdrew the majority of its nuclear arsenal from Asia and has not made any nuclear test since 1992, and most importantly

the US congress's budget cuts on its military bases in Okinawa and Guam in the Pacific are many of the elements that convinced Japan to think about going nuclear.

The growing and sophistication power of the Chinese military and nuclear arsenals are amid other variables that convinced Japan to think about considering the acquisition of its own nuclear weapons. Another threat is North Korea with its ballistic missile tests, and which at any time can decide to launch them to Japan. Inside impediments of course will not make easy for this possible move of Japan because of the Fukushima accident of March 2011. If Washington goes on to give practical assurances to Tokyo, we shall see how it will manage the Sino-Japanese confrontation in the East China Sea over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Samuels and Schoff, 2015). All things considered, Tokyo and Washington see their future together.

The second section of this paper is environmental security. We have attempted to deconstruct the concept of security from its traditional understanding. In effect, we have seen that traditionally security issues were only limited to the military. This part has been subdivided into three chapters. The first chapter is environmental threats to human security. In that chapter we have studied the rise of environmental issues in international politics. We have seen that the environment as a concern of global politics is a recent issue and only dates from the 1960s in the United States thanks to the book Silent Spring by Rachel Carson, which depicted the effects of the insecticide dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) on vegetation, rivers and animals (Hough, 2008).

The second chapter is natural threats to human security. We have seen natural catastrophes and populations demand for water. We have provided many data about the number of dead casualties natural disasters can claim to have provoked. We have explored the connection between water shortage and conflict around the world. We have also examined the problem of population pressures.

The third chapter has been about IEL and the Synergy wherein we have scrutinized the ad hoc approach to the creation of MEAs and their outcome to IEL. This way of working in isolation is called fragmentation. We have seen three conventions on chemical regulation regime: the Basel Convention, which entered in force in 1992, the Rotterdam Convention, which entered in force in 2004 and the Stockholm Convention which also entered in force in 2004. The three conventions are a glaring illustration of the fragmentation regime. This is why from our findings we have provided the Synergy as an alternative to fragmentation. The Synergy represents a single entity that helps reduce

administrative costs and is responsible for dealing with one single issue in its entirety during a single COPs (Morgan III, 2016).

The third part of this dissertation is Security Threats to States and Regional Security. In this section, we have deepened the concept of security by explaining how multidimensional it is. Buzan (1991) dealt with five fields of security, which are political, military, economic, societal and environmental.

In the first chapter, we have provided an approximation to what is securitization. The second chapter is military threats to security from states; we have seen what these threats were during the Cold War, notably with ideological geopolitics and the new world order. We have seen that Cold War geopolitics has to do with the tensions that erupted between the United States and the former Soviet Union right after WW II. The regime of Stalin was both a bureaucracy and dictatorship that had the determination to build a security sphere for itself in the purpose to impede another possible attack from potential western powers (Ó Tuathail et al., 1998).

In the meantime, we have debated the concept of collective security. Collective security was the act of undertaking military action against an aggressor by using an international coalition. Collective security, first attempted by the League of Nations was a failure. Nevertheless, the same has been successful with the establishment of the UN. Under the UN, collective security was successful in the Korean War (1950-1953) and against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (Hough, 2008).

In the third chapter we have examined the issue of non-viability, that is, nonviable states as a major cause of conflict today. We have seen that microstates are fundamentally nonviable. In this perspective, we have analyzed the three dimensions of the viability issue: economic, military and political viabilities. The last chapter of this section is regional security. In it, we have fundamentally considered the observable cooperation between the UN Security Council and regional and sub-regional organizations in the global-regional security mechanism (Felicio and Graham, 2005).

In the fourth part, military strategies and terrorism, we have started to address the issue of the military, especially strategy. We have first attempted to provide a definition to military strategy. In this respect, military strategy and tactics are vital to the waging of armed conflict and strategy is the coordination, the planning and the general management of military operations to achieve total military and political objectives (Goodman, 1993).

The U.S. Army War College in its 2001 edition defines strategy in two different manners: “Conceptually, we define strategy as the relationship among ends, ways, and means”. The second way is as follows: “Strategic art, broadly defined, is therefore: the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests”. After these definitional approaches to strategy, we have dealt with the first chapter of that subsection, that is, historical overview of military strategy. Afterwards, we have dealt with the second chapter where we have debated the five basic military strategies: extermination, annihilation, exhaustion, intimidation and decapitation (Bowdish, 2013; Bartholomees, Jr., 2010).

Afterwards, in the second subsection, we have discussed terrorism as a mounting issue in international affairs. We have basically conducted investigation on two topics divided into two chapters: military threats from terrorists and state responses to non-state violence.

In the last part of this research paper we have debated peace. The section is divided into two subsections: peace and conflict resolution. The first subsection has been about examining peace theory, that is, to basically provide a conceptualization to peace. We have seen that to define peace is to have a good understanding of violence. We have appreciated a categorization of peace: positive and negative peace by Galtung (1964; 1990) with his classification of violence – personal or direct violence, indirect or structural violence and cultural violence –; stable peace by Boulding (1978); and precarious and conditional peace by George (2000).

We have examined an alternative system to war in the first chapter where we have seen that although it may sound idealistic, it is actually possible to consider another system than the current war system. We have studied the impact of war on the environment, the withdrawal of military bases from other nations, the dismantlement of military alliances and the reinforcement of international institutions (WBW, 2015). The second chapter is about building a culture of peace as a way to mitigate the current war system. The reformation of the UN has been debated, as presently states or regions’ representation or electorate seats’ system is purely or extremely undemocratic and illegitimate.

We have considered along with Galtung that to argue something about peace journalism, something has to be argued about peace. To argue something about peace, something has to be argued about conflict and its resolution. To argue about conflict

resolution, something has to be argued about the United States' profound participation in numerous international conflicts (Galtung, 2015). Peace education has been concerned about implementing peace studies in African universities and as well educating kids who underwent conflict in a way that heals their psychological malaise. Meanwhile, children who have never experienced warfare should be educated in a peace education system by impeding them to use things that could enhance in them a violent attitude like violent videogames or violent toys (Harris, 2010; Fulcher, 2012).

In the second subsection of this part, we have carried out research on conflict theory. In dealing with conflict resolution, we have found that we have two types: interstate and intrastate conflicts. We have basically been discussing three issues in conflict resolution subdivided into three chapters: (1) the reasons for war, (2) strategies for international conflict resolution and (3) peace process and the spoiler issue. In the first chapter we have seen that as Opatow (1990) put it, social exclusion and moral exclusivity eventually make the way ripe for violence launched by out-groups. Apart from social exclusion, the causes of conflict are poverty, grievance and weak states.

With regard to the second chapter, we have examined traditional and emerging strategies to conflict resolution, including power politics, conflict transformation, structural prevention, prevention and early warning, normative change, third party roles, partisan roles, economic sanctions, and negotiation – including ripeness –.

Regarding the last chapter of this research paper, we have been interested in the spoiler issue in peace settlement. We have seen that it is good to initiate a peace process, but the problem is that not everybody is okay with it. There is a category of actors in a conflict who will oppose the peace process especially when their interests are directly challenged. These are spoilers. We have identified three types of spoilers: limited, greedy and total. Among the strategies for spoiler management, we have (1) inducement, which is to offer the spoiler what he wants; (2) socialization, or shifting the spoiler's behavior to fit in an ensemble of established rules; and (3) coercion, which is to punish the spoiler's behavior or to reduce his possibility to terminate the peace process (NAS, 2000).

During the peace process spoilers represent a serious problem to peacebuilding, peacemaking and peacekeeping, we have to deal with each type spoiler accordingly. It can be argued that there is no way we should negotiate with total spoilers insofar as they intend to destroy the peace process.

Carrying out research on global security is multidimensional as it takes into account a lot of issues. We do not have the pretention to have dealt with global security in a very advanced and thorough way. In effect, as security is multifaceted, we could not deal with any single aspect of security; however, we have selected the five above-mentioned fields of security to approach it in a more restrictive way.

Therefore, global security is the number one dilemma of the world community as security issues are part of our daily lives. As stated in the introduction, our theme has a great political dimension. Security issues are mainly managed by the global political elite. From this perspective, it can be argued that several if not nearly all of the security issues to be addressed locally, nationally and globally first require the attention of politics. In other words, we would like to underline that politics plays a major role in addressing global security issues.

With reference to the theoretical concepts of our research, we have opted for postmodernism and the historical method as approaches so as to give this work its full academic dimension. In all the sections of this research paper, we have examined all the diverse debated issues both in terms of actuality but also from a historical perspective. We have dealt with the postmodern approach in that our theme is about power.

Now, we would like to deal with the problem statement of this paper. In the introduction, we have stated the problem with a series of questions. In the following lines, we simply answer them one after the other.

Having conducted this great investigation, we consider that non-state military forces can be regarded as new actors of international law with the mounting of terrorism. Of course, it is a great debate that will require further and future researches. We contend that they are actors of international law because the majority of states in planning their security policy and agenda take into consideration the mounting threat of terrorism. Although we assert that they are new actors, they are not like states or international governmental and regional organizations.

The factors that are accountable for non-state military forces around the world are numerous. The widespread and sophisticated utilization of the internet by Al Qaeda represents the most obvious illustration of the age of terrorism (Hough, 2008). Terrorism is a form of psychological weapon, as such terrorists need to convey a message not only to the governments of the victimized, but also to the people watching it from all around the world. To convey their message of terror, they need means of communication, that is, technology. The internet has been essentially utilized to make the publicity of their acts of

massacre. Globalization has also been a contributor to non-state political violence in helping raise funds for the campaigns of terrorists (Hough, 2008).

To find a solution to non-state violence, states have had different approaches. These approaches include appeasement, zero tolerance, containment and diplomatic measures. As for appeasement, one option available to governments in addressing the challenge of terrorism is to come to some type of arrangement with the terrorist group threatening to engage or continue a campaign of violence. This may take a form of concession to the exigencies of a military group regarding a particular issue or action, such as an agreement to release political prisoners in exchange for the safe release of hostages (Hough, 2008).

The Japanese government is a good illustration in a sense that it made various significant and covert concessions to the Japanese Red Army in the 1970s (Hough, 2008). Actually, concession is more likely to occur in a state war against a terrorist group than in war with another state for the reason that absolute military defeat of the enemy is not the issue. We have considered appeasement as a method of conflict resolution between governments and non-state actors, based on mutual concession. If terrorists are criminals, why is it that governments negotiate with perpetrators of acts of violence? Political leaders want to avoid the killing of innocents who are victims of hostage-takers. As it is so embarrassing for governments to negotiate with the perpetrators of violence, they undertake such peace talks secretly.

With regard to the zero tolerance approach, we have seen that while appeasement may spare the lives of civilians in the short term, the potential drawback of this approach to conflict resolution with terrorists is that it might encourage other non-state actors that violence pays dividends (Hough, 2008). The United States, Israel and Russia have been mainly characterized by the phrase *no deal with terrorists*. President Putin has declared this with explicit terms in 2004: "Russia does not negotiate with terrorists, it destroys them." The foundation of such a rough strategy is the belief that only by being viewed not to give in can non-state violence be dissuaded in the long term. The short-term outcome may be a loss of lives, however the famous military adage that you may have to lose a battle in order to win the war holds water here (Hough, 2008).

Regarding containment and diplomatic measures, the most quick and predictable response of the US government to the 9/11 attacks was to take practical measures to reduce the recurrence of such an event. All governments confronted to a considerable

threat of non-state forces seek for ways to secure themselves and their populations in blocking such threats by the toughening of prospective terrorist targets (Hough, 2008).

We have also understood that increased preoccupation with state-sponsored terrorism from the 1980s forward conducted to the amplified utilization of conventional foreign policy instruments aimed to pressure governments thought to be sponsoring or providing refuge to violent non-state military forces. In that case, the definite diplomatic option is the cutting of all diplomatic ties with another state. To withdraw diplomatic recognition to governments regarded as supporting terrorist groups sends a powerful political message, although an appropriate common response to this kind of situation, this is still a rare practice in IR (Hough, 2008).

We will say that the possession of nuclear weapons by states is both a way to deter their enemies from attacking them and in some cases to compel them to act accordingly. When examining the Pakistani nuclear program, we can observe that the program has essentially been designed to deter any aggression from India. From this perspective, we can argue that Pakistan succeeded to discourage any military aggression from India. In the same way India designed its nuclear program in the 1960s to deter any military aggression from China. In both cases, we see that owning nuclear weapons is a guarantee for security since these weapons serve as a powerful deterrent. Vis-à-vis compellence, we will take the case of the Gulf War in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Iraq planned to use biological and chemical weapons against US soldiers on soil. However, this intention was highly discouraged by the U.S. promise to retaliate with nuclear weapons.

We consider that a complete nuclear disarmament is less likely to take place from the traditional NPT NWS in view of issue-specific possessors of nuclear weapons outside the NPT which are not willing to disarm as they use their nuclear weapons as a deterrent against regional and existential threats. In effect, there are several issues that influence the decision of a state to develop nuclear weapons, but generally speaking, today there are basically two types of NWS: global political actors and issue-specific possessors, that is to say, the five NPT NWS and those owning nuclear weapons and which are not parties to the NPT (Rinn, 2013).

Categories of Nuclear-Weapon States	
NPT Nuclear-Weapon States (World-Political Actors)	Non-NPT Nuclear-Weapon States (Issue-Specific Possessors)
China France Russia United Kingdom United States	India Pakistan North Korea (withdrew in 2003) Israel

A complete disarmament even seems impossible because even though the traditional NPT NWS were to disarm, they will not feel secure with the remaining issue-specific possessors of nuclear weapons. The latter will never accept to disarm because of existential and regional threats discussed in chapter 1 of this paper, mainly the outline “1.3 Practical Obstacles to Nuclear Disarmament”.

It is not easy to find a solution to the non-viability issue, be it socioeconomic, military and political viabilities. Indeed, if nonviable states are to subsist and prosper, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, these régimes should make the necessary reforms in order to be more viable. They should be capable of providing external and internal security to their populations. They should also be capable of building infrastructures that make the promotion of social and economic development and sustainability. Lastly, they should find a possibility to adopt and instill managerial capability, which nonviable countries lack seriously (Storie, 2001).

Persistent organic pollutants (POPs) are apparently threatening human security. We consider that as they are already released in the atmosphere there is absolutely nothing we can do about it. However, there are ways to limit air pollution, therefore by limiting the release of POPs in the environment and mitigating health degradation. In this respect, the Rio Summit in 1992 was the climax for important international political action in the field of human health-threatening atmospheric contamination. Equally important, the Governing Council of UNEP in 1997 fleshed out the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, the Rio Summit in Brazil) by the setting of a global binding agreement to eliminate little by little the production and use of 12 POPs. This includes eight organochlorine pesticides and polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) (Decision No.19/13c), (UNEP, 1997). Consequently, neural disorders, sterility and cancer in individuals of the developed nations can be ascribed to the use of organochlorines in other parts of the world (Hough, 2008).

Our investigations have shown that we can examine peace both quantitatively and qualitatively. The quantitative analysis of peace takes us to regard peace as the mere

absence of warfare. Of course this is a precondition that can help us analyze peace in its qualitative approach. Accordingly, we contend that the quantitative approach of peace is what Galtung has termed negative peace. At the same time, analyzing peace qualitatively is to integrate other elements to the concept. These elements include the absence of any form of violence (direct, physical or personal violence; structural or indirect and cultural violence) and the addition of social and human integration – access to good employment opportunities, education and healthcare etc. – (Galtung, 1964; 1990).

We have carried out this research based on two hypotheses mentioned in the introduction. We have not found any reason to invalidate our first hypothesis because even though the world community has taken some actions against domestic and global terrorism, it is less likely to overcome non-state violence. Our findings have shown that the world community can mitigate non-state violence, but may not surely destroy every single cell of non-state military forces around the world. The outcome is that we will always live with the threat of terrorism.

We have no motives to validate the second hypothesis. In other words, we invalidate the second hypothesis as long as we should not confuse issues of global peace with those of global security. The world community can indeed achieve global peace despite the mounting military threats from non-state actors and the threat of nuclear terrorism, the proliferation of conflicts on the planets, the ongoing environmental degradation and population pressures, water problems and hunger. By mitigating and undermining terrorism, intrastate and interstate conflicts and social disparities, the world community can in effect achieve global peace, which is a field comprised within global security issues. When it comes to the degradation of the environment, population pressures, water problems and hunger etc., there we deal with another aspect of global security – environmental security –, but not peace. Therefore, the conclusions of our investigations in this respect have revealed that the world community can achieve global peace if it takes applicable measures to address peace issues.

Our study has been about examining issues that are intertwined in global security with the intention of highlighting the role of the world community in dealing effectively with them. This investigation has not only been a contribution to the scientific community, but also to the general public who can consult it as a book inasmuch as it displays the reality that is presently observed in international affairs. The time location of our investigation ranges from the 1970s to the present. This means that we have dealt with our theme

within and after the Cold War. With regard to the geographical location of our study, we have centered our research on the United States and its relationships with the rest of the world.

As this paper comes to a close, we recommend further research on the following subjects of study:

- Environmental management;
- Biological, chemical and radiological weapons;
- Biological, chemical and radiological terrorism;
- Japan's military viability;
- China's mounting military power;
- Pyongyang's nuclear program;
- Stable peace;
- Precarious and conditional peace;
- Migration and refugees;
- The responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine and states' sovereignty.

APPENDIX

1. **External threats to Japan's national security.** While the US government has some control in addressing the security guarantee factor, it meets limits when it comes to threat perceptions and threats themselves. North Korea is a major preoccupation for Japan, mainly because Pyongyang seems to care little about its nationals and seriously invests in missile and nuclear programs. Should the regime meet imminent downfall or preemptive attack, it might judge that it has little to lose by striking Japan with a nuclear weapon. Another threat to Japan is China's nuclear arsenal and conventional capabilities which are much larger in comparison to North Korea. Most importantly, China keeps building new nuclear warheads – about 10 per year – and China's defense budget has roughly tripled since 2001 to become the second largest of the world (Samuels and Schoff, 2015, p.487-88).
2. **Human Security.** Human security represents not only a broadening and deepening of the security agenda, but also – and even more important – a different mode of diplomatic conduct, which can be described as an “unconventional bottom-up approach to diplomacy”. The notion of human security found repeatedly in Japanese documents and speeches was first encountered in the address given by the then Prime Minister Murayama to the UN General Assembly in 1995. According to Murayama, human security was characterized by respect for the human rights of every citizen on earth and protection from “poverty, disease, ignorance, oppression and violence.” Human security is a concept that takes a comprehensive view of all threats to human survival, life and dignity and stresses the need to respond to such threats (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 88, 93-94).
3. **Impediments to Japan's nuclear breakout.** There are internal and external factors that prevent Japan from going nuclear:
 - **Public opinion.** Japanese views were influenced not only by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, but also by other incidents, such as in 1954, when an American nuclear test at Bikini Atoll exposed 23 Japanese fishermen to high levels of radiation, finally killing one and inspiring the Gorilla film series that sensationalized the potential threat and unpredictable nature of nuclear weapons (Samuels and Schoff, 2015, p.489-90). Equally important, the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident has worsened public opinion about nuclear technology.
 - **Institutional opposition.** Japanese politicians considering nuclear breakout will face other impediments beyond public opinion, with opposition from an expanding variety of political, bureaucratic and economic actors. For years, bureaucratic responsibility

for nuclear strategy rested mainly on the cabinet, with support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Over the years, however, the Ministry of Defense assumed a greater role. In the business world, there are those whose interests lie in preserving a purely commercial exploitation of nuclear power. Japan's utilities, the wider business community, bureaucrats charged with supporting economic growth, and political leaders with ties to these interests are all powerful actors who will probably oppose a nuclear weapons program. In the event of a nuclear breakout, the electric power industry of Japan could be crippled by a loss of access to nuclear fuel, as their purchase was based on peaceful usage. Most importantly, there might be a wider economic backlash against Japanese firms in key markets such as South Korea and China as their governments hype the fear of a remilitarized Japan. In addition to that, prefectural governors also own an important vote on what kinds of nuclear-related activities can be practiced in their jurisdiction (Samuels and Schoff, 2015, p.491-92).

- **External factors.** There are four other constraints that would require leaders to discount the costs of dramatic policy change: (1) the vulnerability of the Japanese population to a first strike, (2) the undermining of Japanese diplomacy, (3) regional instability, and (4) damage to bilateral relations with Washington. Secondly, a nuclear breakout by Japan would likely accelerate a regional arms race – one that would demand a considerably greater investment in defense than postwar Japan has heretofore accepted. If South Korea has not yet broken out, it surely would after a Japanese decision to do so. In this respect, the former South Korean ambassador to Japan, Chul-hyun Kwon explained it with explicit terms: “Japan didn’t declare having nuclear weapons but they made the raw materials, and they. . .are in fact getting rid of the obstacles one by one as the opportunity offers. In the long term, I guess they are preparing for a nuclear weapon.” (Samuels and Schoff, 2015, p.496).

4. **NPT after the Cold War.** Originally initiated in 1968 and co-chaired by the former Soviet Union and the United States, the Non-Proliferation Treaty on Nuclear Disarmament was established to curb the ongoing arms race in the world, especially the possession of nuclear weapons. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, achievement of the NPT’s ultimate goals really seemed within reach. In effect, South Africa and Ukraine abandoned their nuclear-weapons programs and joined the NPT. In the same way, Brazil and Argentina renounced their possession of nuclear programs and became parties to the NPT. In 1995, the NPT, which was up for 25-year review, was extended indefinitely. In addition, the United

States and Russia started to reduce their strategic weapons systems dramatically (Sokolski, 2003, p.54-55).

5. **Nuclear umbrella.** The United States military alliance with Tokyo, under which Washington compromises to protect Japan against any external military threats on condition that Tokyo never goes nuclear. For this purpose, Washington has two military bases in Japan, one at Okinawa and the other at Guam, ready to preempt or react to any external military aggression.




Figure 1. The components of a complete radiological terrorism countermeasures program (Moudler and Medhora, 2011, p. 99).




Figure 2. Simplified ecology- conflict nexus (Heinrich Böll Foundation Office for East Africa, 2006, p. 158).

Table 1: Selected National and International Initiatives on the Environment

(Heinrich Böll Foundation Office for East Africa, 2006, p. 168-170).

Group or Country	Year	Initiative
Club of Rome/ U.S. Department of State	1972 /1981	The Club of Rome's <i>The Limits to Growth</i> and the U.S. government's Global 2000 Report to the President called attention to environmental risks and an array of associated socioeconomic changes (population growth, urbanization, migration) that could lead to social conflict.
Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues	1982	In its first report, <i>Common Security</i> , the Commission stressed the connection between security and environment.
World Commission on Environment and Development	1987	The Commission expanded the concept of security in <i>Our Common Future</i> : "The whole notion of security as traditionally understood— in terms of political and military threats to national sovereignty—must be expanded to include the growing impacts of environmental stress— locally, nationally, regionally, and globally." The Commission concluded that "environmental stress can thus be an important part of the web of causality associated with any conflict and can in some cases be catalytic."
U.N. Environment Program (UNEP)/ Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)	1988	A joint program between UNEP and the Peace Research Institute, Oslo on "Military Activities and the Human Environment" included empirical research projects that were largely conceived and implemented by PRIO. From this initiative, PRIO developed a strong research focus on environment and security.
Soviet Union	1989	Proposals for creating an Ecological Security Council at the United Nations have emerged repeatedly over the past 15 years, beginning when Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and President

		Mikhail Gorbachev suggested to the 46 th General Assembly that environmental issues be elevated to such a lofty status.
Norwegian Government	1989	In 1989, Defense Minister Johan Jørgen Holst pointed out that environmental problems can become important factors in the development of violent conflicts.
UN Development Program (UNDP)	1994	The U.N. Development Program explicitly included environmental security as one of the components of “human security,” a frame that continues to find favor among UNDP and some prominent national governments, such as that of Canada.
German Government	1996	The Federal Ministry for Environment commissioned a state-of-the-art report on environment and conflict in order to explore opportunities to strengthen international environmental policy and law.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development	1998	The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development commissioned a state-of-the-art report on environment and conflict.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	1999	In March 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society published a comprehensive report, Environment and Security in an International Context, following a three-year consultation among security, environmental, and foreign policymakers and experts.
European Union (EU)	2001-2002	In April 2001, the General Affairs Council of the EU presented its environmental integration strategy on the issue of environment and security and the contribution of sustainable development to regional security (adopted March 2002). The EU discussed how to integrate environmental security into its emerging common foreign and security policy and promoted it as a theme for the 2002 World

		Summit on Sustainable Development.
Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation	2002	The Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation explored ways to adapt peace and conflict impact assessments to selected projects of their environment program.
United Nations	2002	U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for better integration of environmental contributions to conflict and instability in the organization's strategy on conflict prevention and the deliberations of his High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change.
German Government	2004	The Federal Action Plan on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Post-Conflict Peace-Building (published in May 2004 after receiving Cabinet approval) identified sustainable development and transboundary environmental cooperation as key ways to foster peace and stability.

Table 2: Categorized objectives of the organ for Politics, Defense and Security (Heinrich Böll Foundation Office for East Africa, 2006, p. 218-219).

Military/Defense	Crime Prevention	Intelligence	Foreign Policy	Human Rights
Protect against instability	Close cooperation To deal with cross-Border crime	Close to Cooperation	Promote cooperation and common political value systems and institutions to deal with cross-border crime	Develop democratic institutions and practices
Develop collective Security capacity	Promote community-based approach	Early warning	Develop common foreign policy	Encourage observance of universal human rights
Conclude a mutual defense pact			Conflict prevention management and resolution	Encourage and monitor international human rights conventions and treaties
Develop a regional peacekeeping capacity			Mediate in inter-and-intra-state disputes	Early warning
			Early warning	
			Preventive diplomacy	
			Encourage and monitor international arms control/ disarmament conventions and treaties	
			Coordinate participation in peace operations	
			Address extra-regional conflicts which impact on the region	

Table 3: World Population Growth (Patomäki, 2008, p. 255).

Year	Population (billion)
1804	1
1850	1.2
1900	1.6
1927	2
1950	2.55
1960	3
1965	3.3
1970	3.7
1975	4
1980	4.5
1990	5.3
1999	6
2010	6.8
2020	7.6
2030	8.2
2040	8.8
2050	9.2

GLOSSARY

Bilateral: involving two parties.

Bipolar: dominated by two sides.

Diplomatic recognition: the process whereby one government acknowledges the legal existence of another government, so permitting it to function as a sovereign entity in international law.

Fossil fuels: fuels produced from fossilized organic material (e.g. oil, coal and natural gas).

Gross domestic product (GDP): the sum total from all economic activity in a given country.

Gunboat diplomacy: the provocative display of military force (typically naval) intended to influence a target state without the resort to war, (see also intimidation through compellence in the outline “11.4 The Strategy of Intimidation”).

Hegemony: the exercise, usually by a single state, of international dominance and leadership, particularly in political, diplomatic and economic relations.

Idealist: term applied to statesmen and academics of the 1920s and 1930s who advocated greater levels of international cooperation, epitomized by the creation of the League of Nations.

Integration: the process whereby states merge some of their economic and political responsibilities into a wider political unit.

Inter-governmental organization (IGO): an international organization comprising government representatives of more than one country.

International non-governmental organization (INGO): an international organization comprising private individuals rather than government representatives.

Multilateral: involving more than two states.

Multipolar: a political system with more than two dominant focuses of power.

Non-state actor: an organization with international political significance other than a state. A generic term for both INGOs and IGOs, and even for terrorist organizations.

Realpolitik: amoral, self-serving political practice by states.

Renewable resources: natural resources which are inexhaustible, such as wind, wood and water.

Satellite states: technically independent but effectively colonized state.

Sovereignty: status of legal autonomy enjoyed by states so that their government has exclusive authority within its borders and enjoys the rights of membership of the international community.

Statist: focused on the state.

Superpower: term applied to the USA and USSR during the Cold War because of their dominance of International Relations, which superseded that of the great powers in earlier eras.

Total war: war in which civilians are targeted as well as military and state targets.

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