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Rethinking the Nation-state Building through People-centred Governance in Southern Africa, 1990

to 2016

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Abstract

Since the termination of colonialism and apartheid followed by a call to democratization in Southern Africa and Africa at large, majority of citizens believed in the emergence of new nation-states from colonies based on the national identity and equality for all. Instead, they witnessed a perpetuation of an administrative nation governed by an ideological state which aborts their national dream. Southern African political elites used state-centered approaches to nation-state building influenced by colonial syndromes that turned them into "neo-colonialist leaders." Struggle for and confiscation of political power in a hand of a club of elites and allies on the expenses of majority of oppressed ordinary citizens became at the fore of political agenda. Consequently, these established brutal top-down approaches have engendered discontent and fragmented the nation which, as a result, went into contestation against the state. Thus, there was a need to rethink the way nation-state was built in Southern Africa for a more inclusive approach. This thesis aimed at rethinking the nation-state building processes in Southern Africa by proposing a people-centered governance, as an alternative to state-centered governance, which promotes inclusion of ordinary citizens. Through an extensive literature review, the thesis, first, investigated the limitations of state-centered approaches to nation-state building in relation to inclusion of ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes, and then, assessed the strength of arguments that people-centered governance promotes full participation of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building processes. The thesis argued that, the state-centered approach nation-state building has failed the inclusion of general citizenry in Southern Africa region. Through a proposed Theory of Change, it was confirmed that, People-centered governance is perceived as a promising alternative approach that promotes inclusion of active and self-reliant citizenry who own the decision-making processes to nation-state building in Southern Africa.

Key Words: Nation-state building, people-centered governance, state-centered approaches, theory of change, Angola, Botswana, DRC, South Africa, Southern Africa.

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

1.1 Introduction

Six decades after the independence, the nation-state building processes in most post-independent states have been criticized to fail the inclusion of the majority of ordinary citizens in various political decisions. Various causes, including implementation of ineffective governance approaches, such as state-centered, were attributed to the indicated failure. African continent was not an exception. More than that, many view the nation-state building as a political process that reconcile state to its nation, not necessarily with government elites as sole actors, but on the contrary, driven by a symbiosis of state and ordinary citizens with people's aspirations at the center.

In that regard, people-centered approaches to nation-state building which prone for an inclusion of ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes were viewed to be appealing for a cohesive society driven by mutual collaboration between state and its citizens. At the same time, active participation of ordinary citizens in the decision-marking is considered to be, not only, one of the eight dimensions of quality of democracy, but contribute to the well-being of the nation (Morlino and Carli, 2014). There is a need, after six decades of independence, to shift from elitist approach to nation-state building to the one which is more inclusive and centered around the aspirations of ordinary citizens in post-colonial era. Exploring Southern African region between 1990 and 2016, this study seeks to rethink the commonly used state-centered approaches to nation-state building processes by proposing an alternative that promote full participation of the Southern African ordinary citizens through mutual relationship between state and nation in post-colonial era. In that regard, the study engages the existing literature. The choice made by this study on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as the site of focus was guided by its hybrid mode of governance employed by its member states ranging from autocracy to consolidating democracy, also participation of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building is still very problematic.

This study is focused on the elitist approaches employed by Southern African countries in post-independent era and how some of them did not fully promote inclusion of ordinary citizens as one of ingredients of socio-economic rights, but in contrary, exclude and marginalize ordinary citizens in the building process of the nation-state. The study argues that, a rethinking of nation-state building is needed as, alike in other post-independent

African countries, Southern African government elites use state-centered approaches to nation-state building which did not fully reconcile state to its nation but, plunge a nation into a sighing mode through exclusion of ordinary citizens in the decision-making that concern their socio-economic well-being. As an introduction to the study, this chapter provides an overview of the thesis by outlining its scope and focus through the problem background, research aims and objectives, justification, relevance and delimitations, and the research methodology used and layout of thesis chapters.

1.2 An Overview of the Study

This study on rethinking nation-state building was motivated by registered sighing of nations through the African continent due to employed state-centered approaches by African leaders at large that condone a pure confiscation of political power in a hand of sociological minority and allies on the expensive of rest of ordinary citizens. Despite their attempts to build nation-state in the post-colonial era, African government elites did not manage to fully reconcile state to its nation in order to enable it to be politically stable and viable in the long run and quell socio-economic disparities charactering the African continent. To some, colonial syndromes, among other many factors, were to be blamed as hindrances to effective nation-state building process in Africa. To other, inadequate governance pattern was deemed to be at the core of the ineffectiveness of nation-state building processes in Africa. Yet, some observers acknowledge that building a nation-state was not an easy political exercise to post-colonial elites due to number of factors (Bangash, 2016).

For example, empirical studies demonstrate that African post-colonial states, alike other in the world, copied from their European colonial masters, an exotic notion of nation-state implemented in Europe thanks to its mono-culture system (Chiriyankadath, 1970, Fukuyama, 2005, Bangash, 2016). However, in their Conversely, these post-colonial African states were reportedly to be cut up of diverse kingdoms and societies epitomized by a multiplicity of culture and ethnicity, religious practices and beliefs, among others, as impediments to state swift consolidation (Bangash, 2016). These diversities were allegedly criticized to trigger ethnic tensions, religious divides and tribalism among different people forced to live together under one leadership or political rule. Against this backdrop, building nation-state which reconcile people and state seemed to be a dilemma and intimidating political exercise to most of African post-colonial states. Given a

plethora of African kingdoms, post-colonial elites were obligated to build either centralized or decentralized patterns of state in post-independence era. Nevertheless, these two patterns of state have yield different results notably, the springing up of numerous insurgencies in centralized states and disintegration of several federal states (Bangash, 2016). The consummative examples of a sour cohabitation among diverse societies within a post-colonial state are legion. From the two consecutive secessions of Kasai Province with Kalonji Ditunga and Katanga led by Moise Tshombe in the then Congo post-independence in the 1960s, rivalry between the North and South Nigeria, persistence of ethnic violent conflicts in the horn of Africa, and the Rwandan genocide in 1994 followed by the South-Soudanese secession July 2011(Nugent, 2004, Mshelizza, 2011, 2011, Lemarchand, 2018).

In Southern African context, like other African countries, many citizens believed in the emergence of new nations from colonies based on the national identity and equality for all. Instead, there was a perpetuation of an administrative nation governed by an ideological state which abort national dream. In that regard, Southern African political elites' approaches to nation-state building were deemed to be shaped by colonial syndromes which turned the new African leaders into neo-colonialists. Struggle for power and only power on the expenses of majority of oppressed ordinary citizens became at the fore of African political agenda.

More than that, the quest for power has become a focal political driver of the relationship between the state and its nation. This era has turned out to be an anti-climactic whereby the former liberators were later criticized to be new oppressors of their fellow citizens for political power, like the cases of Zimbabwe and Democratic Republic of Congo (Nugent, 2004, Melber, 2016). In this case, nation carries the burden as a result of its almost endless dilemma of being handcuffed by the same entity it created to represent it. Consequently, the nation expresses sighs for power allowing countering the perceived or felt oppression. In not few cases, this quasi permanent conflict in the affirmation of the African nation-state led to horrible violent conflicts and wars. The latter failed to incorporate the necessary and inevitable reconciliation, which in turn would serve as a conciliator and harmonizer of both complex or sense of superiority and inferiority behind the actions of the state and nation. The approach followed by post-colonial state in Africa to administer the independence from the colonial power was criticized to fail meeting the most prominent and legitimate aspiration of the African nations. These nations which ended up

confined in a unitary space of the new nation-state saw with a high degree of disappointment the consolidation of the social stratification of the elite system inherited from the colonial powers, as mean to consolidate and further perpetuate the power of the ruling elite that in most of the case transfigured itself with a very impressing speed, from true nationalists into cruel neo-colonialists.

1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study

The main aim of this study is to rethink the way nation-state is built in Southern Africa for more inclusive approach by proposing a people-centered governance as an alternative.

 Specific objectives emerge from the above broad aim are as follows:

i) Investigate the limitations of state-centered approaches to nation-state building in relation to inclusion of ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes in post-colonial Southern African countries - focus will be placed in countries like Angola, Botswana, The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Africa;

ii) Assess the strength of arguments that people-centered governance promotes full participation of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building processes in Southern African countries;

iii) Contribute to the existing literature on nation-state building discourse in Africa by promoting the participation of ordinary citizens in decision-making processes with same rights as state actors.

1.4 Justification and Relevance of the Study

Drawing from Southern African region, this study contributes to the nation-state building discourse by rethinking the mode of governance that foster inclusion of ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes. It has been documented that, after the independence from colonial powers, African people still haven't experienced the improvement of their socio-economic well-being. Instead, they have witnessed a rebound of colonial brutal regime into another form of governance exercised by the egotistic will of a small minority group of African political elites and allies on the expensive of the majority of citizens. This confiscation of political power by post-colonial elites has engendered discontent and fragmented nation which went into contestation against the state. Before independence era become equated to post-independence era.

Young (2010) laments that what happened in Africa after the independence was the mere transformation of former liberators into new national masters around whom all political, social, economic, cultural, military and other spectrum of national life would turn, rather than creating any substantial structure of integral development. People were denied their socio-economic rights and, at the same time consolidation of power become at a core of political survival of African dictators. Southern African region was not exempted from the post-colonial power struggle and exclusion of ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes. More than that, despite the cosmetic democratic transition epitomized by the end of one political party system in the 1990s, Southern African people, alike other in the African continent, are not given a full access at the table of nation-state building processes. Those who are scarcely invited, are joining as either conformists or allies and on consultation basis.

Many African states were allegedly criticized to fail their own citizens and plunged them into abject poverty. Political ego was still at the fore front of political power struggle among African political leaders in a cosmetic democracy. Many schools of thoughts on state-centered approach view government elites as the dominant organizational players attempting to control a problematic domestic environment, thereby restructuring the society over which they claim to rule (Skocpol, 1985, Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). In that regard, Skocpol (1985) rejects society-centered theories, which she criticizes as converting the state into a captive instrument of voters, interest groups or classes, rather than a dominant organization with a mandate to maintain control and order. This implies, the importance of citizen's participation in the nation-state building is minimized. Public participation was described by many scholars (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) to build social capital. The latter consists of engagement activities that bring people together, strengthen and extend their social networks, foster trust and shared values and thereby enable further collective or community action (Davies and Simon, 2012). These entail that, collective participation of citizens in the decision-making processes fosters national cohesion which is an essential social ingredient for an equal and peaceful nation-state. More than that, from the community and international development points of view, citizen participation has been a key policy priority for a socio-economic well-being. The latter can trigger harmony between the state and nation.

The present study on people-centered governance is applicable to a spectrum of disciplines such as democracy studies, democratic governance, participatory governance,

civil society, citizenship, people-centered development, to name a few. The findings are helpful for specialists in post-colonial Southern Africa and beyond, policymakers, government elites, ordinary citizens, scholars and international development agencies. The original contribution this thesis makes is bridging the gap in the contemporary literature and in practice between top-down and bottom-up approaches to nation-state building processes by promoting the inclusion of ordinary citizens in order to shift from state-centric to people-centered paradigms in post-colonial Southern Africa and beyond.

As a focal point of this study, Southern African countries enabled the researcher to (1) identify the shortcomings of state-centered approaches to nation-state building since the independence in relation to inclusion of ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes (2) to assess the strength of arguments that people-centered governance promotes the inclusion of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building processes in post-colonial era. Through this inquiry, the research sought to explore and understand people-centered approaches to nation-state building drawing from Southern Africa and promoting the importance of voice of ordinary citizens within the bigger picture of contemporary debates on nation-state building that is centered on grassroots' aspirations.

1.5 Formulation and demarcation of the research problem

The present study is positioned in the post-colonial nation-state building debates that promote the active participation of ordinary citizens. The study argues that the state-centered approach used to build the nation-state has failed the ordinary Southern African people. There is a need, therefore, to rethink the nation-state building process in Africa by proposing a people-centered governance as an alternative that promotes active participation of ordinary citizens. In that regard, there are two assumptions that need to be confirmed or disconfirmed by the hand of this study. The two assumptions are as follows:

1. State-centered approaches to nation-state building have failed to promote active participation of ordinary citizens in the decision-making in Southern Africa;
2. People-centered governance is viewed as a promising alternative approach that promote inclusion of ordinary citizens in the decision-making pertaining to nation-state building in Southern Africa.

Conceptual, temporal and geographical dimensions delimit the present study guiding its scope and focus. In line with conceptual delimitation, a theory of change lens was adopted to rethink the way nation-state is built in post-colonial Southern Africa by shifting to

people-centered governance as an alternative. The framework provided by theorists of change such as Mackinnon (2006), Stein and Valters (2012), Valters (2014), among others, allowed for an investigation of the state-centered approaches to nation-state building in line with the promotion of active participation of ordinary citizens in the processes. After investigation, the theoretical framework enables the research to understand a need for a shift to an alternative approach to nation-state building, like the people-centered governance in this case. Similarly, the study is conceptually limited to nation-state building as political cohesion between government elites and ordinary citizens at a domestic level within a territory boundary free from any external interference of other states or nations. The study does not include states or nations without territory or vis versa. Thus, there are number of works in line with nation-state building have influenced the current study. These include scientific works by Fukuyama (2005), Young (2010), Giorgis (2010), Mills (2014), Bangash (2016), Freeman (2010), Scott (2007), Hippler (2004), Wimmer and Schiller (2002), among others.

More than that, the study is focused on the nation-state building processes undertaken within a period covering between 1990 and 2016. This temporal delimitation marks, on the one angle, the democratic transition era after three decades of dictatorships in post-independent Africa from 1990 onward. African continent experienced the democratization of political spaces epitomized by a political shift from unique political party regimes to multiparty regimes tinted by a cosmetic inauguration of democracy. Participation of ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes become a mantra of the newly established institutions. Thus, the emergence of plethora of social movements and civil society organizations claiming their insertion into political decision spheres alongside with government elites and open civic spaces to exercise their citizenship and advocacy functions. On the other angle, this temporary delimitation coincides with the declaration of the declaration of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) including its end in 2016. This period triggered the emergence of anti-poverty and pro-democracy movements demanding for democracy and accountability from political elites who failed to deliver to their promises made during the insertion of the assigned development goals within their national strategic development plans. Discontent citizens have distanced themselves from their political elites and withdrew their political legitimacy. The war for full inclusion was inaugurated by the emergency of civil society movements, trade union movements, youth movements, among others, demanding for radical transformation in a

form of an alternative approach to nation-state building which is more inclusive and responsive to people's aspirations.

Regarding the geographical limitation, the study is focused on rethinking of nation-state building processes within four post-independent Southern African countries, namely Angola, Botswana, The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Africa. The geographical choice is empirically justified on the one hand by the fact that these countries are characterized by controversial political regimes ranging from autocracy to consolidating democracy. Some they claim to be democratic while authoritarian in their functions and other one dominant political party democracy. Alike other African countries, Southern African region become a hub of both hybrid and cosmetic democratic regimes.

On the other hand, these countries have been criticized by many to plunge their population into abject poverty fueled by socio-economic disparities despite their potential mineral resources and fertile soil. Subsequently, citizens become discontents and resolve in counterforce citizenship in order to claim their inclusion in political decisions and to debunk authoritarian practices as sources of conflict between Southern African nation and states. In this context, for the sake of space and time, the choice was made on countries such as, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Botswana and South Africa as research sites for the study. Theoretically, studies on rethinking nation-state building with people-centered governance as an alternative approach are still minimized.

1.6 Defining the key concepts

1.6.1 Nation-state building

The concept of nation-state building is composed by other two concepts, notably nation and state that need to be unpacked separately in order to grasp its full meaning. State is generally referred to as a group of human beings possessing territory and a government, representing the physical and political aspects of a country with the ability to exercise preeminent control over the people and the policies within its territorial boundaries without undue interference from external forces such as other states. Freeman (2010:137) views state as "the agent of its policy, the incorporation and instrument of a people's will in their competition and cooperation with other peoples". As such, the "the agent of the nation, the state must pursue the ends the nation assigned to it." Using this line of thought, state-building referred to as interventionist strategies to restore and rebuild the institutions

and apparatus of the state, for example the bureaucracy (Hippler, 2004). Most theorists believe a well-built state to be one of the perquisites of a nation-building (Scott 2007). Freeman presents the nation as the principal in this relationship – rather than the state, as agent – that determines the means by which the state may pursue these ends on the nation's behalf. No more than other agent may the state has its own conscience for that of its principal. The state is an amoral entity; it is the instrument of other's moral judgments rather than the originator of its own. As for the concept of nation, it represents the human aspect of a country, or the concept of nationality.

According to Wimmer and Schiller (2002), the nation emanates from the people who become primarily viewed as a nation united through common ancestry and a shared homeland, no matter where its members might have wandered. These entails, this concept of the people gave each nation its own national character, its peculiar nature and homeland, and a claim to a place in the sun. It suggests that the people living within the state share a sense of distinctiveness as a people; this distinctiveness may be seen in language, religion, ethnicity, or a more general and amorphous sense that we are one people (Bartholomees, 2004). On that note, nation-building refers to the creation of a cultural identity that relates to the particular territory of the state (Scott, 2007). Nation-state building is referred to, in this context, as interventionist strategies to restore and build the institutions apparatus which are in harmony with creation of a cultural identity attached to a territory within a state. It is simply a reconciliation between state and its nation for the well-being of whole.

1.6.2 People-centered governance

In this study, people-centered governance is referred to as an approach that is centered around and on aspirations of ordinary citizens and their inclusion in the decision-making processes across sectors and governance that affect their daily lives (Samuel, 2002, Yates, 2004). People-centered governance is, at the same time, alternative to state-centered approach which has state and technocrats as sole builder of the nation-state, and also to good-governance which is captured by state and markets including technocrats on detriment of ordinary citizens (Tshimpaka, 2019). On that note, people-centered governance become equated to democratic governance which promote human rights of ordinary citizens. It is a governance approach for and with people. The study considers the four integrity principles of people-centered approach notably, participation, communication, representation and legitimacy (Samuel, 2002). More than that, the eight

policies to promote people-centered governance include namely; participation, accountability, decentralization, freedom of, and access to information, legally enforceable obligations, access to justice, national cooperation and coordination, international cooperation and coordination (Yates, 2005).

In line with the assigned objectives, more emphasis was put on participation considered by the researcher as a beacon of a democratic governance that promote inclusion of ordinary citizens in stakeholder processes and make decisions to build nation-state. Spectrum of public participation has served as conceptual ground to understand people-centered governance.

1.6.3 Southern Africa

Southern Africa is a Southern part of African continent comprised by countries grouped with a regional body named the Southern African Development Community formed in 1992 and constituted by 16 countries. These include, Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, ESwatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (SADC, 2019).

1.6.4 Theory of Change

The Theory of Change (ToC) forms a core theoretical frame of this study in order to assess the strength of arguments that people-centered governance promotes the inclusion of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building processes in post-colonial era. The study is based one of the principles of the ToC that, if we do X then Y will change because… (Stein, and Valters, 2012). In this context, these entails, the expected outcomes, which is the inclusion of ordinary citizens in nation-state building processes, depend on change of new pattern of approach as an alternative, people-centered governance that promotes active participation in, self-reliance and ownership of political decision to build nation-state in Southern African countries. The Theory of Change is thoroughly explained and engaged in below chapter 3 of this thesis.

1.7 Research Design and Methodology

1.7.1 Philosophy and theory of the study

The study is ontologically post-positivistic and also epistemologically grounded on people's lived experiences on the ground. The reason being is that post-positivism rejects

the value-free position and claims that objective theories can be crafted in order to understand and explain reality or events. On the contrary, positivism and rationalism claim that it is possible to separate facts from value, that research is value-free, and that the researcher is independent, taking the role of an objective analyst (Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler, 2005, Tshimpaka, 2019). Theory of Change has served as a core lens to this study to understand the needed change in approach that promote inclusion of ordinary citizens in the nation-building processes.

1.7.2 Research Design

Defined as a plan ahead of a given research, research design of this study is qualitative exploratory research (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). Exploratory research is carried out to investigate a problem which is not clearly defined. It is conducted to have a better understanding of the existing problem but will not provide conclusive results. For such a research, a researcher starts with a general idea and uses this research as a medium to identify issues that can be the focus for future research (Babbie, 2007).

Given its flexibility and low-cost character, the exploratory research design enabled the researcher to identify the problem under investigation, create the hypothesis and further the research through descriptive investigation (Stebbins, 2001). The researcher did not fall into an exploratory design's trap of a bias and judgmental in the interpretation of data. In the current context, the research design helps the researcher to undertake an exploration of shortcomings registered by state-centered approach to nation-state building in Southern Africa with aim to propose an alternative model that promote inclusion of ordinary citizens in political decisions. The researcher felt that changing the approach to nation-state building will increase engagements of ordinary citizens in political decisions and consequently will avert conflicts between the state and its nation.

1.7.3 Methods and approach

Secondary method of data collection was used by the researcher in order to explore the failure of the state-centered approaches to nation-state building processes in Southern Africa in order to propose an alternative approach that promotes inclusion of ordinary citizens in the political decision. It was about gathering information from previously published and unpublished primary research in a form of literature review, case studies, to name a few, on the topic under investigation from existing sources such as books, journals, periodic, official and unofficial reports, magazines, including online materials.

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Through a qualitative exploratory approach, the researcher firstly identified the shortcomings charactering the state-centered approaches used by Southern African government elites in the nation-state building processes. Secondly, the researcher created the hypotheses based on the identified problem encountered by the top-down approaches to nation-state building process. Lastly, through a descriptive investigation, the researcher assessed the strength of arguments that people-centered governance promotes the inclusion of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building processes in post-colonial era in order to confirm or infirm the created hypotheses.

1.7.4 Study population and sample

Study population is referred to in this study as the total of the entire individuals having characteristics that are of the interest to the researcher (Babbie, 2007, Salkind, 2012). As for sampling techniques, the researcher used purposing sampling technique in order to strategically choose the informants, based on researcher's judgement, as key to answering the research question, or either confirm or infirm created hypotheses. Bryman (2012:416) underscores most sampling in qualitative research entails purposive sampling. The author adds that, what links the various kinds of purposive sampling approach is that the sampling is conducted with reference to the goals of the research, so that units of analysis are selected in terms of criteria that allows the research questions to be answered or hypotheses to be confirmed or infirmed.

Thus, the target population of this study was the post-colonial African countries embarked into nation-state building after democratic transition period in 1990. The units of analysis were Southern African political regimes, including Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo and South Africa. A desktop search revealed that the above indicated Southern African countries constitute a bastion of hybrid political regimes that on the one hand promised to include ordinary citizens in political decision but at the same time fail to open the public sphere, on the other hand. More than that, these indicated Southern African countries were criticized by many to struggle to establish a people-centered governance that promotes inclusion of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building processes. Political regimes in Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo were reported to be autocratic while that of Botswana and South Africa were evidenced to be consolidating democracy (BTI Regime Classification 2016, Mo Ibrahim Index 2017).

1.7.5 Data Sources

Data was gathered through secondary sources.

1.7.5.1 Secondary sources

The current study used secondary data collection as method to gather information. It encompasses processing data that have already been collected by another party (Babbie, 2007). These existing data were retrieved from needed unpublished and published scientific works, magazines, encyclopedias, annual reports, country constitutions, newspapers and other relevant documents and online materials on nation-state building in Southern African countries. The information gathered by the researcher from these above indicated sources was purposed to confirm or infirm research hypotheses. Discussion on subject matter cannot be effective without a strong academic base reflecting most prominent existing studies on the field. The analysis of the relevant data on nation-state building in Southern African countries has constituted an indispensable source, giving the study the necessary background for the achievement of above indicated study hypotheses.

1.7.6 Data Analysis and Tools of Analysis

Data analysis was done through the qualitative analysis of the theory of change according to the DFID Evaluation Department (2012). This entails, the analysis of the context, clear hypothesis of change and assessment of the evidence (DFID 2012, Stein and Valters, 2012, Valters 2014). As indicated in the methodology section above, the data analysis is about to identify both the problem encountered by the existing elitist approaches to nation-state building and the needed changes before mapping up the causal pathways in order to strengthen the arguments that people-centered approaches enhances full participation of ordinary citizens in the building processes of the nation-state in Southern African countries. Participation as one of the eight dimensions of quality of democracy according to Morlino and Carli (2014), was used as tools of analysis. Additionally, the spectrum of public participation according to the International Association for Public Participation (2007) was used in that regard to understand different pattern of public participation.

The idea was to assess if the proposed alternative approach to nation-state building is in line with the quality of participation as one the democratic principles. These analytical procedures and tools enabled the researcher to develop an adapted theory of change for

nation-state building that promotes inclusion of ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes for their well-being. The newly developed theory of change for inclusive nation-state building was validated based on the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). It is about validating the theory of change against the available evidence and the perspectives of other stakeholders to ensure that the key assumptions were plausible, including assumptions about the roles that were played by partners and other key actors.

1.7.7 Study Limitations Encountered

Relaying only on secondary data in order to come up with a tangible contribution to the body of literature is not an easy academic exercise. Some of the needed existing literature necessary for the meticulous analysis of the subject matter under investigation were rare to be found. In a nutshell, inexistence of some needed data, like more case studies, on nation-building in Southern Africa constituted a limitation encountered by this study. But the research extensively reviews the existing literature in order to countermeasure the above indicated challenges.

1.8 Structure of the Study

Including the introductory chapter, this thesis comprises six chapters.

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

The chapter 1 introduces the study in order to explain the scope and focus through the problem background, research objectives and importance, delimitation, description of the research design and methodology used, and the thesis chapter layout.

Chapter 2: Conceptual Perspectives of state-centered and people-centered approaches to Nation-state Building

Chapter 2 reviews both state-centered and people-centered approaches to nation-state building from relevant unpublished and published literature. It discusses how people-centered approaches to nation-state building have become an alternative to the state-centered approaches which are driven, most of the time, by the will of state and allies. This process entails reviewing ordinary citizen participation debates in the nation-state building processes from different schools of thought in political science.

Chapter 3: Rethinking Nation-state building: lessons from the theory of change

The chapter 3 theorizes the nation-state building processes using the Theory of Change as a core theoretical framework of the study. These entails, illuminating the understanding of the study of this nature that focuses on the revisiting of nation-state building importance to ensure the alternative people-centered governance will contribute to the desired change. This chapter explores the use of Theory of Change as an appropriate core lens through which the researcher scrutinized the desired change of approach to nation-state building that promotes the inclusion of ordinary citizens in order to avoid the sighing of the nation.

Chapter 4: Investigating the impact of nation-state building on relation between state and nation in post-colonial Southern Africa

This chapter 4 investigates the impact of nation-state building processes on relation between state and nation in Southern African countries. This encompasses an in-depth examination of approaches employed by political elites in the quest for building a cohesive society where state and nation collaborate. The way ordinary citizens in Southern part of African continent are either allowed or excluded from participate in the decision-making processes in line with nation-state building is analyzed within this chapter.

Chapter 5: People-centered governance as political remedy to the sighing of nation in Southern Africa

Based on failure registered by elitist approaches to nation-state building in Southern African countries, this chapter 5 present the strength of arguments that people-centered governance promotes inclusion of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building processes in Southern African countries. The chapter is essentially focused on demonstrating how the people-centered governance is a promising approach that enhances full engagement of active and self-reliant ordinary citizens who own political decisions that build nation-state in Southern Africa.

Chapter 6: Conclusion: Towards a people-centered governance as an approach to rethink nation-state building in Southern Africa

The chapter 6 summarizes the thesis with regard to an alternative approach to nation-state building processes in Southern African countries. At the same time, the chapter opens new avenues for further research in line with alternative approaches to nation-state building that promote inclusion of ordinary citizens. There was a general idea that state-

centered approaches to nation-state building exclude majority of population from political decisions. After a thorough examination of the existing approach there was a need to rethink the way nation-state should be built through alternative approach which is people-centered governance. Some suggestions and recommendations were given to Southern African political elites, policy makers and ordinary citizens in order to foster a cohesive society built on a reconciled nation-state.

1.9 Conclusion

This introductive chapter presented the overall study to the rethinking of nation-state building processes in post-colonial Southern Africa by proposing a shift to an alternative approach than the state-centered approach. The general argument of the thesis is that state-centered approaches to nation-state building have failed the majority of the ordinary citizens by excluding them from the political decision-making processes. Consequently, it is time to revisit the nation-state building process by shifting to an alternative approach that is centered on the aspirations of the people and driven in collaboration of the latter. The chapter 1 provides the clear scope and focus of the thesis throughout its problem background, argument, research objectives and rationality, definition of the key concepts, delimitation, and includes a description of the research design and methodology used, and the thesis synopsis.

2. Chapter 2: Conceptual Perspectives of state-centered and people-centered approaches to Nation-state Building

2.1 Conceptual Framework

Figure 2.1: People-centered governance to nation-state building

Source: Author.

The above figure 2.1 presents how people-centered governance is viewed as an alternative approach to state-centered approach in order to link state to its nation and vice versa. In

other words, rethinking nation-state building cannot be possible unless state uses people-centered governance as an alternative approach that goes beyond state-centered and includes ordinary citizens into new created spaces of collaboration with political elites without being marginalized or silenced.

2.2 Conventional approach to the nation-state building

State centered approach to nation-state building was equated to discriminatory and exclusive approach promoting the natural precedence of elites or bureaucracy over the masses in the management of public affairs. Some observers think that, analyzing politics in terms of 'the state' directs our attention to a single central problem. According to Dunleav and O'Leary (1987), the interrelation between the governing institutions of a country and other aspects of that society is embedded in two key versions of the state/non-state contrast, namely, 'the state and civil society' and 'the state and the individual'. This state/civil society dichotomy projects questions about the interrelation between socially powerful interests and the apparatus of government into particularly sharp focus, requiring a strong mediation by representative institutions and by the interest groups of the society. Thus, to operate effectively state institutions require an exogenous leadership input so that they do not thrash around in a directionless and uncoordinated manner. This oversight role is vital because of the potential of political elites to manipulate information and bend political imperatives so as to advance their individual interests, the over-regulation of private sector operations, the over-supply of public services, increased deficit financing and growing public debt - all indicators that a partisan state is exploiting its strategic position to override citizen preferences (Dunleav and O'Leary, 1987).

Similarly, because the state cannot seek to claim a monopoly of legitimacy in the abstract but through a tangible element characterized by cultural symbols (cultural values and identity, national anthem, flag and others elements) (Hoffman, 2004), elites' exploitative posture will also be evident throughout the process of national identity formation, resulting in symbols that will most probably duplicate esteemed values drawn from their "sub"-national identity. This is because in a state centered nation-state actual public consultation is not normally a priority, and even if it eventually occurs, the exercise will be essentially an inconsistent formality aimed at giving some sort of legitimacy to the process. As a result, the emerging nation-state will be essentially contradictory, oppressive and nationalistic, with the aspirations of the ruling elite almost, if not always, prevailing over those of other groups, irrespective of their (ir) relevance to the national

interest. These "unilateral" attitudes are detrimental to the development of the nation-state and can bring about unbearable consequences in the future, including rampant corruption, inadequacy of democratic institutions, strong gaps in democratic practice and increased public cynicism and disillusionment (Hoffman, 2004).

Young democracies, like those in Africa and in Southern Africa in particular, are basically marked by their propensity to exclude and obfuscate core values characterizing democracy as a government "of" the people and "for" the people, due to the tendency by a group of nepotistic elites and their allies to manipulate public institutions in order to achieve their private gains. But ordinary citizens are side-lined, divided and discriminated through ethnic cleavages. This nepotistic attitude is fueled by competition among greed leaders who think about themselves in their fight to gain or consolidate power as their political mantra. Besides being essential elements for nation-state building, culture and identity have been used by nepotistic leaders as political tools to cause political divide among ordinary citizens who they are supposed to unite (Frantzich, 2008).

On that note, nationalism has become, especially in multicultural African states, not only an opportunity to foster national and social cohesion, but also as a great challenge to the consolidating democracy and the nation-building itself. Hence the suggestion by some scholars that nationalism can impact democracy in many ways: the belief that the basis of democratic "fellow-feeling" is a shared language; language is a key way for marking out different nations; each nation ought to have some degree of autonomy; and democracies need a high degree of cohesion, and thus a common identity. This is because citizens should be able to collaborate through one voice that enable them to participate effectively in collective decision-making processes that affect them daily.

Thus, advises Frantzich (2008), it is imperative to consider an inclusive nation-(state) building from the inception, because it is in this stage that occurs the determination of who is 'the people' becoming sovereign. Consequently, lack of inclusiveness and full representation of people's aspirations condemned to live together in a given territory, can trigger contradictory views in relation to the ultimate stage of national identity promotion. As an example, Frantzich indicates that the history textbooks of Israel celebrate the accomplishments of the ancient Hebrews and mourn the setbacks of the Jews throughout history, not just from 1948 onward. The Israeli flag contains the Star of David, a Jewish symbol and the Israeli national anthem lends voice to the yearnings of the Jewish soul. These are not politically neutral matters but are symbols constructed to celebrate a specific

people in an institutionalized fashion. However, while this Israeli identity pleases the people celebrated or the dominant nation in the state, other people in the territory feel excluded and thus, they try by all means to reverse the prevailing status quo. Conflict is almost the daily bread of Israel. Thus, if we consider that the nation-building aims at conjugating efforts in order to come up with an institution that can be called a nation; that is, a situation whereby an entity or a people can be said to have a relationship that can be held to be national (Oloruntoba and Falola, 2018), obviously the presumptive identity of the democracy present in the Israeli reality lacks the legitimacy necessary for the its stability. Excluded nation (s) will not only refuse to recognize such identity but also endeavor in order to reverse it. This is also one of the underlying factors behind the lack of significant progress in the democratization process in Africa, as the continent still fails to make substantial progress beyond what I consider its "primitive" phase of organizing regular controversial elections.

Among other factors, the evident lack of progress in the democratization process in Africa is due to the very special problem – more confining perhaps than even a history of totalitarianism – of building democracy on the weak foundation of a hollowed-out and largely bankrupt, postcolonial state. In contrast to the European experiences, postcolonial African states have neither entered "interactively" into productive and accountable partnerships with their civil societies, nor have they accumulated the autonomous capacities of an administrative or military "leviathan". Instead, African states are either "predatory," having embedded themselves in society by buying popular support through rent seeking and corruption, or entirely "marginal" to society, having lost any capacity to penetrate, extract and regulate. This despite the usual tendency by African states to display the outward, ceremonial and juridical attributes of statehood, while lacking a meaningful empirical presence in many parts of their territories (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982).

The idea of nation-building is also underlined by an attempt to achieve certain status through values and ideals by and through which people can consider themselves to be different or distinct from others and to have more reasons to be more deeply committed to others than ordinarily would be the case. Therefore, if democracy consists of "rule by the people," then the values, attitudes, and behaviors of ordinary folk are central to considerations of the fate of democracy. However, as Biegelbauer and Hansen (2011) explain, in the elite tradition democracy is basically conceived as struggles for power

between narrow elites, being the role of ordinary citizens limited to participation in regular elections so, after fulfilling this function citizens are completely excluded from the all process only to be remembered in the next election.

Such attitudes, says Bratton (2004), are typical to "weak states" such most of African states, because the more dominant the state is the fewer promotion of rule of law and human rights. Weak states tend to reinforce their monitoring or enforcement capacity to an extent that sometimes puts the citizens at risk, including the resort to the use of excessive force either to homogenize the populations or to maintain their territorial integrity (Wilson, 2007). Weak states are marked by bad governance, legitimacy crisis, divided community, neo-patrimonialism, corruption and varieties of personalistic and clientelist politics, which not only constitute danger to their own people but also to the entire international community, due to their propensity to conflict, instability, terrorism, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and dangerous diseases (Zoellick, 2008).

Conventional or state centered approach to nation-state building is commonly supported by the elite theory assuming that any mass of citizens is psychologically incapable of handling complex decisions and as such, needs leaders who can stir them out of apathy and organize them. The term 'elite' originally meant, and in many contexts still means, the best, the excellent, the noble, or *the creme de la creme*. In the contemporary social sciences, the term 'elite' is now generally applied to functional or occupational groups which have high status in a society, for whatever reason. The task to lead the large and complex organization of mass parties necessary for their political participation in the society, creates the need for leaders with expertise, stability in tenure of office, and specialized task-management. This organizational logic further increases the discretion which leaders enjoy to direct organizational activities towards their own purposes, even if this shift means betraying the rank and file's interests (Dunleavy, and O'Leary, 1987), both in democracy and in non-democracy. Although in a non-democracy such discretion is increasingly exaggerated due to the ability of the leader to control the will of the silent and sometimes conformed masses, the risk posed by the elite is also a reality in democracies.

Nevertheless, if we consider the elite as the dominant system of rational-legal administration inside large-scale businesses and government agencies (bureaucracy) capable to progressively supplant all rival systems of administration in a modern society, due to its technical superiority in tackling problems and marshalling large-scale activity

in a purposeful way, as Max Weber did, eventually the elite will not represent any danger to the society, because the oversight role played by checks and balances (parliament and the judiciary) in democracies. Bureaucrats need a decisive political leadership in order to assure social stability, due to their propensity to treat public affairs as their own. In the same way, because bureaucrats apparently make bad leaders because they are indoctrinated to accept authority, any period of their ascendancy produces conservative, unimaginative and unbalanced leadership; and in a bureaucratic hegemony, the state machinery tends to be colonized by outside interests, thus preventing government from being directed towards a genuine 'national interest' (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987).

Hendriks (2010) defines a non-democracy as a system in which some individual or sub-group possesses superior power to make binding collective decisions without any formal accountability to citizens. This implies that, despite its central role in Africa and elsewhere, election alone does not equate to democracy, but to a part of a long-term undertaking leading to the strengthening of national institutions and democratic processes through, among others, the enhancement of sustainable political participation by the citizens, as a way to promote human rights or human dignity. Thus, the absence of full political participation by ordinary citizens extinguishes the possibility of realizing human dignity and gives rises to tensions between state and society, (eventually) leading to the failure of the (nation-) state building (Wilson, 2007). In practical terms, these tensions derives from the widespread human rights abuses perpetrated by or at the behest of state elites and other actors (i.e. major oil and diamond interests) who use quasi-governments as a shield behind which the responsibility of international actors for gross human suffering can be evaded (i.e. displacement, exploitation, ecological devastation). Ultimately, these tensions have reinforced the perception that the nation-state itself is basically a 'market state' due to close link between capitalism and the market.

Against this backdrop, states generate particular ways of 'state-centric' or 'statist' thinking through which the notion of emancipation is either applauded (if it is pro-state) or attacked (if it is against the state), due to its attachment to the absolutism of the state. In such a circumstances, even though a statist mentality may involve (as with classical Marxism and anarchism) critiques of the state, these are critiques which ensure that divisions continue and states remain in business, as a result of the fatalist acceptance of the state generated among the people. Therefore, despite the traditional view of citizens as members of the state, one can argue that a universal and emancipatory notion of

citizenship is only possible when citizenship is detached from the state (Hoffman, 2004). A possibility hardly reachable in a state centered approach to nation-state building.

Thus, despite the ability of elections (in Africa and other parts of the world) to make citizens a present and not a suppressed class, there is no reason to be optimistic that elections provide citizens with a real and reliable choice of policies. Democratization needs to be complemented by a reasonable degree of liberalization of the society in order to produce the necessary elite pluralism rather than mono-elite domination, or the predominance of the principle of 'power elite': a triumvirate of leadership groups drawn from big business, the military and the political cliques that controls the key 'history making' decision, leaving a wide range of less salient domestic issues to be tackled in the 'middle levels of power' such as the parliament and the state governments. The quality of the democratic elites, chosen through a competitive and open process, is vital and critical for the consolidation of democracy (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987) and of the nation-building process.

In the views of Wilson (2007), several reasons have been presented to justify the natural tendency, by the elite, to fear public participation. They include the fear to lose some privileges, due to ability of public participation to enlarge public "interference" to sensitive matters related to the management of the state and render the elite accountable to the public, despite the fact that these factors are premises for equity and equality necessary to accommodate both the interests of the majority and minority, the poor and the rich, the privileged and the disadvantaged. Failure to this will necessarily deepen social asymmetries and conflicts and reveal the incapacity of the government to carry out basic responsibilities (Wilson, 2007) justifying the reason of the state (an amoral institution created most commonly through elections) that in the view of Freeman (2010) is to take care of the interests of (the) moral nation. That is to say, the right to have feelings, desires and emotions rest in the nation as a living entity, and not in the state, because state institutions are creations of the nation. The nation should take precedence in everything, including in its interactions with the state.

Unfortunately, the normal tendency in a state centered approach to nation-state building is the reverse of roles, with the state assuming the leadership in its relationship with the nation. That is to say, more frequently, in Africa the process of nation-state building is turned into state-nation building. This is one of the reasons why, historically, elections in Africa take place in a context of contingent "chaotic pluralism" or incendiary dualisms

expressing (sometimes desperate) attempts to fundamentally re-configure the relationship between state and sub-state groups, and between the state and the structures of violence and inequality (Wilson, 2007). Indeed, in most cases, part of the violence is the political game itself, which leaders view as a winner-takes-all fight to the finish where defeat means a loss not only of the emoluments and status that office brings but sometimes of life itself. The game is for keeps. One must win—by any means necessary (Wilson, 2007). African democracy is basically a fight to keep or grab on to power rather than the stability or the multifaceted development of their respective nation-states (Bates, 2008), hence its failure to produce any significant and tangible shift in the posture of major political regimes generally characterized by authoritarian attitudes.

As a result, more than twenty nine years since the continent was caught by the winds of the third wave of democratization, most of Africans still continue to dream of the day they will emancipate from "mere objects" to actual emancipated subjects with the right to freely participate in the nation-building without any constrain. The same can be said in relation to ever postponed legitimate desire, by the vast majority African citizens, to benefit from the huge resources of their respective countries, which still remains a simple aspiration, as a result of the bad political and economic choices made by political leaders. Kept under political and ideological captivity, most African are made to believe that militancy in a given political party is singular to actual citizenship, as a result of the intensive and extensive manipulation of public perceptions sustained by unethical common patterns (in Africa) and attitudes such as corruption, nepotism, clientelism, patrimonialism and others aimed at making mobilized "objects" to blindly serve the interests of elites either to live or to survive.

According to the Economist Intelligence Unit's annual democracy index for 2008–2015, the disorganized nature of the development of democracy in Africa has led to outcomes ranging from "full" or "flawed" democracy to "hybrid" or "authoritarian" regimes *(The Economist Intelligence Unit 2008–2015).* While electoral contests and term limits are increasingly accepted as rules rather than exceptions, they are being flouted and manipulated in some cases, but not without consequences. This has resulted in Africa being connoted as mixt of democratic consolidation and democratic backsliding, leading some sceptics to interpret Africa's wave of democracy as almost an "historical accident"—the product of wily rulers' responses to an external reform agenda, lacking structural foundations in African societies. In other words, democracy in Africa is falling

victim to arrogant but calculating "born again" democrats in the garb of politicians (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2008–2015, in Oloruntoba and Falola, 2018). This view is corroborated by Herbst (2000) who considers that the African model (of democracy) has resulted in leaders who steal so much from the state that they kill off the productive sources of the economy; a bias in the delivery of services toward the small urban population and the absence of government in large parts of some countries; weak central rule which allows challengers to form large and sophisticated rebel armies; and in some countries, state failure has meant that no one has been able to take charge.

This reality led Bratton (2004) considering that Africa's liberal democracies often falls short on the enforcement of personal freedoms, especially with regard to gender equality and the delivery of socioeconomic rights. Because African women still face widespread discrimination, and due to practical ambiguities over the protection of private property and the provision of social welfare, there is no a single African country that yet warrants a top score on civil liberties. Political minorities are sometimes side-lined from the protections of the constitution and justifiably complain of neglect, as in Malawi and Namibia and freedom of speech is compromised by government domination of the electronic media, which endows the ruling party or coalition with the loudest voice in the land. Most importantly, political power remains concentrated in the hands of executive presidents to the point that significant arenas of decision-making lie beyond the control of other elected officials. While legislatures try to claim authority, for instance on budget matters in Benin and Ghana, parliamentarians more often perform as docile handmaidens of the executive branch. And as ruling political parties increase their parliamentary majorities in second and subsequent elections, executive and legislative powers become fused. Generally, this situation results in a very difficult, if not controversial, relation between the state and the society in Africa due to several factors, including the authoritarian legacy of colonial governance (that has been unable to reinvent itself despite the democratization process); social and political fragmentation; sometimes weak and dependent civil society; and the persistence of a centralized and highly personalized forms of government, leading to corruption, ethnically based decisions and systematic human rights abuses.

This situation also reflects the shortages observed in the marriage of human rights to participatory and/or rights-based processes. These vital elements for the consolidation of the state and the constitution of the people as citizens are at jeopardy. The fact is that

despite the regular holding of multiparty elections, much more need to be done to provide an environment in which individuals feel protected, civil society flourish and the government fulfils its responsibilities in an effective and transparent way and with adequate institutional mechanisms to ensure accountability in Africa. With reference to the above, it is more than evident the urgent need to rethink the way nation-state should be rebuild in Africa through an alternative approach that promotes active participation of ordinary citizens in the process (Wilson, 2007).

That is to say that the stability of the democratic dispensation and, by extension, of the nation-state building in Africa, will depend on the ability by all stakeholders, the govern and the governed, to engage in the process highly convinced of the need for the establishment of an interactive state which, according to Bratton (2004), holds out the promise of a third way between democratization forwards or backwards. In the virtuous version of this cycle, democratization helps build institutions that link citizens to the state while, at the same time, state building increases capacities to improve mass welfare. This would, eventually, be a solution especially in Africa where leaders who are less than fully committed to democracy resist responding to popular needs and, as a result, citizens withdraw still further from the orbit of an already marginal state. At worst, the decay of the state and the corruption of elites together contribute to a downward spiral of disorder and deprivation.

The emphasis should be on viewing society from a relational point of view whereby collective phenomena are seen primarily as expressions of enduring relationships, taking into account the need to harmonize and to solve the differences between workers and bosses, peasants and merchants, students and teachers, men and women, youths and elders, Moslems and Christians, Africans and Asians/ Arabs/Europeans, majority and minorities, people and state, etc., in a healthy way. The lack of such a conciliatory approach has been one of the reasons behind the growing demands for autonomous organizations against party and state authoritarianism, as a means to reconstruct the relations between the people and the state and create the possibility of domination of the state by the civil society, by why workers, peasants, professionals, students, youth, women and communities.

One of the most important issues, within this context, should be the question of a social project in terms of the possibility to conceptualize the type of society people would like to build. Questions like what is the motive force of society (intellectuals? bureaucracy?

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economic forces? social struggles?) Transition to what? In what way do people want their societies/communities organized? Which is the most advanced class/group to undertake such a project politically? In which way is production organized? Who is producing, and who is appropriating the surplus? What forms of accumulation are taking place? Are of a paramount importance for political and social stability and need to be debated in a wider platform other than the parliament or the executive. Democracy and human rights as a process of transforming the state, requires one to focus on the politics of social and political emancipation of the people, and emancipation politics require that one recognizes that the other sites of politics beyond the parliamentary building are such as the factory, the farm, the household, the street, the village, the school, the university, etc. They require, suggests Chachage (1986), the involvement of all the people in resisting state arbitrariness and all forms of domination and exploitation.

2.3 People-centered approach to the nation-state building

People centered approach to nation-state building is better understood in the context of a mature liberal democracy because of its credentials of a core concept and the mostly acclaimed political system, constituting a valuable base from which to build any consistent and realistic analysis on the nation-state building process having the people at the centered. According to Fairfield (2008), democracy is more than a method of fashioning political decisions. It is a symbol and an aspiration both political and extra-political, the expression of the aspiration for a certain moral standing among one's fellows, one of personal non-subordination articulating a certain defiance, a refusal of submission and a protest against indignity. In this regard, popular sovereignty and egalitarianism are but political manifestations of an underlying imperative of escape from servitude, bondage, and suffering that is needless and unequally shared. Best described, democracy is an existential aspiration that speaks to our fundamental being-in-the-world and not only what institutions accord with our "intuitions" or rational self-interest.

Democratic politics is, therefore, fundamentally a revolt against slavery, a nay-saying gesture against an historical succession of powers and the aspiration of suffering humanity to stand in the world no longer on a basis of moral inequality and indignity. In principle, at least, the democratic society is the classless society, one that refuses hierarchical structures and awards formal recognition to the equality of persons, and where this signifies less an equality of economic condition than moral, legal, and political equality.

Democracy can be considered as an end in itself and an illustration that the enlightened state has granted political freedoms to the people, a system that can trigger a virtuous cycle of development" allowing people to press for policies that expand social and economic activities, having at its center fundamental principles of equality of men, individual rights, free elections, the existence of political parties, majority rule, separation of power, checks and balances, the rule of law, freedom of the press and judicial autonomy (Wilson, 2007). Democracy is essentially a political concept concerning the collectively binding decisions about the rules and policies of a group, association or society whose members are considered as equals.

As former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has pointed out, "democracy is not just about one day every four or five years when elections are held, but a system of government that respects the separation of powers, fundamental freedoms like the freedom of thought, religion, expression, association and assembly and the rule of law" (Kofi Annan in Oloruntoba and Falola, 2018). Therefore, the regular holding of elections cannot by any means be equated to the existence of democracy in a given country. These factors reveals the spirit of democracy whose etymology, according to Hislope and Mughan (2012), literally means: *demos* means people and *kratos* means authority; hence the phrase "rule by the people."

Therefore, if democracy is to have not merely a "formal" existence but instead a "substantive" realization, then the existing political system should be able to allow all citizens to freely exercise their power in the decision-making process over any issue affecting their lives. Politics, in this tradition, is understood as the "deliberate efforts [of free citizens] to order, direct, and control collective affairs and activities; to set up ends for society; and to implement and evaluate those ends" .The polis offers human beings the widest forum to direct social life collectively.

Viewed from this perspective, democracy is an intrinsically good system that allows for a better social well- being all ordinary citizens, due to its ability to include them in the management of public affairs. And as such, one can argue that even in situations whereby a given democracy does not display desired effects, the problem will hardly be found in the system itself (even though the process is continuous) but most probably in the incapacity by the ruling elite to fully abide by democratic principles. Hence the importance of checks and balances to assure that the rule of law prevails. Consequently, it is imperative that any event taking place throughout the democratization is informed

solely informed by the desire to satisfy the aspirations of the people rather than those of the elites. And this is only assured through an effective public participation.

The participation of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building, Morlino (2011:195), is analyzed in this study having as a base the framework of quality, adding to the minimalist definition of democracy the notion of 'good quality' democracy. By moving from the ideal to the empirical analysis of a set of dimensions of quality democracy, Morlino was able to identify eight dimensions namely, rule of law, electoral accountability, inter-institute accountability, participation, competition, freedom, equality and solidarity and responsiveness. More than that, these categories are clustered into three main qualities such as, *procedures*, *substantive* or *content*, and *results* (Morlino and Carli, 2014:25-26). In this context, the study is mainly focused on participation dimension encompassing opportunities for participation, election turnout, party membership, social participation, non-institutional political participation and illegal political participation. The Table 2.1 illustrates the above.

Table 2.1 Dimensions, Sub-dimensions, Indicators of Participation according to Democratic Qualities

Dimensions	Sub-dimensions	Indicators
Participation	1. Opportunities for Participation	Political Pluralism and Participation
	2. Election Turnout	Voter Turnout
	3. Party Membership	Party Membership
	4. Social Participation	Associational Membership
	5. Non-Institutional Political Participation	Demonstrations, Petitions
	6. Illegal Political Participation	Unofficial Strikes, Occupation. Buildings

Source: Adapted from Diamond and Morlino, 2005; Morlino 2011; Morlino and Carli, 2014.

Public participation does not happen in a vacuum. It is the result of a specific program implemented by the government to mobilize the citizens around the common task of

nation-state building. This shows the intrinsic link between politics and governance. Creighton (2005) considers democracy as a work in progress that evolves over time, and that produces different results in different context. Nevertheless, he considers that if states embrace some common features of democracy, including public participation, most probably the democratic dispensation would produce acceptable results everywhere. Public participation is an integral part of the very definition of democracy. It is a legal requirement or prerequisite for governmental decision making, that is, democracy without citizen deliberation and participation is ultimately viewed as an empty and meaningless concept.

According to (Ababu, 2013), the benefits of public participation in the nation-state building are remarkable and constitute a foundation for a more stable society, because the main aim of public participation is the incorporation of public values into decisions; improving the substantive quality of decisions; resolving conflict among competing interests; building trust in institutions; and educating and informing the public on major issues of nation-state building. Biegelbauer and Hansen (2011) confirmed this assumption when observed that the main source of democratic legitimacy is not just the fair weighing of the fixed preferences of the citizens, but the process of preference formation through public debate and deliberation.

In the words of Creighton (2005), public participation is the process by which public concerns, needs, and values are incorporated into governmental and corporate decision making. It is a two-way communication and interaction, with the overall goal of better decisions that are supported by the public. It is not just providing information to the public, but the interaction between the organization making the decision and people who want to participate. It is not something that happens accidentally or coincidentally, but an organized process where the participants have some level of impact or influence on the decision being made.

The defining core values of public participation implies that public should have a say in decisions about actions that affect their lives; the promise that the public's contribution will influence the decision; the process communicates the interests and meets the needs of all participants; the process seeks out and facilitates the involvement of those potentially affected; the process involves participants in defining how they participate; the process provides participants with the information they need to participate in a meaningful way; and the process communicates to participants how their input affected

the final decision (The International Association for Public Participation (IAP2, 2007).Like democratization itself, participation is best understood as a continuum. Since it is a continuum, there are really an infinite number of points along the scale, but for the purposes of this paper there are the four major categories shown in Figure 1.1:

Figure 2.2 Continuum of Participation.

Source: Adapted from the International Association for Public Participation's Public Participation Spectrum.

Public participation and engagement promoted by the civic agenda are presumed to have a number of benefits. These include: the possibility for individuals to advance interests via participation (instrumentalist); that participation results in a negotiated collective public interest (communitarian); participation develops an understanding of policy issues (educative); and that participation enables the expression of individual political identity (expressive) (Nabatchi and Leighninger, 2015). Therefore, the promotion of public participation following the patterns described in the figure 1.1 above (inform the public, listen to the public, engage in problem solving and develop agreements) will give the state a variety of benefits. According to Ababu (2013), these include:

- Ensure improved quality of decisions. The process of consulting with the public often helps to clarify the objectives and requirements of a project or policy and offers the public the possibility to force rethinking of hidden assumptions that might prevent seeing the most effective solution. This includes the consideration of new alternatives, beyond the time-honored, and possibly time-worn, approaches that have been used in the past;

- Minimize cost and delay. Public participation does take more time than a more restrict sort of engagement. However, even though unilateral decisions are always the quickest to make, they are often very expensive to implement because frequently there is so much resistance that they are never implemented at all. The efficiency of

making a decision cannot be measured merely in terms of time and costs, but also must take into account any delays or costs created by how the decision was made. If decision making is quick but alienates interested individuals and groups, it may have been very expensive in the long run. Even if the decision is somehow implemented, the next time the agency needs something in that community, the process will start out with ill will and animosity;

- Consensus building. A public participation program may build a solid, long term agreement and commitment between otherwise divergent parties. This builds understanding between the parties, reduces political controversy, and gives legitimacy to government decisions;

- Increased ease of implementation. Participating in a decision gives people a sense of ownership for that decision, and once that decision has been made, they want to see it work. Not only is there political support for implementation, but groups and individuals may even enthusiastically assist in the effort;

- Avoiding worst-case confrontations. Once a controversy becomes bitter and adversarial, it is much harder to resolve the issue. Public participation provides opportunities for the parties to express their needs and concerns without having to be adversarial. Early public participation can help reduce the probability that the community will face painful confrontations. Nevertheless, public participation is not magic; it will not reduce or eliminate all conflicts;

- Maintaining credibility and legitimacy. The way to achieve and maintain legitimacy, particularly when controversial decisions must be made, is to follow a decision-making process that is visible and credible with the public and involves the public. Public participation programs will also leave the public more informed of the reasoning behind decisions;

- Anticipating public concerns and attitudes. As the agency's staff works with the public in public participation programs, they will become increasingly sensitized to the public's concerns and how the public views the agency's operations. These views are often internalized, so that staff is more aware of the probable public response to the agency's procedures and decisions even when the issue is not large enough to justify a formal public participation program;

- Developing civil society. One of the benefits of public participation is a better educated public. Participants not only learn about the subject matter, but they also

learn how decisions are made by their government and why. Public participation trains future leaders as well. As citizens become involved in public participation programs, they learn how to influence others and how to build coalitions. Public participation is training in working together effectively. Today, individuals may represent only groups or interests. Tomorrow, they form the pool from which regional and national leadership can be drawn. Through public participation, future leaders learn the skills of pulling together to solve problems.

Public participation is about citizen empowerment and worries about social exclusion. It is informed by the belief in the curative capacities of social capital, and a fondness for community. It aims at creating opportunities for the engagement of people in the decision decision-making opportunities and to believe that they can make a difference. People need to learn that power is not fixed and immutable and that, together, they can seize opportunities to redefine issues, challenge assumptions and divert the flow of power in new directions. Empowerment is about a journey that links the personal and the political (Brannan, John and Stoker, 2007), an umbrella term that describes the activities by which people's concerns, needs, interests, and values are incorporated into decisions and actions on public matters and issues. The word "public" refers to all kinds of people and to all kinds of matters and issues—not just policy decisions and pieces of legislation, but also how people work together to plant trees, clean up vacant lots, or organize activities for children.

Ultimately, public participation is (or, at least, can be) a way for citizens to achieve problem solving, civility, and community. But for these participation activities to take place and for participation to have these impacts and benefits, it must be sustained by a robust participation infrastructure, the laws, processes, institutions, and associations that support regular opportunities for people to connect with each other, solve problems, make decisions, and celebrate community (Nabatchi and Leighninger, 2015).

This is why public participation infrastructure entails several facets, including: *legal*, or the engagement of government at all levels- numerous laws, rules, and regulations intended to help citizens monitor government decisions, comment publicly on them, and (in some cases) weigh in through petitions, ballot initiatives and other forms of direct participation, even though in many cases, they are obsolete, unclear, or in conflict with one another to the extent that it obstructs and delegitimizes democratic innovation; *governmental*, including structures and employees tasked with informing and interacting

with citizens, either in a particular issue area or by liaising with citizen groups and associations; *civic*, in the form of formal and informal associations, from civic watchdog organizations to neighborhood and parent groups, that exist, in part, to engage citizens in public affairs; *electoral,* through the engagement, by candidates and parties (when necessary), of citizens on policy questions during their campaigns; and *educational*, through the promotion at all levels of education, of programs aimed at preparing the citizens in matters related to their civic participation (Nabatchi and Leighninger, 2015).

As we can observe, public participation has the capacity to produce civility, build relationships and develop stronger community bonds and networks. Apart from assuring stronger impacts on equity, government efficiency, and trust, such sustained forms of participation between residents, people and institutions have the potential to create positive feelings among the citizens about the places they live and thus produce a range of positive social outcomes. In the words of Nabatchi and Leighninger (2015), cities and towns that have higher levels of community attachment have higher rates of economic growth and lower levels of unemployment; neighborhoods where people work together and have higher collective efficacy and lower crime rates; and people with stronger relationships to friends and neighbors are at less risk of serious illness and premature death. In other words, participation strengthens the sense of community belonging and this sense of belonging will motivate participants to discharge their social responsibilities such as paying taxes, and trust more public institutions; governments will be more likely to complete planned projects; public finances will be better managed and less prone to corruption; and public expenditures will more likely benefit low-income people in order to reduce poverty.

Thus, by promoting the necessary and positive political and social cohabitation within the state, public participation also plays a meaningful role in the prevention of social exclusion, while promoting the emergence and the development of the social capital. According to (Social Exclusion Unit, 2004; p. 4 in Brannan, John and Stoker, 2007), "social exclusion is a term which establishes that poverty is about more than low income, but is about a connected set of concerns about significant minorities being excluded from society through lack of access to jobs, good education and civic organizations. It is about something more than the lack of resources held by individuals or households and focuses on deficiencies in the social integration and power of significant groups in many western welfare states. It is multi-dimensional and can pass from generation to generation.

Therefore, social exclusion includes poverty and low income, but is a broader concept and encompasses some of the wider causes and consequences of deprivation". On another hand, social capital refers to the social glue – the networks of ties, information, trust and norms – that binds people and enables them to cooperate more effectively. Thus, a successful economy and society needs financial, physical and human capital, but it also needs social capital. People need to find ways of not being strangers of developing trust, loyalty and a shared commitment to one another. From this perspective, re-energizing citizenship is not about blaming individuals or the structures for our problems; it is about the part citizens could play in tackling those problems, because there is a consensus that unless citizens are mobilized and engaged, then the solution to intractable social and economic problems will remain elusive. Communities and active citizens are seen as part of the solution, not a gathering of problematic and pathologically failing individuals or helpless victims in the grip of economic and historical forces beyond their control. Thus, re-energizing citizenship becomes an essential prerequisite for not only the advancement of democracy but also for making life in the 21st century both fairer for all and more livable for all, as it goes beyond the market and the state and asks people not just to assert their rights but to go further in taking on board wider personal and community responsibilities (Brannan, John and Stoker, 2007).

This makes the sustainable development of any society strictly linked to the increased participation of the citizens. In the words of Wilson (2007), the consolidation of the democratization process and governance needs concrete steps at the national level, including: (a) the creation of an institutional framework that: (i) assuring a wider participation in decision-making and implementing processes and facilitating the emergence of a strong viable and assertive civil society; (ii) promotion of an open dialogue with all groups, be they ethnic, religious or regional; (iii) intensification of the democratization process; and (iv) guaranteeing the rule of law, accountability and transparency of government; (b) allowing free and independent media and encouraging scrutiny by the free press of Government and/or public agencies and bodies; (c) ensures the establishment and functioning of an objective, independent, efficient and reliable judicial system; (d) instituting mechanisms for promoting peace, political stability and security; and (e) creating a developmental state through the establishment of an efficient, motivated and dedicated civil service and by maintaining a strong partnership between government and private sector.

However, despite all virtues mentioned above, public participation has also great and tremendous challenges, including the increased suspicion of officials in relation to conventional participation and its inability to deal with citizen anger and the typical constrain by government agencies in relation to the legal framework that in most cases revels itself outdated in face of the dynamics inherent to the process. To address these challenges, it is important that leaders and networks (civil society organizations, foundations, universities and colleges, private sector organizations, and media institutions) for participation are activated and empowered. Any effective participation is strongly dependent on the capacity of the leadership in relation to (1) the understanding of the potential goals that participants may bring to the process; (2) thinking through how participants' input and ideas will affect decisions, policies, and actions; and (3) offering meaningful ways for participants to remain connected to public institutions and to each other. This is because they want to inform the public on the situation, gather public input, feedback and preferences; want citizens to generate new ideas or new data; support volunteerism and citizen-driven problem solving; want to make a policy decision; and want to develop a plan or a budget for the wellbeing of the community.

This leadership development may also encourage more government-initiated problem solving. Actually, participation allows the co-creation or co-production of public goods and services, and it, too, is more likely to happen when citizens, public officials, and public employees come together to compare notes, generate ideas, and take action. This kind of cooperation is called "good participation" and is more successful when it: (1) provides people with information, (2) uses sound group process techniques, (3) gives people a chance to tell their stories, (4) presents a range of policy choices, (5) gives participants a sense of political legitimacy, (6) supports people to take action in a variety of ways, (7) makes participation enjoyable, and (8) makes participation convenient (Nabatchi and Leighninger, 2015).

The reality of rising citizen capacity is not, however, a comfortable fact for public leaders. Trapped in systems designed to protect their expertise from citizen interference, besieged by people who no longer believe their data or respect their authority, and faced with hostile constituents at public events, public officials, managers, and other leaders are understandably skeptical about the virtues, capabilities, and good sense of their fellow men and women. In turn, citizens are skeptical about the virtues, capabilities, and good sense of their public officials. Highly polarized policy debates, the inability of elected

leaders to agree on seemingly common-sense measures, and the massive influence of moneyed interests have helped produce the highest levels of citizen distrust in government that we have ever seen. Thus, in order to supplement or circumvent this official participation infrastructure, local leaders must engage in a host of existing processes, formats, and structures devised for engaging the public, including intensive face-to-face deliberations, convenient digital tools, and online networks that add dexterity to the power of face-to-face relationships.

Public participation also allows the canalization of action outside the policy arena by people who are not public employees and organizations that are not part of government, by creating settings in which people come up with ideas for new activities or initiatives, propose solutions, comment on and add to others' proposals, and rank ideas according to which they like best. It also helps citizens to find the resources and allies they need (partly by forming relationships with others) to implement their ideas, thus providing spaces where new leaders can emerge (Nabatchi and Leighninger, 2015).

2.4 Situating people-centered governance in the nation-state building debates

2.4.1 Role of citizens in the building of the nation-state

At root, says Bratton (2006:11), "democratic citizens are distinguished by a set of value orientations that underpin popular rule, including, inter alia, political tolerance and a desire for political equality and accountability and by their commitment to democracy as a preferred political regime". Unlike political values, which are imbibed in childhood and are slow to change, political attitudes may be learned in adulthood, often quickly and even fleetingly, on the basis of direct first hand experiences with different political regimes. Beyond the obligation to exercise their right to vote, citizens in a democracy are also expected, between elections, to engage with others in collective action and to take initiatives to contact their leaders (Krishna, 2008). This increased participation of the citizens in the political process is only possible if the state is shaped or willing to satisfy the interests of the people rather than those of the elites. Viewed from this perspective, the democratization will not just mean an elite motivated political change from repressive to democratic governance characterized by a transition program, the adoption of a new constitution, the formation of political parties and the holding of general elections for public offices, but a process characterized by extensive consultations and debates that take into consideration people's history, traditions, political beliefs and practices.

In fact, public participation has to do with active citizenship. It is about engaging people in decision-making processes, giving them a say in the planning and delivery of public services and involving them in their communities and in society in general in order to improve outcomes for the benefit of the society. Thus, whether the pursuit of democracy moves forward or not depends on how effective citizens are being empowered to participate as equal members in shaping their polity. Unfortunately, each triumph in advancing the cause of democracy risks complacency setting in. It is therefore periodically necessary to sound a rallying call for the renewal of citizens' power, in order to reinvigorate democracy by tackling power inequalities and enhancing citizens' collective efficacy in guiding public policies for their common good. And this has to be taken forward at the local, national, and global levels (Nabatchi and Leighninger, 2015).

This capture the spirit of the definition of democracy as the government of the people and by the people, meaning that nothing should be done for the people without the people. Not even a good thing. Hendriks (2010) meant exactly this when considered democracy –a contraction of demos and kratia– as a system essentially about the rule of the people, either by the people itself or through others that are elected, influenced, and controlled by the people, being the underlying idea the fact that people are the driving force and the touchstone of all that happens in the public domain. Democracy gives voice to "we the people" and provides a basis for "the people" thinking about the issues they decide through deliberation, mass participation, and political equality, as a means harmonize the society and prevent the "tyranny of the majority (Fishkin, 2009).

In a democratic society, citizens are and should be the center of any state action and treating them with civility and dignity equates to considering them as mature and responsible adults who know better about their needs and aspiration. This is also vital in relation to nation-state building because. As Birch (2007) puts up, the existence of channels for public participation in the political process is likely to increase the propensity for citizens to comply voluntarily with governmental rules and orders. That is, if people have had the opportunity to play some part in any issue linked to the management of their community, being it the selection of public officials and others, to communicating their views on public issues and to exert pressure on decision makers, they are more likely to accept governmental decisions as legitimate, even if disliked, than would be the case if they did not have such opportunities. Therefore, any healthy society is better constructed

when the role of all citizens in politics, economy and any other state's affairs, is highly acknowledged and respected.

2.4.2 Impact of citizens' participation in the building of nation-state

Public participation has the potential to reinforce and to consolidate the necessary cohesion in the society. It allows for the building, tightening and reinforcement of the indispensable sense of belonging among all its members in relation to the nation-state building. To some observers, participation creates a new direct link between the public and the decision makers in the bureaucracy, thus ensuring that those who make decisions that affect people's lives have a dialogue with that public before making those decisions (Creighton, 2005). In other words, participation increases their influence on the decisions that affect their lives and provides a means by which contentious issues can be resolved and allows decision makers to get relevant information about the relative importance the public assigns to the values choices that underlie a particular decision. It is not limited to government agencies, but includes other institutions of the private sector such as corporations whose ownership of vast resources means they too are making important decisions about how resources are allocated. Many of these organizations are now involving the public in decisions such as siting of facilities as the result of governmental regulation or enlightened self-interest.

Participation impacts all aspects of state's management, including rendering public officials accountable to the public during the course of a given effort and inspires more communication afterward. For example, in a statewide process called "Balancing Justice in Oklahoma," finding common ground helped the state legislature shift from an aggressive prison construction policy to becoming one of the leading states in community corrections. In the same way, after the "California Speaks" process on health care in that state, 40 percent of the 3,500 participants contacted a public official for further interaction (Nabatchi and Leighninger, 2015).

On a different note, when public officials act against the recommendations of citizens who have been mobilized to address a key issue, they often regret it, as it was the case when the city council of Eugene, Oregon, decided not to embrace the budget recommendations advanced through "Eugene Decisions," one of the first participatory budgeting processes in the United States, leading the citizens to rally against the decision. As a result, city council members had to change their minds and accepted the recommendations a week later. These examples show the extent to which civic

engagement increases citizens' civic skills, involvement, and interest in political issues, with corresponding impacts on policy. They also show how public consultation helped the finding of a balanced solution to a community legal problem and how people become more open and confident towards public official.

They are also reflective of a maturing democratic dispensation motivated not just by the need for the elite to keep or reach power, through regular elections, but by a genuine desire to edify a people centered nation-state, contrary to an elite centered "state-nation". Indeed, public participation can serve as a catalytic factor, generation the necessary mutual respect and consideration between both, the officials and the public, privileging communication and interaction in the search of sustainable solutions for the problems affecting public domain. The more striking and remarkable point in this interaction is the leading role of the state in the promotion of the participation of the nation/public in the management of public affairs.

2.5 Some existing research on nation-state building in Southern Africa and beyond

The discussion of this topic cannot be effective without a strong academic base reflecting most prominent existing studies on the field. The analysis of the relevant data on the organization and functioning of the nation-state in Africa will thus constitute an indispensable source, giving the study the necessary background for the achievement of proposed goals.

This being said, it is important to note that at independence, the great majority of African states appeared to possess all of the attributes of statehood. Their territories were, with few expectations, clearly demarcated, and there were few disputes about who was to count as a citizen of one state rather than another. However, within an often astonishingly short period after independence, the nationalist parties formed to mobilize popular support against the colonial regime, and at the same time to launch their leaders into positions of state power, declined from their previous position of apparently unchallengeable strength. In the process, the imposition of control from the top, rather than the mobilization of support from below, became the predominant relationship between African rules and those who were now their subjects (Christopher, 1996).

The reasons behind such a sudden change in the relation between the post-colonial rulers and the vast majority of the population may be found in the inability by the new elites to divorce completely from the discriminatory legacy inherited from colonialism, in what

concern inherited community social stratification. In the views of Chachage (1986), the "invention of tribes" became a popular theme in historiography in Africa in the 1970s, following studies which revealed that particular ethnic identities have come into existence in the relatively recent past as a colonial creation, and that these ethnic categories are constructs which have been changing over time given the nature of the state. Chachage adds that accounts by ethnologists, travelers and missionaries of the 19th century also proved that the description of a continent marked by permanent "tribal wars" and its whole population perpetually at each other's throats, was an imperial creation to justify the intervention and colonization of Africa, a constructed argument by the so-called "humanitarian movements", advocating for colonization as a mean to bring "civilization" to the continent, in line of what the imperial writer Kipling termed "white man's burden"- to "civilize" those "half-devil, half-child" peoples of Africa. Since then (more than 400 years), Africa history has been marked by the intervention of some "superior races" into other areas of the world, within the process in which "race", "civilization", "nation", "tribe", ethnicity" became the catchwords.

Thus, to fulfil their strategic goal of dividing Africans into superior and inferior groups, in order to facilitate the domination of the continent, colonial power did not spare any effort in using anthropologists, missionaries, administrators, diggers, planters, etc. in producing African racial and tribal theories and histories that suited the colonial enterprise, including the utilization of some elements among Africans that would collude with their imperialistic ambitions (Chachage, 1986). As a result, while the African masses were rebelling against colonialists, most of the educated Africans who emerged within the colonial forms of exploitation and oppression, as a product of manual/mental division of labor (as producers of ideas-real or illusory) in a racially discriminatory system, initially surrendered and adopted the colonizers' culture. This despite the fact that the assimilation was not all good to the supposed assimilated themselves. Indeed, while these elements had internalized and swallowed the stereotypes Europeans had put on them on their quest to become "civilized", the paradox is that Europeans regarded them even more disdainfully than the uneducated Africans, because of their tendency to regard themselves as equal to the masters after acquiring a sense of western civilization. Generally, most colonialists considered the so called "civilized" as "bad imitation of a European (Fanon 1967, in Chachage, 1986).

The consequences of this discriminatory action by colonizers remained present in most African countries after independence, because of the tendency by (former) nationalists to transform the state into a sphere of moral "universalism"; a representation of some specific interests in the name of general interests so-called "nation". In this regard, Fatton Jr. (1988:254-55) in Jackson, R. (2002) is of the view that "the patterns of exclusive politics, political centralization, and authoritarian forms of governance that are so evident in Africa, and which are so often at the root of internal conflicts, have similarly deep historical roots. Colonial authorities in Africa subjected the economy to strict control in order to restrict the flow of wealth to the population. This resulted in a newly established bourgeoisie or elite with a precarious material base, but eager to establish hegemony, through the system of private accumulation of capital and direct control of the state. This reality resulted in the transformation of politics into a material struggle". Havermans (1999b:228-9) in Jackson (2002) takes the violent conflict in Congo-Brazzaville that killed more than 10 000 people in 1997 as an example of the struggle between classes in the same country, in a war that was fueled in large part by the struggle for control over the country's rich oil resources by rival factions in the country's elite.

Following the same line of thought, Douma (2006) assumes that during the post-colonial period the Sub Saharan region has witnessed a substantial number of violent conflicts, mostly within states between contending ethno-political entities manipulated by rivalling political elite groups. The problems within these so-called fragile or failed states are closely related to a lack of a 'social contract' between incumbent elite groups and constituent ethnic communities which leads to political fragmentation, exacerbated by the interaction of diverse social, ethnic and resource exploitation-related issues. Inter-group violence in Sub Saharan Africa is, therefore, likely to be the outcome of a political process whereby some local groups take on other groups living in the same region, mostly as a proxy war, resulting from the uneven impact of state policies concerning resource exploitation and distribution. This calls for the need for the state in Sub Saharan Africa to reinvent itself through the adoption, by the incumbent state elite, of a long-term perspective based on solidarity.

This is because of the observation that the prevalence of exclusive politics, political centralization and authoritarianism in weak states is informed by the fact that in such a detrimental situation, the state is deprived of the relative autonomy needed to make reform possible, despotism unnecessary, and genuine democracy viable (Fatton Jr.,

1988:254-55 in Jackson, R. 2002). These modes of governance mask the incapacity of the ruling elite to transform its power into effective, political, economic, and cultural policies. From this perspective, exclusive politics — the one-party state, for example — is in fact, class action by the elite to establish and retain hegemony. Furthermore, the struggle for control of the state is Hobbesian and vicious and only reaches equilibrium when one contestant emerges the victor. In addition, centralization and exclusion has the advantage of depoliticizing society by reducing the effective political participation of the population, intimidating them with state power, and concentrating all power in the hegemonic fraction of the bourgeoisie. As with ethnic mobilization, these strategies also carry risks (Jackson, 2002), including in relation to the consolidation of the legitimacy of the state.

As Chachage (1986) puts up, democratic "transitions" in Africa have not taken into account issues of social justice and are increasingly accompanied by further weakening of the civil society's organizational capacities. Chachage is also of the view that clearly, the change taking place in Africa is just in terms of movement from the authoritarianism of one state party to that of many state parties, with the existing and emerging parties, without exception, confined themselves to the realm of fighting to remain or to enter the state houses (read the treasury). As far as popular politics are concerned, the broad masses are only mobilized for voting or support of policies. These parties have even put a wedge between politics and economics by insisting that the only site of politics is the parliament. That is to say, by failing to organize or facilitate the emergence and consolidation of independent labor, peasant, women, youths and peoples' movements, from which they tend to distance more and more, clearly, multiparty politics still remains captured, monopolized or even imprisoned in the state-controlled (elite) conceptions of politics.

Unfortunately, this reality is more than evident in most post-colonial African states that continue to witness their social development postponed as a result of permanent social and group confrontation due to the continued discriminatory posture assumed by the new authorities. Countering the general view by those Africans scholars and political leaders who tirelessly cast the blame of the setbacks experienced by the continent in terms of nation-state building and social development to the foreign interference in Africans issues, Meyns and Musamba (2010) wisely pointed out that "the bulk of the sub-Saharan African countries were seen to lack sufficient focus on development necessary to establish a developmental state" and that "in these countries, rather than representing a solution to

development challenges, the post-colonial sate came to be seen as the problem hindering development as it came to the control of patronage-orientated political rules". This situation, they assume, resulted in the introduction of various epithets such as 'the predatory state', 'the weak state', 'the new patrimonial state', to name just a few, to characterize the lack of development leadership in many African countries.

Several reason have been appointed as reasons for such a sad reality, characterized by the insistence by post-colonial leaders to keep repressive structures similar to those left by former colonial powers. Therefore, it is commonly evoked that neither independence nor the democratization process were capable to bring about a significant change in the repressive structure left by the colonial power. In the view of Chachage (1986) those oppressive structures remained intact except for the color of the oppressor that shifted from white to black. There remains a link between men of the continent and the money men of the colonies. No narrative has shattered them. Chachage goes further when assumes that, in essence, the forms of democracy that have been introduced in Africa in the 1990s have sowed more seeds of discord, rather than dealing with the crisis facing the continent, as a result of the politic of exclusion and inclusion, privileges and denials attached to them. The winning and losing of votes is based on mobilization, which includes mobilization of even forms of identities, imagined or real. The simple game is, whoever is in power will definitely exclude the community that voted against them. In this context, the issues of "Who originates from where among those in power" or "which party represents which people", become the real stuff. In other words, like in the past, the issue becomes that of which interest group is in a position to influence legislation, resulting in the reinforcement of discriminatory tendencies.

Therefore, it is more than time for Africa to assume a realistic approach and start acting towards the validation of the belief that "African problems should be addressed with African solution", with concrete actions. And the identification of the state of the nation-state in Africa and the reason and the characteristics thereof is essential. This would help to understand the complex situation in which the continent was plunged not only as a result of the continued interference of former colonial power but also of the approach followed by the new African authorities in pursuing almost the same social stratification feature of their people inherited from the colonial rule.

In this regard, Dauvergne (1998, in Jackson, 2002) draws a distinctive line to characterize the African nation-state. From his perspective, "it is possible to distinguish between

strong and weak states using a matrix of social, political, and economic factors" and that while "strong states involve the willingness and ability of a state to maintain social control, ensure societal compliance with official laws, act decisively, make effective policies, preserve stability and cohesion, encourage societal participation in state institutions, provide basic services, manage and control the national economy, and retain legitimacy, weak states are marked, first of all, by unconsolidated or non-existent democracies. As a result, weak states face a serious problems of legitimacy expressed through very low political participation rates, a reliance on coercion to ensure compliance, unstable politics (for example, governmental crises, coups, plots, riots, rebellions), severe social cleavages (ethnic, religious, or class), and the centralization of power in a ruling elite, usually focused on a single leader or political party. They also lack cohesive national identities often expressed in sub-national terms and "exit" from the state — psychologically, socially, economically, and/or politically. In essence, the "hegemonic idea" of statehood is missing or only weakly present.

Byman and Van Evera (1998:37, in Jackson, 2002) offer additional inputs on the nature of weak states. To them, weak states are defined by varying levels of institutional incapacity and a frequent inability by governments to implement their policies. They are also marked by under-resourced, underdeveloped and inefficient state institutions, generally in a terminal spiral of collapse and facing enormous difficulties in mobilizing the population or regulating civil society. In these countries, Byman and Van Evera continue, "even relatively straightforward governmental tasks such as tax collection or maintaining minimal levels of law and order can prove difficult. Weak states typically exhibit all the symptoms of economic underdevelopment- dualistic and poorly integrated mono-economies, heavy debt burdens, low or negative growth rates, high inflation and unemployment, low levels of investment and massive social inequalities. In addition, weak states are characterized by an external vulnerability to international actors and forces, which is the direct result of their internal fragility."

Hameso (2002) offered, in this regard, a very comprehensive picture of historical, political and ideological factors leading to the prevailing situation in most African countries. For him, "the state and the political systems in Africa remained much in the making of the colonial order, swimming in the sea of conquest politics. Post-independence leaders took over the political kingdom in its enticing form and, well versed with repressive and oppressive past, they embraced the single party system as an essential

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mode of rule. Political plurality and ethnic diversity were decried as bottlenecks for the project of "nation-building" and national unity. Arrested, in the process, was the growth of vibrant social, political and economic institutions. Traversing across a range of crises, states have nearly lost the legitimacy so necessary for sensible governance. The transfer of power turned out to be a matter of rebellion and it took military coups d'état or more lately the growing ranks of rebellion armies. In effect, the political foundation of the post-colonial states became military autocracy, personal rule or the combination of both."

The motives behind single party system and the reasons for political regimes to pursue such a route in the view of Hameso, was historical, political and ideological. The familiar historical legacy that preceded independence was the rule of minority over majority, and that was not democracy. Colonial rule undermined local and indigenous values and institutions without creating a stable replacement. Politically, amid cultural, linguistic and religious diversity, the sustenance of power and territorial unity took priority, which seemed to require unitarist, single party state. Ideologically, the development model from China and the then Soviet Union offered ideological justification to maintain authoritarian one-party states. For this purpose, the immediate past was easily replayed as political authoritarianism complemented economic authoritarianism, and both backed by the post-independence development ideology.

As it was said previously, the post-colonial period has then been characterized by a substantial number of violent conflicts in Africa, mostly within states between contending ethno-political entities manipulated by rivalling political elite groups, irrespective of the ideological facade of a given regime. This is because in most cases, post-colonial Africa adopted co-optation and repressive systems with the political leaders holding on to power, time and again, by mobilizing client groups through the distribution of goods and services in order to defend their interests in the face of resistance from contending elite groups or against incursions of outsiders (Douma, 2006). The result of this could not be other than the evident collapse of the already fragile social structure of most African states, rendering them highly dependents from foreign or humanitarian aid to meet their basic needs of food, health and education due to the scarcity of resources. The continent was plunged in various types of conflicts many of which leading to wars and genocides.

Bad choices by post-colonial African leaders, in the words of Mills (2010:4-5), are reflected in the 1994 Rwandan genocide where claiming the life of nearly one million people, slaughtered by their compatriots on accounts of their ethnic origins over a period

of 100 days; Robert Mugabe's wanton destruction of Zimbabwe's economy in the name of land redistribution, if not with the aim of retaining political control; Thabo Mbeki's refusal to acknowledge the link between HIV and AIDS, resulting in an estimated 365.000 deaths; the 2005 famine in Niger; the war in Darfur claiming around 300.000 lives; and the fighting in Somalia, Guinea, Angola, Congo and elsewhere in the continent. We should not be naïve or idealistic about this – reality of post-colonial Africa (Young, 2010), if we want to avoid such type of barbarity to happen again in any part of Africa.

Having reached at this stage and having understood that most of current African problems reside in the incapacity by Africans to promote their political, economic and social emancipation free from the discriminatory approach inherited from colonialism, we are then forced to agree with those who advocate for the need of the reinvention of Africa. An inclusive reinvention incorporating all political, social, communitarian and others nation-state actors, towards the elimination of the asymmetries created by the attempt to build an administrative nation based on the same assimilationist policies adopted by former colonial powers and an ideological state highly imbedded in the believes of the ruling elites. However, for that to be possible, it is imperative that Africans leaders consider and critically analyze the claims of the opposition and or minority groups in their respective countries, as a way of fulfilling their republican duties necessary to assure national cohesion around the promotion of the best "National Interest". The adoption of democratic principles of the government, including regular election and the respect of the rule of law, individual freedom and liberties (Dahl 1989) combined with the observance of core principles elements of the developmental state building (Meyns and Musamba, 2010) is paramount. The belief that the organization of regular election as the only rational to validate the sovereignty of the ruling elites in Africa, should be relegated to the past. Africans should also understand that the continent will never develop until the image of the political idol is replaced by that of a political questionable and answerable leader.

The above assumptions are well captured by Bujra (2002) in his framework proposing possible solutions to the prevailing status of affairs in Africa, a continent mostly characterized by heterogeneous societies, requiring the revival of a genuine sense of nationalism capable to bring all citizens under a common national identity, without any sort of pressure or coercion. This includes the return to soon abandoned spirit of national identity and sovereignty which illuminated African nationalist leadership in their quest and or fight for an independent Africa. This requires the adoption of concrete and bold

political and economic steps embedded in the principles of freedom and liberty for all in the society, in order to assure affirmation, stability and development in the field of Nation-building.

Central to the concept of Nation Building as proposed by Bujra is the acknowledgement of cultural diversity within a framework of national unity, even though the details of these policies will vary from one sub region and country to another. Given the observation that a homogenous culture by itself is not sufficient to keep a country united and prevent serious conflict as the examples of Somalia, Burundi and Rwanda clearly show, we were invited to consider that in situations where efforts to develop consciousness of national unity are not taken into consideration seriously, serious divisive tendencies have led to conflicts, to disintegration of countries or to catastrophic civil wars. In Somalia the state collapsed, while in Burundi and Rwanda strong cultural homogeneity and strong centralized states were not able to avoid catastrophic civil wars. Tanzania and Uganda are good contrasting examples of what are the implications of having or not having national unity.

Bujura's framework also suggests of the need for Africa develop a political system allowing free and fair competition for power and which guarantee the possibility of alternate groups achieving power within a reasonable period of time. A system allowing large numbers of people and groups to be involved in the selection/election of decision-makers at different levels of the power structure embedded in several critical important principles such as: (a) extensive decentralization of power; (b) strict denial of accumulation of wealth through the use of state institutions; (c) full implementation the principles of good and democratic governance, i.e., transparency, accountability, independent judiciary and complete civilian control of the military; (d) and extensive involvement of indigenous independent civil society groups in national and local affairs, especially in the monitoring of policy implementation and service delivery. As for the Economic development, it considers a free market economy as an important tool in the economic development of a country, but suggests that the economy should not be allowed to generate serious poverty and that policies and affirmative action programs must be developed to minimize and reduce poverty, because poverty is an important cause of conflict". To this end, it is important to assure that economic resources and development funds are evenly distributed between the regions and groups in the country, as clear and

serious uneven distribution of economic resources between regions and ethnic groups is known to have led to conflict, sometime to serious secessionist rebellion.

The discussion of all historical and contemporary issues affecting the affirmation and development of the national African nation-state (Chachage, 1986) in search of possible solutions to existing grievances resulting from the ethnic, historic, religious and territorial conflicts and wars, and political and social exclusion and discrimination in most African societies is paramount, It has the potential to help regulating and harmonizing the relation between the state and the nation in their permanent interaction. In this regard, and giving credit Freeman (2010)'s reason of state, it suffices to say that the observation of the above principles not only creates a solid foundation for the desired reconciliation of Africa with itself, but also as serves as a promotor of the desired political, social and economic progress and development in the process of building the African nation-sate once dreamt of by all Africans.

2.6. Conclusion

This chapter 2 reviewed the conventional and unconventional approaches to nation-state building from existing relevant literature in order to unpack limitations of state-centered approach to nation-state building processes. This implies, the chapter examined how people-centered approaches to nation-state building had gained more appeals as an alternative approach to include ordinary citizens in nation-state building processes. It did so by reviewing the involvement of majority of citizens in the nation-building processes from different schools of thought in contemporary politics. The chapter discussed both state-centered and people-centered approaches to nation-state building respectively. It situated people-centered governance in the nation-state building debates, as well as contextualization of nation-state building from Southern African experience and beyond. Unlike previous studies, which have tended to focus on state-centered nation-state building processes, this chapter argued that attempts had been made by democratic governance scholars to understand how participation of ordinary citizens in the processes of building of nation-state was of paramount importance for an inclusive nation-state building that allows ordinary citizens to be not only important, but also independent, active agents in the development of their nation-state. It has been found that statist approaches are driven by aspirations of states and their allies viewed as sole actors in nation-state building. The exclusion and discrimination of ordinary citizens have triggered popular discontent and subsequently loss of popular legitimacy useful for

nation-state reconciliation. The Continuum of participation according to the International Association for Public Participation associated with the dimensions, sub-dimensions, indicators of participation as per democratic qualities according to Morlino and Carli were paramount important to conceptualize the notion of public participation in nation-state building processes. The chapter proposed moving beyond the top-down paradigms dominating the research field of nation-state building and, above all, understanding the importance of ordinary citizens as key builders, with same rights as states, in the processes of nation-state building. The following chapter 3 focuses on theoretical perspective of the study.

3. Chapter 3: Rethinking Nation-state building: lessons from the theory of change

3.1 Linking state to its nation through a people-centered governance

This section focuses on nation-state nexus as one of the guiding principles of people-centered governance aimed at linking government elites to ordinary citizens for a cohesive society. This encompasses presenting how state and nation can mutually interface as per different pattern of political regimes shaping the relationship. Yet, literature demonstrate that there is an existing interplay at the same time between national identity and political autonomy, and between national integration and political sovereignty (Rajai and Enloe, 1969). Historically, the newly independent states from both Asian and African continents were criticized by scholars to primarily be focused on the crystallization of political structures before consolidating national self-consciousness. Contrarily, national self-consciousness was reportedly to precede the crystallization of political structures in both continents, Northern America and Europe (Rajai and Enloe, 1969). Therefore, a frank collaboration between the nation and the state remains of paramount importance for involvement of active ordinary citizens in political decisions to shift from state-nation to nation-state. In that regard, the understanding of a necessity to link the nation to the state depends on the mastering of the notion of state and nation respectively from different schools of thought.

3.1.1 Some theoretical considerations on state-building

To begin with, the nation-state building depends on various factors and actors including among them the state, as one of the stakeholders alongside with the nation. Secondly, it is important for us to understand first what state entails before disserting about its

construction as far as the nation-state building process is concerned. This thesis does not delve too much on a thorough theoretical debate around state and its construction as many scholars and literature have extensively expanded on that already. However, the idea here is to succinctly understand how the notion of state evolve and which factors are involved in its construction in order to nexus with other actors like nation.

The article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933 stipulates that "the state is a person of international law that should possess the following qualifications: i) a permanent population; ii) a defined territory; iii) government; and iv) capacity to enter into relations with the other states" (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, Smith 1991, Grotenhuis, 2016: 2). The state is objective as it concerns citizens, territory and at the same time institutions. This entails, the state should be a factor of a national identification for citizens within a land governed by responsible political elites capacitated to conduct international relations. Building on the classic exposition of Aristotle, Miller (1988) and Hansen (2013) underline that the state is the highest structure that has the power to provide the general citizenry with the idea of the well-being. The failure or the success of any state, therefore, is a determinant to the political and social happiness of any citizen in any polity.

As for Schmitt (1985:19), "the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political". This entails, according to Schmitt, that the state is the foundation of all political activities, and without a sound state, politics suffer decay and so does the economy and society. The state fulfils certain functions that help to materialize a sense of belonging that is fundamental to nationhood, that is, it provides security, justice and social services (Grotenhuis, 2016). Moreover, in order to build a cohesive society, state is meant to play, not exhaustive, five basic functions. These include creating space for public participation in political decision making so that the polity becomes inclusive and open for ordinary citizens; providing security for people against outside and inside aggressors and criminals; providing justice so that people are treated as equals, fairly and without discrimination; providing basic social services that enable people to live their lives in dignity; creating an infrastructure to facilitate economic life and making rules to let economic life be fair (Grotenhuis, 2016). Without overlooking other functions, the first function on participation for an inclusive and open polity resonates with the aim of this thesis on people-centered governance.

However, most states especially in post-independent countries in Africa and Asia were

criticized for excluding ordinary citizens from political decision during the reconstruction processes. These countries were reportedly concerned by the crystallization of their political structures with aim to consolidate their state sovereignty, to the detriment of people sovereignty which gives the state legitimacy. Apart from the above mentioned functions, the strength of a state is identified by its three core competences namely; authority, legitimacy and capacity (Carment, Samy and Prest 2008). The presence of these three competences engender effectiveness, validity and integrity as consequences. Otherwise, it falls under the category of fragile states (Yoo, 2011). This implies, a country that has no control over its territory most often also lacks sufficient legitimacy because part of the country does not recognize the state as their representative. Similarly, states that have insufficient institutional capacity will have a hard time exerting authority over their territory.

Equally speaking, states that have no capacity will lose their legitimacy because they are unable to provide security, justice and basic social services (Carment, Samy and Prest, 2008). Indeed, state failure occurs in respect to a wide range of political goods of which the most important ones are the provision of security, a legal system to adjudicate disputes, provision of economic and communication infrastructures, the supply of some form of welfare policies, and increasing opportunities for participation in the political process (Rotberg, 2003). Therefore, it is important to acknowledge the importance of a consequent state-building process, in order to address the above shortcomings triggered by incompetence. Hence the need for any state building processes to take into account the above indicated competences and their attached consequences in order to avoid any recurring state failure status.

State-building entails the establishment, re-establishment, and strengthening of a public structure in a given territory capable of delivering public goods, hence the need for the acknowledgement of the pivotal role played by nationalism in the state building. Its implications are pertinent in political stabilization and economic modernization, as well as in reshaping the patterns of political control and consolidation (Grotenhuis, 2016). Building on Weber's insights, Fukuyama (1984) underscores that state-building is sanctioned by the creation of sovereign capacities of which the fundamental one is the successful and generally undisputed claim to a "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force". Planck (2005) contends that the objective of state-building is about the establishment of a state as a concentration and expression of collective power without any use of coercive practices. However, Beetham (1991) asserts that the exercise of coercion can only be conducted if the source of power and rules of governing emanate from general

citizenry as source of legitimacy. In other words, the foremost source of legitimacy in societies today is 'the people', a concept which in substance calls for a balance between both the differentiation between the governing and the governed, and a bond uniting the governing and the governed at the same time. The idea of the nation comprises all these elements and is thus often central to legitimizing state-building processes (Planck, 2005).

In line with Tilly's thoughts, state-construction began as the results of a process of rivalling factions vying for power through violence, when one of the parties manages to establish its authority and power in the disputed territory. After that, the process of organizing a state, building its institutions, and acquiring legitimacy begins (Tilly, 1985). Additionally, disharmony between communities, inability to control borders and the entirety of the territory, a growth of criminal violence, corrupt institutions, and a decaying infrastructure, have all been viewed as hindrances to effective state-building. Harmony between communities within a national territory become one of the beacons of state-building processes. Against this backdrop, nation building, and state building have, sometimes, been used interchangeably. However, state building generally refers to the construction of state institutions for a functioning state, while nation building refers to the construction of a national identity which is also pivotal for a functioning state (Alesina and Reich, 2013). In this regard, Nzongola-Ntalaja (2006) notes that democratization, poverty, underdevelopment, incomplete decolonization, elite politics, imported ideas of the state and the trappings of traditionalism have put in peril the project of state-building in Africa. As a result, says Ekeh (2018:23), "the (African) state is the expression of the enduring legacy of colonialism that remains intact and problematic after juridical decolonization".

However, the allied occupation and reconstruction efforts in Western Germany and Japan following World War II, but also the process in Cambodia or post-communist Poland are consummative examples of successful state-building based on the underlying and stabilizing sense of national identity (Glenny, 1990, Planck, 2005). With reference to the above, nation-building is a central element of a successful state-building processes. However, when state-building infers democratization, there is further speculation known as the democratic peace theory. Initially elucidated by Kant (1991) in the seventeenth century, the democratic peace theory says that interminable peace can be accomplished by building up an alliance or class of free republican countries. Representative democracies, composed in a global association, would bring peace. Political researchers who have investigated this theory have concentrated on one of two variants: democracies

don't wedge war against one another or don't start the war by any stretch of the imagination. There is unquestionably proof of the previous, and some proof of the last mentioned.

The opposite side of the coin is that nation-building may occasionally be essentially another name for external intercession and the expansion of domains. If failed states are the reason for national, territorial, or world security issues, or that human rights abuses are broad to the point that the need to overcome them thus defeats the conventional privileges of states under global law, at that point mediation for the sake of nation-building can be believed to be supported. In some cases, nation-building may basically be utilized as a legitimization for the development of imperial control. So, nation-building matters, and what is implied by nation-building matters considerably more.

3.1.2 Unpacking the notion of nation-building from a different school of thoughts

To begin with, equated to "*natio*" from the Latin language, the concept nation entails a social grouping based on real or fancied community of birth or race. Used since the 17th and 18th centuries, the concept was expanded to include such other variables as territory, culture, language, and history (Rajai and Enloe, 1969)**.** However, it is arguably difficult to find a nation that is epitomized by all above indicators. In this context, a nation is viewed as a relatively large group of people who feel that they belong together by virtue of sharing one or more such traits as common language, religion or race, common history or tradition, common set of customs, and common destiny.

The term nation-building is frequently applied concurrently with state-building, democratization, modernization, political advancement, post-conflict reconstruction, and peacebuilding (Stephenson, 2005). However, each of these concepts and terms is unique, however their evolution is entwined. The idea of nation-building came to be applied particularly among American political specialists 10 years or so after World War II, to portray the more significant mix of state and society, as citizenship brought loyalty to the front-line state with it. Sherrod and Lauckhardt (2009) concentrates on the development of citizenship and of rights to political interest. But, Karl (2015) focuses on the role of social communication and national coordination in-country working in Western societies. Almond and Coleman (2015) contend for the functional approach to deal with understanding and looking at the political frameworks of developing nations.

These authors contend for the reliance and multi-functionality of political structures and reasoned particularly that the information and input elements of political frameworks could recognize phases of political development and improvement. They characterize info works as political socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, and political communication. Output functions were rulemaking, rule application, and rule adjudication. Most nation-building after the end of the Cold War seem to focus more on the output functions. According to Stephenson (2005), Pye connected modernization to Westernization and "the dispersion of world culture," what we may today call globalization (Pye, 1966). He distinguished political improvement with: "a world culture dependent on trendsetting technology innovation and the soul of science, on a sound perspective on life, a mainstreamed way to deal with social relations and an inclination for equity in public matters on the acceptance in the political domain that the prime unit of the institution ought to be the nation-state. Building on Pye's readings, Stephenson (2005) coins that Pye identified multiple meanings of political development, among them:

- as a prerequisite to economic development,
- as politics typical of industrial societies,
- as political modernization,
- as administrative and legal development,
- as mass mobilization and participation,
- as the building of democracy, and
- as stability and orderly change.

Almond and Verba (1963) present the idea of "The Civic Culture "to the development of literature which connects custom and innovation as one of the processes that support majority rule government. They characterize it as a component of this civic culture that draws commitment to the sense of civic competence and cooperation. Additionally, they have noticed the significance of the role of training in the advancement of civic culture. In the same way, while Alex de Tocqueville (2016) notices the significance of relationship in continuing Democracy in America at its most late stages, Putnam (1993) in investigating the common conventions in present-day Italy that make majority rule government work, incorporates into his idea of the civic network: community commitment, political balance, and solidarity, trust, and resistance, notwithstanding

associations. He finds the presence of choral social orders in Italy, bowling alliances in the US, and different relationship, to be significant.

The significance of civil society additionally turned out to be clear as a factor in the development from tyranny toward majority rule government in the previous Soviet Union and Eastern Europe towards the end of the Cold War (Putnam, 1993). The role of civil society got much assistance in early nation-building/democratization endeavors in the previous Soviet Union and Eastern Europe but has declined from that point since. This thought of the significance of common society as support to democratic nation-building is by all accounts given lip-service in current endeavors, but in certainty it is not viewed as remarkable by nation-builders if one measures this by any expenditure measure.

In the views of Almond and Coleman (2015), the success of the nation-building depends on how it takes a gander at a portion of its early theorists. The significance of vote-based qualities, of the civic culture and common society that create and sustain them. The significance of expanding social, political, and financial correspondence, and of human improvement, instead of simply monetary advancement or state-building, are key in any effective process for long-term democratic nation-building. Nation-building is something beyond state-building. To be a feasible influence for peacebuilding, it must fuse something other than the Western appendages of democracy. Casting a ballot (Voting systems) and free-market development and expanding the GNP per capita is not liable to bring stable peace.

As indicated in chapter 1, nation-building refers to the bringing together of peoples of different political and cultural identities into the citizenship of one nation. While, state building is the construction of working institutions that minister to the executive, judiciary and legislative running of the country (Chipkin, 2007). There is also a compelling argument that those who seek to understand state construction come with preconceived ideas and do not have the patience to seek the historical and root causes of conflicts and wars (Attree, 2012). Added to that, other scholars and writers register the challenge of corruption, (Lachman, 2017), as causality to institutional decay and dysfunction. Consequently, humanitarian aid, donations and developmental assistance, for example, do not reach its intended beneficiaries, the ordinary people, because of corruption amongst the elite in the political and business leadership of the country (Larmondin, 2008).

Nation-building is a normative concept that can have divergent meanings in different

contexts. It is principally understood as the process of creating a collective identity or a national community through the political integration of members within a given territory. 'It is an indigenous process that often draws on existing traditions, institutions, and customs, redefining them as national characteristics in order to support the nation's claim to sovereignty and uniqueness' (Von Bogdandy et al., 2005: 586). In essence, nation building strategies attempt to create an overarching supra-national identity that could replace and/or incorporate sub-national identities and cultures (Bauman 1998). For a clearer understanding of nation building, it is important to unpack what a 'nation' is and also to differentiate nation building with the concept of the 'nation-state' for which it is often conflated. Early conceptions of a 'nation' defined it as a group or race of people who shared history, traditions, and culture, sometimes religion, and usually language.

Thus, countries usually comprise several nations as it is the case of the United Kingdom which comprises four nations, England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales (Stephenson 2005). Many African countries also comprise multiple nations. However, some scholars distinguish between an ethnic nation, based on the social construction of race or ethnicity and a civic/democratic nation based on common identity and loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions (Stephenson, 2005). Schnapper (1997) notes that a civic nation integrates people into a community of citizens regardless of their ethnic identity. Schnapper (1997: 229) adds that, "through the notion of citizenship, a civic nation transcends all particularities such as biological, historical, economic, social, religious, or cultural differences. Every citizen has the same rights and the same duties, and is subjected to the same laws regardless of their race, gender, religion, socioeconomic status or ethnic identity". Some countries suppress the ethnic identities and elevate the notion of a civic nation, meaning that nation building can also be about building a common identity centered on certain civic political features.

Therefore, when a group of people or a nation becomes a defined political entity, it is regarded as a nation-state. A nation-state can exist after a clear understanding of the nation by a group of people or even in circumstances where there is no conception of a nation. For instance, Rejai and Enloe (1969: 140) observe that "in many western countries, the sense of national identity by nations evolved prior to the crystallization of the structures of political authority of the nation-state whereas in newly independent countries, authority and sovereignty of the nation-state run ahead of a self-conscious national identity and cultural integration". Therefore, in Africa and other parts of the world, nation-states were

imposed from above and created through colonization without consideration for the diverse identities and the need for cultural integration such that it was common to have borders separating a cohesive group of people. A more proactive process of creating a national identity through nation building within the boundaries of a nation-states created by colonization was therefore necessary in these countries to create and strengthen the newly independent political entities.

There are various theories of nation-building and state-building that clarify how a state and country ought to be constructed and developed. The vast majority of the premises take their place from Western models that is regularly inappropriate for African nations (Leiva-Roesch, Mahmoud and Nation, 2014). The concept of nation-building emerged in nineteenth-century from patriotism in Italy and Germany and proceeded by external actors in post-WWII (Leiva-Roesch, Mahmoud and Nation, 2014) in Germany and Japan. However, it is hard and irrelevant to use these countries as viable examples of state bounding as they are built on a strong and solid social and ethnic bond while concentrated more on building democratic institutions. The conditions for state-building, including homogeneity of the population, were significantly more positive in those countries than they are in Africa (Call and Cook, 2003). Due to this reality, most models could be lacking to clarify the unpredictability of the circumstance for example in Sudan, and Somalia (Caplan, 2005). In this way, this study is particular in the choice of relevant theories that envelops additionally significance of component of the country, national identity and its decency together with state-building.

From one perspective, nation-building is a process of socio-political development. It is the most common form of a collective identity formation with a view to legitimizing public power within a given territory. The nation-building, in a perfect world, unites and brings loosely linked communities getting to be one society. According to Planck (2005), a successful nation-building process produces a cultural projection of the nation containing a certain set of assumptions, values and beliefs which can function as the legitimizing foundation of a state structure. The process can set off apolitical, conservative, social or different reason for peace and development. Therefore, such is a process that can include various measurements, emphatically (prudent coordination) just as adversely (restraints like ethnic purifying) to be certain that nation-building actually is effective (Chandler, 2006). Then again, it is a political goal as well as a system where internal or external players attempt to make a framework that is established under a

country state. At that point, the term country building has a somewhat automatic or conceptional character and cannot be utilized for examining the political and social process. Therefore, this goal or system is principally utilized in a development strategy so as to serve nation-building (Chandler, 2006).

In addition, there are three center components, notably: integrative belief system, integration of society and development of a useful and functioning state (Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur, 2005). For there to be a successful nation-building, this outcomes in a triangle should reflect state-building, social coordination and ideological authenticity at its corners, of which all corners should be satisfied (Hippler, 2014). A few aspects of the components can be presented from outside, while others must be worked from inside, for example, ideological authenticity. These different theoretical aspects are discussed below:

(i)   Integrative ideology

There is a need to come from an integrative philosophy or ideology so as to develop a national inclination and give the people, through this, a national character. Hence, a shared view for every single distinctive group in an emerging country should be found. This could be, for instance, religion, language or history. Clearly, the more in like manner, the greater is the opportunity to develop one society. It is imperative to express, that, for this situation, ideology ought to be comprehended in nonpartisan terms as "frameworks of idea and essential methods of reasoning that clarify the past, present and future as indicated by certain value models" (Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur, 2005).

When the national character or identity is closely viewed, one discovers a few definitions. Two of them are associated theoretically. One portrays present-day approach basically and significantly that this belief system contains thoughts relevant to everybody and thought of national union must be more grounded than the possibility of separation (Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur, 2005). Connecting belief system or ideology with national identity requires to acknowledge that various individuals have their own individual characters. "For whatever length of time that the essential character and dedication lies with the clan, family or an ethnic or ethnoreligious group and the national identity level remains subordinate or missing, a nation-state will keep on being precarious" (Dobbins, 2007:11). There is a need to come from an integrative philosophy or ideology so as to develop a national inclination and give the people, through this, a

national character. Hence, a shared view for every single distinctive group in an emerging country should be considered as paramount (Dobbins, 2007).

There are various criteria that government needs adapt to meet the demands of nation-building. Most importantly, government needs to look at what has been done previously, to have the option so as people certainly would believe better future. For instance, if the fallen system left individuals hurt and loaded with doubt in the government, this reality must be taken into contemplations when building a country. In this way "trust in state foundations decimated"(Fukuyama, 2004:7) ought to be visualization for better future. Another compelling component is population really must be eager to collaborate, to be propelled in "making, supporting and molding the country"(Fukuyama, 2004:7). Finally, the idea of state needs to satisfy various criteria in the impression of the individuals.

According to Holsti (2004), nation-building should occupy a central position in people's everyday political and social lives, association with other issues on the agenda, connecting with the experiences of the target groups, narrative familiarity and flexibility and openness to change. Through ingenious strategies and respect for the differences among social groups in the nation, the government can effectively grow a strong national identity and nation-building process.

(ii)   Integration of society

Integration and coordination of society in the country is significant component of nation-building. In post-colonial states, it is generally comprehended through majority rule system and 'third wave of democratization'. The nation-building was joined by exclusive values from the West and in many post-pioneer nations diverse ethnic groups are increasing significantly in the changing institutional framework (Holsti, 2004).

By and large, we characterize three models of national unity that will assist us with understanding how in 'partitioned social orders' nation-building can happen. Those are Imperium, Culturally homogenous country of present-day age and Pluricultural integration. In the Imperium, there is a set chain of command, while religion is ruled by the ruling elite. There is no vital need for unified culture and correspondence. Integration is accomplished through contrast (Kofmehl, 2007). Looking at socially homogenous country, we can see examples of secularization – keeping society and religion separated from the state. Culture of the dominant elite is once more encouraged. Nation-building actions are supported, directed or regulated by standards (Rotberg, 2004). In the last

model, the pluricultural blend, minorities are persecuted and separated and need to battle for acknowledgement of their privileges. This is, for the most part, a case in "multi-ethnic and multi-lingual social orders" that are "assessing social and religious assorted diversity" (Rotberg, 2004:11).

The advancement of democracy in developing countries is testing in part due to great constrains posed by various ethnic leaders to the processes of nation-building in some countries. However, the reality shows that there are significant endeavors for structural innovation of democratic government (Stromseth, Wippman and Brooks, 2006). That implies that there is greater accentuation on the ethnicity and ethnic equity and in this manner, these thoughts "neutralize centralist/assimilatory predispositions"(Stromseth, Wippman and Brooks, 2006). There are four democratic innovations for states in inner conflict – concordance, local representation, federalism and cultural autonomy.

Concordance is a model that "enables representatives of exceedingly significant group to take part in the political decision-making process (Von Einsiedel, 2005), offering variety of institutional structures. The preferred position of this structure is creation of alliances, where various groups need to participate to arrive at their objectives. This model is useful when there is no strong majority to rule and because otherwise, there is no requirement for the alliance. Local representation represents most wide-ranging representation of minorities (Von Einsiedel, 2005). It is additionally critical in the manner that minorities are generally spoken to by their very own agents. The races, ethnic groupings are discovering alliances and approaches to coordinate and to uphold their interests. However, this model can develop ethnic contrasts and strategies may be unequivocally influenced by individual ethnic interests rather than the ones of the entire society (Yannis, 2002).

On the other hand, Federalism offers various groups equivalent power yet additionally indistinguishable guidelines to be pursued. Groups manage their issues exclusively, which makes framework increasingly adaptable, decentralized and minorities progressively secure. On the opposite side, there is a peril of divisions where demands for more prominent independence can be perpetually rising (Zacher, 2001). The last model, cultural autonomy and self-sufficiency, is engaged to save and reinforce the identity of minorities (van Tongeren, 2005). There is accentuation on local languages and religions that are additionally viewed as official dialects. That gives minorities capacity to deal with their undertakings independently, yet on the opposite side, to extend the

contrasts between the groups (probably won't be an issue – manages minority language, lawful pluralism).

Therefore, although state-building is a part of nation-building, it is important to distinguish between both: While state-building is focused only on building state institutions etc. – a functional state apparatus – nation-building is in many states a pre-requirement needed to be fulfilled before (Richmond and Roger 2014). Especially in European countries, where a national identity already exists, only the state needs to be built around it. We can also observe this phenomenon, when we look upon the history of the modern (and in this case European) nation-state, where first a nation existed from which then a nation-state emerged.

Given that a state is primarily viewed as a political-legal concept and nation as a psycho-cultural one, both may exist autonomously from each other. This entails, the state may exist without a nation and nation may also exist without a state. Yet, when the two coincide, when the boundaries of the state are approximately coterminous with those of the nation, the result is a nation-state. As a key concept of this thesis, a nation-state, in addition to what is indicated in chapter 1, constitutes a nation that possesses political sovereignty. It is socially cohesive as well as politically organized and independent (Stephenson, 2005). Bound citizens within a given territory constitute a source of legitimacy and sovereignty of a state through their involvement in the decision-making processes. Therefore, it is paramount to understand the rethinking of the nation-state building by changing the lens through which it is viewed.

3.2 Using the lens of Theory of Change to understand the rethinking of nation-state building

This section presents the lens through which the researcher understood the rethinking of nation-state building processes by changing from most used state-centered approaches for alternative ones which are more inclusive and participatory. As indicated in chapter 1, the central argument of this thesis is that the state-centered approaches to nation-state building processes have failed to promote the inclusion of ordinary citizens in the building processes and continue to sideline them instead. Consequently, a change was needed in used approaches in order to enhance citizen participation. The theory of change was considered to be a suitable core theoretical frame of this thesis to demonstrate how the desired change in approaches to nation-state building may cause the inclusion of ordinary citizens in the building processes viewed as the expected impacts or goals.

This study does not delve too much into different theoretical frame around the nation-state building as the objective was not at the first place to demonstrate how the nation-state is built, how change is needed in approach to make the process more inclusive. Mayne (2015) underlines that, although there is general agreement on what a theory of change is conceptually, there is actually little agreement beyond the big picture of what just it encompasses, what it shows, how it can be represented, and how it can be used. Despite taking often very different starting points, driven by different motivations and using different vocabulary and processes, organizations working in international development and related fields have found Theory of Change thinking a useful approach for exploring and clarifying their thinking about change and how they contribute to it in a context. The theory of change can be used in both straightforward and more complex in developing, managing, and assessing interventions (Mayne and Johnson, 2015). Intervention is used here to describe specific activities undertaken to make a positive difference in outcomes and impacts of interest. It covers policies, programs, and projects (Mayne, 2015). In this thesis, the making causal claims about impact straightforward scenario has interested the researcher as it is about to understand how the change of used approaches as inputs will affect positively or negatively the inclusion of ordinary citizens in building processes which constitute assigned goals.

Having said so, it is important to mention that the Theory of Change (ToC) is defined as an on-going process of reflection to explore change and how it happens – and what that means in a particular context, sector, and/or group of people (Funnell and Rogers, 2011). Theory of change is a model of the intervention as the contributory cause. It is a model of the contribution to and not cause per se of the intended result, because there may be other external factors also contributing to the intended results (Mayne, 2015). Stein and Valters (2012) consider the ToC as a strategy that clarifies how a given mediation, or set of interventions, are relied upon to prompt explicit and specific development change, drawing on a causal investigation dependent on accessible evidence (UNDAF, 2017).

As for Valters (2014), ToC must be driven by sound analysis, interview with key partners and realizing what works and what does not in various settings drawn from the experiences of stakeholders. This lens helps to identify solutions to effectively address the causes of problems that hinder progress and guide decisions on which approach should be taken, considering specific comparative advantages, effectiveness, feasibility and uncertainties that are part of any change process. ToC also helps to identify the underlying

assumptions and risks that will be vital to understand and revisit throughout the process to ensure the approach will contribute to the desired change (Valters 2014, UNDAF, 2017).

Jameel (2014) distinguishes four levels of Theory of Change namely; inputs, outputs, intermediate outcomes and impacts. Inputs constitute program components, activities, approaches, resources, to name a few. Outputs represent tangible products or services produced as a result of the activities. As for the Intermediate outcomes, they are Short-term behavioral changes that result from the outputs. Impacts or goals are simply long-term changes that result from outcomes. These implies that, the desired change, as impact, depends on the effectiveness of efficient of the inputs that consequently affect at the first place the outputs and outcomes. These levels are interconnected through the impact pathways which describe causal pathways presenting the connection between the sequence of steps in getting from activities to impacts/goals (Mayne, 2015). The below Table 3.1 summarizes the above impact pathways. Having said so, the study is based on one of the principles of the ToC that, if we do X then Y will change because… (Stein and Valters, 2012).

Table 3.1 Levels of Theory of Change

Source: Author, adapted from (Jameel 2014, Mayne 2014)

The desired goals in line with the study as per the above Table 3.1 is the inclusion of ordinary citizens in nation-state building processes, depend on change of new pattern of approach, people-centered governance, as an alternative that promotes active participation in self-reliance and ownership of political decision to build nation-state in Southern African countries.

More than that, Vogel and Stephenson (2012), of the DFID, provide the features of the Theory of Change. They argue that, the Theory of Change should encompass the following: analysis of the context, clear hypothesis of change, assessment of the evidence and other. First, the researcher should ensure if the ToC does makes sense as a response to analysis of the context, the problem and the changes needed and if there is one

statement that sums up the theory of change. Second, and very important, he must know if causal pathways are well mapped in a diagram. For example, including intermediate outcomes, make sure there is no missing links, clear conceptualization which entails no congested boxes containing several inputs, outputs, outcomes or causal links all lumped together. Presenting the specifics of this program not just as a generic type of intervention. Someone needs to ensure if the assumptions made are explicit (in the diagram or text). Same applied to the causal links, implementation, context and external factors. An additional question will be to find out if the narrative does highlight and describe the overall logic of the intervention and the key hypotheses which the program is based on. Third, there should be a narrative assessment of the evidence for each key hypothesis. Researcher should make sure if the strength of the evidence was assessed and therefore the assessment make sense given the evidence referred to. Last, in case if the log-frame is included, researcher should ensure if there is a consistency between Theory of Change and log-frame (Vogel and Stephenson, 2012).

Jameel (2014) simplifies the features of Theory of Change as underlined by Vogel and Stephenson (2012) into seven simple steps to building the Theory of Change. These including, Situation Analysis; Clarify the program goal; Design the program/product; Map the causal pathway; Explicit assumptions; Design smart indicators and convert to Logical Framework. The UNDAF mentions the four steps of Theory of Change. These including, focus; identify what is needed for change; reflect assumptions and risks; and identify partners and actors (UNDAF, 2017). Focus entails the high-level desired change as it is the full participation of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building processes. Identification of what is needed for change is informed by the tree of problems and other evidences, and how partners are going to contribute to that change. In this context, exclusion of ordinary citizens by the state-centered approaches to nation-state building processes is identified in order to propose people-centered governance as alternative. Reflect assumptions on how change happen, and risks attached to the process. Identify partners and actors who will be most relevant for achieving each result, taking into account the related risks and assumptions (UNDAF, 2017). The Table 3.2 below illustrates the UNDAF Theory of Change steps.

Table 3.2: The UNDAF Theory of Change Steps

Source: UNDAF (2017).

The two above designs of Theory of Change by Mayne (2014), Jameel (2014) and UNDAF (2017) have respectively helped the researcher to understand how the rethink of nation-state building processes depend on the change of inputs which is the people-centered governance, viewed as an alternative to state-centered approach, in order to enhance a full participation of ordinary citizens in the building processes viewed as a desired goal to achieve. This achievement has to go through a focus on the identification of the desired change to happen from tree of problem to tree of solutions by reflecting on the assumptions made and attached risks before the identification of partners and actors involved in the nation-state building processes in Southern African countries. The theory of change is a suitable lens frame as it helped the researcher to design another theory of change in Chapter 5 to confirm or infirm the research assumptions by Assessing the strength of arguments that people-centered governance promotes full participation of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building processes in Southern African countries.

3.3 Conclusion

This chapter 3 was focused on Theory of Change as the core theoretical lens for the study on rethinking of nation-state building through people-centered governance in Southern African countries. The central objective of this chapter was to revisit the nation-state building processes undertaken by post-independent African political elites in order to ensure if the alternative people-centered governance contribute to the desired change. Succinctly, it was about understanding through the Theory of Change how possible the

change of pattern of approach to nation-state building can lead to the inclusion of ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes. Theoretically, this chapter argued that state-centered approaches to nation-state building have failed to promote participation of majority of citizens in the building processes, consequently the quest for an alternative approach become imperative for an inclusive and cohesive society. Having said so, the chapter began with theoretical perspectives on linking state to its nation through a debate on nation-building and state-building respectively. The chapter briefly unpacked the notion of Theory of Change and demonstrated how suitable it was to the current study through its four levels such as inputs, outputs, outcomes and desired goals. Afterward, the chapter elaborated on how to build a Theory of Change based on proposed steps by different scholars and institutions. These existent relevant designs of theory of change have served to the researcher as a model for construction of a new Theory of Change in order to confirm or infirm, at the later stage, the research assumptions through the assessment of the strength of arguments that people-centered governance promotes full participation of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building processes in Southern African countries. The following chapter 4 scrutinized the nation-state building processes undertaken by the post-independent Southern African countries in order to assess the relationship between the nation and its state.

4. Chapter 4: Investigating the impact of nation-state building on the relation between state and nation in post-colonial Southern Africa

4.1 Trajectories of the nation-state building processes in post-colonial Southern Africa

Nation-state building has long been an important focus for postcolonial and/or contemporary African governments, and particularly of those in the Southern Africa. Upon African independence in the 1950s and 1960s scholars become deeply concerned about the need for what was then called "national integration" within post-independent newly African societies with multiple ethnic, religious and racial cleavages, among others (Coleman and Rosberg, 1966). This concern was more recently resuscitated by political leaders and statesmen who argued for nation-state building as a policy to promote nation-state building in an African continent now notorious for political instability and ethnic violence which was the negative effect of colonialism in Africa. Nation-state building, they believed, will foster peace and unity, development and harmonious co-existence

among African citizens and African states. Thus, this section examines the trajectories of nation-state building in contemporary Southern Africa.

4.1.1 Post-colonialism and the coloniality syndromes

In Africa today, post-colonialism has been synonymous with coloniality, and what is portrayed by many as one of the fundamental causes of fragility or failure of states in post-independent countries. There have been questions confronting nation-building as well as state-building of most newly post-independent African countries on the continent as linked to the syndromes of coloniality and post-colonialism movement. It is understood that the survival of coloniality, as power structures, at the end of direct colonialism and more often continues to perpetuate asymmetrical power relationship and the conceptualization of nation-state building through inherited colonial political systems and power matrix in newly independent states (Grosfoguel, 2007). From this intriguing relationship, many questions arise as Africans get to terms with the understanding post-colonial nation-state building processes. In particular, what emerges from coloniality side of colonialism as the question has been how to build nation-state in African continent without blaming and being driven by colonial syndromes (Young, 2004). A reflection into this question is relevant because, literature proves that during the colonial experiences between African Europeans, the voices of the settlers constituted itself as a major source of research for construction of African history (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). However, emphasis is needed on notion of coloniality and post-colonialism syndromes in order to grasp their effects in newly post-independent states, and at the same time, the importance to decolonizing nation-state building processes for more inclusive and cohesive society in African continent at large.

The concept of coloniality is therefore important in understanding post-colonialism particular the colonial forms of dominations beyond provisional jurisdiction and it affects the nation-state building in post-independent Africa. Building on Grosforguel's readings, Ndlovu (2013) argues that, I quote:

> *"One of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century was the notion that the elimination of colonial administrations amounted to the decolonization of the world. This led to the myth of a 'postcolonial' world. The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-political decolonization of the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live under the same 'colonial power matrix'. With*

juridical administrative decolonization we moved from a period of' global colonialism to the current period of 'global coloniality'. Although 'colonialism administrations' have been entirely eradicated and the majority of the periphery is politically organized into independent states, non-European people are still living under crude European exploitation and domination. The old colonial hierarchies of European versus non-Europeans remain in place and are entangled with the 'international division of labor' and accumulation of capital at a world-scale" (Grosfoguel, 2007:219).

The above reflection of coloniality would easily be understood as ways that celebrate the removal of juridical administrative colonialism on one hand, and on the other, tends to hide the perpetuation of relationship between the colonial past and the invisible colonialism of the present within post-independent Southern African countries. These include the colonization of governance and especially the nation-state building approaches, understanding of peace and colonization of knowledge that would inhibit unity among people of the formally colonized states such as many in Southern Africa.

Similarly, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) and Ndlovu (2013) coin respectively that coloniality survives classical colonialism. In their narrative, the authors refer to what decolonial scholars like Maldonado-Torres entails, I quote:

"Coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such a nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to a long-standing pattern of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labor, inter-subjectivity relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects, we breathe coloniality all the time and every day" (Maldonado-Torres, 2007:243).

Having said so, it is important to interrogate the colonial history of the African continent in order to understand the challenges encountered by both citizens and political elites when it comes to nation-state building. Borrowing from Ndlovu (2013), the concept of coloniality, unlike the critique that underpinned classical colonialism, unveils the mystery

of why, after the end of colonial administrations in the juridical-political spheres of nation-state building, there is still a continuity of colonial forms of domination. This is mainly because the concept of coloniality addresses the issue of colonial domination, not from an isolated and singular point of departure such as the juridical-political administrative point of view, but from a vantage point of a variety of post-colonial situations that include cultural, political, sexual, spiritual, epistemic and economic oppression of subordinate racialized/ethnic groups by dominant racialized/ethnic groups with or without the existence of colonial administrations (Grosfoguel, 2007:220). This holistic approach to the problem of colonial domination allows us to visualize other dynamics of the colonial process which include among them "colonization of imagination" (Quijano, 2007:168-178), "colonization of the mind" (Dascal, 2009:308) and colonization of knowledge and power.

The idea of the colonization of power and knowledge is quite crucial in that it explicates why, despite the advent of colonialism in Africa, and Southern African countries for example, a minority of political elites and allies has been criticized to exert an inherited colonial power in a form of coercive power over the majority of marginalized ordinary citizens for its selfish political gain. On that note, Ndlovu (2013) underlines that the concept of coloniality of power enables us to understand coloniality in ways that go beyond the Foucauldian concept of "disciplinary power" because through the idea of the "colonial matrix of power", the concept of "coloniality of power" views the modern world as a network of relations of exploitation and domination through technologies that affects all dimensions of social existence including the governance system. According to Castro-Gomez (2002:276):

> *The concept of the 'coloniality of power' broadens and corrects the Foucauldian concept of 'disciplinary power' by demonstrating that the panoptic constructions erected by the modern state are inscribed in a wider structure of power/knowledge. This global structure is configured by the colonial relation between center and periphery that is at the root of European expansion.*

The significance of the concept of coloniality of power, therefore, is that it enables the peoples of the Third World to understand the relationship between the power structure of colonial domination and knowledge production. Thus, the concept of coloniality of power is inseparably intertwined with that of knowledge which speaks directly to epistemological colonization of the non-Western peoples through the processes of

displacement, discipline and destruction of their knowledge (Castro-Gomez 2003). In the case of South Africa, for example, where the former colonizers and the formerly colonized have resolved to reconcile and live together after the demise of juridical administrative apartheid, the question that emerges out of understanding how coloniality permeates nation-state building is that of whether this peaceful co-existence in the day-to-day relationships is extended to peaceful co-existence of "ecologies of knowledge" about the past in the field of knowledge production (Robinson, 2002). This question is quite significant because epistemic violence has the potential to affect the physical and social co-existence of the people.

In post-colonial era, African states emerged as the continuation of the bureaucratic apparatus of the colonial state, but now increasingly staffed with African elites, and defined by a national constitution (van Binsbergen, 1995). African states have found difficult to change their political dynamics due to post-colonialism and coloniality syndromes epitomized by the practices, routines and mentalities of the colonial states (Young 2004). According to (Kpundeh, 1992: 7), "the colonial experience was one of a minority imposing its will on a majority—a colonial apartheid, in which there were European and non- European areas in some countries, and where there was legislation for Europeans, but the Africans were relegated to customary law". More than that, a copied Eurocentric notion of nation-state did not work for newly post-independent countries due to plethora of ethnics and religious beliefs followed by inherited brutal pattern of governance. Upon gaining political independence, most of African political elites were preoccupied by the crystallization of their political structures driven by nationalism and developmentalism. State-nations were built instead of nation-states, unlike the case of Europe and North Americas (Rajai and Enloe (1969). It was an era of ambitious political monopoly and newly state sovereignty. Post-independent elites were much concerned about consolidating their political power and protecting newly states and territories against any new forms of rebound colonial evasion. Any person challenging their political leadership was considered to be the first enemy to get ride off. Coercive power and elites-centered approaches become political survival strategies of most of African political elites.

For example, in the former Zaire, the then DRC, after his coup in November 1965, the President Mobutu implemented an inherited colonial greedy and brutal political regime to suppress his own people and consolidate his political power (Mbembe, 2001). Mobutu

ruled over Zairian citizens wielding nearly absolute power like a king under a unique political party regime approach, compulsory membership of the *Movement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR)* and Mobutism as the unique political ideology (New York Times, April 1990, de Villers, 1999). Angola experienced a violent and military regime after a fragile peaceful transition of political power from the Portuguese colonial masters. Consolidation of political power has become a beacon of newly established political structures. Later on, the war broke between two main liberation movements, MPLA and UNITA, and plunged the country in a longest brutal and civil war claiming many lives (Aloa, 1994, Chapman and Kathleen, 2003). It was power struggle between Angolan main liberation movements that tried to position themselves to lead a post-colonial Angola by killing civilians who they sought to lead. These webs of violent conflicts made almost impossible the building process of Angola as a newly nation-state. Violent conflicts flued the war and divided communities hampering the reconciliation process between nation and state.

Since in the 1980s, Zimbabwe was not an exception as the former liberators become the new oppressors of their own citizens. The Gukurahundi massacres of Matabeleland perpetuated by the Zimbabwe National Army from early 1983 to late 1987 are one of the consummative examples of brutal political regime in the post-colonial era (Nyarota, 2006). Under President Robert Mugabe, the brutal regime claimed many lives intended to consolidate political power by marginalizing the majority of the Zimbabweans from any political decisions in line with the nation-state building. Instauration of fear due to political killings have forced many Zimbabwean citizens to enter into exile. In the 1994s, despite a call for democratic governance since the terminal of Apartheid period, South African nation-state building processes also encountered webs of novel violent conflict opposing the African National Congress (ANC) to the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) which claimed lives of innocent citizens. Inherited inequalities from the apartheid regime have averted a smooth nation-state building in South Africa. As for Botswana, it has been viewed by many scholars to be a Southern African miracle case with a debatable stable consolidating democratic system since its independence. In these post-independent era, most of the ordinary African citizens were excluded from participating in political decisions to build nation-states. Young (2004) underlines that the colonial state legacy decanted into a patrimonial autocracy which decayed into crisis by the 1980s, bringing external and internal pressures for economic and political state reconfiguration.

Three decades after the terminal of African colonization period following the collapse of the Soviet Union and irresistible pressures for liberation, African countries, alike other countries in the world, were obliged to adjust their political structures to democracy for which they did not initially master or prepared. Despite a call for democratization of African political landscape by former colonial masters, post-independent African states continued to incorporate many defining attributes of the colonial state which weakening most of them (Young, 2004). Political state reconfiguration for democracy become a nightmare to most of post-independent states in Southern Africa. Political reforms in all sectors were prerequisites of any foreign aids. These implies, African democratization processes includes confronting the past, colonial legacy. Being donor dependents, post-independent states find a way to initiate cosmetic political reforms to attract funds from the institutions of Bretton Woods, such as the International Monetary Funds (IMF) and the World Bank, although feeble resistances were registered (Befekadu, 1988, Osabu-Kle, 2000). On that note, multiparty regimes and holding of elections have gained the centrality in the post-single party regimes. As a result, there was a plethora of political parties which emerged during the 1990s democratic transition period in order to challenge the existing unique party system. But, these mushroom of political parties was reportedly to fail the aspirations of the majority of ordinary citizens due to alleged corruption and selfish interests charactering the political leadership of emerged political parties. Consequently, despite the above political reforms, the prototype of the post-independent African states were criticized to remain dysfunctional, insecure and fragile.

For example, in 1990, Mr Mobutu, the former President of the Democratic Republic of Congo was obliged to abandon the one-party regime after more than two decades of authoritarian practices (New York Times, April 1990, Mbembe, 2001). But, this fact was not considered as a total victory in the war as the lifting of a ban on opposition parties for multiparty regime did not automatically encourage full participation of ordinary citizens in nation-state building processes. Although the longest national dialogue "*la conférence nationale souveraine (CNS)*" was initiated, from July 1990 to August 1992, to promote citizen participation in the nation-state building processes in new democratic era, none of its resolutions was implemented and at the end, suffered suspension from President Mobutu (Willame, 1994, Nzongola et Margaret, 1997, Kabambi 1998, de Villers, 1999). It was an era of relapse to violent conflicts nationwide fueled by oppressive and divide-

to-reign approaches to governance. Mobutu's state had decayed considerably by the early 1990s, it fragility became glaring in the aftermath of the genocide in neighboring Rwanda in 1994. Mobutu provided a heaven in eastern Zaire for the genocide's perpetrators after they were overthrown by Rwandan rebels. These "*genocidaires*," as they were known, then repeatedly attacked Rwanda, ultimately prompting the new Rwandan government to retaliate by backing a coalition of dissidents known as the "*Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo*" (AFDL) in 1997, led by Laurent Kabila who proclaimed himself as the President of Congo. Nevertheless, when President Kabila broke with his former Rwandan and Ugandan allies, those countries backed new insurgent groups in the east. In August 1998, the country was plunged back into war. Laurent Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and his son Joseph Kabila took over the leadership of the giant Central African country till December 2018. With reference to the above, the democratic transition in the DRC has never been that smooth and inclusive.

Like DRC in the 1990s, the Republic of Angola was reportedly to transit from a nominally communist state to a nominally democratic one. The former Portuguese colony managed to manage to abolish the one-party system in June, like during the Mobutu era in 1990, and establish multi-party system (Hodges, 2001, Chapman and Kathleen, 2003). It was a shift from MPLA-PT to the MPLA as the aftermath of the rejection of Marxist-Leninism (Walker, 2004). However, this democratic transition was mined by many skepticism from many observers as the war continued opposition the MPLA to UNITA, claiming many lives in the country (Aloa, 1994). Yet, the new Angola replaced its ideology by the bottom line, as security and selling expertise in weaponry have become a very profitable business. The 1991 peace agreement reached in Bicesse, Portugal, between the government of Angola led by Mr Dos Santos and UNITA of Mr Jonas Savimbi, inaugurated a political transition to multi-party democracy with objective to build a new nation-state through full participation of Angolan citizens. Unfortunately, the September 1992 general elections failed to fully pacify the country, as the war once again erupted after UNITA denounced the elections and the concerned parties failed to reach a new engagement trough negotiations. This despite the presence of the UN mission in the country (UNAVEM). Even though some writers have considered the situation the followed the collapse of the Bicesse Peace Agreement as a Halloween massacre epitomized by mass killing of Savimbi' supporters over electoral disputes (Rothchild, 1997, Hodges, 2004), the reality is that both sides suffered huge losses with the resumption of the war. For Example, Mr

Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA arrived to control about 73% of the territory of country after fierce and long battles that caused a lot of causalities from both sides. Nevertheless, the case of Angola is a typical example of the negative consequences of bad political choices made by political elites during the decolonization and democratization processes, heavily marked by mutual exclusion on grounds of ethical, social or ideological differences. After many attempts of reconciliation following the collapse of the Lusaka Protocol, Savimbi died in a clash with government troops in 2002 (Vines, 1999, Rothchild, 1997, World Fact Book, 2011). The above recurring war situation did not help Angolan government to fully reconcile with its people in order to build together a cohesive nation-state.

The Zimbabwean nation-state building trajectory in the democratic transition era, for example, was at the same time transformative and very brutal. In April 1991, a new Republic of Zimbabwe was born following a few alterations of the country constitution since the independence. The post-colonial government lifted up the 25 years of state of emergency as the aftermath of March 1990 general elections. A few plausible, but also feeble, reforms were registered during this transition period. In 1995, Zimbabweans participated in the parliamentary elections and lately the first and former President of Zimbabwe, Mr Canaan Banana was sentenced and imprisoned for sodomy (Williams 2005). There was power struggle which opposed at a later stage two allies, President Mugabe and Mr Nkomo (Tendi, 2010). More than that, Ethnic tensions became to the forefront of national politics in Zimbabwe and pushed out many whites to neighboring South Africa (Sibanda, 2018). Political power greedy was criticized by many observers to exclude and side-line ordinary citizens from the nation-state building processes and consequently deteriorate their socio-economic well-being. During the 1990s, Zimbabwean students, trade unionists, and workers often demonstrated to express their discontent with the Mugabe regime (Herbst and Herbst, 1990, Tendi, 2010). But, police prevented them from holding any forms of anti-government demonstrations. These entails, the public discontent with the government spawned draconian government crackdowns which in turn started to destroy both the state and society fabrics. Consequently, it brought with it further discontent within the majority of Zimbabweans. Many general strikes, protests and demonstrations were registered in the 1990s. As a result, President Mugabe began in the late-1990s, in a calculated move, forcible land grabbing, from white minority, and redistribution to satisfy war veterans and youth

militias, which brought the government into headlong conflict with the Institution of Bretton Woods (Palmer 1990, Moyo, 2000). Thus a vicious downward spiral commenced and hindered the nation-state building processes in Zimbabwe and sparked the creation of another political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 (Raftopoulos, 2006). Given the political unrest, more whites and black Zimbabweans were reportedly forced to seek for refuge and stability elsewhere in the World.

With regard to South Africa, its nation-state building trajectory in the democratic transition era was remarkably marked by various events such as the end of apartheid rule and 10 years of state of emergence following the liberation of Nelson Mandela in February 1990 among other political prisoners (Drechsel and Schmidt, 1995, Sparks, 1995). The lifting of a ban by President Frederick de Klerk on some black political organizations, the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress and the South African Communist Party, constituted additional events during the transition era (Bauman and Schneiderman, 1996). Similarly, the ANC's armed chapter, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, suspended its armed struggle within the country to give chance to peaceful dialogue as a gateway of the established democratic institutions. It was a shift from resistance to reconstruction and from divided to united communities (Judson, 2001). During this transition period marking the end of apartheid and the arrival of non-racial liberal democracy, disadvantaged black majority citizens were allowed to participate in a rainbow march in solidarity with the freedom fighters and in support of a new post-apartheid South Africa.

However, ethnic, sectorist violent conflicts broke out opposing leaders of black political movements on the race to position themselves to rule the post-apartheid South Africa. As a result, innocent blood of Xhosa people and Zulu people was shed in recurring violent conflicts opposing the *Inkatha* Movement to ANC (Cope, 1990, Adam and Moodley, 1992). Agreement was reached between the leaderships of black-led liberation struggle movements to rule together the post-apartheid South Africa within a government of national unity. People were allowed to freely participate in the first democratic elections held in 1994 through which Nelson Mandela become the first democratically elected President of South Africa (Judson, 2001). However, to many observers, for the acclaimed vertical and horizontal reconciliations to be truly materialized between government and its people, and between white minority and black majority, continuous frank and open dialogue was needed among all actors in order to allow a complete healing from apartheid

syndromes which hindered nation-state building processes. Activities of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) become paramount of importance to reconcile the nation to its people and among people. But some the acclaimed reconciliation entails "working with the enemy". In Judson (2001) readings, ANC become aware of mission impossible of foreseen national transformation after the terminal of apartheid as it coined that:

"The transformation of our country into a united, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous society" is far from complete and that "the main contradiction of this phase [of the national democratic revolution] is the yawning political, economic and social disparities based on race and ethnicity that were created and consolidated by apartheid rule over the years" (ANC, 1995: 5-6 in Judson (2001).

Despite the terminal of apartheid, its distortions and racist legacy did not permit transformation and inclusion of majority of South Africans in the nation-state building processes during the transition period and beyond. Collective social, political, and economic realities faced by majority of marginalized black South African during apartheid have shaped their political attitude and especially mistrust toward the political elites.

Compared to other countries above indicated, Botswana has been applauded to construct a strong state, performing economy and a strong society over a period of many decades, starting from a very weak base during the colonial period. The country has managed to create a stable if not perfect democratic regimes epitomized by more than six consecutive multiparty general elections held immediately after gaining the independence. It was reported to be one of the few African economies that has avoided the common stagnation in the continent during the 1970-1980s. In van Binsbergen's readings, Botswana is a most interesting case among African countries, since to the outside world it has presented the image of one of the very few African democracies that has survived intact since independence (van Binsbergen, 1995). Although perceived as a deviant case in the region, Botswana was criticized by some observers on its limits to establish effective democratic participation by enabling grassroots involvement in a regime that largely isolates the state from popular control (Scarritt, 1996). To other observers, Botswana is one-party dominated system driven by the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) despite the existence of a handful of oppositions political parties such as the Botswana National Front (BNF)

and Botswana People's Party (BPP). Lines below present the current state affairs of nation-state building processes in the above countries.

4.2 Current state affairs of nation-state building processes in Southern Africa

Most Southern African countries portray a mermaid of differences and a few similarities regarding nation-state building processes. While some states are showing glimpses of democracy with one-party dominating political landscape in a multiparty system, others are caught between authoritarian practices and cosmetic democracy in form of hybrid regimes. This section presents how nation-state building is undertaken from political regime perspectives in Southern Africa for inclusion of ordinary citizens. It does so through three registered themes: State-led governance is viewed as political impediment to citizen participation in nation-state building in Southern Africa; Shrinking of public sphere in Southern Africa makes nation-state building processes almost an impossible mission; and Political citizenship becomes an avenue of civic inclusion claims in nation-state building in Southern Africa. For the sake of space in this thesis, Southern African region as the research site was represented by four countries namely; Angola, Botswana, DRC and South Africa as indicated above in chapter 1.

4.2.1 State-centered governance viewed as political impediment to citizen participation in nation-state building in Southern Africa

Public participation in nation-state building decisions in African post-independent states depends on established form of governance. Some scholars on democratic governance coin that, any claim to democracy ought to be underpinned by a citizen body who are invested with the full rights and responsibilities of citizenship; who are governed by a set of laws or norms that both protect their citizenship and hold to account those in power; and that these same citizens are actively encouraged to contest, cooperate and participate in political life (Isakhan, 2012). At the same time, The civic republican view of democracy argues that governance must be constituted by the direct involvement and active oversight of the citizen body and, by doing so, governments will in fact be better able to manage the affairs of the state on behalf of those who elected them within the context of an active and vibrant civil society. According to Marshall et al. (2014), three key factors epitomize institutionalized democracy: (i) institutions and processes that allow citizens to effectively express their political preferences and to combine these

preferences into a package of alternatives from which they can choose, (ii) institutional constraints on the executive and (iii) guaranteed civil rights and liberties for all citizens of the state.

Table 4.1 The 2016 BTI Regime classification in some Southern African countries

A1. SADC Sample Countries	B1. BTI Regime Classification 2016	C1. IIAG 2016 (Score/100)
South Africa	Consolidating Democracy	80,1 %
Botswana	Consolidating Democracy	83,3 %
Angola	Autocracy	26,3 %
DRC	Autocracy	25,3 %

Source: Author, adapted from the BTI Regime Classification (2016) and IIAG (2016)

The Bertelsmann Stiftung Index (BTI) classifies political regimes of more than 129 countries using the following index status: effective power to govern, performance of democratic institutions, commitment to democratic institutions, approval of democracy. Thus, in the Table 4.1 from column A1, B1 to C1, column A1 presents a sample of SADC countries useful for this research namely, Angola, Botswana, DRC and South Africa; Colunm B1 displays the 2016 status of democracy in the region from consolidating democracy to autocracy. As for the column C1, it indicates different scores of the sample countries mentioned in column A1 which are ranged between 83 per cent to 25 percent. The 2016 BTI demonstrates that Southern African region is a home of two types of political regime with consolidating democracy in South Africa and Botswana, and autocratic regime with Angola and DRC on its list. These BTI classification has been triangulated by the IIA scores on overall governance presented in column C1 of the Table 4.1 which gives South Africa and Botswana the highest score of average 80 percent compared to Angola and DRC in autocracy with average 23 percent. These are the indications to prove how political regime may affect either positively or negatively participation of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building processes in Southern African countries.

However, these Southern African countries have committed themselves through their political elites in the Arusha African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation declaration in the following statement:

"We strongly believe that popular participation is dependent on the nature of the State itself and ability of Government to respond to popular demand. Since African Governments have a critical role to play in the promotion of popular participations, they have to yield space to the people, without which popular participation will be difficult to achieve. Too often, the social base of power and decision-making are too narrow. Hence the urgent need to broaden these; to galvanize and tap the people's energy and commitment, and to promote political accountability by the State to the people...[...]" (African charter, 1990: 4).

However, established approaches to nation-state building in Africa were criticized to not yield space for the majority of African citizens for various reasons. For some observers, nascent democratic states, in post-independent Africa, are still driven by colonial inheriting brutal and greedy approaches to nation-state building mainly driven by states. To other, the need for unity in the face of ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences in Africa; the alleged tradition of a single unchallenged chief; associated with the idea of a democratic majority expressed through a single party; are all used as grounds to justify the persistence of one-party system in most African states. Nationalism become a political mantra for consolidation of political power and state sovereignty to avoid any eventual western invasion. As a political ideology and powerful idea paramount for the reproduction of the state-centric element, nationalism becomes intimately linked to the state-centrism (Scholte, 2005). In the name of nationalism, government elites are portrayed to be the main actors to offer ordinary citizens the best organizing principles, but obstruct their involvement by undermining competitive politics (Grugel, 2004, Godsater, 2013). On the whole, competitive politics become deemed by some African elites to be western imported practices to African political landscape and should be rejected in Africa. For example, former Malawian President Kamuzu Banda ironically rejected this competitive politics by theologizing his political stand that: *"There is no opposition in Heaven...[...] Why should Kamuzu have opposition?"* (Kpundeh, 1992: 13-14). The rejection of political competition in the name of state-centrism and nationalism has hindered active participation of ordinary citizens in the state affairs for a cohesive society. These have paved a way for glimpses of democracy than consolidated democracy

in African post-independent states. However, these glimpses of democracy in Africa were seemed to confront colonial legacy of socio-economic disparities, high level of illiteracy, militarization, and underdevelopment produced as a result of poor leadership and corrupt system of governance.

Desktop review reveals that state-led or state-centered mode of governance predominantly allow state to retain a significant degree of importance and at the same time gives the latter a central role in creating and maintaining national governance (O'Brien and Williams, 2010). In other words, state-centrism propagates state hegemony over other potential key players, citizens, in nation-state building processes. It has also been evidenced that, despite a call for democratic transition, after three decades, in many countries including the post-colonial states, Southern African countries, alike Africa at large, are still far from being a hub of democracy. Instead, African political leaders strategically promote pluralism because they view it as a political medium to access to power and confiscate it thereafter (Thomson, 2010). This entails, with an exception of a few, majority of African states are highly struggling with the problematic of democratic principles (Freund, 2010). According to Nwabueze (2003), states in Africa have been featured by high levels of authoritarianism undermining consent of ordinary citizens as source of legitimacy. Centralization of the state in African continent is epitomized by exclusive accumulation of power in the executive branch of the country or kingdom, at the expense of ordinary citizens and representatives. Political elites in the executive office, both at local and national levels, tend to dominate and monopolize formal politics within their respective societies (Godsater, 2013). These confiscation of political power by political elites was extended to political decision-making in line with nation-state building processes in African states. Participation of ordinary citizens in these decision-making processes pertaining to nation-state building are often undermined by those who confiscate the political power at the executive level. Political elites become more visible and powerful, but citizens continue to be less active in Southern African political landscape.

In Kpundeh's reading (1992), personalized nature of rule, the failure of the state to advance and protect human rights, the tendency of individuals to withdraw from politics, and the extreme centralization of power in the hands of few people were found to be major reasons for deficit governance in Africa. At the same time, democracy in African continent has been severely hindered by the state's control of the economy; this has meant

that the only way to get rich has been through political office, intensifying the problem of corruption, and inducing leaders to cling to political power. There is a correlation between state-centrism and neo-patrimonialism, which promotes the concentration of political power in the personal authority like the Head of State, in the case of most of Southern African states (Thomson, 2010).

Oftentimes, the neo-patrimonial leaders run state affairs as they were their personal affairs without political will. There is individualization of political power, which is characterized by the personification of state resources, especially the extraction of mineral resources, for illicit enrichment of political elites and their allies. Monetization of politics become a political mantra to consolidate power of African political elites and to maintain support and legitimacy for regime by nurturing key political, economic and administrative allies through confiscation of state resources (Soderbaum and Taylor, 2008). In the vein, concentration of political power by a political minority group undermines instauration of competitive politics and discourage any consolidation of opposition using the divide-to-reign approach. This also includes shrinking of public sphere by restricting and manipulating participation of active citizens into political decision-making. Intimidation and repression of members from civil society organizations, labor unions, social movements, student movements, to name a few. In the process of centralization African states therefore enjoy a superior position vis-à-vis ordinary citizens, who are refrained from providing advice and feedback on policy or suggesting alternative approaches in various sectors (Thomson 2010, Godsater, 2013).

It has also been found that, according to Nwabueze (2003), some African political elites within authoritarian states sometimes use less civil way to maintain power: the state takes on the peculiar character of an instrument for the domination, expression and repression of the people […] by a regular, systemic application of organized force (Godsater, 2013: 86). In Freund' readings (2010), in order to maintain political power, state elites consciously orchestrate unrest in their country. There is instauration of authoritarian practices epitomized by dominance and personal rulers with mission to suffocate. As in other parts of Africa, Southern African states have fostered a political culture of authoritarian rule and dominance of personal rulers is strong, which is great obstacle towards deepening regional integration (Peters, 2011). With reference to the above, state-centered governance employed by government elites in South Africa does not encourage citizen participation in the nation-state building processes.

<u>Table 4.2 Change in Overall Governance Trend in some Southern African countries</u>
<u>(2007-2017)</u>

A1. SADC Sample Countries	B1. Score/100	C1. Change in governance
South Africa	68 %	Increasing improvement
Botswana	68%	Increasing deterioration
Angola	38,1 %	Warning signs
DRC	32,1%	Increasing deterioration

Source: Author, adapted from the IIAG (2018).

The Table 4.2 complements the preceding Table 4.1 on BTI regime classification in Southern African countries. The Table 4.2 is composed by three columns, A1, B1 and C1. The A1 column presents a sample of SADC countries under study notably; South Africa, Botswana, Angola and DRC. Column B1 indicates the scores of each of these above mentioned countries in overall governance from 2007 to 2017. These scores variegate from 68 per cent to 32 percent. As for column C1, it presents a change in governance of the sample Southern African countries in column A1. The 2018 Ibrahim Index on African Governance (IIAG) demonstrates that South Africa in A1 has increasingly improved (C1) its overall governance from 2007 to 2017 with a score of 68 per cent in B1 compared to Botswana in A1 which increases its governance deterioration (C1) despite its equal score of 68 per cent in B1. At the same time, DRC in A1 has seen an increased deterioration of its governance (C1) with 23, 1 per cent (B1) compared to Angola which encounter warning signs of deterioration with a score of 38, 1 per cent as indicated in column A1,B1 and C1 respectively. The Table 4.2 shows how the trend of governance in Southern African countries is at the same time slightly increasing and deteriorating. Consequently, the status of civic spaces in these above indicated countries is between narrowed and closed civic spaces.

4.2.2 Shrinking of public sphere in Southern Africa makes nation-state building processes almost an impossible mission

Despite the acknowledgement by Africans that, through the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation adopted in 1990, sustainable development must be revamped by a democratic approach employing the energy and devotion of African people themselves, public participation is still a nightmare to majority of ordinary citizens (Heyns, 2002). Through the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, Africans are committed to the public participation promotion. I quote:

"*We affirm that nations cannot be built without the popular support and full participation of the people, nor can the economic crisis be resolved and the human and economic conditions improved without the full and effective contribution, creativity, and popular enthusiasm of the vast majority of the people. After all, it is to the people that the very benefits of development should and must accrue. We are convinced that neither can Africa's perpetual economic crisis be overcome, nor can a bright future for Africa and its people see the light of day unless the structures, pattern, and political context of the process of socio-economic development are appropriately altered*" (African Charter, 1990: 4).

Nevertheless, the above charter suffers its operationalization and instead African political elites encourage passive participation in order to project an appearance of support for government policies. Actually they also tend to promote the cult of personality and to stifle individual and local initiatives. In that regard, with an exception of few, any attempt to counterforce political elites is either intimidated or absorbed within state-centered system of governance. The table 4.3 below shows how the trend of participation and Human Rights in some Southern African countries have changed in a period of 10 years from 2007 to 2017.

Table 4.3 Change in Citizens Participation and human Rights Trend in some Southern African countries (2007-2017)

A1. SADC Sample Countries	B1. Score/100.00	C1. Change in participation & H.Rt
South Africa	74,4 %	Increasing improvement
Botswana	63,3%	Increasing deterioration
Angola	39,3 %	Warning signs
DRC	31,1%	Increasing deterioration

Source: adapted from the IIAG (2018).

The Table 4.3 is the consequence of the preceding Table 4.2 and Table 4.1. This implies, established political regimes by Southern African countries have influenced different forms of governance witch subsequently caused a change in citizens participation and human rights trend within a 10 years period. The Table 4.3 is constituted of three columns namely A1, B1 and C1. The column A1 lists a sample of Southern African countries under studies. B1 column shows the scores of the above indicated countries with regard to change on citizen participation and human rights. As for column C1, it lists the status of the preceding mentioned change which variegates between increasing improvement and increasing deterioration. Between 2007 and 2017, South Africa in column A1 is the first in the region by increasingly improved (C1) its citizens participation and human rights with a top score of 74,4 per cent (B1) compared to the DRC in column A1 that saw its deterioration increased (C1) and epitomized by a score of 31,1 per cent. The change in citizen participation and human rights during the above-mentioned period has hindered full participation of ordinary Southern African citizens in the nation-state building processes one of the necessary ingredients for a cohesive society.

By triangulating the above, it has been found that some of the Southern African elites were engaging into state-centric practices that dissuaded ordinary citizens from fully participating into nation-state building processes. But, literature proves that a healthy or open public sphere implies that ordinary citizens are able to organize, participate and communicate without hindrance, and in doing so, claim their rights and influence the

political and social structures around them (CIVICUS, 2018). An open space is epitomized by dimensions such as association, expression and access to information, peaceful assembly and effective civil society partnerships. In other words, the shrinking of these civic spaces makes almost impossible the nation-state building processes. There is a plethora of illustration demonstrating how authoritarian practices in some of Southern African countries have severely affected full participation of active citizens in nation-state building. In January 2015 for example, on the one hand, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo has cracked down protesters who demonstrated against an attempt of amendment of electoral law by the latter to attach general censor to the general elections of 2016 which supposed to elect the successor of incumbent President Joseph Kabila (BBC News, 2015, Polet, 2016). The internet was reportedly to be shut down and many arrests were made, including loss of lives in both major cities of Kinshasa and Goma. Freedoms of association, assembly and expression were restricted by the government elites in the DRC, thus affecting severely national cohesion and trust between state and nation (HRW, 2015).

On the other hand, civic space of certain category of population within a given country can be shrunk for various reasons such as race, gender orientation, ethnicity, among others. For instance, despite its consolidating democratic regime (BTI, 2016) post-apartheid South Africa experiences high rate of socio-economic inequalities which undermine a smooth nation-state building process. Despite all the efforts towards nation-state building, contemporary South Africa is still divided economically and socially due to mainly apartheid racial legacy. Many believe South African economy to be white dominated which severely affect the well-being of black majority (Anwar, 2017). South African black majority are reportedly not given economic opportunities to participate in the nation-state building without discrimination. For example, according to BusinessTech, 70 % of senior managers in the South African private sector are white (BusinessTech, 2016). More than that, there is an indication that, both the social manifestation of racial differences and the reality of racially skewed economic inequality are likely undermining the nation-state building processes in South Africa (Gelb, 2003). Thus, notions of nation-state building that focus on existential issues such as culture and belonging are limited without a corresponding program that addresses socio-economic inequalities. Similarly, one observer argues that in the post-apartheid South Africa, civil societies partnered with the ANC to assist in developing policy positions and in

determining priorities for the state (Jagwanth, 2003: 9). But, another observer contends that, generally speaking, South African government supports civil society, particularly those involved in service delivery and capacity building; and at the same time becomes increasingly wary of civil society, particularly of critical and counterforce social movement type organizations hostile to the government' authoritarians practices (National Development Agency, 2008: 18, Asuelime, 2017).

Additionally, it has been said that under repressed civic spaces in Angola, discontent citizens find difficult to challenge the government elites by demanding for wider democracy. During President Dos Santo era, it has been reported by the Human Right Watch in Angola that the government elites used also to intimidate, harass, and arbitrarily arrest journalists, activists, and witnesses who sought to document any abuses (HRW, 2013). More than that, in March 2016, a group of 17 Angolan activists and members of the book club were reportedly all charged with planning a rebellion against the Angolan government led by then-President Dos Santos (Lima, 2013). These activists were reportedly convicted and sentenced to between two and eight years of imprisonment, but later released in June 2016 after their convictions were overturned by the country Supreme Court (HRW, May 2019). In Botswana, the exclusion of the Basarwa or San communities from nation-state building decisions and actions has tarnished praises on Botswana's stable democracy and undermines sustainable development in the country (Nthomang and Monaka, 2006, Knoetze and Hambira, 2018).

To some extent, government is shrinking public spaces through different types of legislation such as anti-terrorism laws, cyber security and telecommunications laws, anti-money laundering laws, laws regulating assembly, association and expression, legislation restricting foreign donations, among others (CIVICUS, 2018). The 2018 CIVICUS Monitor tracking civic space in Africa shows that Southern Africa is home of shrinking civic spaces ranging from narrowed to closed civic spaces. Narrowed civic spaces entails that while the state allows individuals and civil society organizations to exercise their rights to freedom of association, peaceful assembly and expression, violations of these rights also take place. People can form associations to pursue a wide range of interests, but full enjoyment of this right is impeded by occasional harassment. As for closed spaces, they entail complete closure - in law and in practice - of civic space. An atmosphere of fear and violence prevails, where state and powerful non-state actors are routinely allowed to imprison, seriously injure and kill people with impunity for

attempting to exercise their rights to associate, peacefully assembly and express themselves (CIVICUS, 2018).

Figure 4.1 Civic space scores for Southern African countries and beyond in 2018

Source: CIVICUS 2018

The above figure 4.1 triangulates the preceding Table 4.3 and shows that Southern Africa is far from being an open civic space enabling full participation of ordinary citizens in nation-state building processes. Reading from the above figure's legend, a closed civic space is represented by a red color. While orange color is explaining repressed civic space. Obstructed civic space is represented by yellow color compared to light green color for narrowed civic space. As for open civic space, it is represented by green color in the figure 4.1. Between open and closed civic spaces, the monitor tracking civic space shows that Southern African countries like South Africa and Botswana have both narrowed civic spaces compared to Angola with a repressed civic space and Congo DR with a closed civic space. With reference to the above figure 4.1, majority of Southern African citizens, like other in the continent, are discriminated and facing exclusion from the nation-state building processes. There is a mistrust between elites and governed in the above indicated countries as citizens express discontentment vis-à-vis their political leaders as a result of shrinking of public sphere. This power struggle between political elites and citizens over public sphere has trigger political citizenship as an alternative avenue to claim for inclusion.

4.2.3 Political citizenship becomes an avenue of civic inclusion claims in nation-state building in Southern Africa

In this study, citizenship encompasses exclusive membership, rights and participation within a territorially bounded political community (Kabeer, 2005, Mohanty and Tandon

2006, Schattle, 2008). Political citizenship entails public responses of active citizens to the prevailing forms of governance in Southern Africa (Marshall, 1992, Dagger, 2002). The shrinking status of public sphere in most of Southern African countries forces discontent and excluded citizens to exercise political citizenship as alternative avenues of participation to demand for inclusion in the nation-state building processes. In nowadays, fields of power and landscapes of authority are being reconfigured, affecting the lives and futures of ordinary citizens nationally and globally, while simultaneously reshaping where and how these citizens engage to make their voices heard (Gaventa and Tandon, 2010). Committed to promote public participation in their continent, African elites and civil society assert through the article 11 of the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation that:

"We believe strongly that popular participation is, in essence, the empowerment of the people to effectively involve themselves in creating the structures and in designing policies and programs that serve the interests of all as well as to effectively contribute to the development process and share equitably in its benefits. Therefore, there must be an opening up of political process to accommodate freedom of opinions, tolerate differences, accept consensus on issues as well as ensure the effective participation of the people and their organizations and associations...[...]" (African charter 1990: 6).

Nevertheless, desktop review reveals that, to an exception of few, established statist mode of governance in Southern African countries did not open up to political process to accommodate freedom of opinions, tolerate differences, accept differences susceptible for a cohesive society. Thus, in order to defy or circumvent government restrictions with regard to public participation in the nation-state building, majority of Southern African citizens took step further by creating alternative spaces for public action in forms of protests, public demonstrations, advocacy and lobbying government elites. These constitute political citizenship which is exercised within citizen-led public spheres such as advocacy groups, social movements, labor unions, student movements, women movements, to name a few. These new spaces for action enable discriminated or side-lined citizens to navigate through the authoritarian terrains to raise public awareness of necessity to include ordinary citizens in nation-state building processes in Southern Africa. In this context, emphasis is put more on social movements considered as more flexible, flat, diverse, shifting, and informal in participation and membership, often

preferring to adopt non-hierarchical modes of organization and unconventional means of political engagement and can act more spontaneously (Elongué and Vandyck, 2019).

Apart from the existing conventional civil society organizations, Southern African countries have registered a new form of emerging public spheres created and driven by ordinary citizens themselves with aim to either counterforce authoritarian practices for radical change or lobby for reform. For instance, from 2012 the DRC experiences the emergence of social movements with transformative intent. As indicated above, these include the *Filimbi*, Whistle in Swahili language, the LUCHA, *Lutte pour le Changement*, "struggle for change" in French language, constituted by youth and students in their diversity throughout the country pushing for democratic change. In her words, Micheline Mwendike, one of the LUCHA militant underlines, confirms that:

"We have realized that the use of violence has failed in this country. Some armed groups had valid demands, but their methods have created others problems. In any case, we want to be part of the solution. Violence also requires a lot of resources and much human sacrifice. The DRC requires committed and robust actions, but in this moment those actions do not imply the use of violence" (Heredia, Pambazuka News, October 2014).

Some of these LUCHA activists face severe repression after claiming to fight against any attempt of third term of the incumbent President Kabila (Polet, 2016). As indicated above, other activists were killed during the January 2015 demonstration decrying a proposed reform of electoral law which attach holding of elections to general censor (BBC News 2015, HRW 2015). There was another case of the Christian movements of the Catholic church, the CLC, *Comité Laïc de Coordination* in French language, led by the Bishops Conference (CENCO), also engaging in political citizenship to demand for accountability and democratic governance in the DRC (Dorlodot, 1994, Maduku, 2016, Radio okapi, December 2017). Few demonstrations were organized in the country causing a rivalry between government and Catholic Church after attacks of place of worship by the law enforcement to quell protests (Polet, 2016). In 2011, Angola experienced the emergence of the *Movimento Revolucionário de Angola* (MRA) among others, as a result of frustrations and discontents nurtured by top-down approaches to nation-state building. MRA was modelled and inspired by the Arab spring and gathered a variety of actors, especially youth, who rally around socio-political claims, such as the resignation of the then-President Dos Santos after 36 years of reign (RFI, Jan. 2016). Triggered by the

shrinking of public spaces in Angola, MRA activists exercised their political citizenship through 15 public demonstrations between 2011 and 2012 despite severe repression from Angolan political elites (Lima, 2013). Their arrest in June 2015 by the Angolan regime has sparked mass campaign nationally and internationally demanding for their immediate release, but which only intervened late in June 2016.

As for South Africa, in 2015 discontent South African youth gathered within an ad-hoc and spontaneous activism called #Rhodes Must Fall to #Fees Must Fall movement in order to demand for decolonization of academic spaces and free education for all (DHET, 2015, Cohen, 2015, Sesant, Kekana and Gia, 2015). These youth movements are consummative examples of political citizenship triggered by inequalities and unresponsive governance. The move to get rid of offensive colonial symbols like the statue to Cecil John Rhodes at University of Cape Town has sparked youth activism followed by university campuses shutdown throughout South Africa. This youth activism demanded for transformation with regard to institutional culture and symbols, the whiteness of South African higher education and its transformation to make it more responsive to, inclusive and representative of the black population. The #Rhodes Must Fall has sparked #Fees Must Fall with demand to halt tuition fee increases and take up the government on its erstwhile promise to provide free education (Luescher and Klemenčič, 2016). After weeks of protests and demonstrations a consensus was found between the government, university governing bodies and student representative councils on 0% fee increase fee for 2016 academic year including 3 Billion Rands subsidies for public universities (Presidency, 2015).

As for Botswana, civil society seemed to suffer its freedom as number of its actions have been reportedly controlled and sponsored by the government, resulting in some of its members names being visible on state's payroll. On that note, it has been observed that political citizenship in Botswana is exercised within conventional civic spaces allowed and controlled by the state.

The above indicated examples demonstrate how shrinking of civic spaces in Southern African countries sparks political citizenship as an alternative avenue of participation in order to allow ordinary citizens to engage in the nation-state building. Hence the need for another alternative proposal to nation-state building approach that put people at the center and attend to their needs for a cohesive society.

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter 4 presented different approaches employed by some Southern African political elites in the nation-state building processes as part of an in-depth investigation to problematize the need for an alternative approach which can promote full inclusion and actions of ordinary citizens. In doing so, the researcher elaborated on both the trajectories and current state affairs of the nation-state building in post-colonial Southern Africa to conclude. On the one hand, post-colonialism and coloniality syndromes and the democratic transition era were dealt with as part of the trajectories of nation-state building in post-colonial Southern Africa. On the other hand, three themes were developed as part of current state affairs of the Southern African nation-state building using documentary study. These including, the state-centered governance was viewed as political impediment to citizen participation in nation-state building in Southern Africa; Shrinking of public sphere in Southern Africa made nation-state building processes almost an impossible mission; and Political citizenship became an avenue of civic inclusion claims in nation-state building in Southern Africa. Building on sample countries like South Africa, Botswana, Angola and DRC, it was found, through a desktop review, that Southern African region was home of consolidating democracy and autocracy at the same time. These political regimes, on their turn, influenced different types of governance practices in the same region mostly dominated by a deteriorating governance performance fueled by authoritarian practices and state-centrism. Consequently, the vacillation between consolidating democracy and autocracy has engendered narrowed, obstructed, suppressed and closed civic spaces respectively in Southern African countries. The shrinking of civic spaces has triggered political citizenship as new avenues of demanding for inclusion in the nation-state building processes in Southern African countries. In a nutshell, the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation suffers its full operationalization. The following chapter 5 discusses and analyses in a thorough manner the need for an alternative approach that promotes full participation of citizens.

5. Chapter 5: People-centered governance as political remedy to the sighing of nation in Southern Africa region

5.1. The Analysis of Status of Political Regimes and Their Impact on Public Participation in Southern Africa

This section focuses on the analysis of the political regimes in Southern Africa and the way they impact public sphere. As indicated in the preceding methodology section in chapter 1, the analysis of the status of political regimes and their impact on public participation in Southern Africa were undertaken through the qualitative analysis of the theory of change according to the DFID Evaluation Department (DFID, 2012, Vogel and Stephenson, 2012). Three tools are used in this regard notably; (i) the analysis of the context, (ii) clear hypothesis of change and (iii) assessment of the evidence, as indicated in the preceding chapter 3 (DFID, 2012, Stein and Valters, 2012, Valters 2014). To remind here, data analysis is about to identify both the problem caused by the instituted elitist approaches to nation-state building in Southern Africa and the needed changes before to map up the causal pathways. Here, the objective is to strengthen the arguments that people-centered approaches enhance full participation of ordinary citizens in the building processes of the nation-state in Southern African countries. Apart from participation as conceptualized by Morlino and Carli (2014) as mentioned in section 2.4 of chapter 2, the spectrum of public participation as per the International Association for Public Participation (2007) is used as well as tool of analysis.

The idea is to help us to understand different patterns of public participation. This entails, to assess if the proposed alternative approach to nation-state building is in line with the quality of participation as one of the democratic principles. These indicated analytical procedures and tools enabled the researcher to develop an adapted Theory of Change for nation-state building that promotes inclusion of ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes for their well-being. The newly developed Theory of Change for inclusive nation-state building is validated based on the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) as mentioned in the analytical tools section 1.7.6 of chapter 1. The UNDAF encompasses the focus; identify what is needed for change; reflect assumptions and risks; and identify partners and actors, as developed in section 5.3 ahead.

5.1.1 State-centrism determines the status of civic space in Southern Africa

It was revealed in the preceding chapter 4 that Southern African countries, here represented by Angola, Botswana, DRC and South Africa, constitute all a bastion of hybrid political regimes that on one spectrum promised to include ordinary citizens in political decision. But, at the same time, they fail to open the public sphere to ordinary citizens, on the other spectrum. These Southern African countries were criticized by many to struggle to establish a people-centered governance that promotes inclusion of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building processes. According to the BTI regime classification of 2016 and the 2016 Mo Ibrahim Index, Republic of Angola and DRC were rated autocratic, while Botswana and South Africa were consolidating democracy in relation to political regimes in the region (BTI Regime Classification, 2016, IIAG, 2016). There is evidence to demonstrate a nexus between political regimes and status of civic spaces in few countries of the region. The table 5.1 below illustrates the link.

Table 5.1 Linking political regime to status of civic space in the region (2007 to 2017)

A1. SADC Sample Countries	B1. Political Regime	C1. Civic space status
A2. South Africa	Consolidating Democracy	Narrowed
A3. Botswana	Consolidating Democracy	Narrowed
A4. Angola	Autocracy	Repressed
A5. DRC	Autocracy	Closed

Source: Author, adapted from the BTI 2016, IIAG 2016, CIVICUS 2018

The Table 5.1 is comprised by three columns namely; A1, B1, and C1. The Column A1 outlines SADC sample countries under study, like South Africa (A2), Botswana (A3), Angola (A4) and DRC (A5). B1 column describes the type of political regimes in Southern Africa which range from consolidating democracy to autocracy. Civic space status in the region is highlighted in column C1. It ranges from closed, repressed and narrowed. The Table 5.1 demonstrates how a link can be established between a political regime and a status of civic space. As indicated in preceding chapter 4, Marshal et al.

(2014) and Isakhan (2012) confirm that any claim to democracy ought to be underpinned by a citizen body who are invested with the full rights and responsibilities of citizenship; who are governed by a set of laws or norms that both protect their citizenship and hold to account those in power; and that these same citizens are actively encouraged to contest, cooperate and participate in political life. In other words, civic space status is determined by the quality of political regime in a country and subsequently at the regional level.

Firstly, consolidating democracy regimes in South Africa (A1) and Botswana (A2), respectively, create a narrowed public sphere as demonstrated also in Fig 4.1 in the preceding chapter 4 by the CIVICUS's monitor tracking civic space (CIVICUS, 2018). That is, ordinary citizens find their rights to participate in the decision-making processes diminished by political elites. Consultation has taken over active participation and voice of ordinary citizens. Secondly, the Table 5.1 shows that autocratic regimes perceived in Angola (A3) and (A4) generate repressed and closed public sphere in their respective countries. Here, most of ordinary citizens are excluded from the decision-making processes pertaining to nation-state building which is most of the time to state-driven and elitist. Autocracy regime is based on the selfish interest of a group of political elites on detriment of ordinary citizens, who are side-lined, in most cases, from the public affairs. Political elites rule in opposition to their commitment to open up to popular support and full participation of the vast majority of the people as per the 1990 African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, in its article 11 (African Charter, 1990:4) as mentioned in the preceding section 4.3.2 of chapter 4. Against this backdrop, there a way to underline that instituted state-centered governance in Southern Africa is deemed to be a political impediment to full participation of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building processes.

5.1.2. Shrinking civic spaces engender exclusion and discontentment of the nation in Southern Africa

Through a desktop review, it was revealed that political regimes in the SADC countries did not only determine the nature of public sphere, but also affect the way ordinary citizens were included or not in the nation-state building processes. The below Table 5.2 highlights the linkage between political regimes, civic spaces and level of public inclusion and satisfaction in participation of citizens in nation-state building processes.

Table 5.2 Linking political regimes to civic space status and public inclusion and satisfaction (2007-2017)

A1. SADC Sample Countries	B1. Political Regime	C1. Civic space status	D1. Public inclusion and satisfaction
A2. South Africa	Consolidating Democracy	Narrowed	Partly excluded and partly unsatisfied nation
A3. Botswana	Consolidating Democracy	Narrowed	Partly exclusion and partly unsatisfied nation
A4. Angola	Autocracy	Repressed	Fully excluded and very unsatisfied nation
A5. DRC	Autocracy	Closed	Fully excluded and very unsatisfied nation

Source: Author, adapted from the BTI 2016, IIAG 2016, CIVICUS 2018

The Table 5.2 is composed by four columns notably; A1, B1, C1 and D1. The column A1 presents SADC countries under study, South Africa, Botswana, Angola and DRC. Political regimes are indicated in column B1. They range from consolidating democracy to autocracy. As for column C1, it outlines the status of civic space status within the countries under study. The column D1 displays the level of public inclusion and satisfaction in line with active participation in nation-state building processes. It variegates between partly excluded and partly unsatisfied nation and fully excluded and very unsatisfied. The Table 5.2 complements the preceding Table 5.1 on linkage between political regime and civic space status. That is, established political regimes in Southern Africa have caused a shrinking of civic sphere in the region. Subsequently, the type of civic sphere generated by political regimes has dictated different levels of citizens' inclusion and satisfaction with regard to nation-state building. For example, the quadrant A2D1 shows how the consolidating democracy (B1) has partly excluded majority of the citizens within a narrowed civic space in C1. Here, people participate in form of consultation, observation and only few may have voices and claim to representative of

the majority, sometimes, without a legit mandate. Misrepresentation of general citizenry has replaced active participation in nation-building processes. This has triggered some tension of conflicts among marginalized citizens and mistrust of political leaders deemed as unresponsive. Consequently, ordinary citizens become partly unsatisfied with the established state-centered approach to nation-state building processes and resolved to seek for alternative avenue to claim their inclusion in the decision-making processes. The above corroborate what was sparked in 2015 within the #RhodesMustFall ad-hoc movement followed by #FeesMustFall driven by outraged South African youth who demanded to halt tuition fee increases and took up political elites on their erstwhile promises to provide free education (Cohen 2015, Luescher and Klemenčič, 2016). As for quadrant A5D1, it demonstrates how autocratic regime in DRC (A5) triggered a closed civic space (C1) that subsequently fully excluded ordinary citizens from the decision-making processes and engendered national dissatisfaction sentiment. Due to a closed public sphere in the DRC between 2007 to 2017, ordinary citizens saw their human rights such as rights to participate in the well-being of their society, being abused by autocratic system of governance instituted by political elites.

Given these autocratic practices, ordinary citizens become very unsatisfied by the level of exclusion in political affairs implemented by political elites to the detriment of the nation. As indicated in preceding chapters 2 and 4, there was a need to for an alternative approach that enables full participation of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building. At the same time, oppressed citizens creates new spaces of participation to claim their full inclusion in the decision-making processes in state affairs. To illustrate, as indicated in the preceding chapter 4, from 2012 the DRC has experienced an emergence of social movements and civil organizations with transformative intent. These including, the Filimbi, LUCHA, CLC, CENCO, to name a few, as a new avenue to claim for inclusion suffocated by instituted authoritarian practices in the DRC for decades (Dorlodot, 1994, Maduku, 2016, Radio okapi December, 2017). Against this backdrop, this entails that shrinking of public sphere in Southern Africa had made nation-state building processes almost an impossible mission. Consequently, political citizenship has become an avenue of civic inclusion claims in nation-state building in the region.

5.2 Evaluating the State-centered Nation-State Building in Southern Africa through the DFID Theory of Change Model

The section assesses the top-down mode of governance in nation-state building in Southern Africa in order to consider an alternative approach that promotes full participation of ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes. In doing so, the thesis employs the DFID Theory of Change evaluation model as indicated in preceding chapter 3 (Vogel and Stephenson, 2012). Here, the idea is to unpack the context in which nation-state was being built in Southern Africa in order to understand what pushed for hypothesis of change formulation after the evidence assessment.

5.2.1 The analysis of the context

The idea is to ensure if the ToC makes sense as response to analysis of the context, the problem and the changes needed. Through a desktop review, it was found that, since the 1990s, nation-state in Southern Africa has been built within a state-centered mode of governance. More than that, there are evidences demonstrating that perceived hybrid political regimes have generated a political context that did allow ordinary citizens to fully participate in political decisions to build nation-state. On the contrary, ordinary citizens were marginalized and side-lined to the fringe of nation-state building processes. Political elites and their allies have been core drivers and at the same time principal beneficiaries of instituted discriminatory politics of reconstruction since the 1990s. The preceding lines in section 5.2 discuss how despite the consolidating democracy in Botswana and South Africa (BTI, 2016, IIAG, 2016), their respective government institutions failed to institute an open public sphere that promote full involvement of ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes for their socio-economic well-being. Instead, the civic spaces in both countries are narrowed and level of public participation is partly excluded. Thus, citizens are partly unsatisfied as their rights to participate in public affairs are sometimes limited by those who have the means of political power. In addition to the narrowed civic spaces, there are repressed and closed public spheres in Angola and DRC respectively fueled by their autocratic regimes as per the BTI (2016) and IIAG (2016) rating. The context in which nation-state building is undertaken is more complicated than the one of Botswana and South Africa. Here, there is a complete shrinking of civic spaces and consequently, ordinary citizens were reportedly to be fully excluded and therefore very with level of participation. Political citizenship become an

avenue for discontent citizens to claim their inclusion in the nation-state building. In a nutshell, the context in which nation-state has being built does not encourage mutual trust and collaboration between state and nation. So, change was needed.

5.2.2   *Clear hypothesis of change*

As indicated in the preceding chapter 3, it is about to ensure if the assumptions made are explicit. Same applied to the causal links, implementation, context and external factors. With reference to the above analyzed context, it is clear to understand that the state-centered governance has failed to promote active participation of ordinary citizens in the decision-making in Southern Africa. Instead, it has marginalized the majority of citizens and created mistrust between state and nation. As demonstrated in preceding section 5.2, there are causal links between the instituted political regimes that implemented a top-down form of governance. The latter causes the shrinking of public sphere undermining full participation of ordinary citizens. These shrinking of civic spaces has generated exclusion and dissatisfaction of ordinary citizens to be part of nation-state building. This exclusion has led to political citizenship to political elites by claiming their inclusion in the decision-making processes. Political unrests emerged out of the resistance and mistrust between state and nation. Development become a nightmare to the majority of citizens in contestation with state and its allies. Given the causal pathways that epitomize the context in which nation-state building processes are undertaken, there was need to visualize for change through an alternative system of governance able to foster full involvement of ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes. Against this backdrop, there a way to hypothesize that "people-centered governance is viewed as a promising alternative approach that promotes inclusion of ordinary citizens in the decision-making pertaining to nation-state building in Southern Africa". The preceding analysis and lines ahead constitute tangible evidences to support the arguments why people-centered governance is viewed, in this thesis, as an alternative approach that is able to promote active participation of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building processes in Southern Africa.

5.2.3   *Assessment of the evidence*

It is about a narrative assessment of the evidence for the above hypothesis. There is a plethora of evidences demonstrating how state-centered governance is not a suitable approach to reconcile the state to its nation in Southern Africa with regard to foster public

participation in the nation-state building processes for socio-economic well-being of ordinary citizens. In order to challenge what the BTI (2016) and IIAG (2016) rate as autocratic regimes in Angola and DRC, ordinary citizens of these countries exercised political citizenship to claim for their inclusion and demand for established democratic principles. For example, as mentioned in the preceding chapter 4, In January 2015 the DRC government has cracked down demonstration of activists, such as LUCHA, Filimbi and others, who contested against an attempt deliberate delay of the 2016 general elections by conditioning it to the general censor in order to keep long the then President Joseph Kabila on power (BBC News, 2015, Polet, 2016). Human rights were reportedly abused by cutting off the internet, followed by restriction of freedom of association and expression (HRW, 2015). More than that, in 2011, activists within the MIRA in Angola demonstrated against the Luanda leadership as a result of frustrations and discontents nurtured by top-down approaches to nation-state building (Lima, 2013). MRA, especially composed by youth, demanded for socio-economic rights and resignation of the then-President Dos Santos after 36 years of reign (RFI, Jan. 2016). Despite its consolidating democracy regime, Botswana was criticized by many to exclude the Basarwa or San communities from nation-state building decisions (Nthomang and Monaka, 2006, Knoetze and Hambira, 2018). After assessing the evidences on shortcomings of political regimes in few countries in Southern Africa, it is clear to argue that established state-centered governance system did not help state to reconcile to its nation by excluding and marginalizing the majority of ordinary citizens from nation-state building processes in the region. On that note, people-centered governance becomes as an alternative.

5.3 Prospects for Alternative Approach to Nation-state Building in the Southern Africa

Given the above analyzed shortcomings presented by the instituted state-centered governance in the Southern Africa, there is a way to believe that people-centered governance has become an alternative for a successful nation-state building. Despite the end of colonialism and call for democratization since the 1990s, literature demonstrates that most of the Southern African countries have failed to establish viable democratic institutions capable to truly unite state to its nation for the well-being of the general citizenry. Practically, these Southern African country under study, Angola, Botswana, DRC and South Africa, were respectively reproached to not fully allow their citizens to actively participate in the decision-making processes pertaining to nation-state building.

Instead, they established some glimpses of democracy through baized elections, perceived by many to be fraudulent and chaotic, supported by tailored constitutions at the service of a club of political elites but at the detriment of the majority of citizens. These corroborate what preceding chapters 2 and 4 mentioned that Southern Africa is hub of hybrid political regimes as rated by the BTI (2016) and IIAG (2016) characterized by consolidating democracy and autocracy, at the same time. These were epitomized by some autocratic practices in few countries, especially in DRC and Angola, marginalizing the majority of the population in the building processes of the nation-states through oppressive tactics and military democracy. More than that, It has been found that the region is characterized by three patterns of civic space status, such as narrowed, repressed and closed (CIVICUS, 2018), which together do not fully allow ordinary citizens to actively participate in the nation-state building processes as per democratic principles promoted by Marshal et al. (2014), Isakhan (2012) and Morlino and Carli (2014).

These narrowed, repressed and closed public spheres did not promote a harmonized and good relationship between political elites and ordinary citizens. Instead, they widen the existing inequalities among marginalized citizens, qualified to be one of the sources of violent conflicts, and plunged state and citizens into recurring conflict as fallout of mistrust for unresponsive political elites and loss of popular legitimacy. Recurring conflicts generates political unrests and mushroom of armed groups and self-defense militias. The demise of the state is established epitomized by an deliberate abandon of development projects, if there was one, and focusing more on securitization of the political power, like it was the case in DRC during the end of President Kabila's second and last constitutional term in the office (Radio okapi December, 2017, Polet, 2016). These corroborate what Frantzich (2008) underlines that nepotistic elites. Mostly in Africa, are engaged into manipulation of public institutions with aim to protect their selfish interests. Consequently, majority of citizens is side-lined and discriminated using ethnicity divide. Here, socio-political claims characterized political citizenship of ordinary citizens to counterforce political elites perceived autocratic governance system for their emancipation and demand for inclusion into nation-state building processes.

Against this backdrop, there is a need to rethink for an alternative mode of governance in Southern Africa that can promote full participation of ordinary citizens in the nation-building processes in order to transform them into active agent, owner of their well-being being and mostly self-reliant (De Beer, 2012). Thus, people-centered governance, in this

regard, has gained more appeal as a suitable alternative approach that can reconcile state to its nation through a democratic avenues of collaboration that permit ordinary citizens to have access to at the table of political decisions aiming at building nation-state. As indicated in the preceding chapter 2, Morlino and Carli (2014) underlines that participation of ordinary citizens encompassing opportunities for participation, election turnout, party membership, social participation, non-institutional political participation and illegal political participation. By opportunities for participation, people-centered governance tolerates political pluralism and participation of diversified type of citizens. Discrimination and marginalization on the profit a small group minority is not promoted. All citizens are given equal chance to politically participate. Election turnout is one of the keys of political stability required in a successful; nation-state building. Participating into elections is not sufficient unless there a transparency from ballot compilation to the results announcements. That is, elections turn should reflect the aspirations of the voters which should also be accepted by the majority of citizens, given the transparency during the entire processes.

People-centered governance encourages party membership and associational membership for all ordinary citizens. The latter are free to associate themselves with who they want in respect of the constitutional principles of their respective country. This implies, this alternative mode of governance does not consent any infringement of these rights of association which were abused in top-down approach. Many conflicts can be averted by promoting such mode of participation for diverse voices useful in the building processes of nation-state in Southern Africa. Non-institutional and illegal political participation are also needed to demand for democracy or human rights in case of any abuses or confiscation of political decisions to build nation-state in a particular sector such as, as indicated in preceded chapter 4, the case of MIRA in Angola, LUCHA in the DRC, #FeesMustFall in South Africa. Through this informal participation, marginalized ordinary citizens are able to create new avenues of participation where political regimes may attempt to shrink civic spaces, like the case of top-down mode of governance.

Additionally, people-centered governance enables citizens involvement in the nation-state building in accordance with a continuum of participation such as inform the public, listen to the public, engage in problem solving and develop arguments as devised by the International Association for Public Participation Spectrum (IAP2) (2013). As Nabatchi and Leighninger (2015) confirm that participation enables citizens to advance interests;

result in a consensual communitarian interest; develop an understanding of policy issues, enable the expression of individual political identity. In this regard, compared to the existing top-down mode of governance, there are enough evidences that support the choice of people-centered governance as alternative approach to nation-state building that promote full inclusion of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building processes in Southern Africa.

5.4 A Proposed theory of change for People-centered governance to nation-state building in Southern Africa

This section attempts to develop a theory of change on people-centered governance for nation-state building in Southern Africa. For the study at hand, the researcher borrows the UNDAF model of theory of change as it fits in a broader scope of promotion of participatory democracy and human rights for all and, at the same time, abides to the principle of "no one shall be left behind". This UNDAF model comprises the following key steps: (i) the focus; (ii) identification of what is needed for the change to happen; (iii) Assumptions and risks; (iv) identification of partners and actors (UNDAF, 2017).

5.4.1 Focus

As indicated in preceding chapter 3, the focus step encompasses the high-level desired change. In this regard, the focus implies to move from state-centered approaches that exclude ordinary citizens from nation-state building processes deemed as trigger of political unrest in Southern Africa. The intent is SADC member states should, at the domestic level, contribute to the operationalization of the article 23 of the Treaty promoting public participation in the decision-making processes.

5.4.2 Identify what is needed

According to the UNDAF model, identification of what is needed for change to happen is informed by the tree of problems and other evidences, and how partners are going to contribute to that change. Here, there is a number of factors that are paramount important as determinants of the desired change. These including, moving from autocratic to democratic regimes within member states, shifting from top-down to bottom-up approaches to nation-state building, shifting from shrinking to open civic spaces, enjoyment of human rights across all countries, abide to the democratic principle of

leaving no one behind, fostering gender equality and friendly ecosystem. Additionally, there is need to identify the immediate/underlying and structural root causes of abject poverty, inequalities and discrimination, recurring political unrest. At a transnational level, there is a need for compliance with the AU and UN norms and standards fostering public participation in nation-state building through a people-centered governance.

5.4.3 Establish Assumptions and Risks

This step is about to reflect assumptions on how change happen and risks attached to the process. It is about what leads to what, and how? Identifying why solutions are key drivers of change in a given context, and factors that may influence these factors (UNDAF, 2017).

In this context, firstly, democratic regimes create a peaceful political landscape whereby human rights and human security are promoted, therefore leads to reconciliation between state and nation. These democratic landscape engineers mode of governance centered around the aspiration of ordinary citizens. Consequently, mutual trust among citizens and between nation and state is established through constant collaboration and cooperation on political decisions to build nation-state. Secondly, instauration of bottom approaches encourages inclusion of ordinary citizens into nation-state building processes. Open civic spaces foster public participation and enable ordinary citizens to become active agents, self-reliant and owners of political decisions affecting their lives on daily basis. That is, people-centered governance to nation-state building   promotes political stability needed for the national development.

The democratic landscape is also nurtured by compliance to the AU and UN norms and standards on public participation. However, international influence for change can be risk to national sovereignty if there are not strong institutions at the national level. Donor-driven change can be a risk for political stability by imposing a democratic system without taking into account realities on the ground in Southern Africa. There is no one size fits all to democracy. It can be a risk if myopically applied without consent of all actors and partners for change. Lastly, excessive and uncontrolled enjoyment of human rights across the society is a risk for public order and tolerance.

5.4.4 Identify partners and key actors

It is about identifying partners and actors who will be most relevant for achieving each result, taking into account the related risks and assumptions (UNDAF, 2017). To identify specific members able to work on different results based on their mandate, capacity and

available resources. In this context, partners and actors include, political elites, ordinary citizens, local civil society organizations, research institutions, member states, international organizations, SADC and other RECs, AU, EU, UN, etc. These actors and partners should work in collaboration at their different capacity in order to end the exclusion of ordinary citizens from nation-state building for reconciliation between the state and the nation. The Table 5. 3 illustrate the Theory of Change for people-centered governance to nation-state building in Southern Africa.

Table 5. 3 Theory of Change for people-centered governance to nation-state building in Southern Africa

Source: Author, adapted from UNDAF (2017)

The above proposed Theory of Change in Table 5.3 demonstrates how the people-centered governance is a promising approach that enhances full engagement of active and self-reliant ordinary citizens who own political decisions that build nation-state in Southern Africa.

5.5 Conclusion

The chapter 5 focused on the analysis of the registered inadequacies of the elitist and top-down approaches to nation-state building outlined in the preceding chapter 4. That is, this chapter 5 presented the strength of arguments that people-centered governance constitutes an alternative to state-centered as it promotes inclusion and voices of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building processes in Southern African countries. Emphasis was on discussion how ordinary citizens in Southern Africa needed people-centered governance as a promising approach in order to be active agent, self-reliant and owner of their nation-state building processes.

In order to understand the above, the chapter started with a thorough analysis of the kind of political regimes and their implications on the public participation in nation-state building processes in SADC region. The chapter argued that Southern Africa region is a home of hybrid regimes, epitomized by consolidating democracy and autocracy. It was found that state-centrism determines the status of civic space in Southern Africa. The latter shapes the status of public sphere, oscillate between narrowed, repressed and closed. And, the shrinking civic spaces engender exclusion and discontentment of the nation in Southern Africa. Ordinary citizens manifest their discontentment through political citizenship exercise in order to claim inclusion and voices in the nation-state building processes.

Additionally, the chapter 5 evaluated the State-centered nation-state building in Southern Africa through the DFID Theory of Change model. That is, the evaluation was conducted through the analysis of the context, clear hypothesis of change and assessment of the evidence. Moreover, the prospects for alternative approach to nation-state building in the Southern Africa whereby the strength of arguments was given to demonstrate the how people-centered governance constitutes an alternative that promotes full participation of ordinary citizens in nation-state building processes. Lastly, based on the UNDAF model of ToC, the chapter has proposed a new Theory of Change for people-governance to nation-state building in order to confirm the hypothesis of the thesis. Elitist or top-down approaches have shown their limits to include ordinary citizens in the nation-state building, consequently people-centered governance constitutes an alternative. The following Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.

6. Chapter 6. Conclusion: Towards a people-centered governance as a promising approach to nation-state building in Southern Africa

As it was alluded to at the introduction, this chapter 6 summarizes the thesis with regard to the need of an alternative approach to nation-state building processes in Southern African countries. At the same time, the chapter opens new avenues for further research in line with alternative approaches to nation-state building that promote inclusion of ordinary citizens. There was a general idea that state-centered approaches to nation-state building exclude majority of population from political decisions. After a thorough examination of the existing approach there was a need to rethink the way nation-state should be built through alternative approach which is people-centered governance. Some suggestions and recommendations were given to Southern African political elites, policy makers and ordinary citizens in order to foster a cohesive society built on a reconciled nation-state.

The realization that after six decades of independence and almost three decades of democratization the process of nation-state building in most post-independent states in Africa in general and in Southern Africa in particular, still continues to be criticized by a latent failure to include the majority of ordinary citizens in various political decisions, was the main motivation behind the study. Constrained by the evident lack of significant progress in the nation-state building process, including the negative consequences (conflicts, war, economic stagnation…) thereof, the researcher not only endeavored to identify the underlying and immediate factors behind prevailing sad reality, but also identify alternative approaches that can help African in general and Sothern Africa in particular, to overcome the existing conflict between the nation and the state. Indeed, various causes, including implementation of ineffective governance approaches such as state-centered, giving precedence to the ruling elites and its clients, were attributed to the indicated failure. The tendency of state-centered approach to give precedence of the interest of the elites and their proxies over those of the vast majority of ordinary citizens, makes the state the sovereign over the nation from which the power naturally emanates. This in turn constitutes an eminent source of social conflict. Therefore the study presents an alternative approach to nation-state building process, placing the citizens at the center of everything. This people-centered approach to nation-state building process is a visionary concept capable to promote the necessary reconciliation between the state and

its nation, because in this case, the process is driven by a symbiosis of state and ordinary citizens with people's aspirations at the center of the entire process. People-centered approaches to nation-state building promotes, through an effective and systematic public participation in the decision-making processes, a strong and cohesive society driven by mutual collaboration between state and its citizens.

Thus, by exploring prevailing reality in the Southern African region between 1990 and 2016, the study demonstrated that most of the political choices in the region in this period were guided by the hybrid mode of governance employed by the governments of its member states ranging from autocracy to consolidating democracy, making the participation of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building still very problematic. Without any controversy, the general observation is that the elitist approaches employed by Southern African countries in post-independent era did not fully promote inclusion of ordinary citizens as one of ingredients of socio-economic rights, but in contrary, continue to exclude and marginalize ordinary citizens in the building process of the nation-state. This despite some remarkable developments in countries like Botswana and South Africa. Based on this observation, the study invites us to rethinking about the nation-state building process as an imperative to the elites use of state-centered approaches to nation-state building which did not fully reconcile state to its nation, but plunges the nation into a sighing mode as a result of the exclusion of ordinary citizens in the decision-making that concern their socio-economic well-being.

The critical analysis of the conventional and unconventional approaches to nation-state building from existing literature, namely the conventional and people-centered approaches to nation-state building respectively, people-centered governance in the nation-state building debates, as well as contextualization of nation-state building from Southern African experience and beyond, allowed the researcher to realize that attempts have been made by democratic governance scholars have demonstrated that the implication of ordinary citizens in the processes of building of nation-state allows ordinary citizens to be not only important, but also independent, active agents in the development of their nation-state. At the core of this observation is a proposal to move beyond the top-down paradigms dominating the research field of nation-state building and, above all, understanding the importance of ordinary citizens as key builders, with same rights as states, in the nation-state building processes. The study is essentially a challenge to the prevailing status quo characterized by the hegemony of the elite in its

interactions with the masses. It uses the Theory of Change as its theoretical framework, because it proposes a shift from state-centered to people-centered approach in the process of nation-state building under the argument that the later, as a catalyst factor toward involvement of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building process, guides the entire process towards meeting the general aspiration for a cohesive society.

However, this general aspiration is in full contrast with the clearly dysfunctional, insecure and fragile characteristic presented by the prototype of post-colonial Southern African countries after six decades of independence, as a result of the inadequate employed approaches or self-centered approaches insistently followed and or implemented by ruling elites, characterized by what can be considered as a "wise" resistance to fully and consistently implement democratic values in their countries. Ruling elites seem to, intentionally, confuse the carrying out of regular elections with a plain democratization process. Like in most of the continent, Southern African countries continue to vacillate between an axis of undemocratic governance and revolve around a vicious cycle of war and conflict that breed underdevelopment, environmental degradation, poverty and disease. The study also found that state-centrism that determines the status of civic space in Southern Africa, also shapes the status of public sphere, oscillate between narrowed, repressed and closed. It also did found out that the shrinking of the civic spaces engender exclusion and discontentment of the nation in Southern Africa, leading ordinary citizens to constantly manifest their discontentment and engage in political citizenship exercise in order to claim inclusion and voice in the nation-state building processes.

The need for an alternative approach to the existing reality characterized by a dominant state-centrist approach to nation building process, prompted the researcher to endeavor in order to explore the strength of arguments that people-centered governance promotes and enhances full engagement of active and self-reliant ordinary citizens in the process, thus making them owners of political decisions related to the nation-state building in Southern African countries. This made the study of instituted political regimes and their impact on public participation into nation-state building in the SADC paramount. The result was the sad observation that, despite all efforts towards the consolidation of the democratic dispensation, including the carrying of regular elections in the region, Southern Africa still remains a home of hybrid regimes which makes the status of civic spaces to oscillate between narrowed and closed civic spaces. Consequently, the oppressive posture assumed by ruling elites has triggered political citizenship. This sort of popular awareness was

viewed as an alternative avenue for the inclusion of claims currently denied by elitist regimes.

This fact reveals not only the legitimate aspirations of the nation to keep a fair and sound relationship with the state, being the citizens the main actor of this relationship, but also the resolve by ordinary citizens to fight for their basic human rights. Therefore, the researcher strongly belief that ruling elites have other choice than to embark urgently into a process of deep structural change capable to adjust their policy making system towards meeting the aspirations of ordinary citizens, of which free participation in the management of the society, including the nation-state building, is of a paramount importance. In other words, it is imperative that, by using the suggestions offered by the Theory of Change sufficiently explored in the previous chapters to this study, political elites in the region consider people-centered governance as a political remedy to discontent nation within the nation-state building processes. By doing so, nation-state build process in Southern Africa will start following the right track of building equitable societies with stakeholders fully informed and willing to allow the state to perform the core reason of its existence that is to serve the nation. Hence the suggestion of a new Theory of Change as a means to promote people-centered governance, as a promising alternative approach that encourages active participation of ordinary citizens in the nation-state building processes in Southern Africa.

The extensive and exhaustive analysis of relevant data from conventional and unconventional approaches to nation-state building from different schools of thought in contemporary politics allowed the researcher to unpack limitations of state-centered approach to nation-state building and conclude that the importance of a people-centered approach to nation-state building reside in the fact that it allows for an inclusive participation of ordinary citizens in the process, makes them important, independent, sovereign and actives agents in the management of the society. Contrary to statist approaches that are driven by aspirations of states and their allies, viewed as sole actors in nation-state building, and as such, a source of constant social conflict in the region. Indeed, the exclusion and discrimination of ordinary citizens have triggered popular discontent and subsequently loss of the popular legitimacy useful for nation-state reconciliation.

Such reconciliation can be perfectly attained if political elites embrace the support offered by the Theory of Change, a core theoretical lens offering sound perspectives capable to

promote the necessary shift from state-centered to people centered nation-building. Indeed, as we rethink the nation-state building process in Southern African countries in order to create an effective avenue for the inclusion of ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes, as a means to edify coherent and stable societies, it become paramount for us to do everything in our capacity, to avoid the mistakes that followed the independence of most African Countries characterized by an abrupt transformation of former liberators into new oppressors. The post-independence Africa is, unfortunately, marked by innumerable examples of conflict, bloodshed, horrible wars, genocide and horrible developments, as a result of the tendency by few members of the political elite and their clients, to call to their responsibility the destiny of the vast majority of their countries.

To promote a sustainable shift from state-centered nation-state building to people-centered nation-state building, the Theory of Change, as an alternative approach for an inclusive and cohesive society, presented valuable theoretical perspectives linking the state to its nation through a debate on nation-building and state-building respectively. I*t unpacked the notion of the concept and demonstrated how suitable it was to the current study through its four levels such as inputs, outputs, outcomes and desired goals, before elaborating on how to build a Theory of Change based on proposed steps by different scholars and institutions.* The Theory of Change for people-governance to nation-state building is proposed to confirm the hypothesis of the thesis, based on the observation that Elitist or top-down approaches have shown their limits to include ordinary citizens in the nation-state building process. Alternatively, people-centered governance was presented as an alternative in a region characterized by different reactions, by political elites, to post-colonialism and coloniality syndromes and the democratic transition.

The study also observed that Southern Africa is marked by three specific patterns, namely the establishment of the state-centered governance, viewed as political impediment to citizen participation in nation-state building in Southern Africa; Shrinking of public sphere in Southern Africa, making nation-state building processes almost an impossible task; and Political citizenship became an avenue of civic inclusion claims in nation-state building in Southern Africa. Building on sample countries like Angola, , Botswana, RDC and South Africa, the study found, through a desktop review, that Southern African region was home of consolidating democracy and autocracy at the same time. These political regimes, on their turn, influenced different types of governance practices in the same

region mostly dominated by a deteriorating governance performance fueled by authoritarian practices and state-centrism. Consequently, the vacillation between consolidating democracy and autocracy has engendered narrowed, obstructed, suppressed and closed civic spaces respectively in Southern African countries. Consequently, the shrinking of civic spaces has triggered political citizenship as new avenues of demanding for inclusion in the nation-state building processes in Southern African countries.

In this regard, the need for a rethinking on the nation-state building process in Southern Africa anchored on the Theory of Change more than urgent, because the public participation in the entire process allows for an inclusive and stable society, because of its peculiarity to give a voice to ordinary citizens. As it has alluded to previously, when ordinary citizens fully participate in the decision making process, they will be more willing to follow those decisions and to pay the price thereof. Therefore, any decision, good or bad, taken without considering the inclusion of ordinary citizens in entire process is susceptible to face strong resistance from the population. This is because, naturally, citizens like to be treated like adults as far as the management of the society is concerned.

Therefore, it is more than time for the political actors in Southern Africa to understand the need for an urgent change in their approach to nation-state building by promoting a consistent shift from state-centered to people-centered approach. In doing so, they will be expressing their respect and consideration towards the citizens of their countries, and show them that they are indeed active agents, self-reliant and owners of their nation-state building processes. Consequently, they will be honoring the efforts and the memory of many Africans who have dedicated much of their lives in the fight for the independence of Africa. Southern African citizens, without any distinction, need and desire to enjoy the gain of the independence of their countries and will continue fighting to achieve this legitimate aspiration. Therefore, political elites are invited to embark on a soft and stable transition from state-centered to people-centered approach to nation-state building. And the Theory of Change offers us an efficient avenue.

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